HANDUOUiND
AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF
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/ ^ /^
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
FOUNDED BY JAAIES I.OEB, I-I^.D.
EDITED BY
T. E. PAGE, C.H., MTT.D.
C/. VPS, PH.D., LL.». W H. D. ROUSE, LITT.D.
ARISTOTLE
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION
THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS
ON VIRTUES AND VICES
AKISTOTLE
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION
THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS
ON VIRTUES AND VICES
WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
H. RACKHAM, MA.
FELLOW AND LECTURER OF CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
fc^3
3fc
LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHLSE'lTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
MCMXXXV
CONTENTS
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION
Introduction ....
Outline of Contents
Text and Translation
Index .....
2
6
8
183
THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS :
Introduction ....
. 190
Text and Translation :
Book I
198
Book II
234
Book III
. 308
Book VII
358
BookVIII
450
Index . . . . . .
479
ON VIRTUES AND VICES :
Introduction ....
484
Text and Translation
488
Index .....
. 505
ARISTOTLE
THE ATHENIAN
CONSTITUTION
INTRODUCTION
The Po lit EI a I
The place of the Athenian Constitution in the encyclo-
pedia of Aristotle's writings is known to us from
the concluding paragraph of the Nicomachean Ethics.
That work forms the first volume of a treatise on
the welfare of man as a social being, of which the
Politics forms the second volume ; and at the end
of the former {N.E. x. ix. 21 , 23) a prefatory outline
of the latter is given, in which occur the phrases ' the
collections of constitutions,' ' the collected con-
stitutions ' ; it is stated that on these will be based
that division of the Politics (i.e. Books III.-VI.) which
will deal with the stability of states in general and
of the various special forms of constitution, and with
the causes of good and bad government.
These treatises are said in ancient lists of Aristotle's
writings to have been a hundred and fifty-eight in
number. Each no doubt consisted, like the volume
before us, of a constitutional history of the state in
question followed by a description of its constitution
at the time of writing. They are frequently spoken
of as the work of Aristotle, but he may well have
employed the aid of pupils in their compilation.
They were not preserved through the Middle Ages
in the Aristotelian Corpus, and until fifty years ago
2
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION
were only known to modern students from numerous
references and quotations in later writers.
The Athenian Constitution: MSS.
But in 1880 two small and much damaged sheets
of papyrus were found in the sands of Egypt which
scholars eventually proved to come from a copy of
the most important of all these constitutional
treatises, the one on the Constitution of Athens.
These sheets are now in the Berlin Museum. Palaeo-
graphers ascribe them to the fourth century a.d.
Ten years later, among some papyrus rolls acquired
from Egypt by the British Museum, the Librarian
F. G. Kenyon recognized four sheets as containing
a copy of almost the whole treatise. These sheets
have writing on both sides. On the front are some
accounts of receipts and expenses kept by a farm
bailiif named Didymus for his master Epimachus,
near the Egyptian town of Hermopolis, in the tenth
and eleventh years of Vespasian, a.d. 78 and 79- On
the back is the Aristotelian treatise ; its beginning
is wanting, and the first page of the book is blank,
showing that it was copied from a damaged copy of
the work ; and the last roll is very fragmentary.
Different parts are written in different hands, four
in all ; the script is said to date the copy at about
A.D. 100. It was doubtless made for a private person
(perhaps the writer of one of the four hands), and
probably buried with its owner at his death.
Editions
In 1891 Sir Frederick Kenyon published a facsimile
of the papyrus, and a printed edition of the text with
ARISTOTLE
an introduction and notes. In 1893 a revised text
with a full and valuable commentary was put out
by Sandys. Kenyon prepared an edition for the
Royal Academy of Berlin, published in 1903, in which
he included the fragments of the fourth roll con-
jecturally arranged in a consecutive text ; and his
latest edition was published at Oxford in 1920. Of
several published abroad, the latest is the Teubner
text of 1928 by Oppermann, based on the previous
editions of Blass and Thalheim.
Text
The text of the present edition is based on the
editio princeps of Kenyon, but it has been corrected
by later scholars' readings of the papyrus. A few
critical notes and suggested emendations are ap-
pended ; but in regard to inaccuracies of grammar
and arithmetic, trifling inelegancies of phrase (e.g.
T0v8e τρόπον, for which most editors substitute rovOe
τον τρόπον), exactly how many are due to a copyist's
carelessness and how many are to be saddled on the
author, no two scholars will agree. To the papyrus
text have here been prefixed and appended the
principal passages from the lost beginning and end
of the treatise that the learned industry of scholars
has gleaned from the quotations of later Greek
authors.
Dates of Composition
The latest event mentioned in the Athenian
Constitution (liv. 7) is the archonship of Cephisophon,
329 B.C. The book also mentions (xlvi. 1) triremes
4
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION
and quadriremes, but not quinquiremes ; and the
earliest date at which quinquiremes in the Athenian
navy are recorded is 325 B.C. The treatise can thus
be dated between 328 and 325 B.C. Moreover it
speaks (Ixii. 16) of officials still being sent to Samos,
and Samos ceased to be under the control of Athens
in the autumn of 322 B.C., the year of Aristotle's
death.
OUTLINE OF CONTENTS
Part I, Constitutional History of Athens to 403 b.c.
(1) FrA. Original hereditary absolute monarchy. Military
command transferred from king to war-lord in time
of Ion.
Fr. 2. Local division of royal power among four sons of
Pandion.
Fr. 3. Unity restored by Theseus.
Fr. 4. Growth of popular power under Theseus.
(2) Fr. 5. Constitution in time of Theseus : four Tribes,
Thirds, Brotherhoods, Clans.
Fr. 6. Murder of Theseus. Recovery of his bones by
Athens.
Fr. 7. End of hereditary monarchy.
Fr. 8. Conspiracy of Cylon put down by Megacles.
MS. c. i. Pollution and purification of Athens.
c. ii. Civil disorders from forced labour of debtors. —
c. iii. Constitution before Draco. Third archon in-
stituted, the king retaining religious functions.
Three archonships finally made annual, and six
Thesmothetae added. An aristocracy, the nine
archons being elected by the Areopagus, whose
members were ex-archons. Conspiracy of Cylon.
Discontent and poverty of lower orders.
(3) c. iv. Constitution of Draco, the first code of laws.
Council of Four Hundred and One. Punishment of
Alcmaeonidae.
(4) cc. v.-ix. Constitution of Solon : four property-classes
with graded functions, the fourth takes part in the -
assembly and law-courts.
6
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION
c. X. Solon's cancellation of debts, and system of
weights and measures,
cc. xi., xii. Ten years of party strife. Solon's poems.
(5) cc. xiii.-xix. Tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons.
(6) cc. xx.-xxii. Reforms of Cleisthenes. Creation of
democracy.
(7) cc. xxiii., xxiv. Supremacy of Areopagus after
Persian wars. Aristeides and Themistocles. Con-
federacy of Delos ; taxation of allies.
(8) cc. xxv., xxvi. Democracy restored by Ephialtes, and
extended by Pericles.
.,...^ c. xxviii. Popular leadership, historical review.
(Sj cc. xxix., XXX. Revolution of the Four Hundred ; after
failure of Sicilian expedition Athens forced to
abandon democracy; citizenship to be limited to
Five Thousand,
c. xxxi. The Council of Four Hundred govern as an
oligarchy.
(10) cc. xxxii.-xxxiv. Counter-revolution : democracy re-
stored. Then Sparta defeats Athens in the war
and sets up the Thirty.
(11) cc. xxxv.-xxxviii. Despotic rule of the Thirty. They
are put down by exiles led by Thrasybulus.
(12) cc. xxxix., xl. Extreme democracy restored : the
people supreme ; payment for attending Assembly,
c. xli. The eleven revolutions recapitulated.
Part II. The Existing Constitution
c. xlii. The franchise.
cc. xliii.-lx. The officials (a) elected by lot — the
Council, archons, and others ;
c. Ixi. (b) elected by vote — military officers.
c. Ixii. Payment of officials.
c. Ixiii. and foil. The law-courts : procedure.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ
ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΑΙΤΕΙΑ
Primae partis Epitoma Heraclidis
[Heracleides Lembos in ike second century b.c. compiled
a book called Ίστοριαι which contained quotations from
Aristotle's Constitutions. Excerpts made from this book,
or from a later treatise by another author based upon it,
have come down to us in a fragmentary form in a
Vatican us. of the 8th century, now at Paris, under
the title Έκ των Ήρακλειδου ττερι Πολιτειών. These
were edited by Schneidewin in 1847 and by others later.
1. Αθηναίοι το μεν i^ αρχής εχρώντο βασιλεία,
συνοικησάντος δέ "Ιωνος αντοΐς rare πρώτον
Ιωνβς εκλήθησαν.
(Τούτου γαρ οίκησαντος την Άττικην, ώς
* Αριστοτέλης φησί, τους 'Αθηναίους "Ιωνας κλη-
^iyvat, και Άττόλλωνα Πατρώοι' αύτοΐς όνο-
/Αασθτ^'^'^'•• (Harpocration s.v. Άττόλλων ΙΙατρωος.)
ΪΙατρώον τιμώσιν Άττόλλωνα 'Αθηναίοι επει
"Ιων ό πολέμαρχος 'Αθηναίων εζ 'Απόλλωνος και
Κρεούσης της Ή,ούθον^ εγενετο. (Schol. Aristoph.
Αυ. 1537.))
1 Έονθον ■CyvvaiKOsy Rose.
" A word has perhaps been lost in the Greek, giving
' the wife of Xuthus ' — unless indeed the text is a ddiberate
ARISTOTLE— THE ATHENIAN
CONSTITUTION
Heracleides' Epitome of the first part
For a complete study of these contributions to the recon-
struction of The Athenian Constitution readers must
consult the standard commentators on the latter; only
those fragments which belong to the lost early part of the
treatise are given here. Quotations of the same passages
of Aristotle made by other writers have been collected by
scholars, and are inserted in the text in brackets { > where
they βΙΙ gaps in Heracleides.^
Fr. 1 . The Athenians originally had a royal govern-
ment. It was when Ion came to dwell with them that
they were first called lonians.
(For when he came to dwell in Attica, as Aristotle
says, the Athenians came to be called lonians, and
Apollo was named their Ancestral god.
The Athenians honour Ancestral Apollo because
their War-lord Ion was the son of Apollo and Creusa
the daughter * of Xuthus.)
bowdlerization of the legend. Xuthus, King of Peloponnesus,
married Creusa, daughter of Erechtheus, King of Athens,
after whose death he was banished ; but Creusa's son Ion
was recalled to aid Athens in war with Eleusis, won them
victory, and died and was buried in Attica.
9
ARISTOTLE
2. Ϊ1αν8ίων 8e βασιλ^ΰσας μβτά 'Epe^^ea
SteVei/xe την αρχήν τοις νΐοΐς (Atyet μβν Βούς την
TTepL το άστυ χώραν, Ανκω δε την 8ίακρίαν,
Πάλλαΐ'τι 8e την παραλίαν, Νισω 8e την Meyaplha
(Id. Vesp, 1223.)) 3. /cat διετελουΐ' ourot στασι'α-
ζοντε?• Θτ^σευ? 8e €κηρυξε καΐ σννφίβασ€ τούτους
67Γ ίστ^ και όμοια} (eVciAet ττάι^τα? eVt τοΓ?
ίσοι? /cat το " δείϊρ' tre, ττάι^τε? λβω " κήρυγμα
θησ€ωζ yeveadai φασί ττανΒημίαν tlvol καθιστάντος.
(Plutarch, Theseus 25.)>
4. (oTt δε πρώτος άπβκλινε ττρός τον οχλον, ώς
Αριστοτέλης φησίν, καΐ άφηκβ το μοναρχ€Ϊν, eoi/ce
μαρτυρ€Ϊν και "Ομηρος iv veatv καταλόγω μόνους
Αθηναίους Βήμον προσαγορβύσας . (Plutarch, ib.))
5. {ζϊς Ιστορεί iv τη ^Αθηναίων ΐίολίτζία
Αριστοτέλης λέγων οϋτως• φυλάς δε αυτών συν-
νενεμησθαί δ', άπομιμησαμένων τάς iv τοΐς
ενιαυτοΐς ώρας, ίκάστην δε 8ιηρησθαι βίς τρία
μ€ρη τών φυλών, όπως yiVTyrat τα πάντα δώδεκα
μ^ρη, καθάπερ οι μήνες εις τον ενιαυτόν, καλεΐσθαι
δε α73τά τριττΰς και φρατρίας• εις δε την φρατρίαν
τριάκοντα γένη Βιακεκοσμησθαι, καθάπερ αϊ ημεραι
εις τον μήνα, το δε γένος εΐναι τριάκοντα άν8ρών.
(Lexicon Patm. p. 152 Sakkel.))
6. Ούτος ελθών εις Ίΐκΰρον (Αριστοτέλης
ιστορεί ότι ελθών θήσευς εις Έκΰρον iπι κατα-
σκοπην εικοτως δια την Αίγεως συγγενειαν . . .
(Schol. Vatic, ad Eurip. Hipp. 11)) ετελεύτησεν
^ Schneidewin : bμoίq. μοίρφ (aut τιμ^) codd.
" Perhaps the formula of the crier sent round to announce
the meetings of the Ecclesia : cf. άκούβτΐ, \^ψ (' Oyez ').
10
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, Frr. 2-6
Fr. 2. Ereehtheus was succeeded as king by Pandion,
who divided up his realm among his sons (giving the
citadel and its neighbourhood to Aegeus, the hill
country to Lycus, the coast to Pallas and the district
of Megara to Nisus). Fr. 3. And these sections were
continually quarrelling ; but Theseus made a pro-
clamation and brought them together on an equal
and like footing. <He summoned all on equal terms,
and it is said that the phrase ' Come hither, all ye
folks ' " was the proclamation of Theseus made when
he was instituting an assembly of the whole people.)
Fr. 4. (And that Theseus first leant towards the
mob, as Aristotle says, and relinquished monarchical
government, even Homer seems to testify, when he
applies the term ' people ' ^ in the Catalogue of
Ships to the Athenians only.)
Fr. 5. (. . . As Aristotle narrates in his Athenian
Constitution, where he says : ' And they were grouped
in four tribal divisions in imitation of the seasons in
the year, and each of the tribes was divided into
three parts, in order that there might be twelve
parts in all, like the months of the year, and they
were called Thirds and Brotherhoods ; and the
arrangement of clans was in groups of thirty to the
brotherhood, as the days to the month, and the clan
consisted of thirty men.') '^
Fr. 6. He having come to Scyros (probably in order
to inspect it because of his kinship with Aegeus ^)
* Iliad, ii. 547.
" After Cleisthenes' reforms, 510 B.C., there were ten tribes,
each divided into Thirds and also into ten or more
Demes ; each Deme was divided into Brotherhoods (number
unknown), and these perhaps into Clans.
** Aegeus, King of Athens, father of Theseus, is not con-
nected in any extant myth with the Aegean island of Scyros.
11
ARISTOTLE
ώσθζΐς κατά. ττβτρών ύπο Αυκομη^ονς, φοβηθ€ντος
μη σφετβρίζηται. την νησον. ^Αθηναΐοί 8e ύστερον
μ€τά τά Μηδικά μ€Τ€κόμίσαν αύτοΰ τά οστά.
< Αθηναίοι μετά τά Μτ^δικά κατά μαντείαν άν-
eXovTes αύτοΰ τά οστά βθαφαν. (Schol. I.e.))
7. Άττό 8e Κοδριδών ονκετι βασιλείς ηροΰντο,
δια το SoKelv τρνφάν και μαλακούς γεγονεναι.
Ιττττομενης δε εΐς των Κοδριδών βουλόμενος
άττώσασθαι την ^ιαβολην, λαβών επΙ τη θνγατρι
Aei/xcovry μοιχόν, εκείνον μεν άνεΐλεν ύποζεύζας
μετά της θυγατρός^ τω άρματι, την δε ΐππω
συνεκλεισεν εως άπώλετο.
8. Του? μετά Κ,νλωνος Βιά την τυραννίδα
επι τον βωμον της θεον ττεφενγότας οι περί
Μεγακλεα άπεκτειναν. και τους Βράσαντας ως
εναγείς ηλαυνον.
Incipit codex
1 I. . . . (κατηγορονντοςΥ Μ^νρωνος, καθ ιερών
όμόσαντες, άριστίν^ην. καταγνωσθ εντός δε του
άγους, αύτοι μεν εκ τών τάφων εζεβληθησαν, το
δε γένος αυτών εφνγεν άειφυγίαν. 'ΈιττιμενίΒης δ
ό }ίρης επί τούτοις εκάθηρε την πόλιν.
1 Π. Μετά δε ταύτα συνέβη στασιάσαι του? τε
^ μΐτα των ξνγίων (sic Aristoph. Nub. 122) coni. Blass: seel.
Koehler. ^ Wilamowitz e Plut. Sol. 12.
» King of Athens, died 1068 b.c. (by the mythical chron-
ology).
^ 722 B.C. ; the Attic nobles deposed him in punishment.
" This nobleman seized the Acropolis to make himself
tyrant. When blockaded he escaped. His comrades were
induced to surrender by the archon, Megacles of the
12
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, Fb. 6— ii. 1
met his end by being thrust down a cliiF by Lyco-
medes, who was afraid that he might appropriate
the island. But subsequently the Athenians after
the Persian Wars brought back his bones. (The
Athenians, after the Persian Wars, in conformity
with an oracle took up his bones and buried them.)
Fr. 7. Kings were no longer chosen from the house
of Codrus," because they were thought to be luxurious
and to have become soft. But one of the house of
Codrus, Hippomenes, who wished to repel the slander,
taking a man in adultery with his daughter Leimone,
killed him by yoking him to his chariot with his
daughter [? emend ' with his team '], and locked her
up with a horse till she died.^
Fr. 8. The associates of Cylon" because of his <'>-Ob.c.?
tyranny were killed by the party of Megacles when
they had taken refuge at the altar of Athena. And
those who had done this were then banished as being
under a curse.
The MS. begins here
I. (The Alcmaeonids were tried, on the prosecu- 1
tion) of Myron, (by jurymen) solemnly sworn in,**
selected according to noble birth. The charge of sog b.c.
sacrilege having been confirmed by the verdict, the
bodies of the guilty men themselves were cast out
of their tombs, and their family was sentenced to
everlasting banishment. Thereupon Epimenides of
Crete purified the city. 596 b.c.
II. Afterwards it came about that a party quarrel 1
Alcmaeonid family, who promised to spare their lives, but
then put them to death. From what follows in the text it
appears that the movement to punish this sacrilege only
came to a head after Megacles was dead and buried.
"* Lit. ' having taken an oath over the sacred victims.'
13
ARISTOTLE
2 γνωρίμους καΐ το πλήθος πολύν χρόνον} ην
γαρ αυτών η πολιτεία τοις τ' άλλοι? ολιγαρχική
ττασι και δη και ε^ούλευον οι πένητες τοις
πλουσιοις και αύτοι και τα τέκνα και αϊ
γυναίκες' και εκαλοΰντο πελάται, και εκτημόροί'
κατά ταυτην γαρ την μίσθωσιν ηργάζοντο των
πλουσίων τους αγρούς (η δε πάσα γη Si* ολίγων
ην), και ει μη τάς μισθώσεις άποΒώοΐεν , αγώγιμοι
και αύτοι και οι παίδες εγίγνοντο' και οι Βανεισμοι
πάσιν επι τοις σώ/χασιρ" ήσαν μέχρι δόλωνος•
ούτος δε πρώτος εγενετο του 8ημου προστάτης.
3 χαλεπώτατον μεν ουν και πικρότατον ην τοις
πολλοίς τών κατά την πολιτείαν το ^ουλεύειν ού
μην άλλα και επι τοις άλλοις εΒυσχεραινον, ού8εν6ς
γαρ ώς ειπείν ετύγχανον μετέχοντες .
1 III. Ή ν δ η τάζις της αρχαίας πολιτείας της
προ Αράκοντος τοιάΒε. τάς μεν αρχάς καθίστασαν
άριστίν^ην και πλουτίν^ην ηρχον δε το μεν πρώτον
2 δια βίου, μετά δε ταύτα Βεκαετειαν. μεγισται δε
και πρώται τών αρχών ήσαν ^ασιλευ? και πολέμ-
αρχος και άρχων, τούτων δε πρώτη μεν η του
βασιλέως, αύτη γάρ ην πάτριος. Βευτερα δ'
επικατεστη πολεμαρχία δια του γενε'σ^αι τινάς
τών ^δασιλε'ωΐ' τα. πολέμια μαλακούς• όθεν και τον
3 "Ιωι^α μετεπεμφαντο χρείας καταλαβούσης . τελευ-
ταία δ' η τού άρχοντος• οι μεν γάρ πλειους επι
^ χρονοντονδ-ημον cod. : secl. Kenyon.
<» χβλάττ;?, ' one who approaches as a dependent,' was later
used as the Greek for cliens.
* Apparently this became almost an official title, see
c. xxviii.
14
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, π. 1— πι. 3
took place between the notables and the multitude
that lasted a long time. For the Athenian constitu- 2
tion was in all respects oligarchical, and in fact the
poor themselves and also their wives and children
were actually in slavery to the rich ; and they were
called Clients,'* and Sixth-part-tenants (for that was
the rent they paid for the rich men's land which
they farmed, and the whole of the country was in
few hands), and if they ever failed to pay their rents,
they themselves and their children were liable to
arrest ; and all borrowing was on the security of the
debtors' persons down to the time of Solon : it was
he who first became head ^ of the People. Thus the 3
most grievous and bitter thing in the state of public
affairs for the masses was their slavery ; not but
what they were discontented also about everything
else, for they found themselves virtually without a
share in anything. , -, ' '"■
III. The form of the ancient constitution that 1
existed before Draco was as follows. Appointment
to the supreme offices of state went by birth and
wealth ; and they were held at first for life, and
afterwards for a term of ten years. The greatest and 2
oldest of the offices were the King, the War-lord and
the Archon. Of these the office of King was the
oldest, for it was ancestral. The second established
was the office of War-lord, which was added because
some of the Kings proved cowardly in warfare
(which was the reason why the Athenians had
summoned Ion to their aid in an emergency)."
The last of these three offices established was 3
that of the Archon, the institution of which is
dated by a majority of authorities in the time of
" See Fr. 1 above.
15
ARISTOTLE
MeSovros, evLoi δ' εττι ^Ακάστον φασί yeveaOai,
ταντην τ€κμηριον δ' ετηφβρονσιν or ι, οι ivvea
άρχοντες όμνύουσιν fj τα} βττΐ ^Ακάστον ορκια^
ποίήσείν, ώς €7τΙ τούτου της βασιλείας τταρα-
χωρησάντων των Κοδριδών αντί των 8οθ€ΐσών^ τω
αρχοντι δωρεών. τοΰτο μεν ονν όποτερως ποτ'
έχει μικρόν αν τταραΧλάττοι τοις χρόνοις• δτι δε
τελευταία τούτων εγενετο των αρχών, σημεΐον και
το μηΒεν των πατρίων τον άρχοντα Βιοικεΐν, ώσπερ
6 ^ασιλεύ? και 6 πολέμαρχος, αλλ' απλώς τά
επίθετα' διό και νεωστι γεγονεν η αρχή μεγάλη,
4 τοις επιθετοις αύζηθεΐσα. θεσμοθεται δε πολλοίς
ύστερον ετεσιν ηρεθησαν, η8η κατ ενιαυτον αιρου-
μενων τάς αρχάς, όπως άναγράφαντες τά ^εσ/χια
φυλάττωσι προς την τών αμφισβητούντων κρίσιν
διό και μόνη τών αρχών ουκ εγενετο πλείων
β εΐΊαυσιας•. τοις μεν οΰν χρόνοις τοσούτον προεχου-
σιν αλλήλων, ήσαν δ ούχ άμα πάντες οι εννέα
άρχοντες, αλλ' 6 μεν )3ασιλ€ΐ;$• εϊχε το νυν καλού-
μενον ^ουκόλιον, πλησίον του πρυτανείου {σημεΐον
δε• €τι και νΰν γάρ της του βασιλέως γυναικός η
σύμμειζις ενταύθα γίνεται τω Αιονύσω και 6 γάμος),
6 δε άρχων το πρυτανεΐον, ό δε πολέμαρχος το
*Έιπιλυκεΐον (ο πρότερον μεν εκαλεΐτο πολεμ-
^ 9j </oi7jf> τά Wilamowitz.
* δίκαια (cf. Iv. 5 St/ca/os &p^fiv) Richards.
' αντιτωνδοθεισων uteris valde obscuris scriptum : άνταπο-
δοθΐΐσών ? Sandys.
" Son of Codrus (see Fr. 7 above) and life-archon.
* Medon's successor.
" Or, with Sandys's reading, ' corresponding privileges
being (at the same time) assigned to the Archon.'
<* The official title of the six junior Archons.
16
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, in. 3-5
Medon," though some put it in that of Acastus,*^ ad-
ducing in evidence the fact that the Nine Archons
swear that they will perform their oaths even as in
the time of Acastus, showing that in his time the
house of Codrus retired from the Kingship in return
for the privileges bestowed on the Archon.'' Which-
ever of the two accounts is true, it would make very
little difference in the dates ; but that this was the
last of these offices to be instituted is also indicated
by the fact that the Archon does not administer any
of the ancestral rites, as do the King and the War-
lord, but merely the duties added later ; on ac-
count of which also the Archonship only became
great in recent times, when augmented by the
added duties. Legislators'* were elected many years 4
later, when the elections to the offices were now 683 b.c.
yearly, to perform the function of publicly recording
the ordinances and to preserve them for the trial of
litigants ; hence this alone of the supreme offices was
never tenable for more than a year. These are the 5
intervals between the dates of the institution of the
various supreme offices. And the Nine Archons ^
were not all together, but the King had what is now
called the Bucolium,^ near the town hall ^ (as is indi-
cated by the fact that even at the present day the
union and marriage'* of the King's Wife with Dionysus
takes place there), while the Archon had the Presi-
dent's Hall, and the War-lord the Epilyceum (which
formerly used to be called the War-lord's House, but
* i.e. their official residences and courts.
' Otherwise unknown.
» Position uncertain.
* An annual ceremony by which the god Dionysus was
incorporated as an Athenian: the lady personifying his
consort passed a night in his temple.
c 17
ARISTOTLE
αρχβΐον, €7Τ€ΐ he Εττίλυκος άνωκο^όμησ^ καΐ κατ-
eaKevaaev αυτό ττολβμαρχησας, ΈτηλυκτβΓον €κλή-
θη), θ^σμοθ^ται δ' et)(^ov το θ€σμοθ€Τ€Ϊον . ΙπΙ he
ΎιόΧωνος ατταντέ? elς το θeσμoθeτeΐov συνήλθαν.
KvpioL δ' ήσαν καΐ τάς δικά? αΰτοτελει? KpLveiv,
/cat ονχ ωσ^τep νυν TrpoavaKplveLV. τα /xev οΰν
6 7Γ€/)ΐ τα? ap-)(^as τούτον el^e τον τρόπον. ή he
των ApeoπaγLτώv βουλή την μέν τάζιν et^e του
8ίατηρ€Ϊν τους νόμους, hicuKet he τα πλeΐστa καΐ
τα μέγιστα των iv ττ) rroXeL, καΐ κολάζουσα καΐ
ζημίοΰσα πάντας τους άκοσμοΰντας κυρίως' η
γαρ aΐpeσις των αρχόντων άpίστLvhηv και πλουτίν-
8ην ην, e^ ων οΐ ^ Αρ€οπαγΐταί καθίσταντο, διό
και μόνη των αρχών αυτή μeμevηκe δια βίου και
νυν. η μεν ουν ττρώτη πολιτεία ταύτην είχε την
ύπογραφην .
1 IV. Μετά he ταΰτα, χρόνου τινός ου πολλού
Βιελθόντος, €π' * Αρισταίχμου άρχοντος δράκων
τους θεσμούς εθηκεν η he τάζις αϋτη τόι^δε τον
2 τρόπον elχe. άπehehoτo μεν η πολιτεία τοις όπλα
παρεχομενοις• ηροΰντο δε τους μεν εννέα άρχοντας
και τους τα^Μία? ούσίαν κεκτημένους ουκ ελάττω
δέκα μνών ελευθεραν, τας δ' άλλα? άρχας τας^
ελαττους εκ των όπλα παρεχομένων, στρατηγούς
he και Ιππάρχους ούσίαν άποφαίνοντας ουκ ελάτ-
τον η εκατόν μνών ελευθεραν^ και πaΐhaς εκ
γαμέτης γυναικός γνησίους υπέρ δβκα ετη γεγονό-
^ τάϊ suppletum a Richards et aliis.
^ edd. : e'KeiSepwv cod.
" Draco was presumably one of the Thesmothetae, Arist-
aechmus being Archon Eponymus. For Draco's work see
18
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, iii. 5— iv. 2
because Epilycus on becoming War-lord rebuilt and
furnished it, it received the name of Epilyceum) ;
and the Legislators had the Legislators' Court. But
in Solon's time they all came together in the Legis-
lators' Court. They also had power to give final
judgement in lawsuits, and not as now merely to hold
a preliminary trial. Such then were the regulations
relating to the supreme offices. The Council of 6
Areopagus had the official function of guarding the
laws, but actually it administered the greatest number
and the most important of the affairs of state, inflict-
ing penalties and fines upon offenders agairist public
order without appeal ; for the elections of the
Archons went by birth and wealth, and the members
of the Areopagus were appointed from them, owing
to which this alone of the offices has remained even
to the present day tenable for life. This* then, was the
outline of the first form of the constitution.
IV. And after this when a certain moderate length 1
of time had passed, in the archonship of Aristaechmus, «21 β .
Draco enacted his ordinances « ; and this system was
on the following lines. Citizenship had already been 2
bestowed on those who provided themselves with
arms ; and these elected as the Nine Archons and the
Treasurers^ '^ who Λvere owners of an unencumbered
estate worth not less than 10 minae,'' and the other
minor offices from those who provided themselves with
arms, and as Generals and Masters of the Horse
persons proving their possession of unencumbered
estate worth not less than 100 minae and sons legiti-
mately born in wedlock over ten years of age. The
Politics 1274 b 15 fF. ; it is there said that he ' adapted his
laws to a constitution that already existed.'
* For the Treasurers of Athena see xlvii. I.
" Sav £40.
19
ARISTOTLE
τα?• τούτους δ e8et 8ί€γγναν τους 7τρντάν€ΐς και
τους στρατηγούς καΐ τους ίπττάρχους τους '4νους
μ^χρι ευθυνών, εγγυητάς δ' e/c τοΰ αύτοϋ τέλους
θιγομένους οΰπερ οι στρατηγοί και οΐ ίππαρχοι.
3 βουλ€υ€ΐν 8e τετρακόσιους και eva τους λαχόντας
€κ της πολιτείας• κληροΰσθαι Se και ταύτην και τας
αΛΛα? αρχάς τους υπέρ τριάκοντα ετη γεγονοτας•
και οις τον αυτόν μη αρχειν προ του παντας
εξελθεΐν, τότε δε πάλιν εξ ύπαρχης κληροΰν. εΐ δε
τις των βουλευτών , όταν Ι'δρα βουλής η εκκλησίας
η, εκΑειποι την συνοοον, απετινον ο μεν πεντα-
κοσιομεΒιμνος τρεις 8ραχμάς, ό δε ιππεύς δυο,
4 ζευγίτης^ δε μίαν. η δε βουλή ή εξ 'Αρείου πάγου
φύλαξ ην των νόμων, και Βιετήρει τάς αρχάς όπως
κατά τους νόμους άρχωσιν. εξην δε τω α6ικουμένω
προς την των Αρεοπαγιτών βουλην είσαγγέλλειν,
αποφαίνοντι παρ* δν άΒικεΐται νόμον. επι δε τοις
σώ^ασιν ήσαν οι δανεισμοί, καθάπερ ε'ίρηται, και
η χώρα δι' ολίγων ην.
1 V. Τοιαύτης δε της τάξεως οϋσης εν τη πολιτεία
και τών πολλών Βουλευόντων τοις ολίγοις, άντεστη
2 TOtS" γνωριμοις ό 8ημος. ίσχυράς δε της στάσεως
ούσης και πολύν χρόνον άντικαθη μένων άλλήλοις,
εΐλοντο κοινή Βιαλλακτην και άρχοντα Σόλωι^α και
την πολιτείαν έπετρεφαν αύτώ, ποιησαντι την
εΛε•}/ειαν ης εστίν αρχή'
^ δταν . . . rj] δτ€ . . . €Ϊη ? Richards.
* (κλίτΓοι Heerwerden, Leeuwen.
^ <ό> ^(υ-/ίτη^ Kontos.
" Probably before Solon's time this denotes the Archons.
' See vii. 3. A drachma (say D^d. or 1 franc) was a
hundredth part of a mina (say £4).
' On these quotations from Solon see Έ.άιηοηάΒ, Elegy and
20
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, iv. 2— v. 2
new officials had to bail the outgoing Presidents <* and
Generals and Masters of the Horse till the audit,
accepting four sureties from the same rating as
that to which the Generals and Masters of the Horse
belonged. And the Council was to be formed of four 3
hundred and one members chosen by lot from the
citizen bod}*, and lots were to be cast both for this
and for the other offices by the citizens over thirty
years of age ; and the same person was not to hold
office twice until the whole num.ber had been gone
through, and then lots were to be cast among them
again from the beginning. And if any Councillor,
whenever there was a sitting of the Council or
Assembly, failed to attend the meeting, he paid a
fine of 3 drachmae if of Five-hundred-measure rank,
2 drachmae if a Knight, and 1 if a Teamster.* The 4
Council of Areopagus was guardian of th.p laws, and
kept a watch on the magistrates to make them
govern in accordance with the laws. A person un-
justly treated might lay a complaint before the
Council of the Areopagites, stating the law in con-
travention of which he was treated unjustly. Loans
were secured on the person, as has been said, and the ϋ. 2.
land was divided among few OAvners.
' V. Such being the system in the constitution, and 1
the many being enslaved to the few, the people rose
against the notables. The party struggle being 2
violent and the parties remaining arrayed in opposi-
tion to one another for a long time, they jointly
chose Solon as arbitrator and Archon, and entrusted 594 b.c.
the government to him, after he had composed the
elegy " that begins :
Iambus (L.C.L,), vol. i. pp. 104 fF., especially pp. 120-121,
142-143, and 148-153.
21
ARISTOTLE
γινώσκω, και μοι φρενός evSodev άλγ€α κείται
πρεσβντάτην εσορών γαΐαν Ίαονίας
καινομενην^'
ev fj ττρος εκατβρους ύπβρ εκατερων μάχεται και
8ιαμφισβητ€Ϊ, καΐ μετά ταΰτα Koivij παραινεί
3 καταπαύειν την ενεστώσαν φιλονικίαν. ην δ' 6
Σίόλων τη μεν φύσει και τη 8όζη των πρώτων,
τη δ' ουσία και τοις πράγμασι των μέσων,
ώς εκ τε των άλλων ομολογείται και αυτός εν
τοΐσ8ε τοις ποιημασιν μαρτυρεί, παραινών τοις
πλουσίοις μη πλεονεκτεΐν
ύμεΐς δ' ησυχάσαντες ενι φρεσι καρτερόν ητορ,
οι πολλών aya^oil•' ες κόρον ηλάσατε,
εν μετρίοισι^ τίθεσθε μεγαν νόον οϋτε γαρ ημείς
πεισόμεθ\ οΰθ' ύμΐν άρτια ταυτ'* εσεται.
και όλως atet την αιτι'αν της στάσεως άνάπτει τοις
πλουσίοις• δίο και εν αρχή της ελεγείας 8ε8οικεναι
φησί
την τε φιλαργυρίαν* την θ* ύπερηφανίαν,
ώς δια ταΰτα ^ς έχθρας ενεστώσης .
1 VI. Κύριο? δε γενόμενος των πραγμάτων Σόλων
τόν τε δημον ηλευθερωσε και εν τω παρόντι και
εις το μέλλον, κωλύσας ^ανείζειν επι τοις σίό/χασιρ-,
και νόμους εθηκε, και χρεών άποκοπάς εποίησε
και τών ίδιων και τών 8ημοσίων, ας σ€ΐσά;ΐ(^€ΐαΓ
1 κΚίνομένην, καρφομένην nonnulli legunt : καιομένην ? Ed-
monds.
* μέτροισι Wilamowitz-Kaibel metri gratia (et Ημεσθε,
' cut to measure,' Edmonds).
8 iravT nonnulli legunt : τ&στ Edmonds.
22
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, v. 2— vi. i
I mark, and sorrow fills my breast to see,
Ionia's oldest land being done to death, —
in which he does battle on behalf of each party
against the other and acts as mediator, and after this
exhorts them jointly to stop the quarrel that pre-
vailed between them. Solon was by birth and re- 3
putation of the first rank, but by wealth and position
belonged to the middle class, as is admitted on the
part of the other authorities, and as he himself testi-
fies in these poems, exhorting the wealthy not to be
covetous :
\
Refrain ye in your hearts those stubborn moods.
Plunged in a surfeit of abundant goods,
And moderate your pride ! We'll not submit,
Nor even you yourselves will this befit."
And he always attaches the blame for the civil strife
wholly to the rich ; owing to which at the beginning
of the elegy he says that he fears
Both love of money and o'erweening pride — ,
implying that these were the causes of the enmity
that prevailed.
VI. Solon having become master of affairs made i
the people free both at the time and for the future
by prohibiting loans secured on the person, and he
laid down laws, and enacted cancellations of debts
both private and public, the measures * that are known
" ' Nor shall ye possess what ye have now without decrease '
(Edmonds).
* Their actual provisions are quite uncertain.
* φίλοχρηίαΐ' legit Edmonds (cf. φιΚοχρηματιαν Plutarch.
Solon 14).
23
ARISTOTLE
2 καΧοϋσιν , ώς άποσ€ΐσαμ€νων^ το βάρος, ev οις
π€ΐρώνταί rives' ^ιαβάλλβίν αυτόν συνββη γαρ τω
Σιόλωνι μζλλοντι ποί€Ϊν την σ^ισάχθ^ιαν rrpo^nrelv
τισΐ των γνωρίμων y eVet^', ώς μέν οΐ δημοτικοί
Χ4γουσι, τταραστρατηγηθηναι δια των φίλων, ως
δ' οι βονλόμ€νοί βλασφημ€Ϊν, καΐ αυτόν κοινων€Ϊν.
8αν€ΐσάμ€νοι γαρ ούτοι συν€πρίαντο πολλην χώραν,
καΐ μ€τ^ ου πολύ της των χρ€ών αποκοπής
γ€νομ€νης^ €πλούτουν• όθεν φασί yevea^ai τους
3 ϋστ€ρον Βοκοΰντας eivai παλαιοπλούτους . ου μην
αλλά πιθανώτβρος 6 των Βημοτικών λόγος• ου
γαρ €ίκός iv μεν τοις άλλοι? οΰτω μίτριον ytvea^at
καΐ κοινόν ωστ', εζόν αύτω τους ίτίρους υπο-
ποιησάμενον τυραννεΐν της πόλεως, άμφοτεροις άπ-
εχθεσθαί καΐ περί πλείονος ποιησασθαί το καλόν
και την της πόλεως σωτηρίαν η την αύτοΰ πλεον-
εξίαν, εν οΰτω hk μικροΐς και άναζίοις^ καταρρυπαί-
4 νειν εαυτόν. Οτι δε ταύτην εσχε την εζουσίαν, τά
τε πράγματα νοσοϋντα μαρτυρεί, καΐ εν τοις ποιη-
/Αασιν αυτό? πολλαχοϋ μεμνηται, και οι άλλοι
συνομολογοϋσι πάντες, ταύτην μεν οΰν χρη νομί-
ζειν φευ^η την αιτιαν efvat.
1 VII. Πολιτειαν 8ε κατέστησε και νόμους εθηκεν
άλλους, τοις Βε /Δράκοντος θεσμοΐς επαύσαντο χρώ-
μενοι πλην των φονικών, άναγράφαντες 8ε τους
^ Mayor: αττοσισαμενοι cod.
* Rutherford : -γινομένης cod.
8 φανεροιζ incerte legit Rutherford.
24.
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, vi. l— vii. l
as ' the Shaking-oiF of Burdens,' meaning that the
people shook off their load. In these matters some
people try to misrepresent him ; for it happened 2
that when Solon was intending to enact the Shaking-
off of Burdens, he informed some of the notables
beforehand, and afterwards, as those of popular
sympathies say, he was out-manceuvred by his•
friends, but according to those who want to malign
him he himself also took a share. For these persons
borrowed money and bought up a quantity of land,
and when not long afterwards the cancellation of
debts took place they were rich men ; and this is
said to be the origin of the families subsequently
reputed to be ancestrally wealthy." Nevertheless, 3
the account of those of popular sympathies is more
credible ; for considering that he was so moderate
and public-spirited in the rest of his conduct that,
when he had the opportunity to reduce one of the
two parties to subjection and so to be tyrant of
the city, he incurred the enmity of both, and valued
honour and the safety of the state more than his own
aggrandizement, it is not probable that he besmirched
himself in such worthless trifles. And that he got 4
this opportunity is testified by the disordered state of
affairs, and also he himself alludes to it in many places
in his poems, and everybody else agrees with him.
We are bound therefore to consider this charge to
be false.
VII. And he established a constitution and made 1
other laws, and they ceased to observe the ordinances
of Draco, except those relating to homicide. They
" Apparently certain well-known families, but not alluded
to elsewhere.
25
ARISTOTLE
νόμους els τους κύρβεις έστησαν eV rij στοά rfj
^δασιλειω και ώμοσαν χρησβσθαι vavres' οι δ'
evvea άρχοντΐς όμννντβς ττρός τω λίθω κατβφάτιζον
avadrjaeiv ανδριάντα χρυσονν εάν τίνα παραβώσι
των νομών bdev ert /cat νυν ούτως ομνυουσι.
2 κατ€κΧ€ΐσ€ν 8e τους νόμους εΙς εκατόν €τη. καΐ
3 δΐ€τα^€ την πολιτβίαν TOvSe τρόττον τιμηματί
SielXev^ εΙς τβτταρα τέλη, καθάπερ Βιγιρητο καΐ
πρότ€ρον, εις πεντακοσιομβ^ιμνον καΐ ίππεα καΐ
ζευγίτην καΐ θητα' καΐ τάς μεν αλλα?^ άρχας
άττένειμεν άρχειν €Κ πεντακοσιομεΒίμνων καΐ Ιπ-
πέων καΐ ζευγιτών, τους εννέα άρχοντας και
τους ταμίας και τους πωλητάς και τους ένδεκα
και τους κωλακρετας, εκάστοις ανά Χόγον τω μεγε-
θει του τιμήματος άποΒώούς εκάστην^ αρχήν
τοις 8e το θητικόν τελοΰσιν εκκλησίας και 8ικα-
4 στηρίων μετεΒωκε μόνον. ε8ει 8ε τελεΐν πεντα-
κοσιομε8ιμνον μεν ος αν εκ της* οικείας ποιη
πεντακόσια μέτρα τα συνάμφω ζηρά και υγρά,
ίππά8α δε τους τριακόσια ποιοΰντας — ώς δ' ενιοί
φασι, τους Ιπποτροφεΐν 8υναμενους• σημεΐον 8ε
φερουσι τό τε όνομα του τέλους, ώς από* του
πράγματος κείμενον, και τά αναθήματα τών
αρχαίων άνάκειται γαρ εν ακροπόλει είκών
Αιφίλου^ εφ' ^ επιγεγραπται τά8ε'
1 SieiXev <avTT]vy ? Rutherford.
* μέι> dWas Diels : μ ... at cod, : μΐ-γίσταί Blass olim.
* ed. : την cod. * yrjs Bywater. * άτό ed. : αναπω cod.
' [Δί0ίλοι/] Thompson.
" Three-sided (or perhaps four-sided) structures of wood
(or perhaps stone) revolving on pivots; set up in the Stoa
Basilike, the court of the King-Archon, on the west side of
the Agora.
26
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, vii. 1-4
wrote up the laws on the Boards °• and set them in
the Royal Colonnade, and all swore to observe them ;
and the Nine Archons used to make affirmation on oath
at the Stone ^ that if they transgressed any one of the
laws they would dedicate a gold statue of a man;
owing to which they are even now still sworn in with
this oath. And he fixed the laws to stay unaltered for 2
a hundred years. And he arranged the constitution in
the following way : he divided the people by assess- 3
ment into four classes, as they had been divided
before, Five-hundred-measure nnian. Horseman, Team-
ster and Labourer, and he distributed the other offices
to be held from among the Five-hundred-measure
men, Horsemen and Teamsters — the Nine Archons,
the Treasurers," the \^endors of Contracts,^ the
Eleven « and the Paymasters, assigning each office
to the several classes in proportion to the amount
of their assessment ; while those who were rated in
the Labourer class he admitted to the membership
of the assembly and law-courts alone. Any man had 4
to be rated as a Five-hundred-measure man the
produce from whose estate was five hundred dry and
liquid measures jointly,-'^ and at the cavalry-rate those
who made three hundred, — or as some say, those
who were able to keep a horse, and they adduce as
a proof the name of the rating as being derived from
the fact, and also the votive offerings of the ancients ;
for there stands dedicated in the Acropolis a statue
of Diphilus y on which are inscribed these lines :
* Perhaps the altar of Zeus Agoraios.
" See xlvii. 1. "* See xlvii. 2. « See Hi. 1.
f i.e. measures of corn and of wine and oil amounting in
all to five hundred.
^ ' Of J^iphilus ' is probably a mistaken insertion ; pre-
sumably the statue was of Anthemion himself.
27
<
ARISTOTLE
Αίφίλον ^Ανθ€μίων την8^ άνεθηκε θεοΐς . . .
θητικοΰ άντΙ τέλους ίτΓττάδ' άμειφάμενος —
/cat παρεστηκεν ΐππος εκμαρτυρών^ ώς την ίπττά^α
τοντο σημαίνουσαν. ου μην αλλ" εύλογώτερον
τοις μετροις 8ιηρησθαί καθάπερ τους ττεντα-
κοσιομεΒίμνους . ζευγίσιον 8e τελεΐν τους Βίακόσια
τά συνάμφω ττοιοϋντας- τους δ' άλλου? θητικόν,
ουδεμιάς μετέχοντας άρχης, διό /cat νΰν επεώάν
ερηται τον μέλλοντα κληροϋσθαί τιν" ο,ρχην ττοΐον
τέλος τελεί, ουδ' αι^ εις είττοι θητικόν.
1 VIII. Τά? δ' άρχας εποίησε κληρωτάς εκ προ-
κρίτων ους εκάστη προκρίνειε^ των φυλών, ττροΰ-
κρινεν δ' εις τους εννέα άρχοντας εκάστη Βέκα,
/cat' τούτων εκληρουν*• όθεν ετι Βυαμένει ταΐς
φυλαΐς το 8εκα κληροΰν εκάστην, εΐτ* εκ τούτων
κυαμεύειν. ση μείον δ' οτι κληρωτάς έττοίησεν^
εκ των τιμημάτων ο περί των ταμιών νόμος
ω χρώμενοι ^ιατελοϋσιν ετι και νυν κελεύει
γαρ κληροΰν τους ταμίας εκ πεντακοσιομε^ίμνων.
2 Σόλων μεν οΰν οϋτως ενομοθέτησεν περί τών
εννέα αρχόντων το γαρ άρχαΐον η εν "Αρείω
πάγω βουλή άνακαλεσαμενη και κρίνασα καθ*
αύτην τον επιτηΒειον εφ" εκάστη τών αρχών επ*
3 ενιαυτον άρζοντα^ άπέστελλεν . φυλαι δ' ήσαν δ*
^ ds μαρτύρων coni. Blass. ^ Gertz : ιτροκριν^ι cod.
lu * κάκ Gomperz fsed cf. xxx. 1, xxxi. 1),
\V * Kaibel-Wilamowitz : του . . . ληρονν cod.
^ Bury : ινοιησαν cod .
• Kaibel : διατάξασα Kenyon : ... τα vel ... σα cod.
" Apparently the property qualification was ignored, with-
out being formally repealed.
* i.e. nine were taken by lot out of forty elected by vote
28
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, vii. 4— viii. 3
Anthemion Diphilus's son dedicated this statue to tiie gods
. . . having exchanged the Labourer rating for the Cavalry —
and a horse stands beside him, in evidence that
' cavalry ' meant the class able to keep a horse.
Nevertheless it is more probable that the cavalry were
distinguished by their amounts of produce as the
Five-hundred-measure men were. And men had to
be rated in the Teamster class who made two hundred
measures, wet and dry together ; while the rest were
rated in the Labourer class, being admitted to no
office : hence even now when the presiding official
asks a man who is about to draw lots for some office
what rate he pays, no one whatever would say that
he was rated as a Labourer.''
VIII. For the offices of state he instituted election 1
by lot from candidates selected by the tribes severally
by a preliminary vote. For the Nine Archons each
tribe made a preliminary selection of ten, and the
election was made from among these by lot ^ ; hence
there still survives with the tribes the system that each
elects ten by lot and then they choose from among
these by ballot.*' And a proof that he made the
offices elective by lot according to assessments is the
law in regard to the Treasurers that remains in force
even at the present day ; for it orders the Treasurers
to be elected by lot from the Five-hundred-measure
men. Solon, therefore, legislated thus about the Nine 2
Archons ; for in ancient times the Council on the
Areopagus used to issue a summons and select inde-
pendently the person suitable for each of the offices,
and commission him to hold office for a year. And 3
by the four tribes; whereas in the writer's day the pre-
liminary election was also by lot and produced one hundred
from the ten tribes. " i.e. by lot again.
29
ARISTOTLE
καθάττ€ρ ττρότζρον και φυλοβασιλέΐς τέσσαρες.
€Κ δε τί^? φνλης βκάστης ήσαν νβν^μ-ημεναι τριτ-
τυ€ς μεν τρεις, ναυκραρίαί δε δώδεκα καθ' εκαστην,
€πΙ δε τών^ ναυκραριών αρχή καθεστηκυία ναν-
κραροι, τεταγμένη ττρός τε τάς εισφοράς και τας
δαπάνα? τα? γινομενας• διό και εν τοις νομοις
τοις Έόλωνος, οΐς ονκετι χρώνται, πολλαχον
γεγραπται τους νανκράρονς είσπράττειν, και ανα-
'ί λίσκειν εκ τοΰ ναυκραρικον αργυρίου, βουλην ο
εποίησε τετρακόσιους, εκατόν εζ εκάστης φυλής,
TTjv δε των Αρεοπαγιτών εταζεν εττι το νομο-
φυλακεΐν, ωσττερ ύττηρχεν και ττρότερον επίσκοπος
ούσα της πολιτείας , rj τά τε άλλα και τα πλείστα
και τά ]υ,ε')/ιστα των πολιτικών^ Βιετήρει και
τους άμαρτάνοντας ηϋθυνεν κυρία ούσα και ζη-
μιοΰν και κολάζειν, και τάς εκτίσεις άνεφερεν εις
πάλιν ουκ επιγράφουσα την πρόφασιν τοΰ εκτινε-
σθαι/ και τους επι καταλύσει τοΰ Βημου συνιστά-
μενους εκρινεν, δόλωνος θεντος νόμον εΙσαγγελίας
5 περί αυτών. ορών δε την μεν πόλιν πολλάκις
στασιάζουσαν τών δε πολιτών ενίους δια την
ραθυμίαν αγαπώντας το αύτόματον, νόμον εθηκε
προς αυτούς ί,'διον, δς αν στασιαζούσης της πόλεως
μη θήται τά όπλα μηΒε μεθ* έτερων άτιμον είΡ'αι
και της πόλεως μη μετεχειν.
1 IX. Τά μεν οΰν περί τάς αρχάς τούτον είχε τον
τρόπον. δοκεΓ δε της Σίόλωνος πολιτείας τρία
^ ^ν δ' έτΓΐ των nonnulli legunt.
* ΊΓοΧιτικΰν coni. Richards : πολιτωρ cod,
' ενθνν^σθαί nonnulli legunt, δι' δ τό έκτίνΐσθαι alii.
" The Naucrariae were forty-eight administrative districts
into which the country was divided for taxation, each having
30
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, viii. 3— ix. 1
there were four Tribes, as before, and four Tribal
Kings. And from each Tribe there had been assigned
three Thirds and twelve Ship-boards "• to each, and
over the Ship-boards there was established the office
of Ship-commissioners, appointed for the levies and
the expenditures that were made ; because of which
in the laws of Solon, which are no longer in force,
the clauses frequently occur, ' the Ship-commissioner
to levy ' and ' to spend out of the Ship-commission
Fund.' And he made a Council of four hundred 4
members, a hundred from each tribe, but appointed ^
the Council of the Areopagus to the duty of guarding
the laws, just as it had existed even before as over-
seer of the constitution, and it was this Council that
kept watch over the greatest number and the most
important of the affairs of state, in particular correct-
ing offenders with sovereign powers both to fine and
punish, and making returns of its expenditure to the
Acropolis without adding a statement of the reason
for the outlay, and trying persons that conspired to
put down the democracy, Solon having laid down a
law of impeachment in regard to them. And as he 5
saw that the state was often in a condition of party
strife, while some of the citizens through slackness
were content to let things slide, he laid down a special
law to deal with them, enacting that whoever when
civil strife prevailed did not join forces with either
party was to be disfranchised and not to be a member
of the state.
IX. This then was the nature of his reforms in 1
regard to the offices of state. And the three most
to defray the equipment of one battle-ship. Their presidents
were Naucrari. Every four Naucrariae formed a Trittys, of
which there were three in each Tribe.
31
ARISTOTLE
A >
ταυτ €Lvai τα όημοηκωτατα, πρώτον /xev /cat
μεγιστον το μτ] 8αν€ίζ€ΐν ΙπΙ τοις σω/^ασιν, έττειτα
το i^eLvai τω βουλομβνω τιμωρ^ΐν vrrep των
αδικούμενων, τρίτον δε, ω^ μάλιστα φασιν Ισ^υ-
κβναι το πλήθος, η et? το ^ικαστηριον €φ€σις•
κύριος γαρ ων 6 δη/χο? της- φηφου κύριος γίνεται
2 της πολιτείας . ετι he και δια το μη γεγράφθαι
τους νόμους απλώς μηΒε σαφώς, αλλ ώσπερ ο
περί τών κλήρων και επικληρων, ανάγκη πολλάς
αμφισβητήσεις ytVea^at και πάντα βραβευβιν και
τα κοινά και τα ί,'δια το ^ικαστηριον. οϊονται μεν
οΰν τίνες επίτηδες ασαφείς αύτον ποιησαι τους
νόμους όπως fj της κρίσεως 6 8ημος κύριος' ου
μην εΙκός, αλλά δια το μη δυι^ασθα6 καθόλου περι-
λαβεΐν το βελτιστον ον γάρ δίκαιον εκ τών νυν
γινομένων αλλ' εκ της άλλης πολιτείας θεωρεΐν
την εκείνου βούλησιν.
1 Χ. Έν μεν οΰν τοις νόμοις ταύτα δό/ίβι ^etvai
δημοτικά, προ δε της νομοθεσίας ποιησας^ την
τών χρεών άποκοπην και μετά ταύτα την τε τών
μέτρων και σταθμών και την του νομίσματος
2 αυ^τ^σίΓ. εττ' εκείνου γάρ εγενετο και τά μέτρα
μείζω τών Φεώωνείων, και η μνα πρότερον έχουσα
σταθμόν εβ^ομηκοντα ^ραχμάς άνεπληρώθη ταΓ?
εκατόν. ην δ' ό αρχαίος χαρακτηρ 8ι8ραχμον.
εποίησε δε και σταθμά προς το ι^ό/χισ/χα, τρεις και
^ δέ, φ Lipsius : δε cod. * νοιησαι legit Kenyon.
" King of Argos, probably early 7th century b.c, see
Politics 1310 b 26. His standards of coinage and weights
and measures came to prevail through most of Greece.
' i.e. seventy of the new drachmae : the drachma coin
32
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, ix. l— x. 2
democratic features in Solon's constitution seem to
be these : first and most important the prohibition
of loans secured upon the person, secondly the liberty ■^
allowed to anybody who wished to exact redress on
behalf of injured persons, and third, what is said to
have been the chief basis of the powers of the
multitude, the right of appeal to the jury-court — for
the people, having the power of the vote, becomes
sovereign in the government. And also, since the 2
laws are not drafted simply nor clearly, but like the
law about inheritances and heiresses, it inevitably
results that many disputes take place and that the
jury-court is the umpire in all business both public
and private. Therefore some people think that
Solon purposely made his laws obscure, in order that
the people might be sovereign over the verdict. But
this is unlikely — probably it was due to his not being
able to define the ideal in general terms ; for it is
not fair to -study his intention in the light of what
happens at the present day, but to judge it from the
rest of his constitution.
X. Solon therefore seems to have laid down these 1
enactments of a popular nature in his laws ; while
before his legislation his democratic reform was his
cancellation of debts, and afterwards his raising the
standard of the measures and weights and of the
coinage. For it was in his time that the measures 2
were made larger than those of Pheidon," and that
the mina, which previously had a weight of seventy
drachmae,^ was increased to the full hundred. The
ancient coin-type was the two-drachma piece. Solon
also instituted weights corresponding to the cur-
was also enlarged, so that seventy of the new equalled one
hundred of the old ; and see note on iv. 1.
D 33
ARISTOTLE
ζζήκοντα μνας το τάλαντον άγουσας, καΐ ctti-
8ιβν€μηθησαν at τρ€Ϊς μναΐ τω στατηρι καΐ τοις
άλλοι? σταθμοΐς.
1 XI. Διάταζα? δε την ττολιτβίαν ovTrep ζΐρηται
τρόπον, irretSr] προσιόντ^ς αύτω irepl των νόμων
€νώγλουν τά μ^ν βπιτιμώντβς τά δβ άνακρίνοντζς.)
βουλόμβνοζ μητζ ταύτα klvclv μήτ^ άπβχθάνεσθαί
παρών, άπο^ημίαν €ποίήσατο κατ' €μπορίαν άμα
και θβωρίαν ets" Α!ίγυπτον , ειπών ώς ούχ ηζει δέκα
ετών, ου γαρ ο'ίεσθαι δίκαιον elvai τους νόμους
ζζηγεΐσθαι παρών αλλ' εκαστον τά γεγραμμενα
2 ποιησαι. άμα δε /cat συνέβαιναν αντώ τών τε
γνωρίμων διαφόρους γεγενησθαι πολλούς 8ιά τάς
τών χρεών άποκοπάς, και τάς στάσεις άμφοτερας
μεταθεσθαι δια το παρά 8όζαν αύτοΐς '^εΐ'ε'σ^αι
την καταστασιν. ο μεν γαρ 8ημος ώετο πάντ
άρ'άδαστα ποιησειν αυτόν, οί δε γνώριμοι πάλιν η
την αύτην τάζιν άπο8ώσειν η μικρόν παραλ-
λάζαντα• ό δε Σόλων άμφοτέροις ηναντιώθη, και
εζόν αύτω μεθ' όποτερων ηβούλετο συστάντα
τυραννεΐν εΐλετο προς αμφότερους άπεχθεσθαι^
σώσας την πατρίΒα και τά βέλτιστα νομοθετησας.
1 XII. Ταΰτα δ' OTt τούτον τρόπον εσχεν^ οι τ'
άλλοι συμφωνοΰσι πάντες και αύτος εν τη ποιήσει
μεμνηται περί αυτώι^ εν τοΓσδε•
8ημω μεν γάρ ε^ωκα τόσον γέρας δσσον απ-
αρκεΐ,
τιμής οϋτ^ αφελών ού'τ' επορεξάμενος,
^ Wyse : απεχθΐσθηναι cod. * eixivWilamowitz-Kaibpl.
The weight of a fiftieth part of a mina.
* See V. 2 n.
34
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, χ. 2— χπ. ι
rency, the talent weighing sixty-three minae, and a
fraction proportionate to the additional three minae
was added to the stater * and the other weights.
XI. When Solon had organized the constitution \
in the manner stated, people kept coming to him j
and worrying him about his laws, criticizing some I
points and asking questions about others ; so as he /
did not wish either to alter these provisions or to stay (
and incur enmity, he went abroad on a journey to \
Egypt, for the purpose both of trading and of seeing \
the country, saying that he would not come back
for ten years, as he did not think it fair for him to j
stay and explain his laws, but for everybody to carry
out their provisions for himself. At the same time 2
it befell him that many of the notables had become
at variance with him because of the cancellations of
debts, and also that both the factions changed their
attitude to him because the settlement had dis-
appointed them. For the people had thought that
he would institute universal communism of property, ^
whereas the notables had thought that he would
either restore the system in the same form as it was
before or with slight alteration ; but Solon went
against them both, and when he might have been
tyrant if he had taken sides with whichever of the
two factions he wished, he chose to incur the enmity
of both by saving the country and introducing the
legislation that was best.
XII. That this is how it happened is the unanimous 1
account of everybody, and in particular Solon him-
self in his poetry ^ recalls the matter in these words :
For to the people gave I grace enough,
Nor from their honour took, nor proffered more ;
35
ARISTOTLE
ol δ' βΐχον Βυναμίν /cat χρημασιν ήσαν άγητοί,
και τοις βφρασάμην μηΒβν aet/ce? €χ€ίν•
€στην δ άμφίβαλών Kparepov σάκος άμφοτεροισι
νικαν δ ουκ βί'ασ ovSerepovs ά8ίκως.
2 τταλιν δ άποφαινόμ€νος Trepl του πλ-ηθους ώς αύτώ
Bel χρησθαί•
Βημος δ' οϋδ' άν άριστα συν -ηγ^μόν^σσιν eVotro,
μητβ λίαν άνβθβΐς μ'ήτ€ βιαζόμ^νος'
τίκτζΐ γαρ κόρος ϋβρίν όταν πολύς όλβος '^ττ-ηται
άνθρώτΓοισιν δσοις μη νόος άρτιος rj.
3 καΐ πάλιν δ €τ€ρωθί που Aeyet π€ρΙ των Sla-
ve ίμασθαι την γην βουλομ^νων
OL δ 60 άρπαγαΐσιν ήλθον βλττ/δ' βΐχ^ον^ άφν€άν,
κάΒόκουν €καστος αυτών ολβον ^ύρησ^ιν πύλύν,
και μ€ κωτίλλοντα λίίως τραχύν €κφαν€Ϊν νόον.
;\;awa μβν τότ' ^φράσαντο, νυν δε μοι χολούμ^νοι
λοξόν όφθαλμοΐσ' όρώσι πάντες ώστ€ Βηιον,
ου χρεών α μεν γαρ είπα συν θεοΖσιν ηνυσα,
άλλα δ' ου μάτην εερΒον, ούΒε μοι τυραννίΒος
ηνΒάνεν'^ βία τι ρεζειν, ούΒέ πιείρας χθονος
πατριΒος κακοΐσιν εσθλούς ίσομοιρίαν εχειν.
4 πάλιν^ Βέ και περί της αποκοπής τών χρεών και
τών Βουλευόντων μεν πρότερον ελευθερωθεντων Βε
Βιά την σ€ΐσάχ^6ί.αν•
^ έφ' apirayij συνηΧθον κάλττίδ' ^ΐχον (commate infra post νόον
posito) Ziegler : έψ' άρπαΎαΐ$ ^xovres ΐλττίδ' ΐ/λθον Richards.
* Richards : οί'δαΐ'ίΐ cod.
^ πάλιν Kenyon : λ^7" Kontos : lacunam cod.
36
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xii. 1-4
While those possessing power and graced with wealth,
These too I made to suffer nought unseemly ;
I stood protecting both with a strong shield,
And suffered neither to prevail unjustly.
And again, when declaring about how the multi- 2
tude ought to be treated :
Thus would the people with the chiefs best follow,
With neither too much freedom nor compulsion ;
Satiety breeds insolence when riches
Attend the men whose mind is not prepared.
And again in a different place he says about those 3
who wish to divide up the land :
They that came on plunder bent were filled with over-lavish
hope,
Each and all imagining that they would find abundant
wealth,
And that I, though smoothly glozing, would display a purpose
rough.
Vain and boastful then their fancies ; now their bile 'gainst
me is stirred.
And with eyes askance they view me, and all deem me as a
foe —
Wrongly : for the things I promised, those by heaven's aid
I did, ^
And much else, no idle exploits ; nothing did it please my
mind
By tyrannic force to compass, nor that in our fatherland
Good and bad men should have equal portion in her fertile
soil.
And again about the cancellation of debts, and 4
those who were in slavery before but were liberated
by the Shaking-off of Burdens :
37
V
ARISTOTLE
€γω δε των aev οϋν€κα ζυνηγαγον
οημον, TL τούτων ττριν τυχ€ΐν €πανσαμην;
συμμαρτνροίη ταντ αν iv Slkt] \ρόνου
μήτηρ μεγίστη Βαιμόνων ^Ολυμπίων
άριστα. Τη /xeAatt'a, της €γώ ποτ€
ορονς αν€Ϊλον πολλαχή πβπηγότας ,
προσθεν δε SovXevovaa, νυν iXeudepa}
πολλούς δ' 'A^ryj/a? ττατριδ' et? θβόκτιτον
ανήγαγον πραθεντας, άλλον €κ8ίκως,
άλλον Βίκαίως, τους δ' άναγκαίης ΰπο
χρειοΰς φνγόντας, γλώσσαν ονκ4τ ^Αττικην
ί€ντας, ως αν'' πολλαχη ττλανωμζνους,
τους δ ενθα8* αύτοϋ 8ουλίην aeiKea
έχοντας, ηθη Βεσποτών τρομευμένους,
ελευθέρους εθηκα. ταύτα μεν κρατείν,
ομοΰ^ βίαν τε και Βίκην συναρμόσας ,
ερεξα καΐ Βιηλθον ώς ύπεσχόμην
θεσμούς θ' ομοίως τω κακω τε κάγαθώ,
ευθείαν εις εκαστον αρμόσας 8ικην,
έγραφα, κεντρον δ' άλλο? ώς εγώ λαβών,
κακοφρα8ής τε καΐ φιλοκτημων άνήρ,
ουκ αν κατεσχε Βημσν• εΐ γαρ ηθελον
α τοις εναντίοισιν ην8α)/εν τότε,
αυθίς δ' α τόΐσιν οΰτι^βφ^φρασαίατο ,
πολλών αν άν8ρών ηδΐ εχηρώθη πόλις.
των οϋνεκ άλκην πάντοθεν ποιούμενος
ως εν κυσίν πολλησιν ^^ράφην λύκος.
5 και τταλιν όνειΒίζων προς τάς ύστερον αυτών
μεμφιμοιρίας αμφοτέρων \
οημω μεν ει χρη 8ιαφρα8ην* 6νει8ίσαι,
α νυν εχουσιν οϋποτ^ όφθαλμρΐσιν άν
38 '
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xii. 4-5
But what did I leave unachieved, of all
The ends for which I did unite the people ?
Whereof before the judgement-seat of Time
The mighty mother of the Olympian gods.
Black Earth, would best bear witness, for 'twas I
Removed her many boundary-posts " implanted :
^re then she was a slave, but now is free. ■^K'
/And many sold away I^did bring home
To god-built Athens, this one sold unjustly.
That otherjustlxj._othiers-tEatTiad iled
From'dire constraint of need, uttering no more
Their Attic tongue, so widely had they wandered,
And others suffering base slavery
Even here, trembling before their master;^' humour
I did set free. /These deeds I made prevaiT
Adjusting might and right to fit together,
/And did accomplish even as Τ had promised.
And rules of law alike for base and noble, , ,
Jitting straight Justice unto each man's case, ^J-^
I drafted. Had anofKerTRaiir myself '/)
Taken the goad, unwise and covetous.
He'd not have held the people ! Had I willed
Now that pleased one of the opposing parties.
And then whate'er the other party bade them.
The city had been bereft of many men.
Wherefore I stood at guard on every side,
A wolf at bay among a pack of houndsJ_______«_
And again in his taunting reply to the later 5
querulous complaints of both the parties :
If openly I must reprove the people.
Ne'er in the dreams of sleep could they have seen
" i.e. posts marking mortgaged estates.
^ πρόσθΐν SedovXevKvTa vdv δ' iXevdipa Ziegler.
* ωσάν cod. et fr. Berol. : ώ? 7^ ? ed.
' κρατ€€ίΐ'ομου cod., κρ ■ τηομου fr. Berol. : Kparei | νόμου edd.
nonnulli ; cf. vi. 1 .
* διαφάδην coni. edd.
39
ARISTOTLE
evSovres elSov. . . .
όσοι he μ^ίζους καΐ βίαν άμείνονες
aivoXev αν μ€ και φιλον ττοιοίατο•
et γάρ τις άλλος, φησί, ταύτης της τιμής €τυχ€ν,
ουκ αν κατβσχε 8ημον, ουδ' επαυσατο
ττρίν άνταράζας ττΐαρ^ e^etAev γάλα'
€γώ 8e τούτων ωσττερ ev μ€ταιχμίω
όρος κατβστην.
1 XIII. Την μ€ν ονν άποΒημίαν €ποιησατο δια
ταύτας τάς αίτιας. Σ^όλωνος δ' άποΒημησαντος,
€Τί της πόλεως τεταραγμενης , επΙ μεν ετη τετταρα
Βιηγον εν ησυχία- τω δβ πεμτττω μετά την Έόλωνος
άρχην ουκ κατέστησαν άρχοντα δια την στάσιν,
καΐ ττάλιν ετει ττεμτττω διά^ την αύτην αΐτίαν
2 άναρχίαν εποίησαν, μετά Βε ταϋτα δια των αυτών
χρόνων Δα/χασια? αίρεθείς άργων ετη Βυο και δυο
μήνας ηρζεν, εως εζηλάθη βία της άρχης. είτ*
εΒοζεν αύτοΐς δια το στασιάζειν άρχοντας ελεσ^αι
Βεκα, πέντε μεν εύπατρώών τρεις δε άγροίκων
δυο δε Βημιουργών, και ούτοι τον μετά Δαμ.ασιαν
ηρζαν ενιαυτόν. ω και Βηλον δτι μεγίστην €Ϊχεν
δυνα/χιν ο άρχων φαίνονται γάρ aiei στασιάζοντες
3 περί ταυττ^? της άρχης. δλως δε διετεΆουι^ νοσοΰν-
τες τα προς εαυτούς, οι μεν άρχην και πρόφασιν
έχοντες την των χρεών άποκοπην (^συνεβεβηκει γάρ
αύτοΐς γεγονεναι πενησιν), οί δε τη πολιτεία
Βυσχεραίνοντες δια το μεγάλην^ γεγονεναι ^ετα-
βολην, ενιοι δε δια την προς αλλήλους φιλονικίαν .
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xii. 5— xiii. 4
The things that they have now . . .
While all the greater and the mightier men
Might praise me and might deem me as a friend ;
for had another, he says, won this office,
He had not checked the people nor refrained,
Ere he had churned and robbed the milk of cream ;
But I as 'twere betwixt their armed hosts
A frontier-post did stand.
XIII. Accordingly Solon made his journey abroad 1
for these reasons. And when he had gone abroad,
though the city was still disturbed, foi^our years
they kept at peace ; but in the fifth year after Solon's 589 b.c. ?
archonship because of party strife they did not
appoint an archon, and again in the fifth year after "iss b.c. ?
that they enacted a suspension of the archonship for
the same cause. After this at the same interval of 2
time Damasias was elected Archon, and held thessiBx.?
post for two years and two months, until he was
driven out of the office by force. Then because of y
the civil strife they decided to elect ten Archons,
five from the nobles, three from the farmers and two "
from the artisans, and these held office for the year 579 b.c. ?
after Damasias. This shows that the Archon had
very great power ; for we find that they were always
engaging in party strife about this office. And they 3
continued in a state of general internal disorder,
some having as their incentive and excuse the can-
cellation of debts (for it had resulted in their having
become poor), others discontented with the constitu-
tion because a great change had taken place, and
some because of their mutual rivalry. The factions 4
^ ■κΐα.ρ edd. ex Plutarcho : ττυαρ cod.
^ δίά fr. Berol. : om. cod.
^ <ού> μβ-γάλην VoUgraf.
41
ARISTOTLE
4 ήσαν δ' at στάσ€ίς τρεις• μία μεν των παραλίων,
ών προειστηκει Μεγακλης 6 ^Αλκμεωνος, οίττ€ρ
iSoKovv /ζάλιστα Βίώκβίν την μεσην ττοΧιτβίαν
άλλη δε των π€8ιακών, οι την ολίγαρχιαν εζητονν,
ηγβΐτο δ αυτών Αυκοΰργος- τρίτη δ η των
Βι,ακρίων, ζφ* rj τεταγμένος ην Πεισίστρατο?,
5 Βημοτίκώτατος eii^at 8οκών. ττροσεκεκόσμηντο δε
τουτοίς ο? τε αφηρημένοι τα χρεα δια την άπορίαν,
καΐ οι τω γένει μη καθαροί δια τον φόβον σημεΐον
δ' δτι μετά την των τυράννων κατάλυσιν εποίησαν
^ιαφηφισμόν^ ως πολλών κοινωνούντων της πολι-
τείας ου προσήκον, εΐχον δ έκαστοι τάς επω-
νυμίας άπο τών τόπων εν οΐς εγεώργουν.
1 XIV. /^ημοτικώτατος δ' efi'ai Βοκών ο Πεισί-
στρατο? και σφό^ρ* εύΒοκιμηκώς εν τω προς
Μ,εγαρεας πολεμώ, κατατραυματίσας εαυτόν συν-
επεισε τον Βημον, ως ύπο τών αντιστασιωτών
ταύτα πεπονθώς, φυλακην εαυτώ Souvai του
σώματος, ^Αριστίωνος γράφοντος την γνώμην.
λαβών δε τους κορυνηφόρους καλουμένους , επανα-
στάς μετά τούτων τω Βημω κατεσχε την άκρό-
πολιν έ'τει Βευτερω^ και τριακοστώ μετά την τών
2 νόμων θεσιν, επί Κωμεου άρχοντος, λέγεται δε
Σόλωνα Πεισιστράτου την φυλακην αιτούντος άντι-
λε^αι, και εΙπεΐν οτι τών μεν εϊη σοφώτερος τών
δ' άι/δρειότερο?• όσοι μεν γάρ άγνοοΰσι Πεισι-
^ διαψηφισμον edd. : διαφημισμον cod.
* δ' (i.e. τΐτάρτψ) coni. Bauer.
" i.e. by Solon's legislation.
*" Perhaps the hostilities that ended in the Athenians'
capture of Nisaea about 570 b.c.
42
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xiii. 4— xiv. 2
were three : one was the party of the Men of the
Coast, whose head was Megacles the son of Alcmaeon,
and they were thought chiefly to aim at the middle
form of constitution ; another was the party of the
Men of the Plain, who desired the oligarchy, and their
leader was Lycurgus ; third was the party of the
Hillmen, which had appointed Peisistratus over it,
as he was thought to be an extreme advocate of the
people. And on the side of this party were also 5
arrayed, from the motive of poverty, those who had
been deprived <^ of the debts due to them, and, from
the motive of fear, those who were not of pure
descent ; and this is proved by the fact that after the
deposition of the tyrants the Athenians enacted a
revision of the roll, because many people shared the
citizenship who had no right to it. The different
parties derived their names from the places where
their farms were situated.
XIV. Peisistratus, being thought to be an extreme 1
advocate of the people, and having won great fame
in the war against Megara,** inflicted a wound on
himself with his own hand and then gave out that
it had been done by the members of the opposite
factions, and so persuaded the people to give him a
bodyguard, the resolution being proposed by Aristo-
phon. He was given the retainers called Club-bearers,
and with their aid he rose against the people and
seized the Acropolis, in the thirty-second year after-
the enactment of his laws, in the archonship of560B.c
Comeas. It is said that when Peisistratus asked for 2
the guard Solon opposed the request, and said that
he was wiser than some men and braver than others
— he was wiser than those who did not know that
43
ARISTOTLE
στρατον εττίπθίμ^νον rvpavvihi, σοφώτΐρος elvat
τούτων, δσοι δ' ειδότβ? κατασιωπώσιν , avSpeio-
τερος. €7Γ€ΐ 8e Χ^γων ουκ eneudev, ^ζαραμ^νος τα
οττλα ττρο των θυρών αύτος μ€ν βφη β€βοηθηκ€ΐ^αί
TTJ πατριοί καθ^ όσον ην δυνατός {ηΒη γαρ σφόΒρα
πρ€σβύτης ην), άζίοΰν 8e καΐ τους άλλους ταύτό
3 τοϋτο TTOLelv. ΊΰόΧων μεν ούν ούΒβν ηνυσεν τοτ€
τταρακαλών ΙΙεισίστρατος 8e λαβών την αρχήν
8ίωκ€ΐ τα κοινά πολιτικώς μάλλον η τυραννικώς .
οϋπω 8e της αρχής ερριζωμάνης ομοφρονησαντες
οι 7Τ€ρι τον MeyaicAea και τον Αυκοΰργον εζεβα-
λον αύτον €κτω eVet μετά την ττρώτην καταστασιν,
4 6^' Ήγησίου άρχοντος. eVet δε δωδεκ-άτω^ μετά
ταΰτα περιελαυνόμενος ο Μεγακλής τή στάσει
πάλιν επικηρυκευσάμενος προς τον ΙΙεισίστρατον,
εφ^ ω τε την θυγατέρα αύτοΰ ληφεται κατηγαγεν
αύτον άρχαίως και λίαν απλώς, προ^ιασπειρας
γάρ λόγον ως της ^Αθηνάς καταγούσης ΥΙεισί-
στρατον, και γυναίκα μεγάλην και καλήν εζευρών,
ώς μεν 'Ηρόδοτο? φησιν εκ του 8ημου τών
riatat'ecuv, ώς δ' ενιοι λεγουσιν εκ του Κολυττοΰ
στεφανόπωλιν θρήτταν fj όνομα Φύη, την θεόν
άπομιμησάμενος τω κόσμω συνεισηγαγεν μετ
αύτοΰ, και ό μεν ΥΙεισίστρατος εφ άρματος
είσηλαυνε παραιβατούσης της γυναικός, οι δ εν
τω άστει προσκυνοΰντες ε^εχοντο θαυμάζοντες.
1 XV. Ή μεν ούν πρώτη κάθοδος εγενετο τοιαύτη,
μετά δε ταΰτα ώ?" έζεπεσε το 8εύτερον ετει μάλιστα
ζβΒόμω μετά την κάθοΒον, — ού γάρ πολύν χρόνον
^ τίτάρτφ Thompson.
" ώί del. Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
44
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xiv. 2— xv. 1
Peisistratus was aiming at tyranny, and braver than
those who knew it but held their tongues. But as
he failed to carry them with him by saying this, he
brought his armour out " in front of his door and said
that for his part he had come to his country's aid as
far as he could (for he was now a very old man), and
that he called on the others also to do the same.
Solon's exhortations on this occasion had no effect ; 3
and Peisistratus having seized the government pro-
ceeded to carry on the public business in a manner "/-^
more constitutional than tyrannical. But before his
government had taken root the partisans of Megacles
and Lycurgus made common cause and expelled him,
in the sixth year after his first establishment, in the 556 b.c
archonship of Hegesias. In the twelfth year after 4
this Megacles, being harried by party faction, made
overtures again to Peisistratus, and on terms of re-
ceiving his daughter in marriage brought him back,
in an old-fashioned and extremely simple manner.
Having first spread a rumour that Athena was bring-
ing Peisistratus back, he found a tall and beautiful
woman, according to Herodotus ^ a member of the
Paeanian deme, but according to some accounts a
Thracian flower-girl from Colly tus named Phye,
dressed her up to look like the goddess, and brought
her to the city with him, and Peisistratus drove in a
chariot with the woman standing at his side, while the
people in the city marvelled and received them with
acts of reverence.
XV. In this way his first return took place. After- 1
wards, as he was expelled a second time in about the
seventh year after his return — for he did not main- 539 rc
tain his hold for long, but came to be afraid of both
" Apparently, for some younger man to use. * i. 60.
45
ARISTOTLE
κατ€σχ€ν, άλλα δια το μη βούλβσθαι rfj τον Meya-
κΧΙους θυγατρί συγγίνεσθαι φοβηθείς άμφοτερας
2 τα? στάσζΐζ ύπβζηλθβν — • καΐ^ πρώτον μβν συν-
φκισε π€ρΙ τον θ€ρμαίον κόλπον χωρίον ο καλείται
'Ραίκηλος, €Κ€Ϊθ€ν δε TraprjXdev ei? τους nepl
nayyaiop' τόπους, odev χρηματισάμ€νοζ και
στρατί,ώτας μισθωσάμ€νος , βλθών ei? 'Έιρ€τρίαν
evheKaTO) πάλιν eVei τό^ πρώτον ανασώσασθαι βία
την άρχην βπβχβιρβι, σνμπροθυμονμ€νων αυτώ
πολΧών μ€ν καΐ άλλων μάλιστα δε Θηβαίων και
Αυγ8άμιος τον Να^ιΌυ, έτι δε τών Ιππ€ων των
3 εχόντων ev 'Ερέτρια την πολιτβίαν. νικησας δε
την ετΓΐ Παλλτ^νιδι μάχην και λαβών την πόλιν
και παρελόμβνος τον 8ημον τα όπλα, κατ€Ϊχ€ν η^η
την Tvpavviha β€βαίως, και Νάζον ίλών άρχοντα
4 κατίστησβ Ανγ^αμιν . τταρειλε^ δε του Βημου τά
όπλα τόνδε τον τρόπον Ιζοπλασίαν iv τω θησ€ΐω*
ποιησάμ€νος βκκλησιάζβιν Ιπβχείρ^ι, της δε φωνής
€χάλασ€ν^ μικρόν, ου φασκόντων δε κατακούΐΐν
ε/<:ε'λευσεν αυτού? προσαναβηναι προς το πρόπυλον
της άκροπόλξως ίνα γεγώνη μα?<λον• iv ω δ'
€Κ€Ϊνος Βιίτριβζ Βημηγορών, άνβλόντΐς οι εττι
τοντω τβταγμίνοι τά όπλα και κατακλησαντβς ει?
τά πλησίον οικήματα τον θησ€ίον 8ΐ€σημηναν
δ €λθόντ€ς προς τον ΙΙβισίστρατον. ο δε εττει τόι^
άλλον λόγον εττετε'λεσεν, είπε και ττερι τών οπλών
το γεγονός ως ου χρη θαυμάζειν ούδ' άθνμβΐν,
^ καΐ fortasse delendum Kenyon. * τύτ€ Blass.
' irapelXero Rutherford.
* Άνακΐίφ legunt nonnulli.
* Kontos : τ a^ec (?) cod. : φθέγ^ΐσθα,ι δ'
έσίΓούδασΐν Wilamowitz-Kaibel : καΐ χρόνον irpoa^yoptvev
Kenyon.
46
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xv. 1-5
the factions owing to his unwilhngness to live with
Megacles' daughter as his wife, and secretly with-
drew— ; and first he collected a settlement at a place 2
near the Gulf of Thermae called Rhaecelus, but from
there he went on to the neighbourhood of Pangaeus,
from where he got money and hired soldiers, and in
the eleventh year went again to Eretria, and now for 528 b.c?
the first time set about an attempt to recover his
power by force, being supported in this by a number
of people, especially the Thebans and Lygdamis of
Naxos, and also the knights who controlled the
government of Eretria. Winning the battle of 3
Pallenis," he seized the government and disarmed the
people ; and now he held the tyranny firmly, and he
took Naxos and appointed Lygdamis ruler. The 4
way in which he disarmed the people was this : he
held an armed muster at the Temple of Theseus, and
began to hold an Assembly, but he lowered his voice
a little, and when they said they could not hear him,
he told them to come up to the forecourt of the Acro-
polis, in order that his voice might carry better ; and
while he used up time in making a speech, the men
told off for this purpose gathered up the arms,^ locked
them up in the neighbouring buildings of the Temple
of Theseus, and came and informed Peisistratus. He, 5
when he had finished the rest of his speech, told his
audience not to be surprised at what had happened
about their arms, and not to be dismayed, but to go
" The deme Pallene, dedicated to Athena Pallenis, lay just
N.E. of Athens.
* The citizens had piled their arms when Peisistratus
began to make a speech, and left them behind when they
went up the hill.
47
ARISTOTLE
αλλ απβλθόντας εττι τών ί^ίων eti^ai, των δε κοινών
αυτός €7ημ€λήσ€σθαί πάντων.
1 XVI. Ή μ€ν οδν ΐΐ€ίσίστράτου τυραννίς i^
ο-ρχης re κατέστη τούτον τον τρόπον καΐ μ€τα-
2 βολάς €σχζ τοσαντας . 8ίωκ€ΐ δ' ο Πεισίστρατο?,
ωσπβρ βϊρηται, τα περί την πάλιν μετρίως και
μάλλον πολιτικώς η τυραννικώς• ev τ€ γαρ τοις
άλλοις φιλάνθρωπος ην και πράος και τοις άμαρ-
τανουσι συγγνωμονικός , και 8η και τοις άπόροις
Χπροβ^άνειζε χρήματα προς τάς εργασίας, ώστε
3ίβιατρεφεσθαι γεωργοΰντας . τοντο δ' εποίει hvolv
χάριν, ίνα μήτε εν τω άστει Βιατρίβωσιν άλλα
διεσπαρμένοι κατά την χώραν, και όπως εν-
ποροΰντες τών μέτριων και προς τοις ίδιοι? δντες
μητ επιθνμώσι μήτε σχολάζωσιν επίιαελεισ^αι
4 τών κοινών. άμα δε συνεβαινεν αύτώ και τάς
προσόδους γινεσ^αι μείζονς εζεργαζομενης της
■χωράς' επραττετο γαρ απο τών γιγνομενων Βεκά-
5 την. διό και τους κατά Βημους κατεσκεύασε^
Βικαστας , και αύτος ^ζηει πολλάκις εις την χώραν
επισκοπών και διαλύωι^ τους Βιαφερομενονς , όπως
μη καταβαίνοντες εις το άστυ παραμελώσι τών
6 έργων. τοιαύτης γάρ τίνος εξόδου τω Πεισί-
στρατο) γιγνομενης συμβηναί φασι τά περί τον εν
τω Ύμηττώ γεωργοΰντα το κληθέν ύστερον χωρίον
ατελές. ώων γάρ τίνα παντελώς πέτρας σκά-
πτοντα και εργαζόμενον, δια το ^αυ/^άσαι τον
τταιδα εκελευσεν ερεσθαι τί γίγνεται εκ του χωρίου'
ο δε " οσα κακά και οδιίι^αι " εφη, " και τούτων
τών κακών και τών ό8υνών^ ΐίεισίστρατον δει
^ Wilamowitz-Kaibel : κατεσκβναξ'ΐ cod.
* [τών κακών καΐ ύδινώΐ'] Hude.
48
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xv. 5— x\i. 6
away and occupy themselves with their private affairs, ' ι
while he would attend to all public business. ' ^
XVI. This was the way, therefore, in which the 1
tyranny of Peisistratus was originally set up, and
this is a list of the changes that it underwent.
Peisistratus 's administration of the state was, as has 2
been said," moderate, and more constitutional than
tyrannic ; he was kindly and mild in everything, and
in particular he was merciful to offenders, and more-
over he advanced loans of money to the poor for their
industries, so that they might support themselves by i/
farming. In doing this he had two objects, to pre- 3
vent their stopping in the city and make them stay
scattered about the country, and to cause them to
have a moderate competence and be engaged in their
private affairs, so as not to desire nor to have time
to attend to public business.* And also the land's 4
being thoroughly cultivated resulted in increasing his
revenues ; for he levied a tithe from the produce.
And for this reason he organized the Local Justices," 5
and often went to the country on circuit in person,
inspecting and settling disputes, in order that men
might not neglect their agriculture by coming into
the city. For it was when Peisistratus was making 6
an expedition of this kind that the affair of the man
on Hymettus cultivating the farm afterwards called
Tax-free Farm is said to have occurred. He saw a
man at farm-work, digging mere rocks, and because
of his surprise ordered his servant to ask what crop
the farm grew ; and the man said, " All the aches and
pains that there are, and of these aches and pains
" ch. xiv. § 3.
'' This policy will be found expressed in general formulae
in Politics 1311 a 13, 1318 b 6, 1319 a 30, 1320 b 7.
" See xxvi. 5, liii. 1.
Ε 49
ARISTOTLE
λαββΐν ΤΎΐν ^€κάτην." ο μ€ν οΰν άνθρωπος άπ-
εκρίνατο άγνοών, 6 8e Πεισίστρατο? rjadels δια
την τταρρησίαν και την φιλ^ργιαν areXri άτταντων
7 €ποίησ€ν αυτόν. ovSev δε το πλήθος ουδ' iv τοις
άλλοις παρηνώχλ€ΐ^ κατά την αρχήν, αλλ' atet
παρ€σκβύαζ€ν βίρήνην και ^τηρβι την ησυχιαν
διό καΐ πολλάκις άκούβιν ήν^ ώς ή Πεισίστρατου
τυραννίς 6 εττι Κρόνου βίος €Ϊη• συνββη γάρ ύστερον
διαδε^α/χενων τών νΐ€ων πολλω "γβνέσθαι τρα-
8 χυτβραν την αρχήν. μ€γιστον δε τταντων ην τών
^ψημένων το Βημοτικόν είναι τω ήθει και
φιλάνθρωπον. ev τε yap τοΓ? άλλοι? ε^ουλετο
πάντα διοικεΐν κατά τους νόμους ουδερ,ι'αν εαυτώ
ττλεονε^ιαν διδου?, και 77θτε προσκληθείς φόνου
8ικην ει? "ΑρειΌν Trciyov αυτό? ρ,εν άπτ^νττ^σεν ώ?
άπολογησόμενος ό δε προσκαλεσάμβνος φοβηθείς
9 ελιπεν. διό και ττολυν χρόνον εμεινεν ev' ττ] άρχη,
και οτ' εκττε'σοι ττάλιν ανελάμβανε ραΒίως. εβού-
λοντο γάρ και τών γνωρίμων και τών δημοτικών
οι πολλοί• τους μεν γάρ ταΐς όρ,ιλιαι? του? δε ται?
ει? τά ί'δια βοηθέ ίαις προσήγετο, και προς άμ-
10 φοτερους επεφύκει καλώς. ήσαν δε και τοι?
Αθηναίοις οι περί τών τυράννων νόμοι πράοι
κατ εκείνους τους καιρούς οι τ άλλοι και 8ή
και ο μάλιστα καθήκων προς την της τυραννιδο?
κατάστασιν.* νόμος γάρ αύτοΐς ην οδε• θεσμια
τάδε Αθηναίων και πάτρια, εάν τίνες τυραννεΐν
^ Wyse : παρωχλ€ΐ cod.
* άκού€ΐν ijv Blass e [Plat.] Ilipparch. 229 β : abrasus cod.
' iv supplevit Blass.
* κατάστασιν insertuni a Wilaniowitz-Kaibel.
50
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xvi. 6-10
Peisistratus has to get the tithe." The man did not
know who it was when he answered, but Peisistratus
was pleased by his free speech and by his industry,
and made him free from all taxes. And in all other 7
matters too he gave the multitude no trouble during
his rule, but always worked for peace and safeguai-ded
tranquillity ; so that men were often to be heard
saying that the tyranny of Peisistratus was the Golden
Age of Cronos ; for it came about later when his sons
had succeeded him that the government became
much harsher. And the greatest of all the things 8
said of him was that he was popular and kindly in
temper. For he was willing to administer everything y
according to the laws in all matters, never giving
himself any advantage ; and once in particular when
he was summoned to the Areopagus to be tried on a
charge of murder, he appeared in person to make his
defence, and the issuer of the summons was frightened
and left. Owing to this he remained in his office for 9
a long period, and every time that he was thrown
out of it he easily got it back again. For both the
notables and the men of the people were most of
them willing for him to govern, since he won over the
former by his hospitality and the latter by his assist-
ance in their private affairs , and was good-natured
to both. And also the laws of Athens concerning lo
tyrants were mild at those periods, among the rest
particularly the one that referred to the establish-
ment of tyranny. For they had the following law :
' These are the ordinances and ancestral principles
of Athens : if any persons rise in insurrection in
51
ARISTOTLE
€7τανιστώνται [eTrl τυραννί8ίΥ η συγκαθισττ) την
τυραννίδα ατιμον elvai αντον καΐ yevog.^
1 XVII. ΐΐ€ΐσίστρατος μ^ν οΰν εγκατβγ-ήρασβ rfj
apxfj καΐ airedave νοσησας βττΐ Φιλόν6ω άρχοντος,
αφ ου μβν κατβστη το πρώτον τύραννος βτη
τριάκοντα καΐ τρία βιώσας, α δ iv ττ) αρχ-η
8te/xeivev βνος δέοντα είκοσι, e^euye γαρ τα Χοίττά.
2 διό καΐ φανξρώς ληροΰσι^ φάσκοντ€ς €ρώμ€νον
elvai ΐΐβίσίστρατον Έόλωνος καΐ στρατηγ€Ϊν ev
τω ττρός Meyapea? ττοΧάμω περί Έαλαμΐνος• ου
γαρ ivSexeTai ταΐς ηλικίαις, βάν τις άναλογίζηται
τον εκατβρου βιον και βφ ου αττεθανεν άρχοντος.
τ€λ€υτησαντος δε Πεισιστράτου κατ€Ϊχον οι υΐίΐς
την αρχήν, ττροαγαγόντβς* τα πράγματα τον αύτον
τρόπον, ήσαν δε δυο μ€ν €Κ της γαμ€της Ιππίας
και "Ιππαρχος, δυο δ' €Κ της ^Αργείας Ίοφών και
'Υίγησίστρατος ω παρωνύμιον ην Θετταλο?.
3 ξ,γημεν^ γαρ Πεισίστρατο? ef "Αργού? ανδρός
^Αργβίου θυγατέρα ω όνομα ην Τόργιλος, Ύιμώνασ-
σαν, ην πρότ€ρον €σχ€ν γυναίκα ^Αρχΐνος 6 Αμ-
πρακιώτης των Κυι/τελιδώι^• δθβν και η προς τους
Αργβιους ανέστη φιλία, και συνβμαχβσαντο χίλιοι
την ετΓΐ Παλληνιδι μάχην, ΥΙγησιτρατου κομι-
σαντος. γτ^ρ,αι δε' ^ασι την ^Αργίίαν οι μέν
€κπ€σόντα το πρώτον, οΐ δε κατέχοντα την άρχην.
1 XVIII. Ήσαν δε κύριοι μέν τών πραγμάτων
δια τα άζιώματα και δια τα? ηλικίας "Ιππαρχος
και ΊτττΓία?, πρεσβύτερος δ' ων 6 *\ππίας και τη
1 Keil.
* ijirav δέ . . . y^vos] totus locus conflatus et interpolatus ? ed.
' Χηροΰσιν <οί> edd. * vpoayovres edd.
' <,έττ^4γημΐν edd., coll. Pint. Cato mat. 24.
52
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xvi. 10— xviii. 1
order to govern tyrannically, or if any person assists
in establishing the tyranny, he himself and his family
shall be disfranchised.'''
XVII. Peisistratus,therefore,grew old in office, and 1
died of disease in the archonship of Philoneos, having 528 b.c.
lived thirty-three years since he first established
himself as tyrant, but the time that he remained in
office was nineteen^ years, as he was in exile for the
remainder. Therefore the story that Peisistratus was 2
a lover of Solon and that he commanded in the
war against Megara for the recovery of Salamis
is clearly nonsense, for it is made impossible by their
ages, if one reckons up the life of each and the
archonship in which he died. When Peisistratus was
dead, his sons held the government, carrying on
affairs in the same Λvay. He had two sons by his
wedded wife, Hippias and Hipparchus, and two by his
Argive consort, lophon and Hegesistratus surnamed
Thettalus. For Peisistratus married a consort from 3
Argos, Timonassa, the daughter of a man of Argos
named Gorgilus, who had previously been the wife
of Archinus, a man of Ambracia of the Cypselid
family. This was the cause of Peisistratus 's friend-
ship with Argos, and a thousand Argives brought by
Hegesistratus fought for him in the battle of Pallenis."
Some people date his marriage with the Argive lady
during his first banishment, others in a period of
office.
XVIII. Affairs were now under the authority of 1
Hipparchus and Hippias, owing to their station and
their ages, but the government was controlled by
" The genuineness of § 10 may be questioned. ^
* Politics 1315 b 31 says ' seventeen.'
" See XV. 8.
53
ARISTOTLE
φύσβι τΓολίτίκος /cat βμφρων εττεστάτει της άρχης'
6 δε "Ιππαρχος τταιδιώδτ^ς• καΐ ερωτικός καΐ
φιλόμουσος ην {και τους πβρι ^Ανακρέοντα και
Έιίμωνώην και τους άλλους ποιητάς ούτος ην 6
2 μεταπεμπόμβνος) y Θετταλος Se νεώτερος πολύ και
τω βίω θρασύς και υβριστής, άφ^ ου και συνέβη
την αρχήν αύτοΐς yerea^ac πάντων των κακών,
ερασθεις γαρ του 'Αρμοδίου και ^ιαμαρτάνων της
προς αυτόν φιλίας ου κατείχε τήν οργήν, αλλ' εν
τε τοις άλλοις ενεσημαίνετο πικρώς και το
τελενταΐον μελλουσαν αύτοϋ τήν άΒελφήν κανη-
φορεΐν ΐΐαναθηναίοις εκώλυσεν, λοώορήσας τι τον
ΆρμόΒιον ώς μαλακόν οντά' όθεν συνέβη παρ-
οζυνθεντα τον ΆρμόΒιον και τον ^ Αριστογείτονα
3 πράττειν τήν πράξιν μετεχόντων^ πολλών.^ ή8η
δε παρατηροΰντες εν άκροπόλει τοις Παι^-
αθηναίοις Ίππίαν {ετύγχανεν γαρ ούτος μεν δε-
χόμενος 6 δ' "\ππαρχος άποστελλων τήν πομπήν),
ιδοΓτε? τινά τών κοινωνούντων της πράξεως
φιλανθρώπως εντυγχάνοντα τω Ιππία και νομί-
σαντες μηνύειν, βουλόμενοί τι δράσαι προ της
συλλήψεως, καταβάντες και προεζαναστάντες τών
άλλων, τον μεν "Ιππαρχον 8ιακοσμοΰντα τήν
4 πομπήν παρά το Αεωκόρειον άπεκτειναν, τήν δ'
ολην ελυμήναντο πράζιν, αυτών δ' 6 μεν 'Αρ-
μόδιος ευθέως ετελεύτησεν ΰπο τών 8ορυφόρων,
r
^ μετά ΊΓοΧιτών nonnulli legunt.
* <οΰ> πολλών Kaibel e Thuc.
54
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xviii. 1-4
Hippias, who was the elder and was statesmanUke
and wise by nature ; whereas Hipparchus was fond
of amusement and love-making, and had literary
tastes : it was he who brought to Athens poets such as
Anacreon and Simonides, and the others. Thettalus 2
was much younger, and bold and insolent in his mode
of life, which proved to be the source of all their mis-
fortunes. For he fell in love with Harmodius, and
when his advances were continually unsuccessful he
could not restrain his anger, but displayed it bitterly
in various ways, and finally when Harmodius's sister
was going to be a Basket-carrier " in the procession
at the Panathenaic Festival he prevented her by
uttering some insult against Harmodius as being
effeminate ; and the consequent wrath of Harmodius
led him and Aristogeiton to enter on their plot with a
number ** of accomplices. At the Panathenaic Festival 3
on the Acropolis they were already keeping a watch 514 b.c•.
on Hippias (who happened to be receiving the pro-
cession, while Hipparchus was directing its start),
when they saw one of their partners in the plot con-
versing in a friendly way with Hippias. They thought
that he was giving information, and wishing to do
something before their arrest they went down and
took the initiative without waiting for their confeder-
ates, killing Hipparchus as he was arranging the pro-
cession by the Leocoreum." This played havoc with 4
the whole plot. Of the two of them Harmodius was
at once dispatched by the spearmen, and Aristogeiton
" Baskets holding the requisites for the religious service
were carried by maidens of high birth.
* Thucydides (vi. 56. 3) says ' not many.'
" A monument to three daughters of Leon who in obedience
to an oracle gave their lives for their country by running
against the enemy's ranks in battle.
55
ARISTOTLE
6 δ' Άρίστογβίτων varepov, συλληφθείς και ττολυν
χρόνον αΐκισθβίς. κατηγόρησεν δ' ev ταΐς άνάγ-
καίς πολλών οι καΐ rfj φύσει των επιφανών και
φίλοι τοις τνράννοις ήσαν. ου γαρ iSvvavro παρα-
χρήμα λαβείν ονΒεν 'ίχνος της πράξεως, αλλ' 6
λεγόμενος λόγος ώς 6 Ιππίας αποστησας απο
των οπλών τους πομπευοντας εφώρασε τους τα
εγχειρίδια έχοντας ουκ άληθ-ής εστίν ου γαρ
επεμπον τότε^ μεθ^ οπλών, αλλ' ύστερον τοΰτο
5 κατεσκεύασεν 6 ^ημος. κατηγορεί δε των του
τυράννου φίλων, ώς μεν οι δημοτικοί φασιν,
επίτηδες ίνα άσεβησαιεν άμα και γενοιντο ασθενείς
άνελόντες τους αναίτιους και φίλους βαυτώρ», ώς
δ' ενιοι λεγουσιν , ούχι πλαττόμενος αλλά τους
6 συνει^ότας έμηνυεν. και τέλος ώς ουκ ε8ύνατο
πάντα ποιών άποθανεΐν, επαγγειλάμενος ώς άλλους
μηνυσων πολλούς και πείσας αύτω τον Ιππιαν
8οΰναι την Βεζιάν πίστεως χάριν, ώς ελαβεν
όνεώίσας δτι τω φονεΐ του άΒελφοΰ την 8εζιάν
Βε8ωκε, οϋτω παρώζυνε τον Ίππίαν ώσθ* ύπό της
οργής ου κατεΐχεν εαυτόν άλλα σπασάμενος την
μάχαιραν Βιεφθειρεν αυτόν.
1 XIX. Μετά δε ταϋτα συνεβαινεν πολλώ τραχύ -
τεραν eiv'at την τυραννίδα- και γαρ δια το τιμωρών^
τω ά8ελφώ [και δια τό]^ πολλούς άνηρηκεναι και
2 εκβεβληκεναι πάσιν ην άπιστος και πικρός. Ιτει
δε τετάρτω μ,άλιστα μετά τον Ίππαρχου θάνατον,
επεί κακώς είχεν τα εν τω άστει, την ^ίουνυχίαν
^ €ΊΓ€μ.ττον τότε Rutherford : επεμττοντο cod.
* Kokalos : τιμωρών cod. ' Kokalos.
" A hill above the sea S. of the city, commanding Peiraeus
and the two other harbours.
56
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xviii. 4— xix. 2
died later, having been taken into custody and
tortured for a long time. Under the strain of the
tortures he gave the names of a number of men that
belonged by birth to families of distinction, and were
friends of the tyrants, as confederates. For they
were not able immediately to find any trace of the
plot, but the current story that Hippias made the
people in the procession fall out away from their arms
and searched for those that retained their daggers is
not true, for in those days they did not walk in the ^--o/
procession armed, but this custom was instituted Ο
later by the democracy. According to the account 5
of people of popular sympathies, Aristogeiton accused
the tyrants' friends for the purpose of making his
captors commit an impiety and weaken themselves
at the same time by making away with men who were
innocent and their own friends, but others say that
his accusations were not fictitious but that he dis-
closed his actual accomplices. Finally, as do what 6
he would he was unable to die, he offered to give
information against many more, and induced Hippias
to give him his right hand as a pledge of good faith,
and when he grasped it he taunted him with giving
his hand to his brother's murderer, and so enraged
Hippias that in his anger he could not control himself
but drew his dagger and made away with him.
XIX. After this it began to come about that the 1
tyranny was much harsher ; for Hippias 's numerous
executions and sentences of exile in revenge for his
brother led to his being suspicious of everybody and
embittered. About four years after Hipparchus's 2
death the state of affairs in the city was so bad that
he set about fortifying Munychia,** with the intention
57
ARISTOTLE
€7Τ€χβίρησ€ τβίχίζβιν, ώς €Κ€Ϊ^ μ€θώρνσόμ€νος . ev
τούτοις δ' ων e^eneaev νττο KAeojUeVofs• του Λα/ce-
8'ήμονος βασίΧ4α>ς , χρησμών γινομένων ael τοΐς
Αάκωσι κατάλυαν την τυραννίδα δια Totavh* αίτίαν.
3 οι φνγά^βς ων οι ^Αλκμεωνβαι ττροβιστηκ€σαν
αύτοΙ μέν δι' αυτών ουκ iSxjvavTO ττοιησασθαι την
κάθοΒον, αλλ' aiet προσβπταιον ev re γαρ τοΐς
άλλοις οΐς βπραττον Βιβσφάλλοντο, και τ€ΐχίσαντ€ς
iv Tjj χωρά ΑαφύΒριον το ύπ€ρ ΥΙάρνηθος, €ΐς ο
συνβζηλθόν Ttve? τών €κ του αστ^ω?, έζβπολιορκη-
θησαν ύττο τών τυράννων, όθεν ύστερον ei'?^ ταύτην
την συμφοράν η^ον iv τοΐς σκολίοις^'
atat Αειφύ^ριον προΒωσβταιρον,
οίους άνδρα? απώλεσα?, ^ααχεσ^αι
αγαθούς re και €ύπατρι8ας,
οι τότ έ'δει^αΐ' οΐων πατέρων eaav.
4 άποτυγχάνοντ€ς οΰν iv άττασι τοΐς άλλοις €μισθώ-
σαντο τον iv Α^λφοΐς ν€ών οίκοΒομβΐν, odev ηύ-
πόρησαν χρημάτων προς την τών Αακώνων βοηθζίαν.
η δ€ ΙΙυθία προίφζρβν aiel τοΐς Αακζ^αιμονιοις
χρηστηριαζομένοις iλ€υθepoΰv τάς Α^τ^να?, et?
τοΰθ^ €ως* προΰτρζφζ τους Σιπαρτιάτας, καίπ€ρ
όντων ζένων αύτοΐς τών ΪΙβισιστρατιΒών σνν-
€βάλλ€το δε ουκ iλάττω μοΐραν της •6ρμης τοΐς
Αάκωσιν η προς τους Άργειου? τοΐς ΓΙίίσιστρατί-
5 δαι? υπάρχουσα φιλία, το μβν οΰν πρώτον ^Αγχί-
μολον απέστειλαν κατά θάλατταν έχοντα στρατιάν
^ ^/cf<<(7e> Mayor._^
^ els Wilamowitz-Kaibel ex Etym. Mag. : ^era cod.
* σκοΚίοίί edd. : σκολιοισαΐίΐ cod.
* roO^' iws Blass : TovTevdews cod,
58
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xix. 2-5
of moving his establishment there. While engaged 511 b.c.
in this he was driven out by the king of Sparta,
Cleomenes, as oracles were constantly being given
to the Spartans to put down the tyranny, for the
following reason. The exiles headed by the Alcmeon- 3
idae were not able to effect their return by their own
unaided efforts, but were always meeting reverses ; for
besides the other plans that were complete failures,
they built the fort of Leipsydrion <* in the country,
on the slopes of Parnes, where some of their friends in
the city came out and joined them, but they were
besieged and dislodged by the tyrants, owing to
which afterwards they used to refer to this disaster
in singing their catches :
Faithless Dry Fountain ! Lackaday,
What good men's lives you threw away !
True patriots and fighters game.
They showed the stock from which they came !
So as they were failing in everything else, they con- 4
tracted to build the temple at Delphi,'' and so acquired
a supply of money for the assistance of the Spartans.
And the Pythian pi'iestess constantly uttered a com-
mand to the Spartans, when they consulted the
oracle, to liberate Athens, until she brought the
Spartiates to the point, although the Peisistratidae
were strangers to them ; and an equally great amount
of incitement was contributed to the Spartans by
the friendship that subsisted between the Argives and
the Peisistratidae. As a first step, therefore, they 5
dispatched Anchimolus with a force by sea ; but he
" The name suggests 'water-failure.' Parnes is a moun-
tain in N.E. Attica.
'' It had been burnt down in 548 b.c. Apparently they
made a profit on the contract, but rebuilt it to the satisfaction
of the priestess.
59
ARISTOTLE
ητττηθζντος δ' αύτοΰ και reXevT'qaavros δια το
Ktveav βοηθησαι τον Θΐσσαλον βχοντα χίλιους
Ιππείς, προσοργισθέντβς τω γβνομβνω KAeo/xeVTyv
εζβπβμφαν τον βασιλέα στόλον έχοντα μείζω κατά
γην, ος επεί τους των Θεσσαλών Ιππείς ενίκησεν
κωλύοντας αυτόν εις την ^Αττικην παριεναι, κατα-
κλείσας τον Ίππίαν εις το καλού μενον ΙΙελαργίκον
6 τείχος επολιόρκει μετά των ^Αθηναίων . προσκαθ-
ημενου δ' αύτοΰ συνεπεσεν ύπεζιόντας άλώναι τους
των Πεισιστρατιδών" υΐεΐς• ων ληφθέντων ομο-
λογίαν επΙ τη των τταιδων σωτήρια ποιησαμενοι
και τα εαυτών εν πενθ^ ημεραις εκκομισάμενοι
παρε^ωκαν την ακρόπολιν τοις ^Αθηναίοις επΙ
'Αρπακτικού άρχοντος, κατασχόντες την τυραννίδα
μετά την του πατρός τελευτην ετη /χάλιστα βτττα-
καίΒεκα, τα δε σύμπαντα συν οΐς ό πατήρ ηρζεν
ενός Βεΐν^ πεντήκοντα.
1 XX. Κ^αταλυΘείσης δε της τυραννικός εστασιαζον
προς αλλήλους ^Ισαγόρας 6 ΎεισάνΒρου, φίλος ων
τών τυράννων, και Ιίλεισθενης του γένους ών τών
*Αλκμεονώών. ηττημένος^ δβ ταΓ? εταίρε ιαις ο
Κλεισθένης προσηγάγετο^ τον Βημον, άπο8ώούς
2 τω πληθει την πολιτείαν. 6 δε Ισαγόρας επιλειπό-
μενος τη δυνάμει, πάλιν επικαλεσάμενος τον Κλεο-
μενην οντά εαυτώ ξένον συνεπεισεν ελαυί'ειν το
άγος, δια το τους ^Αλκμεωνί8ας Βοκεΐν είι^αι τών
3 εναγών, ύπεζελθόντος δε του Κλεισθένους, μετ
^ Mayor: Seicod.
■ήττώμ€νοί edd. ex Herod, v. 66
* ττροσήΎΐτο Thalheim.
" The fortification surrounding the west end of the Acropolis.
60
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xix. 5— xx. 3
was defeated and lost his life, because the Thessalian
Cineas came to the defence with a thousand cavalry.
Enraged at this occurrence, they dispatched their
king Cleomenes by land with a larger army ; he
won a victory over the Thessalian cavalry who tried
to prevent his reaching Attica, and so shut up Hippias
in the fortress called the Pelargicum " and began to
lay siege to it with the aid of the Athenians. While he 6
was sitting down against it, it occurred that the sons
of the Peisistratidae were caught when trying secretly
to get away ; and these being taken they came to
terms on the condition of the boys' safety, and con-
veyed away their belongings in five days, surrender-
ing the Acropolis to the Athenians ; this was in the
archonship of Harpactides, and Peisistratus's sons5iiB.c.
had retained the tyranny for about seventeen years
after their father's death, making when added to the
period of their father's power a total of forty-nine
years.
XX. When the tyranny had been put down, there 1
was a period of faction-strife between Isagoras son
of Teisander, who was a friend of the tyrants, and
Cleisthenes, who belonged to the family of the
Alcmaeonidae. Cleisthenes having got the worst of
it in the Comradeships * enlisted the people on his side,
offering to hand over the government to the multi-
tude. Isagoras began to lose power, so he again 2
called in the aid of Cleomenes, who was a great friend
of his, and jointly persuaded him to drive out the
curse," because the Alcmaeonidae were reputed to
be a family that was under a curse. Cleisthenes 3
secretly withdrew, and Cleomenes with a few troops
* Political clubs with anti-democratic leanings.
" Cf. ch. i.
61
ARISTOTLE
ολίγων^ ηγηλάτ€ΐ των 'Αθηναίων επτακόσια?
οικίας' ταύτα δέ ^ιαττραξάμζνος την μ^ν βονλην
€π€ψατο κατάλυαν Ίσαγόραν δε καΐ τριακόσιους
των φίλων μ€τ' αύτοΰ κυρίους καθισταναι της
ττόλβως. της δε βουλής αντίστασης καΐ συν-
αθροισθέντος του ττληθους οι /χέν ττερι τον Κλεομίνην
και Ίσαγόραν κατίφυγον €ΐς την άκρόπολιν, 6 δε
8ημος δυο μβν ημέρας προσκαθεζόμβνος €πολιορκ€ΐ,
τη δε τρίτη Κλβομβνην μβν και τους μ,ετ' αυτού
ττάντας άφβΐσαν ύποσπόνΒους , Ιίλΐΐσθένην δε και
4 τους άλλους φυγάδας μβτβπβμφαντο. κατασχόντος
δε τοΰ Βημου τα πράγματα Κλβισθβνης ηγεμων ην
καΐ του 8ήμου προστάτης, αιτιώτατοι γαρ σχβΒον
εγβνοντο της βκβολης των τυράννων οι Άλκ-
μεωνί^αι, /cat" στασιάζοντβς τα πολλά διετε'λεσαν.
5 έτι δε πρότ€ρον των 'Αλκμ€ονώών Κη^ων επίθετο
τοΙς τυράννοις• διό και η8ον και εις τούτον εν τοις
σκολίοις'
εγχει και Κτ^δωνι, διάκονε, μη^' επιληθου,
ει χρη τοις άγαθοΐς άν^ράσιν οινοχοεΐν.
1 XXI. Δια μεν οΰν ταύτας τάς αιτίας επίστευεν
6 Βημος τω Κλεισθενει. τότε δε τοΰ πλήθους προ-
εστηκώς έ'τει τετάρτω μετά την των τυράννων
2 κατάλυσιν επι Ίσαγόρου άρχοντος, πρώτον μεν
συνενειμε^ πάντας εις δέκα φυλάς άντι των τετ-
τάρων, άνα/ιχεΓ^αι βουλόμενος, όπως μετάσχωσι
πλείους της πολιτείας- όθεν ελέχθη και το μη
^ ζάφικόμεΐΌ^ ό Κλεομένη^'} μ(τ όλί-γων Wilamowitz-Kaibel
ex Herod, v. 72.
* <οί> καΐ Richards.
* συνένΗμε Newman : oweui^t cod.
62
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xx. 3— xxi. 2
proceeded to expel as accursed seven hundred
Athenian households ; and having accomplished this
he tried to put down the Council and set up Isagoras
and three hundred of his friends with him in sovereign
power over the state. But the Council resisted, and
the multitude banded together, so the forces of
Cleomenes and Isagoras took refuge in the Acropolis,
and the people invested it and laid siege to it for
two days. On the third day they let Cleomenes and
his comrades go away under a truce, and sent for
Cleisthenes and the other exiles to come back. The 4
people having taken control of affairs, Cleisthenes was
their leader and was head of the People. For almost
the chief initiative in the expulsion of the tyrants
was taken by the Alcmaeonids, and they accomplished
most of it by party faction. And even before the 5
Alcmaeonids Cedon had attacked the tyrants, owing
to which people also sang in his honour in their
catches :
Now fill to Cedon, boy ! let's drink him too,
If duty bids us toast good men and true.
/ XXI. These were the causes, therefore, that led the 1
people to trust in Cleisthenes. And when this time
he had become Chief of the multitude, in the fourth oos n.c.
year after the deposition of the tyrants, in the archon-
ship of Isagoras, he first divided the whole body into 2
ten tribes instead of the existing four, wishing to
mix them up, in order that more might take part
in the government « ; from which arose the saying,
' Don't draw distinctions between tribes,' addressed
" Less incompletely stated in Politics iii. 275 b 37 ff.
Members of the same class might now belong to different
tribes; and a number of new citizens were enrolled (see
§ 4), free-born aliens and emancipated slaves, who were not
members of clans.
63
ARISTOTLE
φυΧοκρινβίν, προς τους e^erct^etv τα γβνη βονλο-
3 μένους . eVeira τ'ην βουλην ττ^ντακοσίονς αντί
τ€τρακοσίων κατ€στησ€ν, TrevTiqKovra i^ €κάστης
φυλής' rare δ' τίσαν βκατόν. δια τοϋτο he ουκ
els δώδεκα φυλάς συνέταζβν, οττως αύτω μη συμ-
βαίντ) μέριζαν κατά τάς προϋπάρχουσας τρίττΰς
(jjaav γάρ €Κ δ' φυλών δώδε/ία τριττύίς), ωστ
ου συνβτηπτβν άν^ άναμίσγβσθαι το ττληθος.
4 8ί€ν€ΐ,μ€ δε καΐ την χώραν κατά δήμους τριάκοντα
μέρη, SeKa μ^ν των Trepl το άστυ, δέκα δε της
παραλίας, δέκα δε της μ€σογ€ίου• καΐ ταιίτα?
έπονομάσας τριττΰς Ικληρωσβν τρεις ει? την
φυλην €κάστην, δπως έκαστη μετέχη πάντων των
τόπων, καΐ Βημότας έποίησεν άλλτ^λων τους οίκοΰν-
τας iv έκάστω των Βημων, ΐνα μη πατρόθβν ττροσ-
αγορ€ύοντ€ς έζελέγχωσιν τους νεοπολίτας, άλλα
των 8ημων άναγορζύωσιν odev καΐ καλοϋσιν
5 * Αθηναίοι σφάς αυτούς των Βημων. κατέστησε
δε /cat δημάρχους την αύτην έχοντας έπιμέλειαν
τοις πρότερον ναυκράροις• καΐ γάρ τους Βημους
άντΙ των ναυκραρίών έποίησεν. προσηγόρευσε δε
των Βημων τους μέν άπο των τόπων, τους δε απο
των κτίσάντων , ου γάρ άπαντες ύπηρχον εν* τοις
6 τόποις. τά δε γένη καΐ τάς φρατρίας και τα?
ίερωσύνας είασεν εχειν έκαστους κατά τά πάτρια.
^ kf supplevit Hude.
^ ev fr. Berol. : in cod. alii ec, alii en legunt.
" See viii. 3 n.
•" i.e. he made the deme a social group, united by almost
a family feeling.
" C/., e.g., xxviii. 3 ' Callicrates of the Paeanian deme,' and
subsequent designations of persons by their demes ; up to
that point the father's name is used.
64
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxi. 2-6
to those who want to inquire into people's clans.
Next he made the Council to consist of five hundred 3
members instead of four hundred, fifty from each
Tribe, whereas under the old system there had been
a hundred. This was the reason why he did not
arrange them in twelve tribes, in order that he might
not have to use the existing division of the Thirds "
(for the four Tribes contained twelve Thirds), with
the result that the multitude would not have been
mixed up. He also portioned out the land among the 4
demes into thirty parts, ten belonging to the suburbs,
ten to the coast, and ten to the inland district ;
and he gave these parts the name of Thirds, and
assigned them among the Tribes by lot, three to each,
in order that each Tribe might have a share in all the
districts. And he made all the inhabitants in each of j>^
the demes fellow-demesmen of one another,'' in order
that they might not call attention to the newly
enfranchised citizens by addressing people by their
fathers' names, but designate people officially by
their demes ; owing to which Athenians in private
life also use the names of their demes as surnames."
And he also appointed Demarchs, having the same 5
duties as the former Ship-commissioners,** for he put
the demes in the place of the Ship-commissions. He
named some of the demes from their localities, but
others from their founders, for the demes were no
longer all corresponding to the places. The clans 6
and brotherhoods ^ and priesthoods belonging to the
various demes he allowed to remain on the ancestral
"* See viii. 3 n.
* In Politics 1319 b 23 it is said that ' Cleisthenes increased
the number of the brotherhoods,' but that no doubt refers to
the new citizens.
F 65
ARISTOTLE
ταΓ? δε φνλαΐς, inoirjaev Ιττωννμονς €κ των ττρο-
κρίθβντων ίκατον άρχηγβτών ους avelXev η ΐίνθία
Se/ca .
1 XXII, Τούτων Se γ^νομβνων Βημοτίκωτίρα ττολύ
της Έόλωνος iyevcTO η 77θλιτ€ΐα• /cat γαρ συνέβη
τους μ€ν Σιόλωνος νόμους άφανίσαι την τυραννίδα
δια το μη χρησθαί, καινούς δ' άλλους deivai τον
Ιίλβίσθενη στοχαζόμενον του πλήθους, iv οΐς €Τ€θη
2 /cat 6 TTcpi του οστρακισμοϋ νόμος, πρώτον μεν
ουν eVet πεμπτω^ μετά ταύτην την κατάστασιν
€φ* 'Έ,ρμοκρεοντος άρχοντος τη βουλή τοις πεν-
τακοσίοις τον ορκον εποίησαν ον ετί /cat νυν
ομνύουσιν . έπειτα τους στρατηγούς ηροΰντο κατά
φυλάς, εξ εκάστης φυλής ενα, της δε άπάσης
3 στρατιάς ήγεμών ην ό πολέμαρχος, ετει δε jLtera
ταύτα Βω^εκάτω νικήσαντες την εν Ma/oa^cDi't
μάχην, επί Φαινίππου άρχοντος, ^ιαλιπόντες ετη
Βύο μετά την νίκην, θαρροΰντος ηΒη του Βημου,
τότε πρώτον εχρησαντο τώ νόμω τώ περί τον
όστρακισμόν, ος ετέθη Βιά την ύποφίαν τών εν
ταΓ? Βυνάμεσιν δτι* ΐίεισίστρατος Βημαγωγός και
4 στρατηγός ών τύραννος κατέστη. και πρώτος
ωστρακισθη τών εκείνου συγγενών "Ιππαρχος
\άρμου Κ,ολλυτεύς , δι' ον και μάλιστα τον νόμον
εθηκεν ο Κ,λεισθενης, e^eAciaat βουλόμενος αυτόν.
οί γάρ 'Αθηναίοι τους τών τυράννων φίλους, όσοι
μη συνεζαμαρτάνοιεν^ εν ταΓ? ταραχαΐς, εϊων οι-
κεΐν την πόλιν, χρώμενοι τη είωθυία του Βήμου
^ τέμιττω ( = e') Cod. : 6-γ56φ { — η')? Kenyon.
* Kenyon : ore cod.
' Poste : αννεξαμαρταΐΌν Cod.
66
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxi. 6— xxii. 4
plan. As eponymous deities of the Tribes he insti-
tuted ten tutelary heroes selected by an oracle of
the Pythian priestess from a previously chosen list
of a hundred.
XXII. These reforms made the constitution much i
more democratic than that of Solon ; for it had come
about that the tyranny had obliterated the laws of
Solon by disuse, and Cleisthenes aiming at the «^
multitude had instituted other new ones, including
the enactment of the law about ostracism. First of 2
all, in the fifth year'' after these enactments, in the
archonship of Hermocreon, they instituted the oath
of induction for the Council of Five Hundred that is
still in use. Next they began to elect the Generals
by tribes, one from each tribe, while the whole ,
army was under the command of the War-lord.
Eleven years afterwards came their victory in the 3
battle of Marathon ; and in the archonship of Phaen- 490 b.c.
ippus, two years after the victory, the people being 488 b.c.
now in high courage, they put in force for the first
time the law about ostracism, which had been enacted
owing to the suspicion felt against the men in the
positions of power because Peisistratus when leader
of the people and general set himself up as tyrant.
The first person banished by ostracism was one of his 4
relatives, Hipparchus son of Charmus of the deme
of Collytus, the desire to banish whom had been
Cleisthenes' principal motive in making the law.
For the Athenians permitted all friends of the tyrants
that had not taken part with them in their offences
during the disorders to dwell in the city, — in this the
customary mildness of the people was displayed ; and
" i.e. in 504 b.c. ; but if Marathon (490 b.c.) was eleven
years later (§ 3), perhaps the Greek should be altered here
to give ' in the eighth year after.'
67
ARISTOTLE
πραότητι- ών ηγ^μών καΐ προστάτης ην Ίππαρχος,
δ €νθύς δε τω νστβρω erei €πΙ TeXeaivov άρχοντος
€κυάμ€υσαν τους ivvea άρχοντας κατά φυλάς e/c
-^ των προκριθέντων ύπο των Βημοτών^ πεντακοσίων
TOTe^ μ€τά την τυραννίΒα πρώτον gl_hk πρότεροι
πάντες ήσαν αιρετοί, καΐ ώστρακίσθη Μεγακλης
6 'Ιπποκράτους Άλωπεκηθεν. επΙ μεν ουν ετη γ
τους των τυράννων φίλους ώστράκιζον, ών χάριν
6 νόμος ετέθη, μετά δε ταύτα τω τεταρτω ετει
και τών άλλων ε'ί τι? Βοκοίη μείζων etvai μεθιστατο'
και πρώτος ώστρακίσθη τών άπωθεν της τυραν-
7 νίΒος Ή^άνθ ίππος 6 ^ Αρίφρονος . ετει δε τριτω
μετά ταΰτα ΝικομηΒου^ άρχοντος, ώς εφάνη* τα
μέταλλα τά εν Μαρώνεια καΐ περιεγενετο τη
πόλει τάλαντα εκατόν εκ τών έργων, συμβουλευ-
όντων τινών τω Βημω διαι^ει/χασ^αι το άργύριον
Θεμιστοκλής εκώλυσεν, ου λέγων ο τι χρήσεται
τοις χρημασιν, άλλα δανεΓσαι κελεύων τοις πλου-
σιωτάτοις ^Αθηναίων εκατόν εκάστω τάλαντον,
είτ' ε'άν μεν άρεσκη το άνάλωμα, της πόλεως
είναι/ ει δε μη, κομίσασθαι τά χρήματα παρά
τών Βανεισαμενων . λαβών Β επι τούτοις εναυ-
πηγήσατο τριήρεις εκατόν, εκάστου ναυπηγού-
μενου τών εκατόν μίαν, αΐς εναυμάχησαν εν
Σαλα/xtvt προς τους βαρβάρους. ώστρακίσθη δ'
εν τούτοις τοις καιροΐς ΆριστείΒης ό Αυσιμάχου.
^ δήμων fr. Berol. * rore Whibley : rots cod.
* Ί^ικοδημον fr. Berol.
* <λνσιτ(\έστΐρα> έφάν-η Richards coll. Xen. Red. 4. 31.
^ post dvai, in cod. alia manus τηνδαπανην supra lineam
scripsit.
68
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxii. 4-7
Hipparchus was the leader and chief of these persons.
But directly afterwards, in the next year, in the 5
archonship of Telesinus, they elected the Nine +87 b.c.
Archons by lot, tribe by tribe, from a preliminary
list of five hundred chosen by the demesmen : this
was the date of the first election on these lines, after
the tyranny, the previous Archons having all been
elected by vote. And Megacles son of Hippocrates
of the deme Alopeke was ostracized. For three years 6
they went on ostracizing the friends of the tyrants,
at whom the legislation had been aimed, but after-
wards in the fourth year it was also used to remove
any other person who seemed to be too great ; the
first person unconnected with the tyranny to be
ostracized was Xanthippus son of Ariphron. Two 7
years later, in the archonship of Nicomedes, in con- 483 b.c.
sequence of the discovery of the mines at Maronea,*^
the working of which had given the state a profit of a
hundred talents, the advice \vas given by some per-
sons that the money should be distributed among the
people ; but Themistocles prevented this, not saying
what use he would make of the money, but recom-
mending that it should be lent to the hundred richest
Athenians, each receiving a talent, so that if they
should spend it in a satisfactory manner, the state
would have the advantage, but if they did not, the
state should call in the money from the boiTowers.
On these terms the money was put at his disposal,
and he used it to get a fleet of a hundred triremes
built, each of the hundred borrowers having one ship
built, and with these they fought the naval battle at
Salamis against the barbarians. And it was during
this period that Aristeides son of Lysimachus was
" Possibly five miles north of Cape Suniuni.
69
ARISTOTLE
8 τ€ταρτω^ δ eret KareSe^avro ττάντας τους ώστρα-
κισμίνους άρχοντος ΎφηχίΒου, δια την Έέρζον
στρατβίαν καΐ το λοιπόν ωρισαν τοΐζ όστρακίζο-
μένοίς ivTOs TepaiaTov καΐ Έικυλλαίονζμ,η^/κατ-
OLKelv η άτιμους elvai καθάτταζ.
1 XXIII. Tore μεν οΰν μεχρί τούτον προηλθεν
η ττόλίς, α/χα τη Βημοκρατία κατά μικρόν ανζανο-
μάνη• μβτά Be τά ΜηΒικά πάλιν ΐσχνσ€ν η iv
'Apeio) πάγω βουλή και Βιωκ€ΐ την πάλιν, ovSevi
Βόγματι λαβοΰσα την ηγβμονίαν άλλα δια το
yevea^at της περϊ Σαλα/χΓνα ναυμαχίας αιτία,
των γαρ στρατηγών εζαπορησάντων τοις πράγ-
/χασι και κηρνζάντων σωζβιν €καστον iavTov,
πορίσασα Βραχμάς ίκάστω οκτώ Βι^Βωκε και
2 Ινφίβασεν €ΐς τάς ναΰς. Βιά ταυτην Βη την
αιτίαν παραχωρούν αύτης^ τώ άζιώματι και εττο-
λιτευ^τ^σαν 'Αθηναίοι καλώς κατά* τούτους τους
καιρούς- συνάβη γάρ αντοΐς κατά τον χρόνον
τούτον τά τ€ eis" τον πόλαμον άσκησαι και παρά
τοις "Έαλλησιν βνΒοκιμησαι και την της θαλαττης
ηγαμονίαν λαβείν ακόντων τών ΑακεΒαιμονίων .
3 ήσαν Be προστάται του Βημου κατά τούτους τους
καιρούς ^ΑριστείΒης ό Αυσιμάχον και Θεμιστο-
κλής ό ^εοκλεους, 6 μεν τά πολέμια ασκών'
ό Be τά πολιτικά Βεινός eiv'ai και Βικαιοσύνη τών
1 τρίτψ Wilamowitz-Kaibel coUato Plut. Aristid. 8.
* μη supplevit Kaibel (e'/cros pro ivrbs Wyse).
^ Blass: αυττ^ΐ' cod.
* κατ& (vel και ζμ€τpίωίy κατά ?) Kenyon : καικατα cod.
' δοκών Richards : δοκύν άσκΐϊν Kenyon.
70
?6-
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxii. 8— xxiii. 3
ostracized. Three years later in the archonship of 8
Hypsechides they allowed all the persons ostracized
to return, because of the expedition of Xerxes ; and +80 b.
they fixed a boundary thenceforward for persons
ostracized, prohibiting them from living'* within a
line drawn from Geraestus ^ to Scyllaeum " under
penalty of absolute loss of citizenship.
XXIII. At this date, therefore, the state had 1
advanced to this point, growing by slow stages with
the growth of the democracy ; but after the Persian ^
Wars the Council on the Areopagus became powerful
again, and carried on the adminrstraBon, having
g-ainer| the leadprship by no definite resolution but
*owmg to its having been the cause of the naval battle
of Salarnis. For the Generals had been reduced to
utter despair by the situation and had made a pro-
clamation that every man should see to his own
safety ; but the Council provided a fund and distri-
buted eight drachmas a head and'got them to man the
ships. For this reason, therefore, the Generals gave "i!
place to the Council in esteem. And Athens was well J
governed in these periods ; for during this time it
occurred that the people practised^ilitary duties and
wonliigh esteem among the Greeks and gained the r
supremacy of the sea against the will of the Lacedae-
monians. The heads of the People '^ in these periods 3
were Acigtejdes son of Lysimachus and Themistocles
son of Neocles, the latter practising to be skilful in mili'
tary pursuits, and the former in polifics,* and to excel
" The MS. gives ' enacting that they must live.'
* The S. point of Euboea.
" The S.E. point of Argolis. <* See ii. .S n.
' The Greek should perhaps be altered to give ' the latter
practising military pursuits, and the former esteemed to be
skilful in politics.'
71
ARISTOTLE
καθ" eavTov ^ιαφύρβιν διό καΙ €χρωντο τω μ€ν
4 στρατηγώ τω δε συμβονλω. την μεν ονν των
τ€ΐχών άνοίκοΒόμησιν κοίνη Βιωκησαν, καίττερ δια-
φζρόμενοι προς αλλήλους• cttl he την άπόστασίν
την των "Ιώνων άττο της των Λακεδαιμονίων συμ-
μαχίας^ "Αριστείδης ην 6 ττροτρεφας, τηρησας τους
5 Αάκωνας Βιαβεβλημενους δια ΙΙαυσανίαν. διό και
τους φόρους ούτος ην 6 τάζας ταΐς ττόλεσιν τους
πρώτους eVei τρίτω μετά την εν Σαλα/χΓνι ναυ-
/χαχι'αν €771 Ύιμοσθενους άρχοντος, καΐ τους όρκους
ώμοσε τοις "Ιωσι ώστε τον αυτόν εχθρον eivai και
φίλον, εφ" οίς και τους μύΒρους εν τω πελάγει
καθεΐσαν.
1 XXIV. Μβτα. Se ταύτα θαρροΰσης η8η της
πόλεως και χρημάτων ηθροισμενων πολλών, συν-
εβουλευεν άντιλαμβάνεσθαι της ηγεμονίας και κατα-
jSavTas• εκ τών αγρών οικεΐν εν τω άστει• τροφην
γάρ έ'σεσ^αι πάσι, τοις μεν στρατευομενοις τοις δε
φρουροϋσι τοις δε τα κοινά πράττουσι, εϊθ" οϋτω
2 κατασχησειν την ηγεμονιαν. πεισθεντες δε ταύτα
και λαβόντες την άρχην τοΐς^ συμμάχοις δε-
σποτικωτερως εχρώντο πλην Χιών και Αεσβίων
και Σιαμίων τούτους δε φύλακας εΐχον της άρχης,
εώντες τάς τε πολιτείας παρ" αύτοΐς και άρχειν
3 ων ετνχον άρχοντες. κατέστησαν δε και τοις
πολλοίς εύπορίαν τροφής, ώσπερ "Αριστείδης
^ καιτηντωνΧακεδαιμονιωνσνμμαχιαν cod., corr. Blass.
^ Tots Blass : roisre cod.
" The city fortifications were rebuilt, the harbour of Peiraeus
completed and the Long Walls built to link Peiraeus and
Phaierum with the city.
* The parties swore to keep the covenant until the iron
72
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxiii. 3— xxiv. 3
his contemporaries in justice ; hence the Athenians
employed the one as general and the other as
counsellor. So the rebuilding of the walls "• was directed 4
by both these statesmen joirftTy, although they were
at variance with one anotTier ;('but the secession of
the Ionian states from the Lacedaemonian alliance
was promoted by Aristeidesy who seized the oppor-
tunity when the Lacedaemonians were discredited
because of Pausanias. Hence it was Aristeides who 5
assessed the tributes of the allied states on the first
occasion, two years after the naval battle of Salamis, 478 b.u.
in the archonship of Timosthenes, and who adminis-
tered the oaths to the lonians when they swore to
have the same enemies and friends, ratifying their
oaths by letting the lumps of iron sink to the bottom
out at sea.'' ^
XXIV. Afterjvards, (now that the state was em- 1 ^,^
boldened^nd ^uch money had been collected,") he
began to advise them to aim at the leadership, and
to come down from their farms and live in the city,
telling them that there would be food__^f!it~aJl, some
serving in the army and others as frontier-guards
and others conducting the business of the community,
and then by this method they would kee^ the leader-
ship. [ Having taken this advice and won the empire, 2
they treated the allies too masterfully, except Chios,
Lesbos and Samos, which they kept as outposts of
empire, and allowed to have their own governments
and to rule the subjects that they had at the time.^
They also established a plentiful food-sjipply for the 3
multitude, as Aristeides had proposed ; for the corn-
appeared again on the surface, wplv fj τον μύδρον τούτον
άναφηναι Hdt. i. 165, and Hor. Epodes 16. 25 —
sed iuremus in haec : ' simul imis saxa renarint
vadis leuata, ne redire sit nefas.'
ARISTOTLE
€ΐσηγ'ησατο' σννββαινξν γαρ άπο των φόρων καΐ
των τ€Αών καΙ των συμμάχων πλβίονς τ) ΒισμυρΙονς
^ dvSpag τ ρΐφβσθ at. δικασται μ^ν γαρ ήσαν ίζα-
jN κίσχίλιοί, τοξόται δ' ίζακόσιοι καΐ χίλιοι και
/ y προς τούτοις ιππείς χίλιοι και διακόσιοι^ βουλή
/ δε -πεντακόσιοι, και φρουροί νεωρίων πεντακόσιοι
και προς τούτοις εν Trj πόλει φρουροί ν' , άρχοι δ'
ενΒημοι μεν εις επτακοσίους άνΒρας νπερόριοι δ'
εις επτακόσιους^• προς δε τούτοις, επει συνεστή-
σαντο^ τον πολεμον ύστερον, όπλΐται μεν Βισχίλιοι
και πεντακόσιοι, νηες δε φρουρίΒες ε'ίκοσι, άλλαι
δε νηες αϊ τους φρουρούς^ άγουσαι τους άπο του
κυαμου ^ισχιλίους άνΒρας• ετι δε πρυτανεΐον και
ορφανοί και Βεσμωτών φύλακες' απασι γαρ τού-
τοις απο των κοινών η Βιοικησις rjv.
1 XXV. Η μεν ουν τροφή τω 8ημω δ6ά τούτων
εγινετο. ετη δε επτακαιΒεκα μάλιστα μετά τα
Μτ^δικά 8ιεμεινεν η πολιτεία προεστώτων των
Αρεοπαγιτών, καίπερ ύποφερομενη κατά μικρόν,
αύζανομενου δε του πλήθους γενόμενος τοΰ ^ημου
προστάτης ^Εφιάλτης ό ΈωφωνίΒου και 8οκών*
ά8ωρο8όκητος είναι και δίκαιο? προς την πολι-
2 τείαν, επεθετο τη βουλή, και πρώτον μεν άνεΐλεν
πολλούς τών ^Αρεοπαγιτών αγώνας επιφερων περί
τών 8ιωκη μένων έπειτα της βουλής επι Κόνωνος
άρχοντος ατταΐ'τα ττεριεΓλε* τα επίθετα δι' ων ην η
της πολιτείας φυλακή, και τά μεν τοις πεντα-
^ numerum e priore versu male repetitum notant Wila-
mowitz-Kaibel.
^ συνέστησαν τά <eis> ? ed. : συν€στήσαντο τα fis Wilamowitz-
Kaibel.
* Hlass, cf. Ixii. 1 : ^opois cod.
* δοκών και Kaibel. ^ τηρκίλΐτο Richards.
74
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxiv. 3— xxv. 2
bined proceeds of the tributes and the taxes and the
allies served to feed more than twenty thousand men.
For there were six thousand jurymen, one thousand
six hundred archers and also one thousand two
hundred cavalry, five hundred members of the
Council, five hundred guardians of the docks, and
also fifty watchmen in the city, as many as seven
hundred officials at home and as many as seven
hundred " abroad ; and in addition to these, when later
they settled into the war, two thousand five hundred
hoplites, twenty guai-d-ships and other ships con-
veying the guards to the number of two hundred
elected by lot ; and furthermore the prytaneum,*
orphans, and warders of prisoners — for all of these
had their maintenance from public funds.
XXV. By these means the people were provided 1
with their food-supply. The constitution remained
under the leadership of the Areopagites for about
seventeen years after the Persian War, although it
was being gradually modified. But as the popula-
tion increased, Ephialtes son of Sophonides, having
become head of the People ^ and having the reputation
of being incorruptible and j ust in re«ard to the constitu-
tion, attacked the Council. Firswie made away with 2
many of the Areopagites by bringing legal proceed-
ings against them about their acts of administration ;
--s^then in the archonship of Conon he stripped the 462 u.c
(^2^ouncil of all its added powers which made it the
safeguard of the constitution, and assigned some of
" The number is probably repeated frem the previous line
by mistake ; other\vise ' also ' would be added.
'' The town-hall, probably in the old Agora, south of the
Acropolis; in it a fire was kept continually burning, and
the Prytaneis dined.
" See ii. 3 n.
ARISTOTLE
κοσίοις τα he τω Βημω καΐ τοις Βίκαστηρίας
3 άπβΒωκβν. errpa^e he ταΰτα σνναιτίου yevoμevoυ
θeμLστoκλeoυς, δς ην μέν των 'ApeoTraytrcui'
eμeλλe he Kpiveadai μηhισμoΰ. βουλόμ€νος he
καταλυθηναι, την βονλην 6 θ€μιστοκλης προς μ€ν
τον ^Έιφίάλτην eXeyev οτι σvvapπάζeLV αυτόν η
βονλη μeλλeL, προς he τους ^ Kpeoπaγίτaς δτί
hei^ei τινάς συνισταμένους ΙπΙ κaτaλύσeι της
πo\ιτeίaς. άγαγών he τους αΙρ€θ€ντας^ της βουλής
οΰ hteτpLβ€v 6 ^Έιφίάλτης ίνα h€Lξη τους άθροι-
4 ζομένους, hieXeyeTO μ€τά σπoυhης αύτοΐς. ό δ'
^Έιφίάλτης ώς elhev κaτaπλaγelς κάθιζα μονο-
χίτων €πΙ τον βωμόν. θαυμασάντων he πάντων
το γ€γον6ς καΐ μeτά ταΰτα συvaθpoLσθeίσης της
βουλής των π€ντακοσίων κατηγορούν των ^Apeo-
παγιτών 6 τ ^Κφίάλτης καΐ ό" Θεμιστοκλής,
καΐ πάλιν ev τω hημω τον αύτον τρόπον, ea»?
περιείλοντο αυτών την hύvaμιv. /cat' άνηρεθη he
και 6 ^Έιφιάλτης hoλoφovηθ€ις /χετ' ου πολύν
χρόνον δι' ^Apιστohίκoυ του Ύαναγραίου.
ι XXVI. Ή μεν οΰν των ^Αρεοπαγιτών βουλή τού-
τον τον τρόπον άπεστερηθη της επιμελείας, μετά
hε ταύτα συνεβαινεν άνιεσθαι μάλλον την πολιτείαν
δια τους προθύμως hημaγωγoΰvτaς. κατά γάρ
τους καιρούς τούτους συνέπεσε μηh^ ηγεμόνα εχειν
τους επιεικέστερους , αλλ' αυτών προεστάναι
Κίμωνα τον M.ιλτιάhoυ νεώτερον* οντά και προς
^ Kenyon : αφαιρΐθβνταί cod.
* ό suppletum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
^ [και] Mayor : καΐ <ό μέν Θεμιστοκλής . . .> Wilamowitz-
Kaibel.
* νωθρυν Blass : νωθρώτερον Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
76
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxv. 2— xxvi. l
them to the Five Hundred and others to the People
and to the jury-courts. For these acts of Ephialtes, ^
Themistocjes ° was partly responsible ; he was a
/member of the Areopagus, but was destined to be
> put on trial for treasonable dealings with Persia.
Themistocles desirmg the Council to be jiestroyed
used to tell Ephialtes that the Council was going to "
arrest him, while he'^told the Areopagites that he
would give information about certain persons who
were conspiring to destroy the constitution. And he
used to take selected members of the Council to
the place where Ephialtes resided to show them the
people collecting there, and conversed with them
seriously. Ephialtes was dismayed when he saw 4
this, and took his seat at the altar in only his shirt.
Everybody was amazed at what had happened,
and afterwards when the Council of Five Hundred
assembled Ephialtes and Themistocles kept on
denouncing the Areopagites, and again similarly at
the meetings~of the people, until they deprived
them of their power. And also Ephialtes was actually
made away with not long after, being craftily
murdered by A'ristodicus of Tanagra.
I XXVI. IrT this way the Council of the Areopagites 1
fwas deprived of the superintendence of affairs. After
this there came about an increased^elaxation of the
constitution, due to the eagerness of those who were
the leaders of the People. For it so happened that
during these periods the better classes '' hadno leadeT
at all, but the fh^ιpf^J^ιpr^nη ^p^nnfT thpm , Γ||γ|Γ>Γΐ gon
of Miltiades, was a rather young man who had only
"In Politics ii. xii. the place assigned here to Themisto-
cles is taken by Pericles.
* Or ' more respectable ' : it is a vague term of social
approval, cf. § 1 fin, xxvii. 4, xxviii. 1, xxxvi. 9.
77
ARISTOTLE
την ττόλιν οφέ ττροσζλθόντα, ττρός 8e τούτοις
βφθάρθαι τους ττολλονς κατά 7τόλ€μον• της γαρ
στρατζίας γινομένης ev τοΐς τότ€ χρόνοις €Κ κατα-
λόγου καΐ στρατηγών υφισταμένων άττ^ίρων μ€ν
τον ττοΧζμζΙν τιμωμένων δε δια τα? ττατρικάς
δό^α?, alel συνέβαινεν των έζιόντων ανά 8ισχιλίονς
η τρισχιλίους άπόλλνσθαι, ώστ€ άναλίσκ€σΘαι
τους €πΐ€ΐκ€Ϊς και τον Βημου καΐ των βύπόρων,
2 τά μ€ν ονν άλλα πάντα διώκουν ονχ ομοίως και,
7τρότ€ρον τοΐς νόμοις ττροσέγ^οντβς, την he. των
ivvea αρχόντων αΐρ€σιν ουκ έκίνουν αλλ η^
€κτω eVet μ€τά τον ^Εφιάλτου θάνατον έγνωσαν
(και €κ ζβνγιτών προκρίνζσθαι τονς κληρωσο-
μένους των εννέα αρχόντων και ττρώτος ηρζ^ν
έζ αυτών Ήίνησιθβί^ης. οι δε ττρό τούτου ττάντ^ς
€ζ Ιππέων και π€ντακοσιομ€8ίμνων ήσαν, οί δε*
ζζυγΐται τάς εγκυκλίους ηρχον, ει μη τι παρ-
3 €ωράτο των έν τοΐς νόμοις. έ'τει δε πέμπτω μβτα
/( ταΰτα έπι Αυσικράτους άρχοντος οί τριάκοντα
ι' 8ικασταΙ κατέστησαν πάλιν οί καλούμ€νοι κατά
Βημους' καΐ τρίτω μ€τά τούτον έπι Άντώότου
δια το πλήθος των πολιτών Περικλεου? €ΐποντος
Λ έγνωσαν μη μ€τέχ€ΐν της ττόλεω? ος αν μη έζ
ι άμφοΐν άστοΐν η γεγονώς.
1 XXVII. Μετά δε ταΰτα προς το ^ημαγωγεΐν
έλθόντος Περικλέους• και πρώτον^ ίύ^οκιμησαντος
6τ€ κατηγόρησε τάς εύθύνας Κίμωνος στρατη-
γοΰντος νέος ων, Βημοτικωτέραν έτι συνέβη
^ ij supplevit Blass. * 5k supplevit Kenyon.
' πρώτον Blass : ττωτου cod. : πρό τον Jackson.
• ' ' !l ' '
« C/. xvi. 5.
78
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxvi. 1— xxvii. 1
lately entered public life ; and in addition, that the
multitude had suffered seriously in war, for in those
days fEe expeditionary torce wasraised from a muster-
roll, and was commanded by generals with no experi-
ence of war but promoted on account of their family
reputations, so that it was always happening that the
troops on an expedition suffered as many as two or
three thousand casualties, making a drain on the
numbers of the respectable members both of the
[people and of the wealthy. Thus in general all 2
I the administration was conducted without the same
[attention to the laws as had been given before,
although no innovation was made in the election of
the Nine Archons, except that five years after the
death of Ephialtes they decided to extend to the
Teamster class eligibility to the preliminary roll
from which the Nine Archons were to be selected
by lot ; and the first of the Teamsier class to hold
the archonship was Mnesitheides. (All the Archons 457 b.c.
hitherto had been from the Knights and Five-hundred-
measure-menj while the Teamsters held the ordinary
offices, unlesssome provision of the laws was ignored.
Four years afterwards, in the archonship of Lysicrates, 3
the thirty judges called the Local Justices were in- 453 b.c.
stituted again " ; and two years after Lysicrates, in 451 b.c
the year of Antidotus, o^ving to the large number of
the citizens an enactment was passed on the proposal
of Pericles confining citizenship to persons of citizen "^
birth on both sides.
XXVII. After this when Pericles advanced to the 1
leadership of the people, having first distinguished 463 b.c.
himself when while still a young man he challenged
the audits of Cimon who was a general, it came about
that the constitution became still more democratic.
79
ARISTOTLE
γ€ν€σθαι την ττολίτζίαν. καΐ γαρ των 'A/aeo-
τταγιτών eVta TrapetXeTO, καΐ μάλιστα προντρβφεν
την πόλιν inl την ναυτίκην Βύναμιν, i^ ης συνέβη
θαρρήσαντας τους πολλούς αττασαν την ττολίτβίαν
2 μόίλλον άγ€ΐν et? αύτοΰς. μετά he την iv Σαλα/χΓνι
ναυ/χαχιαν' ύνος Set ττεντηκοστω eVet ΙττΙ ΥΙυθο-
8ίόρου άρχοντος ό ττρός ΥΙελοποννησίονς ενίστη
ττόλεμος, iv ω κατακλεισθείς 6 8ημος iv τω άστ€ΐ
καΐ συνεθισθείς iv ταΓ? στρατβίαις μισθοφορ€Ϊν, τά
μεν εκών τά he άκων προηρεΐτο^ την ττολιτείαν
hiOLKelv αυτός, iπoίησe he καΐ μισθοφόρα τά
hiKaoTTipia ΥΙ,ερικλης πρώτος, άντώημαγωγών
3 προς την Κίμωνος ενπορίαν. 6 γάρ Κίμων are
τυραννικην έχων ούσίαν πρώτον μεν τάς κοινάς
λητουργίας iλrjτoυpγει λαμπρώς, έπειτα τών
hημoτώv έτρεφε πολλούς' i^rjv γάρ τω βονλομενω
AaκLahώv καθ^ εκάστην την ημεραν iλθόvτί παρ'
αύτον εχειν τά μέτρια, ετι hi τά χωρία πάντα
άφρακτα ην, όπως i^rf τω βονλομενω της όπώρας
4 άπολανειν. προς δτ) ταύτην την χορηγίαν επι-
λειπόμενος ο ΙΙερικλης τη ουσία, συμβουλενσαντος
αύτώ Aaμωvίhoυ του Οίηθεν {ος ihόκει τών πολλών
εισηγητής etv-at τω ΥΙερικλει, διό και ώστράκισαν
αυτόν ύστερον) iπει τοις ιhίoις ηττάτο διδόΐ'αι τοις
πολλοίς τά αυτών, κατεσκευασε μισθοφοράν τοις
hικaστηpίoις^• αφ' ων αίτιώνταί rtve? χείρω*
γενέσθαι, κληρουμενων iπιμελώς άει μάλλον τών
5 τυχόντων η τών iπιεικώv ανθρώπων, ηρξατο hi
' προή-γΐτο Richards.
* (ξτ) Kenyon : εξηι> cod.
' Blass: δικασται? cod.
* χΐίρονί Wilamowitz-Kaibel (servato δικασταΐί).
80
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxvii. 1-5
For he took away some of the functions of the Areo-
pagus, and he urged the state very strongly in the i.
direction of naval power, which resulted in embolden-
ing the multitude," who brought all the government
more into their own hands. Forty-eight years after 2
the naval battle of Salamis, in the archonship of432B.c.
Pythodorus, the war against the Peloponnesians broke
out, during which the people being locked up in the
city, and becoming accustomed to earning pay on
their military campaigns, came partly of their own
will and partly against their will to the decision to
administer the government themselves. Also Pericles /
first made service in the jury-courts a paid office, as'"
a popular counter-measure against Cimon's wealth.
For as Cimon had an estate large enough for a 3
tyrant, in the first place he discharged the general
public services in a brilliant manner, and moreover he
supplied maintenance to a number of the members
of his deme ; for anyone of the Laciadae who liked
could come to his house every day and have a moder-
ate supply, and also all his farms were unfenced, to
enable anyone who liked to avail himself of the
harvest. So as Pericles' means were insufficient for 4
this lavishness, he took the advice of Damonides of ■
Oea (who was believed to suggest to Pericles most of
his measures, owing to which they afterwards ostra-
cized him), since he was getting the worst of it with
his private resources, to give the multitude what was
their own, and he instituted payment for the jury-
courts ; the result of which according to some critics
was their deterioration, because ordinary persons
always took more care than the respectable to cast lots
for the duty. Also it was after this that the organized 5
<• Cf. xxii. 7. xxiv. 1.
ο 81
ARISTOTLE
μ€τα ταΰτα /cat το Se/«x^etv, πρώτου καταΒΐΐ-
ζαντος ^Ανύτου μετά την iv Πυλω στρατηγίαν
κρινόμενος γαρ υττό τίνων δια το άποβαλεΐν ΐΐύλον,
Βεκάσας το δικαστή ριον άπεφυγεν.
1 XXVIII, "Κως μβν οΰν ΐίερίκλης προαστηκει
τον Βήμου βελτίω τα κατά την πολιτείαν ην,
τελεντησαντος he ΙΙερίκλεονς πολύ χείρω. πρώτον
γαρ τότ€ προστάτην ελαββν ο Βημος ουκ evSoKi-
μοΰντα παρά τοις επιεικάσιν, iv 8e τοις πρότερον
χρόνοίς aei Βίετβλονν οΐ^ επιεικείς Βημαγωγονντες .
2 εζ αρχής μεν γαρ και πρώτος εγενετο προστάτης
του Βημου Σόλων, δεύτερος 8e ΐίεισίστρατος,
των ευγενών και γνωρίμων καταλυθείσης 8e
της τυραννικός Ιίλεισθενης του γένους ων τών
Άλκμεονώών, και τούτω μεν ούΒεις ην άντι-
στασιώτης ώς εζεπεσον οι περί τον Ισαγόραν
μετά 8ε ταΰτα του μεν Βήμου προειστήκει Έάνθ-
ιππος, τών 8ε γνωρίμων Μιλτιάδη? " έ'ττ^ιτα
Θεμιστοκλής και 'Αριστείδης- μετά δε τούτους
'Έιφιάλτης μεν του Βήμου, Κ,ίμων δ' ό Μιλτιάδου
τών ευπόρων είτα ΐίερικλης μεν του Βήμου,
θουκυΒίΒης δε τών έτερων, κηΒεστης ών Κίμωνος.
3 Τίερικλεους 8ε τελευτήσαντος τών μεν επιφανών
προειστήκει Νικίας 6 εν Έικελία τελευτησας, του
δε 8ημου Κλέων ό Κλεαινε'του, δς 8οκεΐ μάλιστα
Βιαφθεΐραι τον 8ημον ταΐς ορμαΐς,^ και πρώτος
ϊ ετΓΐ τοΰ βήματος άνεκραγε και ελοιΒορησατο και
περιζωσάμενος εΒημηγόρησε, τών άλλων εν κόσμω
1 [οΊ] Richards.
' διανο/χαΐϊ Sandys : νομαΐί Thalheim.
" Pylos (Navarino) on the W. coast of Peloponnesus, had .
been taken by Atheas 425 b.c, but was retaken by Sparta
82
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxvii. 5— xxviii. 3
bribery of juries began, Anytus having first shown the <»^
way to it after his command at Pylos** ; for when ^, -
he was brought to trial by certain persons for having
lost Pylos he bribed the court and got off.
XXVIII. So long, then, as Pericles held the head- 1 — -—
ship ^ of the People, the affairs of the state went
better, but when Pericles was dead they became
much worse. For the People now for the first time
adopted a head who was not in good repute with the
respectable classes, whereas in former periods those
always continued to lead the people. For Solon 2
was the first and original head of the People, and the
second was Peisistratus, who was one of the men of
nobility and note. After the tyranny had been put
down, Cleisthenes, a member of the family of the
Alcmaeonidae, was head of the People, and he had
no opponent, since the party of Isagoraswas banished ;
but after this Xanthippus held the headship of the
People, and Miltiades of the notables ; and then
Themistocles and Aristeides ; and after them Ephialtes
held the headship of the People, and Cimon son of
Miltiades of the wealthy ; and then Pericles of the
People and Thucydides of the others, he being a
relation of Cimon. When Pericles died, Nicias, who 3
died in Sicily, held the headship of the men of dis-
tinction, and the head of the People was Cleon son
of Cleaenetus, who is thought to have done the most
to corrupt the people by his impetuous outbursts,
and was the first person to use bawling and abuse on
the platform, and to gird up his cloak before making
a public speech, all other persons speaking in orderly
409 B.C. Anytus (see also xxxiv. 3, one of the prosecutors of
Socrates) was sent with 30 triremes to its relief, but owing
to weather never got round Cape Malea.
See note on ii. 3.
83
ARISTOTLE
AeyovTOJi'. etra μ€τά τούτους των μβν €Τ€ρων
Θηραμβνης 6 "Αγνωνος, του δε δτ^/χου ΥΛ^οφών ο
λυροποίός, ος καΐ την ^ιωβολίαν^ βπορισβ πρώτος•
και χρόνον μεν τίνα διεδίδου/ /χβτά he ταΰτα
κατέλυσε Ιίαλλίκράτης ΥΙαιανίΐύς πρώτος υπο-
σχόμενος βπίθήσβιν προς τοΐν 8υοΐν όβολοΐν άλλον
όβολόν. τούτων μεν οΰν αμφοτέρων θάνατον κατ-
εγνωσαν ύστερον εΐωθεν γαρ καν ί^^αττατη^^ το
πλήθος ύστερον μισεΖν τους τι προαγαγόντας ποιείν
4 αυτού? τών μη καλώς εχόντων, από δε Κλεο-
φώντος η8η 8ίε8εχοντο συνεχώς την ^ημαγωγιαν
οΐ μάλιστα βουλόμενοι θρασύνεσθαι καΐ χαρι-
ζεσθαί τοις πολλοίς προς το παραυτίκα βλέποντες .
5 ^οκοΰσι δε^ βέλτιστοι γεγονεναι τών Αθηνησι
ιπολιτευσαμενων μετά τους αρχαίους Νικίας και
^θουκυ^ίΒης και Θηραμένης, και περί μεν Νικίου
και ΘουκυΒί8ου πάντες σχεΒόν όμολογοΰσιν άνδρας
γεγονεναι ου μόνον καλούς κάγαθούς άλλα και
πολιτικούς και τη πόλει πάση πατρικώς χρω-
μενους, περί δε Θηραμένους δια το συμβηναι κατ
αυτόν ταραχώδεις τάς πολιτείας είΐ'αι* άμφισ-
βητησις της κρίσεως εστί. Βοκεΐ μεντοι^ τοις
μη παρεργως αποφαινομενοις ουχ ωσπερ αυτόν
Βιαβάλλουσι πάσας τάς πολιτείας καταλύειν, αλλά
πάσας προάγειν εως μη^έν παρανομοΐεν, ως δυνά-
μενος πολιτεύεσθαι κατά πάσας, όπερ εστίν αγαθού
πολίτου έργον, παρανομούσαις οέ ου συγχωρών
αλλ' άπεχθανόμενος .
1 διωββλίαν edd. * δίΐδίδοτο Wyse.
3 δέ : δοι (-δ' οί) cod., f superscripto.
* €Ϊναι supplevit Richards. ' μέντοι Kenyon : μ(ν cod.
" By instituting the ' theatre-fund ' (τό θεωρικό»), which was
84
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxviii. 3-5
fashion. Then after these Theramenes son of
Hagnon was chief of the others and Cleophon the
lyre-maker of the People, who first introduced the
two-obol dole ** ; he went on distributing this for a
time, but afterwards Callicrates of the Paeanian deme
abolished it, being the first person to promise to add
to the two obols another obol. Both of these two
leaders were afterwards condemned to death ; for
even though the multitude may be utterly deceived,
subsequently it usually hates those who have led it
to do anything improper. From Cleon onward the 4
leadership of the People was handed on in an unbroken
line by the men most willing to play a bold part
and to gratify the many with an eye to immediate
popularity. And it is thought that the best of the 5
politicians at Athens after those of early times were
Nicias, Thucydides and Theramenes. As to Nicias
and Thucydides, almost everybody agrees that they
were not only honourable gentlemen but also states-
manlike and patriotic servants of the whole state, but
about Theramenes, owing to the confused nature of
the constitutional changes that took place in his time,
the verdict is a matter of dispute. However, the
view of wTiters not making mere incidental references
is that he was not a destroyer of all governments, as
critics charge him with being, but guided them all
forward into a fully law-abiding course, since he was
capable of serving the state under all of them, which
is the duty of a good citizen, but did not give in
to them when they acted illegally, but faced their
enmity.,^
a state fund for defraying the cost of an ordinary seat at
the theatre, 2 obols. Plutarch attributes its institution to
Pericles. An obol was about l^d., 6 to a drachma.
85
ARISTOTLE
1 XXIX. 'Έα>9 /Aev οΰν Ισόρροπα τα. πράγματα
κατά τον πόΧεμον ην 8ί€φνλαττον την Βημοκρατίαν.
€7Γ6ΐ Se μβτά την iv Σικτβλια γ€νομ€νην συμφοράν^
Ισχυρότατα'^ τα των Αακ€^αιμονίων ΙγΙνετο δια
την προς βασιλέα συμμαχίαν, ηναγκάσθησαν κινη-
σαντ€ς την Βημοκρατίαν καταστησαι την εττι των
• τ€τρακοσίων ποΧιτβίαν, ΐΐπόντος τον μ^ν προ^ τοΰ
\ φηφίσματος λόγον ^Ιηλοβίου, την δε γνώμην γρά-
φαντος ΐΐυθο^ώρου τοΰ ^ Αναφλυστίον * μάλιστα δέ
συμπ€ΐσθβντων των πολλών δια το νομίζζΐν βασιλέα
μάλλον ίαυτοΐς συμπολ^μησ^ιν eav δι ολίγων
2 ποιησωνται την πολιτβίαν. ην δε το φηφισμα τοΰ
Πυ^οδωρου τοιόΐ'δε• τον Βημον ελβσθαι μβτα των
προϋπαρχόντων δέκα προβονλων άλλους είκοσι εκ
των ύπερ τβτταράκοντα €τη γεγονότων, οιτιν^ς
όμόσαντ€ς η μην συγγράφειν ά αν ηγώνται βέλ-
τιστα είναι τη ττόλει συγγράφουσι ττερι της
3 σωτηρίας• e^elvai δε και των άλλων τω βουλομύνω
γράφειν, ιν ε|• απάντων αιρώνται το άριστον.
Κλειτο^ών δε τα /αέν άλλα καθάπβρ Πυ^οδωρο?
ειττεν, προσαναζητησαι δε του? αιρ^θβντας ^γραφβν
και του? πατρίους νόμους ους Κλεισ^ε'νη? ΐθηκ^ν
δτ€ καθιστή την 8ημοκρατίαν, δπως^ άκούσαντες
και τούτων βουλ^ύσωνται το άριστον, ως ου
Βημοτικην άλλα παραπλησιαν οΰσαν την Κλει-
4 σθένους ττολιτειαν ττ^ Σόλωνο?. οί δ αιρε^ε'ντε?
πρώτον /χεν έγραφαν επάναγκ^ς ε?ναι του? ττρυ-
^ Richards : διαφοραν cod,
* ίσχυρύτΐρα Mayor, * ττρό] 7re/)i Wyse,
* Blass: . . . v. τιον cod.
5 όττω? <&;'> Wilamowitz-Kaibel,
" Or ' before the resolution.'
86
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxix. 1-4
XXIX. In the period of the war therefore, so long 1
as fortunes were evenly balanced, they continued to
preserve the democracy. But when after the occur-
rence of the disaster in Sicily the Lacedaemonian side 4i3 b.c.
became very strong owing to the alliance with the
king of Persia, they were compelled to overthrow the
democracy and set up the government of the Four
Hundred, Melobius making the speech on behalf of the
resolution " but Pythodorus of the deme Anaphlystus
having drafted the motion, and the acquiescence of
the mass of the citizens being chiefly due to the belief
that the king would help them more in the war if they
limited their constitution. The resolution of Pytho- 2
dorus was as follows : ' That in addition to the ten
Preliminary Councillors * already existing the people
choose twenty others from those over forty years of
age, and that these, after taking a solemn oath to
draft whatever measures they think best for the state,
shall draft measures for the public safety ; and that 3
it be open to any other person also that wishes, to
frame proposals, in order that they may choose the
one that is best out of them all.' Cleitophon moved
an amendment to the resolution of Pythodorus, that
the commissioners elected should also investigate the
ancestral laws laid do\vn by Cleisthenes when he was
establishing the democracy, in order that they might
decide on the best course to advise after hearing
these laws also, on the ground that the constitution
of Cleisthenes was not democratic but similar to that
of Solon. The commissioners when elected first pro- 4
* The ten commissioners appointed at Athens after the
Sicilian disaster to deal with the emergency (Thuc. viii. 1),
and later instructed to reform the constitution {ib. Ixvii.).
87
ARISTOTLE
τανβις άπαντα τα Χ^γόμζνα rrepl της σωτηρίας
€πίφηφίζβιν, €7Γ€ΐτα τάς των παρανόμων γραφάς
καΐ τάς είσαγγβλίας καΐ τάς προσκλησ€ΐς^ avetXov,
όπως άν οι €θβλοντ€ς ^Αθηναίοι συμβουλενωσι
π€ρί των προκ€(,μ€νων• iav Se τις τινα^ τούτων
χάριν η ζημιοΐ η προσκαληται η ^Ισάγη ei?
8ίκαστηρίον, evhei^iv αύτον elvai και άπαγωγην
προς τους στρατηγούς , τους δε στρατηγούς παρα-
5 Sovvai τοις eV8e/ca θανάτω ζτ^^υ,ιώσαι. μ€τά 8e
ταύτα την ποΧιτ^ίαν SieTa^av TovBe τρόπον τά
μεν προσιοντα^ μη εζεΐναι αλλοσε δατταιη^σαι
η €ΐς τον πόλεμον, τάς δ' αρχάς αμίσθους
άρχ€ΐν άπάσας €ως αν 6 πόλεμος η, πλην
των ivvea αρχόντων και των πρυτάνεων οι άν
ώσιν, τούτους δε φερειν τρεις όβολούς εκαστον
της ημέρας• την δ' άλλην πολιτείαν επιτρεφαι
πασαν* 'Αθηναίων τοις Βυνατωτάτοις και τοις
σώ/χασιν και τοις χρήμασιν λητουργεΐν μη ελαττον
η πεντακισχιλίοις^ εως άν ο πόλεμος ν• κυρίους δ'
etvat τούτους και συνθηκας συντίθεσθαι προς ους
άν εθελωσιν ελεσθαι δ' e/c* της φυλής εκάστης δέκα
άνδρας ύπερ τετταράκοντα ετη γεγονότας οΐτινες
καταλεξουσι τους πεντακισχιλίους όμόσαντες καθ*
ιερών τελείων.
1 XXX. Ot μεν ούν αίρεθεντες ταύτα σννεγραφαν
κυρωθέντων δε τούτων εΐλοντο σφών αυτών οΐ
^ Blass : προκΚ-ησΐΐ^ Cod.
^ Tij Tiva Richards: tls cod.
^ Ίτροσίοντα, Richards (cf. xxxix. 2) : χρηματαπροσιοντα cod. :
Xp. <τά> ττρ. Kenyon.
* πάσαν Mayor: ττασιν cod.
* -ων (i.e. ίλαττον νεντακισχιΧίων) v.l. adscr. cod.
* δ' έκ edd. : 5ΐκαι cod.
88
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxix. 4— xxx. 1
posed that it should be compulsory for the Presidents"
to put to the vote all proposals made for the public
safety, and then repealed the procedures of impeach-
ment for illegal proposals, information and summons,
in order that those Athenian citizens who wished
might give advice about the matters before them ;
and enacted that, if anybody attempted to punish or
summon or bring them into court for so doing, he be
liable to information and summary arrest before the
Generals, and that the Generals should hand him
over to the Eleven to be punished with death. After <
this they framed the constitution in the following
way : that it should not be permissible to spend the
revenues on any other object than the war ; that all
the officers of state should be unpaid for the duration
of the war, excepting those who held the posts of the
Nine Archons and the Presidents, and these should
draw three obols '' per man per day ; and that all the
rest of the functions of government should be en-
trusted to those Athenians who in person and property
were most capable of serving the state, not less than
five thousand, for the duration of the war ; and that
the powers of this body should include competence to
contract treaties with whatever people they wished :
and that they should elect ten men over forty
years of age from each tribe, who should enroll the
Five Thousand after taking oath over unblemished
victims.
XXX. So the Commissioners drafted these pro-
posals ; and these being ratified, the Five Thousand
" The Presidents of the Council, see xliii. 2.
^ Half a drachma, see iv. 3 n.
89
ARISTOTLE
ΤΓ^ντακίσγ^ίΧιοι, τους αναγράφοντας την ττοΧιτ^ίαν
βκατόν dvSpas. οΐ δ' alpedevTes ανέγραφαν καΐ
2 έζηνεγκαν τάδε* βουλ€ν€ΐν μβν κατ' Ινιαυτον τονς^
υπέρ τριάκοντα €τη γΐγονότας avev μισθοφορας•
τούτων δ' elvat, τους στρατηγούς καΐ τους ivvea
άρχοντας καΐ τον Ιβρομνημονα και τους ταξιάρχους
και ιππάρχους και φυλάρχους και άρχοντας et? τα
φρούρια και ταμίας των ΐ€ρων χρημάτων τη θ€ω
και τοις άλλοις θ€θΐς δεκτά και ίΧληνοταμίας^ και
των άλλων οσίων^ χρημάτων απάντων βίκοσιν οι
8ιαχ€ΐριοΰσιν,* και Ίζροποιούς και έπιμελητάς δέκα
ίκατέρους• αιρ€Ϊσθαι δβ πάντας τούτους e/c προκρί-
των, €Κ των det βουλβυόντων πλ€ΐους προκρίνοντας,
τάς δ' αλλάς• αρχάς άπάσας κληρωτάς elvat και
μη €Κ της βουλής• τους δε ίλληνοταμίας οι αν
3 8ιαχ€ΐρίζωσι τα χρήματα μη συμβουλ^ΰ^ιν . βούλας
δε ποιησαι τέτταρας e/c της ηλικίας της ίίρημβνης
βίς τον λοιπόν χρόνον, και τούτων το λαχον μέρος
βουλίύ^ιν , t'etjLtac he και τους άλλους προς την
ληξιν ίκάστην. τους δ' εκατόν άνδρα? διανεΓ^ίΐαι
σφάς Τ€ αυτούς και τους άλλους τ4τταρα μέρη
ως ίσαίτατα και Βιακληρώσαι, και €ΐς ένιαυτόν
4: βουλζύβιν τους λαχόντας^• βουλ^ύζσθαι^ he fj αν
^ Tovs] τ€τρα.κοσίονί Niemeyer.
* [και έΧληΐΌταμίαί] Sandys.
' [όσίωΐ'] ? ed.
* [-V οΐ διαχΐίριοΐσιν] Thompson.
^ τούί λαχόνταί siippletum a Wilamowjtz-Kaibel.
' βονλβύεσθαι suppletum a Sandys.
" The secretary or registrar who with the actual repre-
sentative, the Pylagoras, was sent by Athens, as by the
other members, to the Amphictyonic Council.
90
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxx. 1-4
elected a hundred of their members as a committee
to draw up the constitution. This committee drew
up and pubhshed the following resolutions : ' The 2
Council to consist of members over thirty years of
age holding office for a year and drawing no pay ;
these members to include the Generals, the Nine
Archons, the Sacred Remembrancer,'* the Company-
commanders, ** Officers of the Horse,'' Officers of Tribes ^
and officers in command of the Guards,^ the Trea-
surers of the Sacred Funds of the Goddess^ and the ten
Treasurers of the other gods, the Greek Treasurers,^
and tΛventy Treasurers of all the secular funds as
well, who shall manage them,'* and Sacrificial Officers
and Superintendents, ten of each ; and the Council
to elect all of these from a larger preliminary list of
candidates proposed by it from its members at the time,
but all other offices to be elected by lot and not from
the Council ; and the Greek Treasurers * that are to
manage the funds not to be members of the Council.
And four Councils to be formed for the future from 3
persons of the stated age, and a division of these
selected by lot to officiate, but the others also to be
included in each such selection. And the Hundred
Men to divide themselves and the others ' into four
divisions as nearly equal as possible, and to cast lots
among them, and those on whom the lot falls to form
the Council for a year. And the Council to frame 4
^ See 1x1. 3. ' See ib, 4. "* See ib. 5.
* See xxiv. 3. f Athena.
» This contradicts the end of the section, and the text seems
to be corrupt.
* This clause seems to be interpolated from below.
»■ The managers of the funds paid as tribute by the Con-
federacy of Delos.
^ i.e. the rest of the Five Thousand.
91
ARISTOTLE
hoKT) αντοΐς άριστα e^ecv ττ€ρί re των χρημάτων
οττως άν σώα fj καΐ els το δέον άναλίσκηται, καΐ
ΤΓβρΙ των άΧλων ως άν Βννωνται άριστα- eav 8e^
τι θβλωσιν βονλζνσασθαι μετά ττΧζΐόνων, €7Γ€ΐσ-
KaXeiv ζκαστον επείσκλητον ον άν iOeXr] των €Κ
της αντης ηλικίας. τάς δ έδρα? ττοΐ€ΐν της
βουλής κατά 7Τ€νθημ€ρον, eav μη δεωνται πλειόνων.
5 κληροΰν δε την βονλην τους ivvea άρχοντας, τάς
δε χειροτονίας κρίνβιν πέντε τους λαχόντας εκ
της βουλής, και εκ τούτων ενα κληροΰσθαι καθ*
εκάστην ημεραν τον επιφηφιοΰντα. κληροΰν δε
τους λαχόντα? πέντε τους εθελοντας προσελθεΐν
εναντίον της βουλής, πρώτον μεν Ιερών, Βεχττερον
δε κήρυξ IV, τρίτον πρεσβείαις, τέταρτον τών άλλων
τά δε τοΰ πολέμου όταν 8εη άκληρωτι προσαγα-
6 γόντας τους στρατηγούς χρηματίζεσθ αι. ^ τον δε
μη ιόντα εις το βουλευτήριον τών βουλευόντων
την ώραν την προρρηθεΐσαν όφείλειν Βραχμήν τής
ημέρας εκάστης, εάν μη ευρισκόμενος^ άφεσιν τής
βουλής άπή.
1 XXXI. Ύαύτην μεν οΰν εις τον μέλλοντα χρόνον
ανέγραφαν την πολιτείαν, εν δε τω παροντι καιρώ
τήν8ε' βουλεύειν μεν τετρακοσίους κατά τά
πάτρια, τετταράκοντα εξ εκάστης φυλής εκ προ-
κρίτων ους άν ελωνται οι φυλεται τών υπέρ
τριάκοντα ετη γεγονότων. τούτους δε τας τε
αρχάς καταστήσαι, και περί τοΰ όρκου οντινα
χρή ομόσαι γράφαι, και* περί τών νομών και
τών ευθυνών και τών άλλων πράττειν fj αν
2 ήγώνται σνμφερειν. τοις δε νόμοις οΐ άν τεθώσιν
1 δέ suppletum a Mayor. * χρημάτιζαν Blass.
3 ΐΰρόμΐνο% Tyrrell. * και supplevit Kenyon.
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxx. 4-xxxi. 2
such resolutions as may seem to them likely to be
best to secure the safe preservation of the funds and
their expenditure upon necessary objects, and about
the other affairs to the best of their abihty ; and in
case of their desiring to consider some matter with
added numbers, each member to summon as a co-
opted member anybody of the same age as himself
that he may wish. To hold the sittings of the
Council every five days, unless more sittings are re-
quired. The Council to elect the Nine Archons by 5 ^
lot. The tellers to be five persons elected by lot
from the Council, and one of these to be chosen by
lot to serve daily as putter of the question. And the
five tellers elected to cast lots among those who
desire an audience of the Council, first about matters
of religion, second for Heralds, third for embassies,
fourth about other business ; but whenever questions
relating to war need consideration they are to intro-
duce the Generals without casting lots and take their
business. A member of the Council not coming to the 6
Council-chamber at the time previously announced
to be liable to a fine of a drachma for each day, unless
he obtain leave of absence from the Council.'
XXXI. This constitution, therefore, they drcAV up 1
for the future, but the following to be in force in
the present crisis : ' The Council to consist of four !
hundred members according to the ancestral regula- 1 1
tions, forty from each tribe taken from a preliminary ' '
list of any persons over thirty years of age that the
members of the tribe may elect. These to appoint
the officials, and to draft a proposal about the form of
oath to be taken, and to take action about the laws
and the audits and other matters as they may think
good. And to follow any laws that may be enacted 2
93
ARISTOTLE
Trepl των ττοΧηικών χρησθαι, καΐ μη i^etvai μ€τα-
KiveTv μη^^ €Τ€ρους θ€σθαί. των Se στρατηγών το
νυν elvai την alpeaiv Ιζ απάντων ττοιβΐσθαι των
πεντακίσχίλίων, την Be βονλην eVetSav καταστη^
ττοιήσασαν £^ετασιν iv^ οπλοις iXeauai δεκτά
άνΒρας καΐ γραμματέα τούτοις, τους 8e αίρ^θίντας
αρχ€ΐν τον βίσιόντα βνιαυτον αυτοκράτορας, και
αν τι Βεωνταί συμβουλβύβσθαί μετά της βουλής.
3 eXeoOai 8e καΐ ΐττπαρχον eva^ καΐ φυλάρχους δέκα-
το δε λοίπον την alpeaiv ποΐ€Ϊσθαι τούτων την
βουλην κατά τα γβγραμμβνα. των δ άλλων" αρχών
πλην της βουλής καΐ τών στρατηγών μη e^elvai
μητ€ τούτοις μητ€ αλλω μηΒ€νΙ πλβΐον η άπαξ
άρξαι την αύτην αρχήν, ει? δε τον άλλον χρόνον.
Ινα ν€μηθώσιν οΐ τετρακόσιοι ει? τας τετταρα?
λήζεις, όταν έκάστοις* γίγνηται /χετά τών άλλων
βουλεύειν, διανει/χ.άν'των αυτού? οι εκατόν άνδρε?,
1 XXXII, Οι /χέν ουν εκατόν οι υπό τών ττεντα-
κισχιλίων αιρεθέντ^ς ταύτην ανέγραφαν την πολι-
τειαν. ΙπικυρωθΙντων δε τούτων ύπο του πλήθους
βπιφηφίσαντος ^ Κριστομάχου , ή μβν βουλή η^ εττι
Καλλίου πριν Βιαβουλεϋσαι κατελύθη μηνός Θαρ-
γηλιώνος τετράδι εττι δε'κα, οι δε τετρακόσιοι
ειστ^σαν ενάτη φθίνοντος θαργηλιώνος• έδει δε
την είληχυΐαν τω κυάμω βουλην εισιε'ναι δ επι
2 δε'κα Σικιροφοριώνος . ή μεν ουν ολιγαρχία τούτον
κατέστη τον τρόπον επί Καλλιου μεν άρχοντος
ετεσιν δ' ύστερον της τών τυράννων εκβολής
1 Wyse : καταστησψ cod. * fV supplevit Wyse.
* ^va <καΙ ταξιάρχους δέκα^ Wilamowitz.
* 'έκαστοι! (vel Toh avTois, αύτοΐς) edd. : τοισαστοΐί Cod.
^ ή supplevit Rutherford.
94
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxi. 2— xxxii. 2
about the affairs of state, and not to have powers
to alter them nor to enact others. The election of
the Generals for the time being to be made from
among all the Five Thousand, and the Council as soon
as it is appointed to hold a review under arms and
elect ten men to the post, and a secretary for them, and
those elected to hold office for the ensuing year with
autocratic powers, and to consult with the Council
about any matter if they require. And also to elect 3
one Master of the Horse and ten Tribe-commanders ;
and for the future the Council to conduct the election
of these according to the procedure enacted. And
none of the other officials except the Council and the
Generals, nor anybody else, to be allowed to hold the
same office more than once. And for the future, in
order that the Four Hundred may be divided into the
four lists,** when each division takes its turn to form
the Council with the rest, let the Hundred Men
divide them into sections.'
XXXII. This then was the constitution drawn up by 1
the Hundred elected by the Five Thousand. These
proposals were carried by the multitude, being put
to the vote by Aristomachus, and the Council in
Callias's year was dissolved on the 14<th day of the 4i2 b.(;.
month of Thargelion before it had completed its
term of office ; while the Four Hundred came into
office on Thargelion the 21 st ; and the Council elected "X- '^ '
by lot was due to enter office on Scirophorion the
14th. ^ In this way therefore the oligarchy was set 2
up, in the archonship of Callias, about a hundred
years after the expulsion of the tyrants, the chief
« Cf. XXX. 3.
*" The three dates are about May 31, June 7, and June 30.
ARISTOTLE
jLtaAiara Ικατόν, αίτιων /μάλιστα γ€νομ4νων lleia-
auhpov καΐ Αντιφώντος και Θηραμένους, άνΒρών
καΐ γ€γ€νημ€νων ev και avveaei και γνώμη hoKovv-
3 των ^ιαφΙρ€ΐν. γενομένης hk ταύτης της πολιτείας
οΐ μεν πεντακισχίλιοι λόγω μόνον ηρεθησαν, οι οε
τετρακόσιοι μετά των 8εκα τών αυτοκρατόρων
είσελθόντες εις το βουλευτήριον ηρχον τε^ της
ττόλ^ως και προς ΑακεΒαιμονίους πρεσβευσάμενοι
κατελύοντο τον πόλεμον εφ' οΐς εκάτεροι τυγ-
χάνουσιν εχ^οντες, ούχ υπακουόντων δ εκείνων
εΐ μη και την άρχην της θαλάττης άφησουσιν,
οϋτως άπεστησαν.
1 XXXIII, Μτ^ν'α? μεν οΰν ΐσως τετταρας 8ι-
εμεινεν η τών τετρακοσίων πολιτεία, και ηρζεν εζ
αυτών Μ,νασίλοχος ^ίμηνον επι θεοπόμπου άρχον-
τος, δς^ VP^^ τους επιλοίπους 8εκα μήνας,
ήττηθεντες δε τη περί Ύψετρίαν ναυ/χ^αχια και
της Έίύβοίας απόστασης δλης πλην Ω,ρεοΰ,
χαλεπώς ενεγκόντες επι τη συμφορά μάλιστα τών
προγεγενημενων {πλείω γαρ εκ της Έιύβοιας η
της 'Αττικής ετύγχανον ωφελούμενοι) κατελυσαν
τους τετρακοσίους καΐ τα πράγματα παρε8ωκαν
τοις πεντακισχιλίοις τοις εκ τών οπλών, φηφισα-
2 μενοι μηΒεμίαν άρχην efvai μισθοφόρον. αιτιω-
τατοι δ' εγενοντο της καταλχ)σεως Αριστοκράτης
και Θηραμένης, ου συναρεσκό μενοι τοις υπο τών
τετρακοσίων γιγνομενοις' άπαντα γαρ δι αυτών
επραττον, ούΒεν επαναφεροντες τοις πεντακι-
σχιλίοις. Βοκοΰσι Βε καλώς πολιτευθηναι κατά
τούτους τους καιρούς, πολέμου τε καθεστώτος
και εκ τών οπλών της πολιτείας ούσης.
1 τ£ supplevit Hude. * 5s supplevit Kenyon.
96
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxii. 2— xxxiii. 2
movers having been Peisander, Antiphon and Thera-
menes, men of good birth and of distinguished reputa-
tion for wisdom and judgement. But when this con- 3
stitution had been set up, the Five Thousand were
only nominally chosen, but the Four Hundred with
the aid of the Ten with autocratic powers " entered
the Council-chamber and governed the state. They
also sent envoys to the Lacedaemonians and proposed
to conclude peace on terms of uti possidetis ; but the
Lacedaemonians would not consent unless Athens
would also relinquish the empire of the sea, so that
they finally abandoned the project.
XXXIII. The constitution of the Four Hundred 1
lasted perhaps four months, for two of which Mnesi-
lochus was archon, in the year of the archonship of 411b.c.
Theopompus, who received the office for the remain-
ing ten months. But when they had been worsted
in the naval battle ofFEretria and the whole of Euboea
except Oreum had revolted, they were more dis-
tressed at the misfortune than by any previous dis-
aster (for they were actually getting more support
from Euboea than from Attica), and they dissolved
the Four Hundred and handed over affairs to the Five
Thousand that were on the armed roll,^ having passed
by vote a resolution that no office should receive pay.
The persons chiefly responsible for the dissolution 2
were Aristocrates and Theramenes, who disapproved
of the proceedings of the Four Hundred ; for they
did everything on their own responsibility and re-
ferred nothing to the Five Thousand. But Athens
seems to have been well governed during this
critical period, although a war was going on and the
government was confined to the armed roll.
" The Ten Generals, see xxxi. 2. ** Cf. iv. 2, xxix. 5.
Η . 97
ARISTOTLE
1 XXXIV. Τούτου? μ^ν οΰν αφείλ^το την ττολι-
Teiav 6 8ημος δια τάχους' eret δ' ^β^όμω^ /χετα
TTjv των τετρακοσίων κατάλνσιν , errl Καλλιου τον
^Αγγζληθεν άρχοντος, γενομένης της εν Άργι-
νούσαίς ναυμαχία?, ττρώτον μεν τους 8εκα στρατη-
γούς τους τη ναυ/χαγια νικώντας συνέβη κριθηναι
/χια χειροτονία πάντας, τους μεν ούΒε συνναυμαχη-
σαντας, τους δ' εττ' αλλότριας νεως σωθεντας,
εζαττατηθ εντός του ^ημου δια. του? τταροργίσαντας•
eVeiTa βουλομενων Αακε^αιμονίων εκ Αεκελειας
αττιεναι^ εφ* οΐς εχουσιν εκάτεροι καΐ είρηνην
άγειν^ ενιοι μεν εσπούΒαζον, το δε ττληθος ούχ
ύττηκουσεν , εζαπατηθεντες ύττο Κ^λεοφώντος, ος
εκώλυσε γενέσθαι την εΙρηνην ελθών εις την
εκκλησίαν μεθύων και θώρακα εν8ε8υκώς, ου
φάσκων επιτρεφειν εάν μη ττάσας άφιώσι Αακε^αι-
2 μόνιοι τάς πόλεις, ου χρησάμενοι δε καλώς τότε
τοις πράγμασι /χετ' ου πολύν χρόνον έγνωσαν την
άμαρτίαν. τω γάρ ύστερον ετει επ* ^Αλεζίου
άρχοντος ητύχησαν την εν Atyo? ποταμοΐς ι^αυ/χα-
χίαν, εζ ης συνέβη κύριον γενόμενον της πόλεως
Αύσαν^ρον καταστησαι τους τριάκοντα τρόπω
3 τοιώδε• της ειρήνης γενομένης αύτοΐς εφ* ω τε
πολιτεύσονται την πάτριον πολιτείαν, οι μεν
δημοτικοί διασωζεΐΓ επειρώντο τον ^ήμον, τών δε
^ 'έ κτ φ edd, * Mayor: avievai cod.
■ ^φ' oh . . . a7etc cum schol. Wilamowitz-Kaibel : xau-
φοΐίΐχονσιΐΊρηνην(κατεροια,'γ(ΐν Cod.
" ' wSixth ' (in Greek arithmetic ' seventh ') is a mistake for
' fifth ' (Greek ' sixth ') : the Four Hundred fell in 41 1 , Callias
was archon 406 b.c.
* i.e. with his courage artificially stimulated and with
armour to protect him against assassination (unless we adopt
98
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxiv. 1-3
XXXIV. So the people speedily took the govern- 1
jnent out of these men's hands ; and in the sixth "
year after the dissolution of the Four Hundred, in the
archonship of Callias of the deme of Angele, after the
occurrence of the naval battle at Arginusae, it came
about first that the ten Generals to whom victory
in the naval battle was due were all condemned by a
single vote, some of them not even having been in the
engagement at all and the others having escaped on
board a ship not their own, the people being com-
pletely deceived through the persons who provoked
their anger ; and then, when the Lacedaemonians
were willing to evacuate Decelea on terms of both
parties retaining what they held, and to make peace,
though some persons were eager to accept, yet the
mass of the people refused to consent, being com-
pletely deceived by Cleophon, who prevented the
conclusion of peace by coming into the assembly, drunk
and wearing a corslet,^ and protesting that he would
not allow it unless the Lacedaemonians surrendered
all the cities." But though on this occasion they had 2
managed their affairs ill, they realized their mistake
not long afterwards. For in the next year, when 405 b.c.
Alexius was Archon, they met with the disaster in
the naval battle of Aegospotami which resulted in
the city's falling into the hands of Lysander, who
set up the Thirty in the following way. The peace 3
having been concluded on terms of their carrying on
the government according to the ancestral constitu-
tion, the popular party endeavoured to preserve the
the conjecture that μεθύωι> και θώρακα evdedvKws is a mistaken
paraphrase of some original record giving θώρακα ΐχων in
the slang sense of ' well primed with liquor,' cf, Aristoph.
Ran. 1504).
* i.e. those that they had taken in the war.
99
ARISTOTLE
γνωρίμων ol μ^ν iv ταΐς eraipeiai? οντ€ς, και των
φυγάδων οΐ μ€τά την ζίρηνην ι<ατ€λθόντ€ς , ολιγ-
αρχίας βττ^θύμουν, οι 8' iv iratpeia μβν ouSe/Mta
συγκαθ€στώτ€ς άλλως δε 8οκοΰντ€ς ούΒβνος ετη-
λείπβσθαι των πολιτών την ττάτριον πολιτ€ΐαν
εζητουν ων ην μεν και ^Αρχΐνος καΙ "Ανυτος
καΐ Ιίλεηοφών καΐ Φορμίσιος και έτεροι πολλοί,
προειστηκει 8ε μάλιστα Θηραμένης. ΑυσάνΒρον
8ε προσθεμένου τοις όλιγαρχικοΐς καταπλαγείς ο
8ημος ηναγκάσθη χειροτονεΐν την όλιγαρχιαν.
έγραφε 8ε το φηφισμα ΑρακοντίΒης Αφι8ναΐος.
1 XXXV. Ot μεν οΰν τριάκοντα τούτον τον
τρόπον κατέστησαν επι ΐΙυθο8ώρου άρχοντος,
γενόμενοι 8ε κύριοι της πόλεως τα μεν άλλα τα
8όζαντα περί της πολιτείας παρεώρων, πεντα-
κόσιους 8ε βουλευτάς και τάς άλλα? αρχάς κατα-
στησαντες εκ προκρίτων εκ των χιλιωΐ'/ και
προσελόμενοι σφίσιν αύτοΐς του ΙΙειραιεως άρ-
χοντας 8εκα και του 8εσμωτηρίου φύλακας εν8εκα
και μαστιγοφόρους τριακόσιους ύπηρετας κατεΐχον
2 την πόλιν δι' εαυτών, το μεν οΰν πρώτον μέτριοι
τοις πολίταις ήσαν και προσεποιοΰντο 8ιοικεΐν^ την
πάτριον πολιτείαν , και τους τ' 'Έφιάλτου και
{/ * Αρχεστράτου νόμους τους περί τών ^Αρεοπαγιτών
καθεΐλον εζ 'Αρείου πάγου καί τών Έόλωνος
θεσμών όσοι 8ιαμφισβητησεις εΐχον, και το κΰρος
ο ην εν τοις 8ικασταΐς κατελυσαν, ως επανορ-
1 {(Κ των] χιλίων Herwerden : [έκ των χιλίων] Rutherford :
φνλων pro χιλίων Hude.
^ διώκ€ΐν edd.
100
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxiv. 3— xxxv. 2
democracy, but the notables who belonged to the
Comradeships and those exiles who had returned
after the peace were eager for oligarchy, while those
notables who were not members of any Comradeship
but who otherwise were inferior in reputation to none
of the citizens were aiming at the ancestral constitu-
tion ; members of this party were Archinus, Anytus,
Cleitophon and Phormisius, while its chief leader was
Theramenes. And Λvhen Lysander sided with the
oligarchical party, the people were cowed and were
forced to vote for the oligarchy. The motion was
proposed by Dracontides of Aphidna.
XXXV. So in this manner the Thirty were estab- i
lished, in the archonship of Pythodorus. Having be- 404 b.c.
come masters of the state they neglected most of the
measures that had been resolved on in regard to the
constitution, but appointed five hundred Councillors
and the other offices from among persons previously
selected from the Thousand," and also chose for them-
selves ten governors of Peiraeus, eleven guardians
of the prison, and three hundred retainers carrying
whips, and so kept the state in their own hands. At 2
first, then, they were moderate towards the citizens
and pretended to be administering the ancestral form
of constitution, and they removed from the Areopagus
the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus ^ about the
Areopagites, and also such of the ordinances of Solon
as were of doubtful purport, and abolished the
sovereignty vested in the jurymen, claiming to be
rectifying the constitution and removing its un-
" i.e. from the knights ; but the text can hardly be correct,
and may be emended to give 'from among a thousand
persons previously selected.'
* Probably a supporter of Ephialtes, for whose legislation
see ch. xxv.
101
ARISTOTLE
θοΰι^τ€ς και ποίονντ€ς άναμφισβητητον την ττολι-
reiav, οίον Trepl του δούναι τα εαυτού ω άν ideXrj
κύριον 7τοίήσαντ€ς καθάπαζ, τάς Se προσονσας
δυσκολία? " iav μη /χανιών η γηρως (eveKaY η
γυναίκΐ ττιθόμ^νος ' ' άφβΐλον όπως μη η τοις
συκοφάνταις ^φο^ος• ομοίως δε τοΰτ' έ'δρων και
3 ετΓΐ των άλλων, κατ' αρχάς /xev ονν ταυτ' Ιττοίονν
και τους συκοφάντας και τους τω Βημω ττρος
χάριν όμιλοΰντας παρά το βελτιστον και κακοπραγ-
μονας οντάς και πονηρούς άνηρουν, εφ οΐς έχαιρεν^
η πόλις γιγνομίνοις, ηγούμενοι του βέλτιστου
4 χάριν ποιεΐν αυτούς, επει δε την πάλιν εγκρατε-
στερον εσχον, ούΒενός άπείχοντο των πολιτών,
αλλ' άπεκτειναν τους και ταΐς ούσίαις και τω
γένει και τοις ά^ιώ/χασιν προέχοντας, ύπεξαιρού-
μενοί τε τον φόβον και βουλόμενοι τας ουσίας
Βιαρπάζειν και χρόνου Βιαπεσόντος βραχεος ουκ
ελάττους άνηρήκεσαν η χίλιους πεντακόσιους.
1 ΧΧΧνί. Ού'τω? δε της πόλεως ύποφερομενης
Θηραμένης άγανακτών επΙ τοις γινομενοις της
μεν ασέλγεια? αύτοΐς παρηνει τταυσασ^αι μετα-
δουναι δε των πραγμάτων τοις βελτίστοις. οι δε
πρώτον^ εναντιωθεντες, επει Βιεσπάρησαν οι λόγοι
προς το πλήθος και προς τον θηραμενην οίκείως
είχον οΐ πολλοί, φοβηθεντες μη προστάτης γενό-
μενος τοΰ Βημου κατάλυση την Βυναστειαν κατα-
λε'γουσιν των πολιτών τρισχιλιους* ώς μετα-
2 δώσοντε? της πολιτείας. Θηραμένης δε ττάλιν
^ ^€κα Ύ7ΐρω$ Wyse : •^/ηρων cod.
* SidgWJck (cf. xxxiv. 1 το δέ πληθοί ούχ νπ-ήκονσεν, ίξαττατη-
eivres) : exaipov cod.
^ edd. : ττρωτοί cod. * edd. : δισχιλιου; cod.
102
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxv. 2— xxxvi. 2
certainties : for example, in regard to the bestowal
of one's property on whomsoever one wishes, making
the single act of donation valid absolutely, while
they removed the tiresome qualifications ' save when
in consequence of insanity or of old age, or under the
influence of a woman,' in order that there might be
no opening for blackmailers ; and similarly they did
this in the other matters as well. At the outset, there- 3
fore, they were engaged in these matters, and in
removing the blackmailers and the persons who con-
sorted undesirably with the people to curry favour
and were evil-doers and scoundrels ; and the state
was delighted at these measures, thinking that they
were acting with the best intentions. But when 4
they got a firmer hold on the state, they kept their
hands off none of the citizens, but put to death those
of outstanding wealth or birth or reputation, in-
tending to put that source of danger out of the way,
and also desiring to plunder their estates ; and by
the end of a brief interval of time they had made
away with not less than fifteen hundred.
XXXVI. While the state was thus being under- 1
mined, Theramenes, resenting what was taking place,
kept exhorting them to cease from their wantonness
and to admit the best classes to a share in affairs.
At first they opposed him, but since these proposals
became disseminated among the multitude, and the
general public were well disposed towards Thera-
menes, they grew afraid that he might become head
of the People and put down the oligarchy, and so
they enrolled three thousand of the citizens with the
intention of giving them a share in the government.
But Theramenes again criticized this procedure also, 2
103
I
ARISTOTLE
βττιτιμα και τούτοις, ττρώτον μ^ν δτι βουλομβνοί
μ€ταΒοΰναι τοις επιεικεσι τρίσχιλίοις μόνοις μβτα-
διδοασι, ώς iv τοντω τω πλήθ^ι της αρετής
ώρισμ€νης, βπ€ΐθ' οτι δυο τα εναντιώτατα ττοιοΰσιν,
βίαων τ€ την αρχήν καΐ των αρχομένων ηττω
κατασκβυάζοντβς . οι δε τούτων μβν ώλιγωρησαν,
τον δε κατάλογον των τρισχιλίων ττολνν μεν
χρόνον νττερεβάλλοντο^ και τταρ' αύτοΐς Ιφύλαττον
τους εγνωσμένους, ore δε και ho^eiev αύτοΐς
€κφ4ρ€ΐν τους μεν εξηλβιφον των εγγεγραμ-
μένων'^ τους δ' άντενεγραφον των έζωθεν.
1 XXXVII. "Ηδ-)7 δε του χειμώνος ενεστώτας,
καταλαβόντος Θρασυβούλου μετά των φυγάδων
Φυλην και κατά την στρατιάν ην έξηγαγον οι
τριάκοντα κακώς αποχωρήσαντες , έγνωσαν τών
μεν άλλων τα οττλα παρελέσθαι Θηραμένην δε
8ιαφθεΐραι τόνδε τρόπον, νόμους είσήνεγκαν εις
την βουλην δυο κελεύοντες έπιχειροτονεΐν, ων ο
μεν εις αυτοκράτορας έττοίει τους τριάκοντα τών
πολιτών άποκτεΐναι τους μη του καταλόγου μετ-
έχοντας τών τρισχιλιων, 6 δ' έτερος εκωλυε
κοινωνεΐν της παρούσης πολιτείας όσοι τυγχα-
νουσιν το εν Ήετιωΐ'εια, τείχος κατασκάφαντες η
τοις τετρακοσίοις εναντίον τι πράζαντες τοΐς^
κατασκεύασασι την προτέραν όλιγαρχιαν ων ετυγ-
χανεν αμφοτέρων κεκοινωνηκώς ό Θηραμένης,
ώστε συνέβαινεν έπικυρωθέντων τών νόμων εξω
^ ΰτΓΐρ€βάλ\οντο <,ίκφέρΐΐν'ρ Gertz.
2 ίγ^ί'^ραμμένων Herwerden : -^("γραμμ^νων cod.
^ τ6ΐ% Herwerden : T/rots cod.
104
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxvi. 2— xxxvii. 1
first on the ground that although willing to share the
government with the respectable they were only
giving a share to three thousand, as though moral
worth were limited to that number, and next because
they were doing two absolutely incompatible things,
making their rule one of force and at the same time
weaker than those they ruled. But they despised
these remonstrances, and for a long time went on
postponing the roll of the Three Thousand and keep-
ing to themselves those on whom they had decided,
and even on occasions when they thought fit to
publish it they made a practice of erasing some of the
names enrolled and writing in others instead from
among those outside the γοΙΙ.**
XXXVII. Winter had already set in, when Thrasy- 1
bulus with the exiles occupied Phyle, and things went
badly with the Thirty on the expedition that they
led out against them ; so they decided to disarm the
others and to destroy Theramenes in the following
way. They introduced two laws into the Council,
with orders to pass them ; one was to give the Thirty
absolute powers to execute any citizens not members
of the roll of Three Thousand, and the other pro-
hibited admission to citizenship under the present
constitution for all who had actually taken part in the
demolition of the fort ^ on Eetionea, or in any act of
opposition to the Four Hundred who had instituted
the former oligarchy ; in both of these proceedings
Theramenes had in fact participated, so that the
result was that when the laws had been ratified he
" So that no one would be sure of being on it.
' A projecting mole on the northern side of Peiraeus
harbour, commanding the entrance. It had been begun,
but was then demolished at the instigation of Theramenes
(Thuc. viii. 90-92).
105
ARISTOTLE
τ€ γίγνεσθαι της ττοΧιτβίας αύτον και του? τριά-
2 κοντά κυρίους elvai θανατοΰντας . άναιρ^θίντος δε
Θηραμένους τά τ€ όπλα τταρβίλοντο πάντων πλην
των τρισχίλίων καΐ iv τοΐς άλλοι? ττολυ προς
ωμότητα και πονηρίαν βπ^Βοσαν. πρβσβζΐς δε^
πέμφαντες eiV Λακεδαί/χονα του τε Θηραμένους
κατηγορούν και βοηθ^ΐν αύτοΐς ηζίουν ων άκού-
σαντ€ς οΐ Λακεδαι/χόνιοι Ιίαλλίβίον άττε'στειλαι^
άρμοστην και στρατιώτας ως επτακόσιους , at την
άκρόπολιν ελθόντβς ^φρουρούν.
1 XXXVIII. Μετά δε ταύτα καταλαβόντων των
άπο Φυλής την Μ,ουνιχίαν και νικησάντων μάχη
τους μ€τά των τριάκοντα βοηθησαντας, εττανα-
■χωρησαντες μετά τον κίν^υνον οι εκ τοΰ άστεως
και συναθροισθεντες ει? την άγοράν τη ύστεραία,
τους μεν τριάκοντα κατελυσαν αίροΰνται δε δέκα
των πολιτών αυτοκράτορας επι την τοΰ πολέμου
κατάλυσιν. οι δε παραλαβόντες την άρχην εφ*^
οΐς μεν ηρεθησαν ουκ επραττον, επεμπον δ ει?
Λακεδαί)αονα βοηθειαν μεταπεμπόμενοι και χρη-
2 ματα δανειζόμενοι, χαλεπώς δε φερόντων επι
τούτοις των εν τη πολιτεία, φοβούμενοι μη κατα-
λυθώσιν της άρχης και βουλόμενοι καταπληζαι
τους άλλους {δπερ εγενετο) , συλλαβόντες Αημ-
άρετον ούΒενος οντά δεύτερον των πολιτών άπ-
εκτειναν, και τά πράγματα βεβαίως^ ^ι^χον, συναγω-
νιζόμενου Καλλι^ιου τε και τών ΪΙελοποννησιων
των παρόντων και προς τούτοις ενιων τών €V
τοΐς ίππεΰσι• τούτων γάρ τινε? μάλιστα τών
πολιτών εσπούΒαζον μη κατελθεΐν τους απο
^ δ^ supplevit Mayor.
^ έφ' edd. : ev cod. '^ βιαίως Mayor.
106
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxvii. 1— xxxvni. 2
became outside the constitution and the Thirty had
authority to put him to death. Theramenes having 2
been put out of the way, they disarmed everybody
except the Three Thousand, and in the rest of their
proceedings went much further in the direction of
cruelty and rascality. And they sent ambassadors
to Sparta to denounce Theramenes and call upon
the Spartans to assist them ; and when the Spartans
heard this message they dispatched Callibius as
governor and about seven hundred troops, who came
and garrisoned the Acropolis.
XXXVIII. After this the refugees in Phyle took 1
Munichia, and defeated in action the force that came
with the Thirty to the defence ; and the force from
the city, on their return after this dangerous ex-
pedition, held a meeting in the market-place the day
after, deposed the Thirty, and elected ten of the
citizens as plenipotentiaries to bring the war to a
conclusion. These, however, having obtained this
office did not proceed to do the things for the purpose
of which they had been elected, but sent to Sparta
to procure help and to borrow funds. But this was 2
resented by those within the constitution, and the
Ten, in their fear of being deposed from office and
their desire to terrify the others (which they suc-
ceeded in doing), arrested one of the most leading
citizens, Demaretus, and put him to death, and kept
a firm hold upon affairs, while Callibius and the
Peloponnesians at Athens actively supported them,
and so did some members of the corps of Knights as
well ; for some of the Knights were the most eager
of all the citizens that the men at Phyle should not
107
ARISTOTLE
3 Φυλ-^?. o)5 δ' ol τον Retpatea και την Μοννυχίαν
€χοντ€ς άποστάντος άπαντος του Βημου ττρος
αυτούς^ €π€κράτουν τω ττολβμω, τότε καταλυσαν-
Tes• τους δέκα τους ττρώτους αίρζθίντας , άλλους
βΐλοντο SeKa τους βέλτιστους etvai ^οκοΰντας, €φ
ων συνέβ-η καΐ τάς διαλύσει? yeveadai και κατ-
ελθεΐν τον δη/χον, συναγωνιζόμενων και προθυμου-
μενων τούτων, προει,στηκβσαν δ' αύτων μάλιστα
'Ρίνων τ€ 6 Παιαι^ιεύ? και Φάυλλος 6 ^ΑχερΒονσιος'
οΰτοί γαρ ττρίν τε Παυσαι^ιαν^ άφικεσθαι δι-
επβμποντο προς τους iv Heipaiei και άφικομενου
4 συνβσπού^ασαν την κάθο^ον. €πι πέρας γαρ ηγαγε
την είρηνην και τα? διαλύσει? Παυσανία? ό των
ΑακεΒαιμονίων ^ασιλεύ? μετά των δέκα διαλ-
λακτών των ύστερον άφικομενων εκ Λακεδαι-
μονος ους αυτό? εσττουδασεν ελθεΐν. οι δε 77ερι
τον 'ΡΙνωνα διά τε την εΰνοιαν την ει? τον Βημον
επηνεθησαν, καΐ λαβόντες την επιμελείας εν ολιγ-
αρχία τάς εύθύνας εδοσαν εν δημοκρατία, και
ούδει? ουδει^ ενεκαλεσεν αυτοί? ούτε των εν αστει
μεινάντων ούτε των εκ Υϊειραιεως κατελθ όντων,
άλλα διά ταΰτα καΐ στρατηγός ευθύς ηρεθη 'Ρίνων.
ι XXXIX. ^Έιγενοντο δ' αί διαλύσει? εττ' Ευ-
κλει'δοι» άρχοντος κατά τάς συνθήκας τάσδε. τους
βουλομενους ^Αθηναίων των εν αστει μεινάντων
εζοικεΐν εχειν Ελευσίνα επίτιμους οντάς και
κυρίους και αυτοκράτορας εαυτών και τα αυτών
2 καρπουμενους . το δ' ίερον είναι κοινον αμφο-
^ Blass : αντην cod.
2 re II αυσαί-ίο)/ Richards: 7?7rai'<ra»'ta»'re cod.
108
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxviii. 3— xxxix. 2
return. But the party holding Peiraeus and Munichia, 3
ποΛν that the whole of the people had come over to
their side, began to get the upper hand in the war,
and so finally they deposed the ten who had been
elected first, and chose ten others whom they thought
to be the best men, and while these were in power
there took place the reconciliation and the return of
the people, with the active and eager support of the
ten. The most prominent among them were Rhinon
of the Paeanian deme and Phayllus of the Acherdusian ;
for these men had repeatedly gone on missions to
the men at Peiraeus before Pausanias's arrival, and
after his arrival they zealously supported the return.
For it was Pausanias the king of the Lacedaemonians 4
who brought the peace and reconciliation to fulfilment,
with the aid of the ten mediators who later an-ived
from Sparta, and whose coming was due to the efforts
of the king himself. Rhinon and his companions
were commended for their goodwill towards the
people, and having been appointed to superintend
these negotiations under an oligarchy they gave
in their accounts under a democracy, and no one
made any charge against them whatever, whether of
those who had remained in the city or of those who
had returned from Peiraeus ; indeed, on the contrary
Rhinon was immediately elected general because of
his conduct in this office.
XXXIX. The reconciliation took place in the 1
archonship of Eucleides on the following terms : 403 b.c.
' That those of the Athenians who have remained
in the city that desire to emigrate do have Eleusis,
retaining their full rights, and having sovereignty and
self-government, and enjoying their own revenues.
And that the temple be the common property of both 2
109
ARISTOTLE
τίρων, €πιμ€λ€Ϊσθαυ Be Κήρυκας καΐ ΈνμολπίΒας
κατά, τα ττάτρια. μτ] i^etvai he /χτ^τε τοΙς Ελευ-
aivoOev els ro άστυ ju^re rot? e/c τοΰ άστεω?
Έλευσίναδ' elaievai πλην μυστηρίοις ίκατίρους.
συvτeλeΐv he άττο των ττροσίόντων els το συμ-
3 μαχικον καθάπερ τους άλλους 'Αθηναίους, eav δε
τιν€ς των άτηόντων οΐκίαν λαμβάνωσι,ν Έλβυσΐνι,
συμπe^θeιv τον κeκτημevov^ eav he μη συμ-
^αινωσιν άλλήλοις τιμητάς eXeadai τpeΐς €κάτ€ρον,^
καΐ ηντιν' αν οΰτοι τάζωσι τιμήν λαμβάν€ίν.
*Έιλ€υσίνίων he auvoLKelv ους αν ουτοι^ βούλωνται.
4 τήν δ' άττογραφήν elvat τοις βουλομ4νοις e^oiKetv,
τοις μ€ν €πώημοΰσίν αφ' ης αν ομόσωσιν τους
όρκους heKa ήμepώv, την δ' έζοίκησιν eiKoai, τοις
δ' ά■πohημoΰσιv εττειδάν €πώημήσωσιν κατά ταύτα.
δ μή e^eZvai he άρχειν μηheμίav αρχήν των ev τω
αστει τον Έλευσΐνι κατοικοΰντα πρΙν άττογράφηται
πάλιν ev τω άστει κατοικ€Ϊν. τάς he hίκaς τοΰ
φόνου etvat κατά τα πάτρια, el τις τίνα auro^etp
6 άπeκτeιvev ή eτpωσev.^ των he παρ€ληλυθότων
μηhevL προς μηΒ^να μνησικακ€Ϊν e^eZvai πλην προς
τους τριάκοντα και τους heKa και τους evheKa
καΐ τους τοΰ Ileιpaιeως άρζαντας, μηhe προς
τούτους eav hιhώσιv eύθύvaς. eύθύvaς he hoΰvaι
τους μεν ev Heipatet άρζαντας ev τοις ev Ueipaiel,
τους δ' ev τω άστ€ΐ ev τοις* τά τιμήματα παρ-
^ ίκάτβρον Bury : (κατ€ρωρ cod.
* αύτοί Richards.
* et τΐί . . . ίτρωσ(ν Blass, partim ex aliis : valde confusa cod.
* iv Totj <ev τφ άστ€ΐ> ? Kenyon.
" See Ivii. 1.
* Perhaps ' in the city ' should be inserted after ' property,
110
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxix. 2-6
sections, and be under the superintendence of thie
Heralds and the Eumolpidae " according to the an-
cestral practice. But that it be not lawful for those
at Eleusis to go into the city, nor for those in the city
to go to Eleusis, except in either case at a celebration
of the Mysteries. And that they contribute from
their revenues like the other Athenians to the fund
for the common defence. And that any of those who 3
go away that take a house at Eleusis be helped to
obtain the consent of the owner ; and if they can-
not come to terms with one another, each party to
choose three valuers, and to accept whatever price
these valuers assess. And that of the people of
Eleusis those whom the settlers may be willing to
allow do dwell in the place with them. And that the 4
registration of those that Avish to migrate be, for those
who are in the country, within ten days of the date
of their swearing the oaths of peace, and their
migration within twenty days, and for those abroad
similarly from the date when they return. And that 5
it be not permitted for anyone residing at Eleusis
to hold any of the offices in the city until he removes
himself from the roll in order to reside again in the
city. And that trials for homicide be in accordance
with the ancestral ordinances, if a man has killed or
wounded another with his own hand. And that there 6
be a universal amnesty for past events, covering
everybody except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven,
and those that have been governors of Peiraeus, and
that these also be covered by the amnesty if they
render account. And that those who had been
governors in Peiraeus render account before the
courts held in Peiraeus, but those in the city before a
court of persons that can produce ratable property ^ ;
111
ARISTOTLE
€χομ€νοίς• eW* οϋτως i^oiKciv τους μη^ εθίλοντας.
τα δε χρήματα α iSaveiaavTO els τον ττόλβμον
€κατ€ρονς απο^οΰναι χωρίς.
1 XL, Τενομενων 8e τοιούτων των διαλύσεων,
καΐ φοβούμενων όσοι μετά. των τριάκοντα συνεττολε-
μησαν, και πολλών μεν επινοονντων εζοικεΖν ανα-
βαλλόμενων δε ΤΎ)ν άπογραφην'^ εΙς τάς εσχάτα?
ημέρας, όπερ εΐώθασιν ποιείν άπαντες, ^Αρχΐνος
συνώών το πλήθος καΐ βουλόμενος κατασχεΐν αυ-
τούς ύφεΐλε τάς υπολοίπους ημέρας της απογραφής,
ώστε συναναγκασθηναι μενειν πολλούς άκοντας
2 εως εθάρρησαν. /cat δοκεί τοΰτό τε πολιτεύσασθαι
καλώς Άρχΐνος, καΐ μετά ταΰτα γραφάμενος το
φηφισμα το Θρασυβούλου παρανόμων, εν ω μετ-
εδιδου της πολιτείας πάσι τοις εκ ΧΥειραιεως συγ-
κατελθοΰσι, ων ενιοι φανερώς ήσαν δούλοι, και
τρίτον, επεί τι? ηρζατο τών κατεληλυθότων μνησι-
κακεΐν, (XTTayaycut' τούτον επι την βουλην και
πείσας άκριτον άποκτεΐναι, λέγων οτι νυν Βειζουσιν
εΐ βούλονται την Βημοκρατίαν σωζειν και τοις
ορκοις εμμενειν άφεντας μεν γαρ τούτον προτρε-
φειν και τους άλλους, εάν δ' άνελωσιν παράδειγμα
ποιησειν απασιν. όπερ και συνεπεσεν αποθανόν-
τος γάρ ού^εις πώποτε ύστερον εμνησικάκησεν,
άλλα Βοκοΰσιν κάλλιστα 8η και πολιτικώτατα
απάντων και ΙΒία και κοινή χρησασθαι ταΓ? προ-
3 γεγενημεναις συμφοραΐς• ου γάρ μόνον τα? ττερι
^ TOVS μη Blass : tovs δ cod. (δ supra lineam),
* Jackson : ανα-^ραψην cod.
112
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xxxix. 6— xl. 3
or that those who will not render account on these
terms do migrate.'* And that each party separately
repay their loans contracted for the war.'
• XL. The reconciliation having been made on these 1
terms, all those who had fought on the side of the
Thirty were alarmed, and many intended to migrate,
but put off their registration to the latest days,
as everybody usually does ; so Archinus perceiving
their numbers and wishing to retain them, cancelled
the remainder of the days allowed for registration,
so that many should be jointly compelled to stay
against their will until they recovered courage. This 2
seems to have been a statesmanlike act of Archinus ;
as was also later his indicting as unconstitutional
the decree of Thrasybulus admitting to citizenship
all those who had come back together from Peiraeus,
some of whom were clearly slaves ; and his third act
of statesmanship was that when somebody began
to stir up grudges against the returned citizens, he
arraigned him before the Council and persuaded it
to execute him without trial, saying that this was
the moment for them to show if they wished to save
the democracy and keep their oaths ; for by letting
this man off they would incite the others too, but if
they put him out of the way they would make him
an example to everybody. And this is what actually
occurred ; for never since he was put to death has
anybody broken the amnesty, but the Athenians
I appear both in private and public to have behaved
towards the past disasters in the most completely
honourable and statesmanlike manner of any people
in history ; for they not only blotted out recrimina- 3
" A variant reading («^' οϋτω^ έ^οικείν rovs (e^Xovras) gives
' then those who wish are to emigrate on these terms.'
I 113
ARISTOTLE
των ττροτίρων αίτιας e^rjXeiipav άλλα και τα
χρήματα Λακεδαι/χονίοι? ο. οΐ τριάκοντα προς τον
πόλεμον ζλαβον άττί^οσαν Koivrj, KeXevovaojv των
συνθηκών ίκατίρονς άττο^ώόναι χωρίς, τους τ εκ
τοΰ άστεως καΐ τους Ικ του Iletpateajs, ηγούμενοι
τοντο πρώτον αρχειν heiv της ομονοίας' iv δε
ταΐς άλλαυς πόλεσιν ονχ οΐον eVc προστιθέασιν
τών οίκβίων οΐ 8ημοκρατησαντ€ς^ άλλα /cat την
4 χώραν άνά8αστον ποίοϋσιν. ^ιελύθησαν oe και
προς τους iv 'Έιλβυσΐνι κατοικήσαντας eret τρίτω
μ€τά την εζοίκησιν €πΙ Ξεναινετου άρχοντος.
1 XLI. Ταϋτα μ€ν οΰν iv τοις ύστερον συνέβη
γενέσθαι καιροΐς, τότε δε κύριος 6 Βημος γενό-
μενος τών πραγμάτων ενεστήσατο την νυν ούσαν
πολιτείαν iπι ΥΙυθοΒώρου μεν άρχοντος .Βοκοΰντος
δε δικαίως'' τοΰ 8ημου λαβείν την πολιτείαν δια
το ποιησασθαι την κάθο8ον δι' αύτοΰ τον 8ημον.
2 ην δε τών μεταβολών ενδέκατη τον αριθμόν αύτη .
πρώτη μεν γαρ εγενετο η κατάστασις' τών εξ
άρχης "Ιωνος και τών /χετ' αύτοΰ συνοικισαντων
τότε γαρ πρώτον εις τάς τετταρας συνενεμηθησαν
φυλάς και τους φυλοβασιλεας κατέστησαν . δευτέρα
8ε, καΐ πρώτη μετά ταύτην εχουσά τι πολιτείας
τάξις* ή iπl Θησέως γενομένη, μικρόν παρεγ-
κλίνουσα της βασιλικής, μετά δε ταύτην η επι
Αράκοντος, εν fj και νόμους ανέγραφαν πρώτον,
τρίτη δ' η μετά την στάσιν η επι Έόλωνος, αφ
^ οι δήμοι κρατήσαντΐ'ϊ edd.
* δίκα/ου Richards. ' μετάστασίί alii legunt.
* Wilamowitz : (χουσαιιτοΚιταανταξίν cod.
» The Greek text is very doubtful, but apparently tin
114
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xl. 3— xli. 2
tions with regard to the past, but also pubUcly
restored to the Spartans the funds that the Thirty
had taken for the war, although the treaty ordered
that the parties in the city and in Peiraeus were
each to make restitution separately. The Athenians
thought that they must take this as a first step to
concord, whereas in the other states those who have
set up democracy not only do not pay any more out
of their own property but even make a redistribution
of the land. They also made a reconciliation with 4
those that had settled at Eleusis two years after the
migration, in the archonship of Xenaenetus. 40i b.c.
XLI. These events then came about in the follow- 1
ing periods ; but at the date mentioned the people
having become sovereign over affairs established
the now existing constitution, in the archonship of
Pythodorus, when the People's having accomplished
its return by its own efforts made it appear just for 402 b.o.
it to assume the government. In the list of reforms 2
this was the eleventh in number. There first occurred
the organization of the original constitution after the
settlement at Athens of Ion and his companions,
for it was then that the people were first divided into
the four Tribes and appointed the Tribal Kings. The
second constitution, and the first subsequent one
that involved a constitutional point," was the reform
that took place in the time of Theseus, which was a
sUght divergence from the royal constitution. After
that one came the reform in the time of Draco, in
which a code of laws was first published. Third was
the one that followed the civil disturbance in the time
of Solon, from which democracy took its beginning.
constitution in the time of Ion is taken as the starting-point,
and the eleven revolutions follow.
115
ARISTOTLE
'^S αρχή δημοκρατίας iyeveTO. τετάρτη δ' η eirl
Πεισιστράτου τνραννίς. πβμπτη δ' η μ€τά την
τών^ τυράννων κατάλυσιν η ¥>.λβίσθ€νονς, ^-ημοτι-
κωτ€ρα της Σ^όλωνος. €κτη δ' η μ€τά τα. Μηδικά,
της εζ 'Apeiou πάγου βουλής βπιστατούσης.
ββΒόμη δε /cai^ μ€τά ταυτην ην Άριστειδτ^? μ^ν
ύττε^αζβν ^Εφιάλτης δ' eneTeXeaev καταλυσας την
Αρ€θ7ταγΐτι.ν βουλην, iv fj ττλβιστα συνίβη την
ι / ττόΧιν δια του? δημαγωγούς άμαρτάνβιν δια' την
της θαλάττης άρχην. ογΒόη δ' η των τετρακοσίων
κατάστασις , καΐ μετά ταυτην ενάτη δε η δημοκρατία
τταλιν. Βεκάτη δ' η των τριάκοντα και η των
8eKa τυραννίς. ενδέκατη δ' η μετά την άπο
Φυλής και εκ ΐίεψαιεως κάθοΒον άφ^ ης δια-
γεγενηται μέχρι της νΰν, άει προσεπιλαμβάνουσα
τω πληθει την εζουσίαν. απάντων γαρ αύτος
αυτόν πεποίηκεν 6 ^ημος κύριον καΐ πάντα δι-
οικείται φηφίσμασιν και 8ικαστηρίοις εν οΐς ό ^ημος
εστίν 6 κρατών, και γαρ αϊ της βουλής κρίσεις
εΙς τον Βημον εληλύθασιν. και τοΰτο δοκουσι
ποιεΐν ορθώς• εύΒιαφθορώτεροι γαρ oAtyoi τών
3 πολλών εισιν και κε'ρδει και χάρισιν. μισθοφόρον
δ' εκκλησίαν το μεν πρώτον άπεγνωσαν ποιεΐν
ου συλλεγομένων δ' εις την εκκλησίαν , άλλα ττολλα
σοφιζομενων τών πρυτάνεων όπως προσιστηται το
πλήθος προς την επικύρωσιν της χειροτονίας,
πρώτον μεν Άγύρριος όβολον επόρισεν, μετά δε
^ Τ7)ν τΰν Kenyon: τωρ cod.
" και seel. Blass : ή coni. Mayor.
' <καΙ> διά, κΛτά, δια . . . άρχην <θαρρήσασαρ> coni. edd.
116
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xli. 2-3
Fourth was the tyranny in the time of Peisistratus.
Fifth the constitution of Cleisthenes, following the
deposition of the tyrants, which was more democratic
than the constitution of Solon. Sixth the reform
after the Persian War, under the superintendence of
the Council of Areopagus. Seventh followed the
reform outlined by Aristeides but completed by
Ephialtes when he put down the Areopagite Council,
during which it came about because of the dem-
agogues that the state made many mistakes, because
of the empire of the sea." Eighth was the establish-
ment of the Four Hundred, and after that, ninth,
democracy again. Tenth was the tyranny of the
Thirty and that of the Ten. Eleventh was the con-
stitution established after the return from Phyle and
from Peiraeus, from which date the constitution has
continued down to its present form, constantly taking
on additions to the power of the multitude. For the
people has made itself master of everything, and
administers everything by decrees and by jury-
courts in which the people is the ruling power, for
even the cases tried by the Council have come to the
people. And they seem to act rightly in doing this,
for a few are more easily corrupted by gain and by
influence than the many. The proposal to introduce 3
payment for attendance at the Assembly was on the -'
first occasion rej ected ; but as people were not attend-
ing the Assembly but the presidents kept contriving
a number of devices to get the multitude to attend
for the passing of the resolution by show of hands,
first Agyrrhius introduced a fee of an obol, and after
" Here again the exact text is doubtful.
117
ARISTOTLE
τούτον 'ΥίρακλζίΒηζ 6 KAa^o/xevio? 6 Βασιλεύς
€τηκαλούμ€νος Βιώβολον, πάλιν δ' ^Αγνρριος
τριώβολον.
1 XLII. "Έιχ€ΐ δ' η νυν κατάστασις της ττολιτεια?
TovSe τον τρόπον. μ€Τ€χονσίν μβν της πολιτβίας
οΐ Ιζ αμφοτέρων γβγονότβς αστών, εγγράφονται
δ' ets" τους Βημότας οκτωκαί^βκα €τη γ€γονότ€ς.
όταν δ' €γγράφωνται 8ιαφηφίζονται π€ρΙ αυτών
όμόσαντ€ς οι ^ημόται, πρώτον μ€ν el 8οκοΰσι
γβγονέναι την ηλικίαν την €Κ του νόμου, καν μη
Βό^ωσι άπ€ρχονται πάλιν €ΐς τταΓδας", SeijTepov δ'
ei ελ^ύθ^ρός βστι και γβγονβ κατά τους νόμους•
67Γ6ΐτ' άν^ άποφηφίσωνται^ μη etvat έλζύθβρον,
6 μέν έφίησιν βις το Βικαστηριον, οι δε δτ^^όται
κατηγόρους αίροΰνται vreWe άνδρα? e^ αυτών,
καν μ€ν μη 8όζη δικαίως ίγγράφ^σθαι, πωλξΐ
τούτον η πόλις' iav δε νικηση, τοις ^ημόταις
2 €πάναγκ€ς ^γγράφζίν. μετά δε ταΰτα Βοκιμάζβι
τους έγγραφίντας η βουλή, καν τι? ^όζη νεώτερος
οκτωκαίΒεκα ετών είναι, ζημιοΐ τους 8ημότας
τους εγγράφαντας. επάν δε Βοκιμασθώσιν οι
έφηβοι, συλλεγεντες οι πατέρες αυτών κατά φυλάς
όμόσαντες αίροΰνται τρεις εκ τών φυλετών τών
ύπερ τετταράκοντα ετη γεγονότων ους αν ηγώνται
βέλτιστους ειΐ'αι και επιτη^ειοτάτους επιμελεΐσθαι
τών εφήβων, €Κ δε τούτων 6 Βήμος ενα της φυλής
εκάστ7)ς χειροτονεί σωφρονιστήν, και κοσμητήν εκ
3 τών άλλων Αθηναίων επι πάντας. συλλαβόντες
δ' οΰτοι τους εφήβους, πρώτον μεν τά Ιερά περι-
ήλθαν, εΓτ' εις ΥΙειραιεα πορεύονται και φρουροΰ-
^ iLf Papageorgios : ανμεν cod. ^ Wyse ; €πιψ. cod.
118
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xu. 3— xlii. 3
him Heracleides of Clazomenae, surnamed ^ King, two
obols, and Agyrrhius again three obols.
XLII. The present form of the constitution is as 1
follows. Citizenship belongs to persons of citizen
parentage on both sides, and they are registered on
the rolls of their demes at the age of eighteen. At
the time of their registration the members of the
deme make decision about them by vote on oath, first
whether they are shown to have reached the lawful
age, and if they are held not to be of age they go back
again to the boys, and secondly whether the candi-
date is a freeman and of legitimate birth ; after this,
if the vote as to free status goes against him, he
appeals to the jury-court, and the demesmen elect
five men from among themselves to plead against
him, and if it is decided that he has no claim to be
registered, the state sells him, but if he wins, it is
compulsory for the demesmen to register him. After 2
this the Council revises the list of persons that have
been registered, and if anyone is found to be under
eighteen years of age, it fines the demesmen that
registered him. And when the cadets have been
passed by this revision, their fathers hold meetings
by tribes and after taking oath elect three members
of the tribe of more than forty years of age, whom
they think to be the best and most suitable to super-
vise the cadets, and from them the people elects by
show of hands one of each tribe as disciplinary officer,
and elects from the other citizens a marshal over
them all. These take the cadets in a body, and 3
after first making a circuit of the temples then go to
° Or ' nicknamed ' (as was Peisistratus in Eupolis's
comedy Demos) : but perhaps his family claimed royal
descent in Asia Minor.
119
ARISTOTLE
σιν οι /xev την Μοννιχίαν οι δε την Άκτην.
XeipoTovel δε και τταώοτρίβας αντοΐς 8υο και
διδασκάλου? oirive? 6πλομαχ€Ϊν και To^evevv και
άκοντίζ^ίν και καταττάλτην αφι^ναι διδάσκουσιν/
διδα>σι δε και ei? τροφην tols μ-ev σωφρονισταΐς
^ραχμην α ίκάστω, toZs δ' ξφηβοις τετταρα?
όβολούς ίκάστω• τα δε των φνλίτών των αντοΰ
λαμβάνων 6 σωφρονιστής έκαστος άγοράζβι τα
ε'τΓίτιίδεια ττασιν ει? το κοινόν (συσσιτοΰσι γαρ
κατά φυλάς), και των άλλων εττι/χελειται πάντων.
4 και τον μ€ν πρώτον iviavTOv όντως Βιαγουσι•
τον δ' νστβρον, ίκκλησίας iv τω θβατρω γενομένης
άτΓοδει^ά/χε^οι τω 8ημω τά πβρί τάς τά^ει? και
λαβόντες ασπίδα και δόρυ παρά της πόλεως, περι-
πολοϋσι την χώραν και Βιατρίβονσιν εν τοις
5 φυλακτηρίοις . φρουρονσι δε τά δυο ετη' χλα/χυδα?
έχοντες' και ατελει? εισι πάντων και Βίκην ούτε
διδόασιν οντε λαμβάνονσιν, ίνα μη πρόφασις η του
άτΓίε'ναι/ πλην περί κλήρου και επικλήρον καν
TLVL κατά* γένος Ιερωσννη γεντ^ται. Βιεξελθόντων
δε των» δυειν' ετών ήΒη μετά τών άλλων είσιν.
1 XLIII. Τά μεν οΰν περί την τών πολιτών
εγγραφήν και τους εφήβους τούτον έχει τον
τρόπον. τάς δ' αρχάς τάς περί την εγκυκλιον
Βιοίκησιν άπάσας ποιοϋσι κληρωτάς, πλην ταμιου
στρατιωτικών και τών επι τών θεωρικών και του
τών κρηνών επιμελητού• ταύτας δε χειροτονοΰσιν,
και οι χειροτονηθεντες άρχουσιν εκ Πανα^τ^ι^αιων
1 ζιδάξονσίν Rutherford.
^ πρόφασίί . . . άπι^ναι legit Blass, sed incertus cod.
* κατά Wilamowitz-Kaibel : κατατο cod.
120
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlii. 3— xliii. 1
Peiraeus,and some of them garrison Munichia," others
the Point. ^ And the people also elects two athletic
trainers and instructors for them, to teach them their
drill as heavy- armed soldiers, and the use of the
bow, the javelin and the sling. It also grants the
disciplinary officers one drachma a head for rations, and
the cadets four obols a head ; and each disciplinary
officer takes the pay of those of his own tribe and buys
provisions for all in common (for they mess together
by tribes), and looks after everything else. They go 4
on with this mode of life for the first year ; in the
following year an assembly is held in the theatre, and
the cadets give a display of drill before the people,
and receive a shield and spear from the state ; and
they then serve on patrols in the country and are
quartered at the guard-posts. Their service on 5
patrol goes on for two years ; the uniform is a mantle ;
they are exempt from all taxes ; and they are not
allowed to be sued nor to sue at law, in order that
they may have no pretext for absenting themselves,
except in cases concerning estate, marriage of an
heiress, and any priesthood that one of them nnay
have inherited. When the two years are up, they
now are members of the general body of citizens.
XLIII. Such, then, are the regulations about the i
registration of the citizens and about the cadets. All
the officials concerned with the regular administration
are appointed by lot, except a Treasurer of Military
Funds, the Controllers of the Spectacle Fund, and the
Superintendent of Wells ; these officers are elected
by show of hands, and their term of office runs from
" See xix. 2 n.
* The southern promontory of Peiraeus.
121
ARISTOTLE
elg ΐΐαναθηναια. χ€ψοτονοΰσί he καΐ τάς ττρος
τον ττόλβμον άττάσας.
2 Βουλτ^ δε κληροΰται φ', ν' άττο φνλης έκαστης.
πρυταν€ν€ί δ' iu jaepet των φυλών έκαστη καθ* δ
τι άΐ' λάγ^ωσιν, αί μέν ττρώται τβτταρβς ζ' καΐ λ'
ημέρας έκαστη, αί δε ?■' αί νστ^ραι πέντ€ και
λ' ημέρας έκαστη' κατά σελήνην γαρ αγουσιν τον
3 ένιαυτόν. οι he πρυτανεύοντας αυτών πρώτον μέν
συσσιτοϋσιν έν τη θόλω, λαμβάνοντες άργυριον
παρά της πόλεως, έπειτα συνάγουσιν καΐ την
βουλην καΐ τον 8ημον, την μεν οΰν^ βουλην
δσαι ημέραι,^ πλην εάν τις άφέσιμος η, τον δε
Βημον τετράκις της πρυτανείας εκάστης, και όσα
8εΐ χρηματίζειν την βουλην, και δ τι έν εκάστη
τη ήμερα, και δπου καθίζειν,^ ούτοι προγράφουσι.
4 προγράφουσι δε και τάς εκκλησίας ούτοι• jutav
μεν κυρίαν, έν fj δει τάς αρχάς έπιχειροτονεΐν ει
Βοκοΰσι καλώς άρχειν, και περί σίτου και περί
φυλακής της χώρας χρηματίζειν, και τάς εισ-
αγγελίας έν ταύτη τη ήμερα τους βουλομενους
ποιεΐσθαι, και τάς άπογραφάς τών 8ημευομένων
άναγινώσκειν, και τάς λήξεις τών κλήρων και τών
έπικλήρων άναγινώσκειν,'^ δπως μηΒένα λάθη μη^έν
Γ) έρήμον γενόμενον έπι δε της έκτης πρυτανείας
προς τοις είρημένοις και περί της όστρακοφορίας
έπιχειροτονίαν διδόασιν ει δοκεΓ ποιεΐν ή μή, και
συκοφαντών προβολάς τών Ά^ηΐ'αιων και τών με-
^ [ore] edd. * όσημέραι Kenyon.
^ Wilamowitz-Kaibel ; οπονκαθι^ίΐ cod.
* [avayivwcKeiv] Gennadios.
" i.e. in every four years ; the Great Panathenaic Festival,
as also the Pythian, was held in the third Olympic year.
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xliii. 1-5
one Panathenaic Festival to the next." All military
officers also are elected by show of hands.
The Council is elected by lot, and has five hundred 2
members, fifty from each tribe. The Presidency is
filled by each tribe in turn, in an order settled by lot,
each of the first four selected holding the office for
thirty-six days and each of the latter six for thirty-
five days ; for their year is divided into lunar months.''
Those of them serving as Presidents first dine to- 3
gether in the Round-house," receiving a sum of money
from the state, and then convene meetings of the
Council and the People, the Council indeed meeting
on every day excepting holidays, but the People four
times in each presidency. And the Presidents put up
written notice of the business to be dealt with by the
Council, and of each day's agenda, and of the place of
meeting. They also put up written notice of the 4
meetings of the Assembly : one ^ sovereign meeting,
at which the business is to vote the confirmation of
the magistrates in office if 'they are thought to
govern Avell, and to deal with matters of food supply
and the defence of the country ; and on this day
informations have to be laid by those who wish, and
the inventories of estates being confiscated read,
and the lists of suits about inheritance and heiresses,
so that all may have cognizance of any vacancy in
an estate that occurs. In the sixth presidency in 5
addition to the business specified they take a vote
on the desirability of holding an ostracism, and on
preliminary informations against persons charged as
malicious informers, citizens and resident aliens, up
'' Alternate months of 29 and 30 days make a year of
354 days, as does 36 χ 4+35 χ 6.
" At the N.E. of the Areopagus, near the Council-chamber.
'^ One in each presidential term of office.
123
ARISTOTLE
τοίκων fiexpL τριών ίκατίρων , καν τις ύττοσχ6μ€νός
β τι μη ποιηστ) τω 8ημω. €Τ€ραν δε ταΐ? ικ€τηρίαις,
€V η deig 6 βουλόμβνος [κ€τηρίαν virep ων αν
βούληται και ι6ίων και δημοσίων διαλέγεται προς
τον 8ημον. αι δε δυο ττερι των άλλων elaiv, iv
αίς κβλβύουσιν οι νόμοι τρία μ^ν ι^ρών χρηματίζ€ΐν,
τρία δε κήρυξιν και πρβσββίαις, τρία δ' οσίων,
χρηματίζουσιν δ' ενίοτε και άνευ προχειροτονίας.
προσέρχονται δε και οι κήρυκες και οι πρέσβεις
τοις πρυτανεσιν πρώτον, και οι τάς επιστολάς
φέροντες τούτοις αποδιδόασι.
ι XLIV. "Εστί δ' επιστάτης τών πρυτάνεων εις 6
λαχών οΰτος δ' επιστατεΐ νύκτα και ήμεραν, και
ουκ έ'στιν οϋτε πλειω χρόνον οντε δι? τον αυτόν
γενέσθαι, τηρεί δ' ούτος τάς τε κλεΐς τάς τών
Ιερών εν οΐς τα χρΎ}ματ^ εστίν καΐ τά^ γράμματα
τη πόλει, και την Βημοσίαν σφραγίδα, και μενειν
άναγκαΐον εν τη θόλω τοΰτόν εστίν και τριττύν
2 τών πρυτάνεων ην άν οΰτος κελεύη. και επεώάν
συναγάγωσιν οί πρυτάνεις την βουλήν η τον ^ημον
οΰτος κλήροι προέδρους εννέα, ενα εκ της φυλής
εκάστης πλην της πρυτανευούσης, και πάλιν εκ
τούτων επιστατην ενα, και τταραδιδωσι το πρό-
3 γράμμα αύτοις• οί δε παραλαβόντες της τ' εύ-
κοσμίας επιμελούνται και ύπερ ών δει χρηματίζειν
προτιθεασιν και τας χειροτονίας κρινουσιν και τά
άλλα πάντα ^ιοικοΰσιν και τοΰ^ άφεΐναι κύριοι εισιν.
^ τά suppletum ab edd.
* του Richards : τοντ cod. : τοΰ δ' Hude.
124
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xliii. δ— xi.iv. 3
to the number of not more than three crimes of
either class, and cliarges of failure to perform a
.Jservice promised to the People. Another meeting q
.'js given to petitions, at Avhicli anyone Avho wishes,
after placing a suppliant-bi-anch," may speak to
- the People al)out any matter he may wish whether
■^public or private. The tAvo other meetings deal Aviih
l-aW other business, at wliich the laws enact that three
iipases of sacred matters are to be dealt A\'ith, three
ijlAudiences for heralds and embassies, and three cases
'^of secular matters. And sometimes they do business
r.V'ithout a preliminary vote being taken. Also tlie
'^Presidents give a first audience to lieralds and to am-
■^bassadors, and to the Presidents dispatches are de-
^■Jivered by their bearers.
??i XLIV. I'he Presidents have a single Head elected 1
φγ Jot ; he holds office for a day and a night, and may
■ not hold office longer, nor serve a second time. Pie
: keeper of the keys of the temples in which tlie
i.iuuey and documents of the state are lodged, and
-'.of the state seal, and he is required to stay in the
' iiound - house, and so is Avhichever Thiid * of the
".Presidential Boards he orders. And Avhenever the 2
;;jPresidents call a meeting of the Council or of the
/People, this official selects by lot nine Chairmen, one
:.:from each tribe except the tribe presiding, and ag in
^"from these a single Plead, and he hands over the hst
■^of agenda to them ; and after receiviiig it they super- 3
I;intend procedure, bring forward the business to be
i dealt Avith, act as tellers, direct all the other busi-
^mess and have power to dismiss the meeting. A man
,, " -^" olive-branch wreathed with wool was carried by the
j suppliant ' and placed on the altar in the assembly.
^ * See viii. 30 n.
125
ARISTOTLE
/cat hr LOT arrja at ftev ουκ ζζ^στιν ττλζΐον η ατταζ iv
τω ii'iavrw, TrpoeSpeuGLV δ' c^cartu ατταζ iirl τη;
Trpuraveias €κάστϊ]ς.
4 ΐίοιονσι Be καΐ αρχαιρεσίας^ στρατηγών καΐ
ιππάρχων και, των άλλαη' των ττρος rov πόΧεμον
άρχων iv rfj εκκλησία, καθ^ ο τι αν τω Βημω BoKfj
ποιοΰσι δ ol μετά την ζ' πρυτανεύοντες εφ* ων
αν εύσημία γενηται. Βεΐ Be προβονλενμα γενεσθα
και περί τούτων. ■'•
1 XLV. Η Βε βουλή πρότερον μεν ην κυρία κα\
χρήμασιν ζημί,ώσαι και Βησαι και άποκτεΐναί.
και Αυσίμαχον Β'' αί^τ-ί]? άγαγούσης ώς τον Βημιον,
καθημενον ηΒη μέλλοντα άποΟνησκειν Έιύμηλί-
Βης ό ^ΑλωπεκηΟεν άφείλετο, ου φάσκων Βεΐν άνεν
Βικαστηριου γνώσεως ούΒενα των -πολιτών άπο~
θνήσκειν και κρίσεο)ς εν Βικαστηρίω γενομένης
6 μεν Αυσίμαχος άτίεφυγεν, και επωνυμίαν εσχεν 6
άπο του τνπάνου• 6 Βε Βημος άφείλετο της βουλη^^
το θανατοΰν και Βεΐν και χρημασι ζημιοΰν, καΐ
νόμον εθετο, αν τίνος άΒικεΐν η βουλή καταγνώ η
ζημιώση, τάς καταγνώσεις καΐ τάς επιζημιώσεις
είσάγειν τους θεσμοθετας εις το Βικαστηριον,
και ο τι αν οΐ Βικασταΐ φηφίσοηηαι τοΰτο κύριον
είναι.
2 KptVet δε τάς αρχάς η βουλή τάς πλείστας, καΐ
μάλισθ* οσαι χρήματα Βιαχειρίζουσιν ου κυρία, δ'
η κρίσις αλλ' εφεσιμος εις το Βικαστηριον. εζεστι
Βε και τοις ΙΒιώταις εΙσαγγέλΧειν ην άν βούλωνται
^ edd. : δ€καίδ€καρχαΐ[>(σια$ (dittographia) cod.
^ Αυσίμαχον δ' Papageorgios : και\νσψαχον codex. -
126
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xliv. 3— xlv. 2
r.m'ot become Head more than once a year, but he
ii be Chairman once in each presidency.
They also conduct elections of Generals, and 4
Lvalry Commanders and the other military officers
Lhe Assembl}', in Avhatever manner seems good to
People ; and these elections arc held by the first
i.-d of Presidents, after the sixth Presidency," in
. term of office favourable Mcatl)er-omens may .
r. These matters also require a preliminary
vuutiou of the Council.
XLV. The Council formerly had sovereign power 1
!">ftss sentences of fine, imprisonment and death.
. , .-, it -once it had brought L3'simachus to the public
'••'ieriuirAUtioner, Mhen, as he already sat awaiting death,
. i;lic:jii^lides of the dcme Alopece rescued him, saying
\ ^that^io citizen ought to die without sentence by a
t't •*3 UE}•' i and when a trial Avas held in a jury-court
'r ; iJTsijjiachus s:ot off, and he "fot the nickna)ne of ' the
ί' ,nr~afrom the drum-stick ' ^ ; and the People deprived
•- 'tli/'. Council of the power to sentence to death and
-onment and to impose fines, and made «i law
ill verdicts of guilty and penalties passed by the—
ruicil must be brought before the jury-court by the κ
"' lators, and that any vote of the jurjanen should
. ereign.
Is of officials are held in most cases by the 2
•il, particularly those of the officials who handle
; but the verdict of the Council is not sovereign, :
iibject to apjjeal to the jurj^-cciurt. Private
^s also liave the right to lay an information
. the Prosidcnts holding tlie seventh or a later term
c, see xliii. 2. Rain, thunder, etc., were bad omens,
■e regulation liad a practical value for- the ojien-air
ί iii^-s in the Pnyx.
' V.-'.the man who escaped the bastinado.
I
ARISTOILE
των άρχώΐ' μη χρησθαι τοις νόμοις• €φεσις ?,έ ι ,
τούτοι,ς εστίν etV το Βίκαστηριον εάν αντοη• \ V
βουλί] καταγνω.
3 Αοκιμάζζΐ δε καΐ τονς βονλεντάς τονς τον νσΐίη
evLai'Tov βονλευσοντας και τονς -eiWa αργό:- •.
καί τιροτερον μεν -ην αττοοοκιμασαι κνρια, νν.
τούτοις^ εφεσις εστίν εις το Βικαστ-ήριηΐ' _ :,
4 Τουτωΐ' μεν ονν ακυρός εστίν -η βονΧη, ττρο-
βονΧεύει δ' εΙς τον S-ημον, καΐ ουκ £^€στί.ν ovuh-
απροβουλευτον ούΒ* 6 τι αν μ-η ττρογράφωσίν' Όί
πρυτάνεις φηφισασθαί τω S-ημcρ' κατ^ . αυτά '.
ταΰτα ένοχος εστίν 6 νίκησας γραφτ) ηαραΐ'όμ ~•.
1 XLVI. Έιπιμελεΐται he καΐ τών ττειτοιημεΜύν
τριηρών και των σκευών καΐ των νεωσοίκων,::•καί
ποιείται καινάς^ τριήρεις η τετρηρεις, όποτζρ'Χς
αν ο 8ημος χειροτόνηση, και σκευή ταύτα.ις- ;κό}
νεϋίσοικονς' χειροτονεί δ αρχιτέκτονας ο 8ήι. Ος
εττι τας ναΰς. αν δε μη τταρα^ώσιν εζειργασμίι'α
ταΰτα τη νεα βουλή, την 8ωρεάν ουκ εστίν ά,ντοΐς
λαβείν εττι γαρ της ύστερον βουλής λαμβανήνσίν'.,
ττοιεΐται δε τάς τριήρεις, δέκα άνΒρας εζ QxrcY}<
2 ελομενη τριηροποιοΰς. εζετάζει δε και τα ηίικσ-
Βομηματα, τά δϊ^/Μοσια ττάντα, καν τις ά^ικεΐν'.αντ'^ί
^όζη τω τε 8ημω τούτον άττοφαινει και καταγνρ^ου,
τταραδιδωσί δικαστήριο). -..
1 XLVII. ΣιυνΒιοικεΐ δε καΐ ταΐς άλλαι? ά/0Τ(.ιί
τά πλείστα. πρώτον μεν γαρ οι ταμιαό,'τη
Αθηνάς εισι μεν Βεκα, κληροϋται δ εις εκ-,-ττ.-
φυλης, εκ πεντακοσιομεΒίμνων κατά τον Σόλωίτ
\ <καί> Toi'rots Wilamowitz-Kaibcl. ":;
^ Kaifas Kenyon : K-atvasSe cod.- ;:
*-καταγί'0!'τοϊ Wilamowitz-Kaibel- ■"-
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xr.v. 2-χιλ'π. 1
Γ illegal piOccdure against any official they may wish;
oat in these cases also there is an appeal to the reo])le
/ if the Council passes a verdict of guilty.
ί The Council also checks the qualifications of the 3
I Councillors v.ho are to hold office for the folhnving
Lyear, and of the Nine Archons. And formerly it iiad
sovereign power to reject them as disqualified, but
"how they have an appeal to the jury-court.
ί In these matters therefore the Council is not 4
k ■ sovereign, but it prepares resolutions for the People,
:^ and the People cannot pass any measures that have
I _not been prepared by the Council and published in
';_ writing in advance by the Presidents ; for the pro-
ί poser Λνΐιο carries such a measure is ipso facto liable
% to penalty by indictment for illegal procedure.
i XL\ I. The Council also inspects triremes after 1
^ construction, and their rigging, and the naval sheds,
.• and has new triremes or quadriremes, Avhichever the
'^'"Peojilc" votes for, built and rigged, and naval sheds
built ; but navaljirqhitccts are clected.by the People.
«, If the outgoing Council does not hand over these
works completed to the new Couiicil, the members
cannot draw their lionorarium, Mhich is payable Λvhen
the next Council is in office. For the building of
\ triremes it elects ten of its own members as Naval
Constructors. It also inspects all public buildings, ο
and if it finds any commissioner in default it rej)orts
Jiim to tlie People, and if it gets a verdict of guilty
liands hira over to a jury-court.
XLVII. The Council also shares in the administra-
tion of the other offices in most affairs. First there
are the ten Treasurers of Athena, elected one from
a tribe by lot, from the Five-hundred-bushel class,
according to tlie law of Solon (>vhich is still in force),
i
ARISTOTLIi
νόμον (ert γαρ 6 νόμος KvpLos cotlv), αρχζί δ' ό
λαχων καν ττάνυ Tievr^s fj. τταραλαμβάνουσί δε τό
re αγαλ/χα rijs * Αθηνάς καΐ τάς Νίκας καΐ τον
άλλον κόσμον καΐ τά χρήματα εναντίον της
βουλής.
2 "ΈιπίΐΘ* οί ττωλι^ταΐ ι μίν elai, κληροΰται δ' €Ϊς
e/c της φυλής, μισθονσι Se τά μισθώματα ττάντο
καΐ τά μέταλλα τίίϋλ,ονσι καΐ τά τέλη μ€τά τον
ταμίου των στρατιωτικών καΐ τών Ιττι το θβωρικον
γιρημάνων ivainriw της βουλής, και κυροΰσιν οτω
αν η βονλη χειροτόνηση , και τά irpaOevra μέταλλα
τά τ* εργάσιμα^ τά εις τρία ετη ττεπρο^μενα και τά
συγκεχοίρημενα το. ζΐς . . .' ετη ττεττραμενα. και τας
ουσίας τών εζ * Αρείου ττάγου φευγόντων και τών
άλλων εναντίον της βουλής ττωλοΰσιν, κατακυρονσι
δ' οΐ Ο' άρχοντες, καΐ τά τέλη τά εις ενιαντον
πεπραμενα άναγράφαντες εις λελευκωμενα γραμ_-
ματεΐα τόν τε ηριάμενον και οσου^ αν ττρϊηται τη
3 βουλή 7ταραΒι8όασιν. άναγράφουσιν Βε χωρίς μεν
ους Bel κατά ττρυτανείαν εκάστην καταβαλλειν εις
Βεκα γραμματεία, χο)ρ\ς Β ους τρις του ενιαντον,
γραμματεΐον κατά την καταβολην εκάστην τγοιύ^-
σαντες, χωρίς Β' ους εττι της ενάτης ττρντανείας.
άναγράφουσι Βε και τά χωρία καΐ τάς οικίας
τάττογραφίέντα καΐ ττραθεντα εν τω Βικαστηρίω-
και γάρ τανθ^ οΰτοι ττωλοΰσιν. εστί Be τών μςν
οικιών εν ε' ετεσιν ανάγκη την τι^τ^''' άποΒονναι,
' τά τ' <apya, και τά> ΐρ-γάσιμα Sandys.
* numcrum rasum alii ι', alii y legunt.
^ erasum supplevit Wilamowitz.
" Golden figures, tept in the Parthenon; probably there
130
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlvii. 1-3
and the one on whom the lot falls holds office even
though he is quite a poor man. They take over the
custody of the statue of Athena and the Victories"
and the other monuments and the funds in the
presence of the Council.
Then there are the ten Vendors, elected by lot 2
one from a tribe. They farm out all public contracts
and sell the mines and the taxes, with the co-operation
of the Treasurer of Military Funds and those elected to
superintend the Spectacle Fund, in the presence of
. the Council, and ratify the purchase for the person
I for whom the Council votes, and the mines sold and
the workings that have been sold for three years and
the concessions sold for . . .^ years. And the estates
of persons banished by the Areopagus and of the
ί others they sell at a meeting of the Council, but the
; sale is ratified by the Nine Archons. And they draw
. up and furnish to the Council a list written on
whitened tablets " of the taxes sold for a year, showing
ί the purchaser and the price that he is paying. And 3
; they draw up ten separate lists of those who have to
] pay in each presidency, and separate lists of those
j who have to pay three times in the year, making a
I list for each date of payment, and a separate list of
i those who have to pay in the ninth presidency. They
I also draw up a list of the farms and houses written
' off ** and sold in the jury-court ; for these sales are also
: conducted by these officials. Payment must be made
for purchases of houses within five years, and for
had been ten, but eight were melted down for coinage
towards the end of the Peloponnesian War.
J " The ilumber half erased may be 10 or 3.
•^ Wooden boards coated with chalk, on which notices were
i scratched; they could be easily rubbed oiF, c/. xlviii. 1.
•* i.e. registered as confiscated.
131
ARISTOTLE
των δε χωρίων iv 8e/ca• καταβάλλουσιν 8e ταύτα
4 €πΙ της ενάτης πρυτανείας. εΙσφερει δε και ο
βασιλεύς• τα? μισθώσεις των τέμνων αναγραφας
iv γραμματείοις λελενκωμενοις. εστί 8ε και τού-
των ή μεν μίσθωσις εις ετη δέκα, καταβάλλεται
δ' επί της θ' πρυτανείας• διό καΐ πλείστα χρη-
5 ματα επί ταύτης συλλεγεταί της πρυτανείας, εισ-
φέρεται μεν οΰν εις την βουλην τά γραμματεία
κατά τάς καταβολάς άναγεγ ραμμένα, τηρεί δ ό
δημόσιος' όταν δ' fj χρημάτων καταβολή, παρα-
δι'δωσι τοις άπο^εκταις αυτά ταύτα καθελών απο
των επιστυλίων ων εν ταυττ7 τη ημέρα hεΐ τα
χρήματα καταβληθηναι καΐ άπαλειφθηναι, τά δ
άλλα απόκειται χωρίς Ινα μη προεξαλειφθη.
1 XLVIII. Εισι δ' άπο^έκται 8έκα κεκληρωμένοι
κατά φυλάς' ούτοι δε παραλαβόντες τα γραμματεία
άπαλείφουσι τά καταβαλλόμενα χρήματα εναντίον
της βουλής εν τω βουλευτήρια) και πάλιν απο-
διδόασιι^ τά γραμματεία τω 8ημοσίω • καν τι? ελλίπη
καταβολην, ενταΰθ^ εγγέγραπται, και διττλασιαν ,
ανάγκη το ελλειφθεν καταβάλλειν η ^εΒεσθαΐ' Ι
και ταΰτα είσπράττειν η βουλή και δησαι κυρία
2 κατά τους νόμους εστίν, τη μεν ούν προτεραία
δέχονται τάς καταβολάς^ και μερίζουσι ταΓ? αρχαΐς,
τ^δ' ύστεραία τόν τε μερισμόν είσφέρουσι γράφαντες
εν σανίδι και καταλεγουσιν εν τω βουλευτήρια),
και προτιθέασιν εν τη βουλή ει τις τίνα οώεν
άΒικοΰντα περί τόν μερισμόν η άρχοντα η ώιώτην,
και γνώμας επιφηφίζουσιν εάν τις τι ^οκη α^ικεΐν.
1 τάί καταβολάί (vel ras waaas) Kaibel: τα s cod.
182
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlvii. 3— xlviii. 2
farms within ten ; and they make these payments in
the ninth presidency. Also the King-archon intro- 4
duces the letting of domains, having made a list of
them on whitened tablets. These also are let for ten
years, and the rent is paid in the ninth presidency ;
hence in that presidency a very large revenue comes
in. The tablets written up with the list of pay- δ
ments are brought before the Council, but are in the
keeping of the official clerk ; and whenever a payment
of money is made, he takes down from the pillars
and hands over to the receivers just these tablets
showing the persons Λvhose money is to be paid on
that day and wiped oif the record, but the other
tablets are stored away separately in order that they
may not be wiped off before payment is made.
XLVIII. There are ten Receivers elected by lot, 1
one from each tribe ; these take over the tablets and
wipe off" the sums paid in the presence of the Council
in the Council-chamber, and give the tablets back
again to the official clerk ; and anybody that has
defaulted in a payment is entered on them, and has
to pay double the amount of his arrears or go to
prison ; and the legal authority to impose this fine
and imprisonment is the Council. On the first day, 2
therefore, they receive the payments and apportion
them among the magistrates, and on the second day
they introduce the apportionment, written on a wooden
tablet, and recount it in the Council-chamber, and
bring forward in the Council any case in which some-
body knows of anyone, either an official or a private
person, having committed a wrong in relation to the
apportionment, and put resolutions to the vote in case
anyone is found to have committed any wrong.
" See xlvii. 2 n.
133
ARISTOTLE
3 Κληροΰσί he καΐ λογιστας i^ αυτών οι βονλζυταΐ
θ€κα τους ΧογιουμΙνους τοις άρχαΐς κατά την
4 ττρντανβιαν βκάστην. κληροΰσί he καΐ (ύθύνους,
eva της φυλής ίκάστης, και irapehpovg β' €κάστω
των ζύθύνων, οΐς άναγκαΐόν εστί ταΓ? άγοραΐς^
κατά τον e^τώvυμov τον της φυλής έκαστης
καθησθαι, καν τι? βουληταί τινι των τάς €ύθυνας
ev τω hικaστηpίω hehωκότωv €ντ6ς y' ημερών
αφ ης ehωκe τάς εύθύνας εϋθυναν αν τ' ιδίαν αν re
hημoσίav e/xj3aAeCT^ai, γράφας ei? ττινάκιον λελευκω-
μενον τούνομα το θ αύτοΰ και το του φει'γοντος
και το α8ικημ 6 τι αν Ιγκαλη, και τίμημα έπιγρα-
φαμενος δ τι άν αύτώ hoKrj, hίhωσιv τω εύθυνω•
5 ο he λαβών τοϋτο και άναγνούς, eav^ καταγνώ
τταραδιδωσιν τα μέν ί'δια τοις hικaστaΐς τοις κατά
hημoυς τοις την φυλην ταύτην €ΐσάγονσιν,^ τά
he hημόσιa τοις θεσμοθ4ταις επιγράφει. οι he
θεσμοθεται eav παραλάβωσιν πάλιν εισάγουσιν
ταυτην την* εΰθυναν εις το 8ικαστηριον, και ο τι
αν γνώσιν οι hικaστaι τοϋτο κύριόν εστίν.
1 XLIX. Αοκιμάζει he και τους ίππους η βουλή,
καν μεν τις καλόν ΐππον έχων κακώς hoKrj
τρεφειν, ζημιοΐ τω σίτω, τοις hε μη hυvaμevoις
ακολουθεΐν η μη θελουσι μενειν αλλ' άνάγουσι^^
τροχον επι την γνάθον επιβάλλει, και ο τοϋτο*
παθών άhόκιμός εστί. hoκιμάζ€l he και τους
^ Kenyon, sed γ incertuin, op desunt.
^ eav Herwerden : eav^tv cod.
^ δίκάζονσιν Richards.
* ταύτην ante την supplet Blass.
^ άλ,ν άνά-γουσί Blass, sed incertum : άλλ' avay<.wyoisy oDol
(' unbroken ') Wyse.
' -γνάθον . . . TovTo Blass (et partim alii) : -γναθ . . . ουτο cod.
134.
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlviii. 3— xlix. 1
The Council also elect by lot ten of their own body 3
as Accountants, to keep the accounts of the officials
for each presidency. Also they elect by lot Auditors, 4
one for each tribe, and two Assessors for each Auditor,
who are required to sit at the tribal meetings accord-
ing to the hero after Avhom each tribe is named,"
and if anyone wishes to prefer a charge, of either a
private or a public nature, against any magistrate
who has rendered his accounts before the jury-
court, within three days from the day on which he
rendered his accounts, he writes on a tablet his
own name and that of the defendant, and the
offence of which he accuses him, adding whatever
fine he thinks suitable, and gives it to the Auditor ;
and the Auditor takes it and reads it, and if he con- 5
siders the charge proved, he hands it over, if a private
case, to those jurymen in the villages who introduced
this tribe, and if a public suit, he marks it to the
Legislators. And the Legislators, if they receive it,
introduce this audit again before the jury-court, and
the verdict of the jurymen holds good.
XLIX. The Council also inspects the Knights' 1
chargers, and if anybody having a good horse keeps it
in bad condition, it fines him the cost of the feed, and
horses that cannot keep up with the squadron or
will not stay in line but jib it brands on the jaw
with the sign of a wheel, and a horse so treated
has failed to pass the inspection. It also inspects
" i.e. one Auditor and two Assessors are assigned to each
tribe, the assignment being indicated by the name of the
hero after whom the tribe was named. See liii. 5 n.
135
ARISTOTLE
προΒρόμονς όσοι αν avrfj ^οκώσιν €7ητη8βιοι προ-
8ρομ€ύ€ίν elvai, καν rtv* άποχβίροτονηστ], κατα-
βββηκβν ούτος. 8οκίμάζ€ί δε και τους άμιππους,
καν τίνα άποχαροτονηστ] , ττάτταυται μισθοφόρων
2 οντος. τους δ' ιππέα? καταλζγουσιν οι καταλογβΐς ,
ους αν 6 Βημος χβιροτονηστ] δέκα άνδρα?* ους ο
αν καταλξζωσι παραδιδοασι τοις ιππαρχοις και
φυλάρχοις, ούτοι δε παραλαβόντ€ς ^ισφ4ρονσι τον
κατάλογον €ΐς την βονλην και τον ττίνακα αν-
οίζαντ€ς iv ω κτατασεστ^/χασ/χεί'α τα ονόματα των
ιππέων εστί, τους μβν €^ομνυμ€νους των ττροτ€ρον
ζγγβγραμμβνων μη δυνατούς είναι τοι? σώ/χασιν
ίππευειν ε'^αλειc^oυσt, τους δε κατειλεγ/χε'νου?
καλοΰσι, καν /χε'ν τι? βζομόσηται μη δυνασθαι τω
σώματι ίππευειν η τη ουσία τούτον αφιασιν, τον
δε μη βζομνυμβνον Βιαχβιροτονοΰσιν οΐ βουΑ^υται
ττότβρον επιττ^δειό? εστίν ιππευειν η ου' καν μ€ν
χ€ΐροτονησωσιν , βγγραφουσιν ει? τον πίνακα, ει
δε μή, και τούτον ά</>ιασιν.
3 "Εκρινεν δε' ποτέ και τα τταρα^ζίγματα και^ τον
ττάττΧον η βουλή, νυν δε το Βικαστηριον το λαχόν
€8όκουν γαρ ούτοι καταχαρίζίσθαι την κρίσιν,
και της ποιησ^ως των Νικών και των άθλων των
€ΐς τα Πανα^τ^ναια συνεπι/χελειται /χετά του ταμίου
των στρατιωτικών.
4 Αοκιμάζ€ΐ δε και του? άδι^νάτου? η βουλή•
νόμος γάρ εστίν ος κελεύει τους εντό? τριών μνών
Κ€κτημ€νους και το σώμα ττ€ττη ρω μένους ωστ€
^ καΐ] τα it's coniecit Blass.
" Woven for Athena at every Panathenaic Festival and
carried in the procession.
136
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlix. 1-4
the mounted skirmishers, to see which it considers
fit for skirmishing duty, and any that it votes to
reject are thereby deposed from that rank. It
also inspects the, foot-soldiers that fight in the
ranks of the cavalry, and anyone it votes against is
thereby stopped from drawing his pay. The Knights' 2
roll is made by the ten Roll-keepers elected by the
People ; and they pass on the names of all whom
they enroll to the Cavalry Commanders and Tribe
Commanders, and these take over the roll and bring
it into the Council, and opening the tablet on which
the names of the Knights have been inscribed, they
delete those among the persons previously entered
who claim on oath exemption from cavalry service
on the ground of bodily incapacity, and summon
those enrolled, and grant discharge to anyone who
claims exemption on oath on the ground of bodily
incapacity for cavalry service or lack of means,
and as to those who do not claim exemption the
Councillors decide by vote whether they are fit for
cavalry service or not ; and if they vote for them as
fit they enter them on the tablet, but if not, these
also they dismiss.
At one time the Council used also to judge the 3
patterns for the Robe," but now this is done by the
jury-court selected by lot, because the Council was
thought to show favouritism in its decision. And the
Council has joint supervision with the Steward of the
Army Funds over the construction of the Victories
and over the prizes for the Panathenaic Games.
The Council also inspects the Incapables ; for 4
there is a law enacting that persons possessing less
than 3 minae * and incapacitated by bodily infirmity
* See iv. 4 n.
137
ARISTOTLE
μη δυνασ^αι μη^βι^ epyov €ργάζ€σθαί 8οκίμάζ€ΐν
jxev TTjv βουλην, διδόναι δε Βημοσία τροφην δυο
οβολονς ίκάστω της ημέρας, καΐ τα/χια;? iarlv
αύτοΐς κληρωτός.
Συΐ'διοικεΓ δε /cat ταΐς άλλαις άρχαΐς τα TrXeCaO*
ως έτΓΟ? eLTTelv.
1 L. Τα μ€ν οΰν υπό της βουλής 8ιοικουμ€να
ταΰτ €στίν. κληροΰνται δβ /cat Ιερών βτησκευα-
σται δe/cα άν8ρ€ς, οΐ λαμβάνοντες τριάκοντα μνας
τταρα των airoheKTchv Ιπισκενάζονσιν τα /χάλιστα
2 ^εόμενα των Ιερών, /cat αστυνόμοι δe/cα• τούτων
he e μεν άρχουσιν εν Fletpatet πέντε δ' εν άστει,
και τάς τε αύλητρβας /cat τα? φαλτρίας /cat τάς
κιθαρίστριας ούτοι σκοποΰσιν δπως μη πλείονος
η Βυεΐν Βραχμαΐς μισθωθησονται, καν πλείους την
αύτην σπου^άσωσι λαβείν οΰτοι 8ιακληροΰσι και
τώ λαχόντι μισθοΰσιν . και δπως τών κοπρολόγων
μηΒεις εντός ι' σταδίων του τείχους καταβαλεΐ
κόπρον επιμελούνται, και τάς ό^ούς κωλύουσι
κατοικο8ομεΐν και Βρυφάκτους ΰπερ τών οδών
ύπερτείνειν και οχετούς μετεώρους εις την ό8ον
εκρουν έχοντας ποιεΐν και τάς θυρίδας εις την
oSov άνοίγειν και τους εν ταί? όδοΓ? άπογιγνο-
μενους άναιροΰσιν, έχοντες δημοσίους ύπηρετας.
1 LI. Ιίληροΰνται Βέ και άγορανόμοι t'/ πέντε
μεν εΙς Iletpatea, e' δ' εις άστυ. τούτοις δε ύπό
τών νόμων προστετακται τών ώνίων €7Γΐ]υ.ελ€Γσσαι
πάντων, όπως καθαρά και άκίβ^ηλα πωληται.
2 Υ^ληροΰνται δε και μετρονόμοι t'/ πέντε μεν
εις άστυ, ε' δε εις ΥΙειραιεα• και οΰτοι τών μέτρων
^ numerum ι' bis supplevit Papageorgios.
138
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xlix. 4— li. 2
from doing any work are to be inspected by the Council,
which is to give them a grant for food at the pubUc
expense at the rate of 2 obols*^ a day each. And
there is a Treasurer for these persons, elected by lot.
The Council also shares in the administration of
virtually the greatest number of the duties of the
other offices.
L. These then are the matters administered by the 1
Council. Also ten men are elected by lot as Restorers
of Temples, who draw 30 minae ^ from the Receivers
and repair the temples that most require it ; and ten
City Controllers, five of whom hold office in Peiraeus 2
and five in the city ; it is they who supervise the flute-
girls and harp-girls and lyre-girls to prevent their re-
ceiving fees of more than two drachmas,* and if several
persons want to take the same girl these officials cast
lots between them and hire her out to the winner.
And they keep watch to prevent any scavenger from
depositing ordure within a mile and a quarter of the
wall ; and they prevent the construction of buildings
encroaching on and balconies overhanging the roads,
of overhead conduits with an overflow into the road,
and of windows opening outΛvard on to the road ;
and they remove for burial the bodies of persons
who die on the roads, having public slaves for this
service.
LI. Also Market-controllers are elected by lot, five 1
for Peiraeus and five for the city. To these the laws
assign the superintendence of all merchandise, to
prevent the sale of adulterated and spurious articles.
Also ten Controllers of Measures are appointed by 2
lot, five for the city and five for Peiraeus, who super-
Say threepence.
* See iv. 4 n.
139
ARISTOTLE
/cat των σταθμών €7ημ,βλοννταί πάντων, δττως οι
ττωλονντ^ς χρησωνται^ δίκαιοι?.
3 ^Ησαν 3e και σίτοφνλακες κληρωτοί ι / π€ντ€
μβν els rieipaiea, ττέντ€ δ' els άστυ, νυν δ είκοσι
μ^ν els άστυ, ττεντεκαιδεκα δ' ei? Ileipaiea.
ούτοι δ eπtμeλoΰvτaL ττρώτον μev οττω? ο ev
άγορα σίτο? apyos" ώνιο? έ'σται δικαιω?, eTreiv
oτΓωs οΐ Te μνλωθροί npos tcls τLμas των κριθών
τα αλφιτα πωλήσονσιν και οί άρτοττώλαι προ? τα?
τίμάs τών πυρών tovs apTOVs, καΐ τον σταθμον
ayovTas όσον αν ούτοι τάζωσιν ο γαρ νομο5
toUtovs KeXevei ταττειν.
4 ^Εμπορίου δ' eπιμeλητάs δέκα κληρονσιν του'τοι?
δε προστέτακται τών τ' εμπορίων iπιμeλeΐσθaι,
και τον σίτου του κaτaπλeovτos ει? το σιτικον
€.μπόριον τα δυο μeprj του? ε/χττόρου? άvaγκάζeιv
els το άστυ κoμLζeιv.
1 LII. Κα^ιστασι δε και του? ένδεκα κληpωτoύs,
επιμ€λησομ€νον5 τών εν τω Β€σμωτηριω, και tovs
άπaγoμevovs κλε'τττα? και του? άι^δραποδιστα? και
TOVS λωπoSύτas αν μίν όμολογώσι θανάτω ζημιω-
σοντα?, αν δ' άμφισβητώσιν elσάζovτas ει? το
Βικαστηριον, καν /χέν άποφνγωσιν άφήσovτas, ει
δε μη τότε ^ανατώσοντα?, και τα άπoγpaφόμeva
χωρία και οικία? εισά^οντα? ει? το ^ικαστηριον
και τα Βόζαντα δτ^/χόσια είναι πapahώσovτas τοΓ?
πωλ•)7ταΓ?, και τα? ε'νδει'^ει? εισά^οντα? — και ya/o
ταύτα? εtσάyoυσιv οί ένδεκα* είσάyoυσι δε τών
ενδείξεων τίνα? και οι θεσμοθΐται.
1 χρή(Το;'ται Rutherford.
* ι' suppletum ex Harpocratione a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
* ά.στικ6ν vel Άτταόι/ edd. (v.ll. ex Harpocratione).
140
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, li. 2— lii. l
intend all measures and weights, in order that sellers
may use just ones.
Also there used to be ten Corn-wardens elected by 3
lot, five for Peiraeus and five for the city, but now
there are twenty for the city and fifteen for Peiraeus.
Their duties are first to see that unground corn in
the market is on sale at a fair price, and next that
millers sell barley-meal at a price corresponding with
that of barley, and baker-women loaves at a price
corresponding with that of wheat, and weighing the
amount fixed by the officials — for the law orders that
these shall fix the weights.
They elect by lot ten Port-superintendents, whose 4
duty is to superintend the harbour-markets and to
compel the traders to bring to the city tΛvo-thirds of
the sea-borne corn that reaches the corn-market.
LII. They also appoint the Eleven, officers chosen 1
by lot to superintend the persons in the prison,
and to punish with death people arrested as thieves
and kidnappers and footpads that confess their guilt,
but if they deny the charge to bring them before the
Jury-court, and if they are acquitted discharge them,
but if not then to execute them ; and to bring before
the Jury-court lists of farms and houses declared to
be public property and to hand over to the Vendors "
those that it is decided to confiscate ; and to bring
in informations — for these too are brought in by the
Eleven, though the Legislators also bring in some
informations.
" See xlvii. 2.
141
ARISTOTLE
2 Κληροΰσι 8e και ^ΙσαγωγΙας e dvSpag, ot, τα?
€μμ'ήνους ^Ισάγουσι δικά?, hvoiv φνλαΐν βκαστος.
elai δ' έμμηνοι προικός, eav τις οφειλών μη άττοδω,
καν τις inl δραχμή ^ανεισάμβνος anoorepfj, καν
τι? iv αγορά βονλόμενος εργάζεσθαι Βανεισηται
τταρά τίνος άφορμην έτι δ αΐκειας και ερανικας
καΐ κοίνωνι,κάς και άνδραττόδων καΐ υποζυγίων
3 /cat τριηραργίας καΐ τραπεζιτι,κάς} ούτοι μεν ούν
ταύτα? οικαί,ουσιν έμμηνους εισαγοντες, οι ο
άποΒεκται τοις τελώι^αις• και κατά των τελωνών,
τα μεν μ^χρι Βεκα δραχμών οντες κύριοι, τα δ
αλλ' εΙς το 8ικαστήριον εισάγοντες έμμηνα.
1 LIII. Κληροϋσι δε και^ τετταράκοντα, τετταρας
εκ της φνλης εκάστης, προς ους τάς άλλα? δικά?
λαγχάνουσιν οι πρότερον μεν ήσαν τριάκοντα και
κατά δήμους περιόντβς^ ε^ίκαζον, μετά Βε την
επι των τριάκοντα όλιγαρχίαν τετταράκοντα γεγο-
2 νασίΓ. και τά μεν μέχρι Βεκα 8ραχμών αυτοτελείς
είσι Βικάζειν, τά δ' ύπερ τοΰτο το τίμημα τοις
Βιαιτηταΐς παρα^ώόασιν. οΐ Βέ παραλαβοντες εαν
μη δυι^ωνται Βιαλΰσαι^^γιγνώσκουσι, καν μεν αμ-
φοτεροις άρεσκη τά γνωσθεντα και εμμενωσιν,
έχει τέλος η Βίκη. αν δ' 6 έτερος εφη των αντι-
δίκων εΙς το Βικαστήριον, εμβαλόντες τα? μαρ-
τυρίας και τάς προκλήσεις και τους νόμους εις
εχίνους, χωρίς μεν τάς του Βιώκοντος χωρίς be
τάς του φεύγοντας, και τούτους κατασημηνάμενοι
* έρανικαι . . . κοινωνικαΐ . . . τραπε^ιτικαΐ Bury.
* καΐ <τοι>ϊ> Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
* irepuovTes Kenyon.
ο A drachma a mina a month = 12 per cent per annum.
" i.e. particularly an action to recover expenses, brought
142
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lii. 2— liii. 2
They also elect by lot five men as Introducers, who 2
introduce the cases to be tried within a month, each
official those of two tribes. These cases include prose-
cutions for non-payment of dowry due, actions for the
recovery of loans borrowed at a drachma interest,"*
and of capital borrowed from one party by another
wishing to do business in the market ; and also actions
about outrage, friendly-society business, partnerships,
slaves, draft animals, naval command,* and bank cases.
These officials, therefore, bring into court and decide 3
these suits within a month ; but the Receivers '^ decide
suits brought by tax-farmers or against them, having
power to deal summarily with suits up to ten francs
but bringing the others into the Jury-court within a
month.
LIII. They also elect by lot forty persons,'* four 1
from each tribe, who are the court before which the
other suits are brought ; formerly they were thirty
and went on circuit trying cases in each parish, but
since the oligarchy of the Thirty their number has
been raised to forty. They have summary jurisdiction 2
in claims not exceeding ten drachmas, but suits above
that value they pass on to the Arbitrators. These
take over the cases, and if they are unable to effect a
compromise, they give judgement, and if both parties
are satisfied with their judgement and abide by it,
that ends the suit. But if one of the two parties
appeals to the Jury-court, they put the witnesses'
evidence and the challenges and the laws concerned
into deed-boxes, those of the prosecutor and those
of the defendant separately, and seal them up, and
by the captain of a trireme against his successor who had
failed to relieve him when his year of office was over.
"^ See xlviii. 1.
<* Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' the Forty.'
143
ARISTOTLE
/cat την γνώσιν του διαιττ^του γζγραμμβνην iv
γραμματεία) ττροσαρτ'ησαντζς , ττα/οαδιδόασι τοις 8'
3 τοις την φνλην τον φεύγοντας δικάζουσιν. οι Se
παραλαβόντες είσάγουσιν εις το ^ικαστηριον, τα
μεν εντός χιλίων εις ενα και Βιακοσίους, τα δ'
ύπερ χίλίας εις ενα καΐ τετρακόσιους, ουκ εζεστι
δ' οντε νόμοίς ούτε ττροκλησεσι ούτε μαρτυρίαις
αλλ' η ταΐς παρά του Βίαιτητον χρησθαι ταΐς εις
4 τους εχίνους εμβεβλημεναις . διαιττ^ται δ' είσΐν οΐς
αν εζηκοστον έτος fj• τοΰτο δε hijXov εκ των
αρχόντων και των επωνύμων εισι γαρ επώνυμοι
8εκα μεν οι τών φυλών, δυο δε καΐ τετταράκοντα
οΐ τών ηλικιών οι δ' έφηβοι εγγραφόμενοι πρό-
τερον μεν εις λελευκωμενα γραμματεία ενεγρά-
φοντο, και επεγράφοντο αύτοΐς ο τ' άρχων εφ' ου
ενεγράφησαν και 6 επώνυμος 6 τω προτερω^ ετει
8ε^ιαιτηκώς, νυν δ' εΙς στηλην χαλκην αναγρά-
φονται, και ϊσταται η στήλη προ του βουλευτήριου
5 παρά τους επωνύμους. τον δε τελευταΐον τών
επωνύμων λαβόντες οι τετταράκοντα Βιανεμουσιν
αύτοΐς τάς δίαιτα? και επικληροΰσιν άς έκαστος
διαιττ^σει• και άναγκαΐον άς αν έκαστος λάχη
δίαιτα? εκδιαιταν, 6 γαρ νομός άν τις μη γενηται
διαιτητής της ηλικίας αύτώ καθηκούσης άτιμον
είναι κελεύει, πλην εάν τύχη άρχην άρχων τινά εν
εκείνω τω ενιαυτώ η αποΒημών ούτοι δ ατελείς
^ irpbrepov edd. hiatus causa.
» Of the 100 Attic heroes 10 gave their names to the
Tribes (see xxi. (i), and of the remaining 90, 42 names were
affixed to the successive years of active citizenship, military
service being from the age of 18 to 59, and those in their
60th year serving as diaetetae. As each year expired, the
144
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, liii. 2-5
attach to them a copy of the Arbitrator's verdict
written on a tablet, and hand them over to the four
judges taking the cases of the defendant's tribe.
When these have received them they bring them before 3
the Jury-court, claims within 1000 drachmas before
a court of two hundred and one jurymen, and claims
above that before one of four hundred and one. The
litigants are not permitted to put in laws or chal-
lenges or evidence other than those passed on by the
Arbitrator, that have been put into the deed-boxes.
Persons fifty-nine years of age may serve as Arbi- 4
trators, as appears from the regulations for the
Archons and Name-heroes ; for the Heroes giving
their names to the Tribes are ten in number and those
of the years of military age forty-two," and the cadets
used formerly when being enrolled to be inscribed
on whitened tablets, and above them the Archon ^ in
whose term of office they were enrolled and the
Name-hero of those that had been Arbitrators the
year before, but now they are inscribed on a copper
pillar and this is set up in front of the Council-chamber
at the side of the list of Name-heroes. The Forty 5
take the last one of the Name-heroes and distribute
the arbitration-cases among those of his year and
assign by lot the cases that each is to arbitrate upon ;
and it is compulsory for each of them to complete
the arbitration of the cases allotted to him, for the
law enacts the disfranchisement of anybody who does
not become Arbitrator when of the proper age, unless
he happens to hold some office in that year or to be
abroad, these being the only grounds of exemption.
Name-hero of the men now passing the age of 60 was trans-
ferred to those now just 18.
'> i.e. the senior of the Nine Archons, called 'Επώΐ'νμο$
because his name dated the year.
L 145
ARISTOTLE
6 €ΐσΙ μόνοι, εστίν δε καΙ etVayyeAAetv els τους
Βιαιτητάς^ εάν τις ά^ικηθΎ] νττο του Βιαιτητοΰ, καν
τίνος καταγνώσιν άτιμοΰσθαι κελεύουσιν οι νομοί'
7 εφεσις δ' εστί και τούτοις. χρώνται δε τοις
βπωνυμοις και προς τάς στρατειας, και όταν
ηλικίαν εκπεμπωσι προγράφουσιν άττο τίνος άρχον-
τος και επωνύμου μ^χρι τίνων δει στρατεύεσθαι.
1 LIV. Κ.ληροΰσι δε και τάσδε τάς αρχάς• όδο-
ττοιούς ττεντε, οΐς ττροστετακται δημοσίους εργατας
2 εχουσι τάς οδού? εττισκευάζειν και λογιστάς δε'κα
και συνηγόρους τούτοις δε'κα, ττρος ους απαντάς
ανάγκη τους τάς αρχάς άρζαντας λόγον άπενεγκεΐν.
ούτοι γάρ είσιν οί^ μόνοι τοις ύπευθύνοις λογι-
ζόμενοι και τάς εύθύνας εις το Βικαστήριον εισ-
άγοντες. καν μεν τίνα κλεπτοντ εζεΧεγζωσι,
κλοπην οι οικασται καταγινωσκουσι, και το
γνωσθεν άποτίνεται 8εκαπλοΰν• εάν 8ε τίνα οώρα
λαβόντα επώειζωσιν και καταγνώσιν οι δικασται,
Βώρων τι/χώσιν, άποτίνεται δε και τοΰτο οεκα-
πλοΰν αν δ' ά^ικεΐν καταγνώσιν, άΒικιου τι/χώσιν,
άποτίνεται δε τοϋθ* άπλοΰν εάν προ της θ πρυ-
τανείας εκτείση τι?, ει δε μη, Βιπλοΰται- το δε'
Βεκαπλοΰν ου Βιπλοϋται.
3 Κληροΰσι δε και γραμματέα τον κατά πρυτα-
νείαν καλούμενον, δς τών γραμμάτων* εστί κύριος
και τά ψηφίσματα τά γιγνόμενα φυλάττει και
τάλλα πάντα αντιγράφεται και παρακάθηται τη
βουλή, πρότερον μεν ουν ούτος ην χειροτονητός,
^ δικαστάί Kenyon.
» €ΐσιν οί Jos. Mayor : eiai cod. ^ δέ supplevit Kenyon.
* ex Harpocratione edd. : -γραμματίων cod.
" Perhaps διa^τητάs is a mistake for δικαστάί, 'jurymen.'
146
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, liii. 6— liv. 3
Anybody unjustly dealt with by the Arbitrator may 6
indict him before the Arbitrators,* and the laws
prescribe the penalty of disfranchisement for an
Arbitrator found guilty ; but the Arbitrators also
have an appeal. The Name-heroes also are employed 7
to regulate military service ; when soldiers of a
certain age are being sent on an expedition, a notice
is posted stating the years that they are to serve,
indicated by the Archon and Name-hero of the
earliest and latest.
LIV. They also elect by lot the following officials : 1
five Highway-constructors, whose duty is to repair
the roads, with workmen who are public slaves ; and 2
ten Auditors and ten Assessors with them, to whom
all retiring officials have to render account. For these
are the only magistrates who audit the returns of
officials liable to account and bring the audits before
the Jury-court. And if an official is proved by them
to have committed peculation, the Jury convict him
of peculation, and the fine is ten times the amount of
which he is found guilty ; and if they show that a man
has taken bribes and the Jury convict, they assess the
value of the bribes and in this case also the fine is ten
times the amount ; but if they find him guilty of
maladministration, they assess the damage, and the
fine paid is that amount only, provided that it is paid
before the ninth presidency ; otherwise it is doubled.
But a fine of ten times the amount is not doubled.
They also appoint by lot the officer called Clerk for 3
the Presidency, who is responsible for documents, is
keeper of the decrees that are passed and supervises
the transcription of all other documents, and who
attends the sittings of the Council. Formerly this
officer was elected by show of hands, and the most
147
ARISTOTLE
και Tovs €νΒοζοτάτους καΐ πιστότατους €χ€ΐρο-
τόνουν, καΐ γαρ iv ται? στηλαίς προς ται? σνμ-
μ,αχίαις καΐ προζζνίαις και πολιτβίαις ούτος άναγρά-
4 φ^ταί• νυν δε yeyove κληρωτός, κληροΰσι δε καΐ
ετΓΐ τους νόμους^ €Τ€ρον ος παρακάθηται ttj βουλτΙ,
5 και άντιγράφβται καΐ ούτος ττάντα?. χ€ίροτον€Ϊ
δε /cat ο δήμος γραμματέα τον άναγνωσόμ^νον
αύτω καΐ ttj βουλή, καΐ ούτος ουδενό? εστί κύριος
αλλά του avayt'cut'at.
6 Ιίληροΐ δε καΐ Ι^ροποιούς δε'κτα τους εττί τα
βκθύματα καλουμένους, οι τά τε μαντευτά ιερά
θυουσιν, καν τι καλλιερησαι δε'τ^ καλΧιεροΰσι μετά
7 των μάντεων, κλήροι δε και έτερους δε'/ca τού?
κατ' ενιαυτόν καλουμένους, οι θυσίας τε τινας
θύουσι και τάς πεντετηρίδας άπάσας διοικοΰσιν
πλην ΐΐαναθηναίων . είσι δε πεντετηρίδες μία μεν
η εις Αηλον (εστί δε και επτετηρις ενταύθα),
δευτέρα δε Βραυρώνια, τρίτη δε 'Ηράκλεια,
τετάρτη δε Ελευσίνια• ε' δε Πανα^τ^ναια, και
τούτων ούΒεμια'^ εν τω αύτω εγγίνεται. νυν δε
πρόσκειται και 'Υίφαίστια εττι' Ιίηφισοφώντος
άρχοντος.
^ Ιίληροΰσι δε και εις Σαλαju,t^'α άρχοντα και εις
ΐίειραιεα Βήμαρχον, οι τά τε Διονυσία ποιοΰσι
εκατερωθι και χορηγούς καθισταοιν εν Σιαλαμΐνι
δε και τοϋνομα του άρχοντος αναγράφεται.
^ e Polluce Kenyon : €πιτοντοίίΐΌμοΐ' cod.
^ Wilamowitz-Kaibel : ονδΐμια cod.
' άπό Blass.
" An honourable office assigned to a citizen of another
state who represented Athenian interests there.
* i.e. taking place once in every four or six years : in Greek
this is called " five-yearly," " seven-yearly."
148
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, liv. 3-8
distinguished and trustworthy men used to be elected,
for this officer's name is inscribed on the monumental
slabs above records of alliances and appointments to
consulships " and grants of citizenship ; but now it has
been made an office elected by lot. They also elect 4
by lot another officer to superintend the laws, who
attends the sittings of the Council, and he also has
copies made of all the laws. The People also elect 5
by show of hands a clerk to read documents to the
Assembly and to the Council ; he has no duties except
as reader.
The People also elects by lot the ten sacrificial 6
officers entitled Superintendents of Expiations, who
offer the sacrifices prescribed by oracle, and for busi-
ness requiring omens to be taken watch for good
omens in co-operation with the soothsayers. It also 7
elects by lot ten others called the Yearly Sacrificial
Officers, who perform certain sacrifices and administer
all the four-yearly ^ festivals except the Panathenaic
Festival. One of the four-yearly festivals is the
Mission to Delos (and there is also a six-yearly "^
festival there), a second is the Brauronia, a third the
Heraclea, and a fourth the Eleusinia ; a fifth is the
Panathenaic, which is not held in the same year as
any of the others mentioned. There has now been
added the Festival of Hephaestus, instituted in the
archonship of Cephisophon. 329 b.c.
They also elect by lot an archon for Salamis and 8
a demarch for Peiraeus, who hold the Festivals of
Dionysus ^ in each of those places and appoint Choir-
leaders ; at Salamis the name of the archon is re-
corded in an inscription.
" Both the text and the facts are most uncertain.
'^ τά Αιοννσια τά κατ' aypous.
149
ARISTOTLE
1 LV. Αύται μ€ν οΰν αϊ άρχαΐ κληρωταί re
και κύριαι των ειρημβνων πάντων^ elaLv. οι 8e
καλούμενοι ivvea άρχοντες το μεν εζ ο,ρχης ον
τρόπον καθίσταντο εΐρηταΐ' νυν δε κληροΰσιν θεσμο-
θετας μεν εζ καΐ γραμματέα τούτοις, ετι δ'
άρχοντα και βασιλέα και πολεμαρχον, κατά μέρος
2 εζ εκάστης φυλής. Βοκιμάζονται δ' ούτοι πρώτον
μεν εν ttj βουλτ^ τοις φ' , πλην του γραμματέως ,
οΰτος δ' εν 8ικαστηρίω μόνον, ωσττερ οι άλλοι
άρχοντες {πάντες γαρ και οι κληρωτοί και οΐ
χειροτονητοι 8οκιμασθεντες άρχουσιν), οι δ' εννέα
άρχοντες εν τε τη βουλή και πάλιν εν 8ικαστηρίω.
και πρότερον μεν ουκ ηρχεν οντιν" άποΒοκιμάσειεν
ή βουλή, νυν δ' εφεσίς eWiv* εις το ^ικαστηριον,
3 και τοΰτο κύριόν εστί της δοκιμασίας, επερωτώσιν
δ' οταΓ Βοκιμάζωσιν πρώτον μεν " τις σοι πατήρ
και πόθεν τών Βήμων, και τις πατρός πατήρ, και
τις μητηρ, και τις μητρός πατήρ και πόθεν τών
Βημων;" μετά δε ταύτα ei εστίν αύτω Άπόλλωΐ'
Πατρώο? και Zeu? 'Έιρκεΐος, και που ταΰτα τα
ιερά εστίν είτα ηρία ει εστίν και που ταύτα*
επεηα γονέας ει ευ ποιεί, κεί^ τά τέλη τελεΐ, και
τάς στρατείας ει έστράτευται. ταΰτα δ' άν-
ερωτησας " κάλει" φησιν "τούτων τους μάρ-
4 τυράς." επειΒάν Βέ παράσχηται τους μάρτυρας,
επερωτά "τούτου βούλεταί τι? κατηγορεΐν;"
καν μεν ^ τις κατήγορος, δού? κατηγορίαν και
^ Ίτάντων Kenyon : νράξβων alii : ... ων cod.
* Thalheim : και cod. {καΐ τά τέλη <ei> Wilamowitz-Kaibel).
" Chaps, iii., viii., xxii., xxvi.
150
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lv. 1-4
LV. These offices, then, are elected by lot and have 1
authority over all the matters stated. As to the
officials designated the Nine Archons, the mode of
their appointment that was originally in force has
been stated before * ; but now the six Lawgivers and
their clerk are elected by lot, and also the Archon,**
King and War-lord, from each tribe in turn. The 2
qualifications of these are first checked in the Council
of Five Hundred, except the Clerk, but he is checked
only in a Jury-court, as are the other officials (for all
of them, both those elected by lot and those elected
by show of hands, have their qualifications checked
before they hold office), while the Nine Archons are
checked in the Council and also again in a Jury-
court, Formerly any official not passed by the
Council did not hold office, but now there is an
appeal to the Jury-court, and with this rests the final
decision as to qualification. The questions put in 3
examining qualifications are, first, ' Who is your
father and to what deme does he belong, and who is
your father's father, and who your mother, and who
her father and what his deme ? ' then whether he has
a Family Apollo and Homestead Zeus," and where
these shrines are ; then whether he has family tombs
and where they are ; then whether he treats his
parents well, and whether he pays his taxes, and
whether he has done his military service. And after
putting these questions the officer says, ' Call your
witnesses to these statements.' And when he has 4
produced his witnesses, the officer further asks, * Does
anybody wish to bring a charge against this man ? ' And
if any accuser is forthcoming, he is given a hearing and
* i.e. the Archon Eponymus, see liv. 4 n.
« The gods of the Athenian's home.
151
ARISTOTLE
άττολογίαν, ούτω 8ί8ωσιν iv μεν rfj βουΧγι την
επιχβίροτονίαν iv δε τω Βικαστηρίω την φηφον
iav δε μηΒβΙς βονληται κατηγορβΐν, €νθνς διδωσι
την φηφον και ττρότζρον μ€ν €Ϊς ενββαλλζ την
φηφον, νυν δ' ανάγκη ττάντας έ'στι ^ίαφηφίζζσθαι,
πβρί αυτών. Ινα αν τις πονηρός ών άπαλλάζη τους
κατηγόρους €πι τοις Βικασταΐς yevT^rac τούτον
5 άπο8οκιμάσαι. 8οκιμασθ€ν^ δε τούτον τον τρόπον,
βα^ίζουσι προς τον λίθον βφ* ου τα τόμι eartf
(ε0 ου και οι 8ιαιτηται όμόσαντβς αποφαίνονται
τα? δίαιτα? και οι μάρτυρες έζόμνυνται τάς μαρ-
τυρίας), άναβαντ€ς δ' εττι τούτον ομνυουσιν δικαίως
άρξειν και κατά τους νόμους, και δώρα μη
ληφεσθαι της άρχης eveKa, καν τι λάβωσιν αν-
δριάντα άναθησειν χρυσοΰν. εντεύθεν δ' όμόσαντες
εις άκρόπολιν βα8ίζουσιν και πάλιν εκεί ταυτά
ομνυουσι, και /χετα ταϋτα εις την άρχην είσ-
ερχονται.
1 LVI. Ααμβάνουσι δε και πάρεδρους δ τε άρχων
και 6 ^ασιλεί)? και 6 πολέμαρχος δυο έκαστος
ους αν βούληται, και ούτοι δοκιμάζονται εν τώ
Βικαστηρίω πριν παρεΒρεύειν, και εύθύνας διδοασιι/
επάν παρεΒρεύσωσιν .
2 Και ό μεν άρχων ευθύς εισελθών πρώτον μεν
κηρύττει δσα τις εΐχεν πριν αυτόν είσελθεΐν εις
την άρχην ταΰτ εχειν και κρατεΐν μέχρι άρχης
3 τέλους. έπειτα χορηγούς τραγωΒοΐς καθίστησι
τρεις, εξ απάντων ^Αθηναίων τους πλουσιωτάτους'
πρότερον δε και κωμωΒοΐς καθιστή πέντε, νυν δε
^ δοκιμασθέν<τΐί'> Rutherford.
152
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lv. 4— lvi. 3
the man on trial an opportunity of defence, and then
the official puts the question to a shoAV of hands in the
Council or to a vote by ballot in the Jury-court ; but
if nobody wishes to bring a charge against him, he
puts the vote at once ; formerly one person used to
throw in his ballot-pebble, but now all are compelled to
vote one way or the other about them, in order that
if anyone being a rascal has got rid of his accusers,"
it may rest with the jurymen to disqualify him. And 5
when the matter has been checked in this way, they
go to the stone on which are the victims cut up for
sacrifice (the one on which Arbitrators also take oath
before they issue their decisions, and persons sum-
moned as witnesses swear that they have no evidence
to give), and mounting on this stone they swear
that they will govern justly and according to the laws,
and will not take presents on account of their office,
and that if they should take anything they will set
up a golden statue. After taking oath they go from
the stone to the Acropolis and take the same oath
again there, and after that they enter on their office.
LVI. The Archon, the King and the War-lord also 1
take two assessors each, chosen by themselves, and
the qualifications of these are checked in the Jury-
court before they hold office, and they are called to
account when they retire from office.
Immediately on coming into office the Archon first 2
makes proclamation that all men shall hold until
the end of his office those possessions and powers
that they held before his entry into office. Then he 3
appoints three Chorus-leaders for the tragedies, the
wealthiest men among all the Athenians ; and for-
merly he used also to appoint five for the comedies,
" i.e. has bribed them to let him oiF.
153
ARISTOTLE
τούτους^ αϊ φυλαΐ φέρουσιν. erreiTa παραλαβών
τονς χορηγούς τους Ινηνβγμένους νττο τών φυλών
els /Διονύσια avSpdaiv καΐ τταίσΐν καΐ κωμωΒοΐς
καΐ εΙς Θαργήλια άνΒράσιν καΐ παισίν (etat δ' οι
μ,εν elg Αίονύσια κατά φυλάς, els Θαργήλια 8e^
8υ€Ϊν φυλαΐν εις, παρέχει δ' iv μ€ρα ίκατέρα
τών φυλών) τούτοις τάς αντιφάσεις ποιεί και
τάς σκήφεις εΙσάγει Ιάν τι? η λελητουργκη-
κεναι φ-η πρότερον ταντην τ-ην λητουργιαν η
ατελής ett'at λελητουργηκως ετεραν λτ^τουργιαν και
τών -χρόνων αύτώ της ατέλειας μή εζεληλυθοτων
ή τα ετη μή γεγονεναι (δει γαρ τον τοις τταισιν
■χορηγοΰντα ύπερ τετταράκοντα ετη γεγονεναι).
καθίστησι he και εις Αήλον χορηγούς και αρχι-
θεωρον τώ τριακοντορίω τώ τους ήιθεους αγοντι.
4 πομπών δ' επεμελεΐται της τε τω Ασκληπιώ
γινομένης όταν οικουρώσι μύσται, και της Αιο-
ννσίων τών μεγάλων μετά τών επιμελητών, ους
πρότερον μεν 6 Βήμος εχειροτόνει 8εκα οντάς,
και τά εις τήν πομπήν άναλώματα παρ αυτών
άνήλισκον, νυν δ' ενα της φυλής εκάστης κλήροι
5 και διδωσιν εις τήν κατασκευήν εκατόν μνάς' επι-
μελείται δε και της εις 0apyr;Aia και της τώ Διι
τώ Ίίωτήρι. Βιοικεΐ δε και τον αγώνα τών Αιονυ-
σίων ούτος και τών Θαργηλίων, εορτών μεν ούν
6 €πιμελεΐται τούτων, γραφαι δε και 8ίκαι λαγχά-
^ Wyse : Toirrois cod. * δέ supplent edd.
" A festival in May, at which there were competitions of
cyclic choruses and a procession (§ 5).
* A citizen appointed to one of these expensive public
offices could challenge another as better able to afford it,
154
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lvi. 3-6
but these are now returned by the Tribes. After-
wards he receives the Chorus-leaders nominated by
the Tribes for the men's and boys' competitions and
the comedies at the Dionysia and for men and boys
at the Thargeha <* (for the Dionysia one for each tribe,
for the Thargelia one for two tribes, which take
turns to supply them), and deals with their claims for
substitution by exchange of property,'' and brings
forward their claims to exemption on the ground
of having performed that public service before, or of
being exempt because of having performed another
service and the period of exemption not having
expired, or of not being of the right age (for a man
serving as Chorus-leader for the boys must be over
forty). He also appoints Chorus-leaders for Delos and
a Procession-leader for the thirty-oared vessel that
carries the youths.'' He supervises processions, the 4
one celebrated in honour of Asclepius when initiates
keep a watch - night, and the one at the Great
Dionysia, in which he acts jointly with the Super-
visors ; these w^ere formerly ten men elected by
show of hands by the People, and they found the
expenses of the procession out of their own pockets,
but now they are elected by lot, one from each tribe,
and given 100 minae for equipment ; and he also 5
supervises the procession of Thargelia, and the one
in honour of Zeus the Saviour. This official also
administers the competition of the Dionysia and of
the Thargelia. These, then, are the festivals that he
supervises. Criminal and civil law-suits are instituted 6
and the man challenged could only escape undertaking
the office by exchanging estates with the challenger.
" For the festival at Delos see liv, 7 ; boys' choruses went
from Athens.
155
ARISTOTLE
νονται προς αυτόν, άς άνακρίνας els το Βικαστήριον
ζΐσάγζί, γονέων κακώσ^ως {αύται 8e eloiv άζήμίοι
τω βουλομβνω διώκαν), ορφανών κακωσεως (αύται
δ etat Λτατά των βττίτρόττων) , βτηκληρον κακώσ€ως
(αύται Se eiai κατά των επιτρόπων και των συν-
οικούντων), οΐκου όρφανικον κακωσβως [elai δε
και αύται κατά των επιτρόπων), παράνοιας, idv
τις αιτιάται τίνα παρανοοΰντα τά υπάρχοντα^
άπολλυναι, et? 8ατητών aipeaiv, idv τι? μη deXr]
κοινά τα οντά νεμβσθαι, βίς επιτροπής κατάστασιν ,
€ΐς βπιτροπης διαδικασία^, €ΐς εμφανών κατά-
στασιν, επιτροπον αυτόν εγγράφαι, κλήρων και
7 επικληρων επιδικασιαι. επιμελείται δε και τών
ορφανών και τών επικλήρων και τών γυναικών
όσαι αν τελευτησαντος του ανδρός σκηπτωνται
κύειν, και κύριος εστί τοις άΒικοΰσιν επιβάλλειν
η είσάγειν εις το Βικαστηριον. μισθοί δε και τους
οίκους τών ορφανών και τών επικλήρων εως αν τι?
τετταρακαώεκετις^ γενηται και τά άποτιμήματα
λαμβάνει, και τους επιτρόπους^ εαν μη διδώσι τοις
παισίν τον σΐτον ούτος εισπράττει.
1 LVII. Και ο μεν άρχων επι/χελειται* τούτων, ό
δε ^ασιλεύ? πρώτον μεν μυστηρίων επιμελείται
μετά τών επιμελητών ους ό 8ημος εχειροτονεΐ, δυο
μεν εζ * Αθηναίων απάντων, ενα δ' εζ ΈιύμολπιΒών ,
ενα δε εκ Κηρύκων, έπειτα Αιονυσίων τών Έττι-
^ Blass (alii alia) : τα . . . . απολλιψ . . cod.
* Blass : εττικλ ακαιδΐ . . ris cod.
* Brooks : /cat .... oij cod.
* Blass : καιο ... at cod.
156
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lvi. 6— lvii. 1
before him, and after a preliminary trial he brings
them in before the Jury-court : actions for ill-usage
of parents (in which anybody who wishes may act as
prosecutor without liability to penalty) ; for ill-usage
of orphans (which lie against their guardians) ; for
ill-usage of an heiress (which lie against the guardians
or the relations that they live with) ; for injury to an
orphan's estate (these also lie against the guardians) ;
prosecutions for insanity, when one man accuses
another of wasting his property when insane ; actions
for the appointment of liquidators, when a man is un-
willing for property to be administered in partner-
ship ; actions for the institution of guardianship ;
actions for deciding rival claims to guardianship ;
actions for the production of goods or documents ;
actions for enrolment as trustee ; claims to estates
and to heiresses. He also supervises orphans and 7
heiresses and women professing to be with child
after the husband's death, and he has absolute
power to fine offenders against them or to bring them
before the Jury-court. He grants leases of houses
belonging to orphans and heiresses until they are
fourteen years of age, and receives the rents, and he
exacts maintenance for children from guardians who
fail to supply it.
LVII. These are the matters superintended by the 1
Archon. But the King superintends, first, the mys-
teries, in co-operation with Superintendents elected
by show of hands by the People, two from the whole
body of the citizens, one from the Eumolpidae
and one from the Heralds." Next the Dionysia in
" The Eumolpidae and Kerykes were two ancient priestly
families at Athens.
157
ARISTOTLE
ληναίων^' ταντα δ' earl πομττη re και αγων.^
την μ€ν ονν πομπην KOivfj ττέμττουσιν ο re βασιλεύς
/cat οι ετημβληταί, τον δε aycova ^ιατίθησιν ο
βασιλζύζ. τίθησί δε και τους των λαμπάδων
αγώνα? απαντάς, ώς δ' €πος elrreiv και τα?
2 πατρίους θυσίας διοικεί οΰτος πάσας, γραφαι δε
λαγχάνονταί προς αυτόν άσβββίας, καν τις ΐ€ρω-
σύνης άμφισβητη προς τίνα. διαδικάζει δε κ:αι τοις
γ4ν€σι και τοις ίερεΰσι τα? αμφισβητήσεις τα?
ύπ€ρ των γερών άπάσας οΰτος. λαγχάνονται δε
και αι τοΰ φόνου δίκαι ττασαι προς τούτον, και ο
προαγορβύων εϊργβσθαι των νομίμων ούτος εστίν.
3 ει'σι δε φόνου Βίκαι και τραύματος , αν μεν εκ
προνοίας άποκτείνη^ η τρώση, εν Άρειω πάγω,
και φαρμάκων, εάν άποκτείνη 8ούς, και πυρκαας-
ταύτα γαρ ή βουλή μόνα δικάζει, τών δ' ακουσίων
και βουλευσεως καν οίκετην άποκτείνη τι? η
μέτοικον ή ζενον, οι επι Παλλαδιω• εάν δ απο-
κτεΐναι μεν τι? ομόλογη, φή δε κατά του? νόμους,
οίον μοιχόν λαβών ή εν πολεμώ αγνοησας ή εν
άθλω αγωνιζόμενος, τούτω επι Αελφινίω δικά-
ζουσιν εάν δε φεύγων φυγήν ων άρεσις εστίν
αιτιαν εχη άποκτεΐναι ή τρώσαί τίνα, τούτω δ εν
Φρεάτου δικάζουσιν, ό δ' άττολογειται προσ-
4 ορμισάμενος εν πλοίω. δικάζουσι δ' οί λαχόντε?
ταΰτ' εφεται πλην* τών εν Άρείω πάγω γιγνο-
^ ένΐ ληναίω Bywater.
* Van Leeuwen : εστί . . . η . . . cod.
8 ίττοκτύντι <jisy Papageorgios.
* Kenyon : τα . . . ττ\•ην cod.
" Held at the Limnae, S.E. of the Acropohs, at the end
of January. The 7th Attic month, Gamelion (January-
February), was in old Ionic called Lenaeon.
158
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lvii. 1-4
Lenaeon '^ ; this festival consists of a procession and
a competition, the former conducted by the King and
the Superintendents jointly, the latter organized by
the King. He also holds all the Torch-race Com-
petitions ; also he is the director of practically all
the ancestral sacrifices. He holds the court that 2
tries charges of impiety and disputed claims to
hereditary priesthoods. He adjudicates between
clans and between priests in all disputed claims to
privileges. Before him are also brought all murder
cases, and proclamations of exclusion from customary
rites are made by him. Trials for deliberate murder 3
and wounding are held in the Areopagus, and for
causing death by poison, and for arson ; for these only
are tried by the Council, whereas involuntary homicide
and plotting to murder, and murder of a slave or
resident alien or foreigner, come before the court at
the Palladium ^ ; and one who admits homicide but
declares it to have been legal (for instance when he
has killed a man taken in adultery), or who in war has
killed a fellow-citizen in ignorance, or in an athletic
contest, is tried at the Delphinium ; but if, when a
man has taken refuge in exile after an offence that
admits of satisfaction, he is charged with homicide
or wounding, he is tried at the Precinct of Phreatus,<'
and delivers his defence from a ship anchored
near the shore. Commissioners appointed by lot 4
try these cases, except those that are held on the
Areopagus ; the cases are introduced by the King,
'' This shrine and the Delphinium were probably S.E. of
the Acropolis.
'' Near the harbour of Zea; doubtless the eponymous
hero was fictitious, the place being really named from a
well, φρέαρ. If the defendant had landed he would have
been arrested for his former offence.
159
ARISTOTLE
μβνων elaayei δ' ο βασιλβύς, καΐ Βικάζουσιν ev
ίβρω καΐ ύτταίθριοί, και ό ^ασιλ^ύ? δταν Βικάζτ)
nepiaipeirai τον στίφανον. 6 he την αιτιαν έχων
τον μ€ν άλλον χρόνον βΐργβται των Upcov καΐ ούδ
et? την άγοράν νόμος ^μβαλβΐν αυτω, τότβ δ ets'
το lepov €ΐσ£λθών άπολογ€Ϊται. όταν Se μη etSfj
τον ΤΓΟιησαντα, τω Βράσαντι λαγχάν€ί, Βι,κάζβι δ
ο βασίλβύζ καΐ οΐ φυλοβασίλζΐς , καΐ τα? των
άφνχων καΐ των άλλων ζώων.
1 LVIII. Ό δε πολέμαρχος θυβι μ^ν θυσίας την
re τη ^Αρτ€μώ(, τη Άγροτβρα καΐ τω Έι^υαλιω,
^ιατίθησι δ' aycoi'a τον €πιτάφίον [και]^ τοις τ€Τ€-
λευτηκόσιν iv τω πολεμώ, καΐ Άρ/χοδιω και
2 'AptCTToyeiTOVt et'ttyta/xara ttoicl. ^ίκαι Se λαγ-
χάνονται προς αυτόν ΐ'διαι μόνον,^ αι re τοις
μ,βτοίκοις καΐ τοις ΙσοτζλΙσι καΐ (αίΥ τοις προ-
ζ4νοις γίγνόμ€ναι• καΐ δει τούτον λα^όι^τα /cat
8ίαν€ίμαντα δέκα μ^ρη τό λα;;^όν €κάστη τη φυλή
μ€ρος προσθ^ίναι, τους δε την φυλην δικάζοντας
3 τοις Βιαίτηταΐς άπο8οΰναί. αυτός δ' εισάνει Οίκας
τα? τ€ του αποστασιου και απροστασιου και
κλήρων καΐ ζ,πικληρων τοΙς μετοίκοις, /cat ταλλ
όσα τοις πολίταις ο άρχων ταύτα τοις μ€τοίκοίς ο
πολέμαρχος .
1 LIX. 01 δε θβσμοθέται πρώτον μ^ν του προ-
γράφαι τά δικαστήρια είσι κύριοι τίσιν ημβραις
δει δικτάζειν,* εττειτα του 8οΰναι ταΓ? αρχαΐς-
καθότι γαρ αν ούτοι 'όώσιν, κατά τοϋτο χρώνται.
^ Kenyon secundum Pollucem.
' μόνον Wilamowitz-Kaibel: με»» cod.
» Kaibel. * καθίί^ίΐν Richards.
<• A form of Ares.
160
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lvii. 4— lix. 1
and the court sits within the sacred precinct in the
open air, and Avhen the King is acting in a case he
takes oiF his crown. The accused man all the rest of
the time is debarred from sacred places and is even
forbidden by law from setting foot in the market-
place, but at the trial he enters the precinct and
makes his defence. When the King does not know
who committed the act, he institutes proceedings
against ' the guilty man,' and the King and Tribal
Kings try the case, as also prosecutions of inanimate
objects and animals for homicide.
LVIII. The War-lord offers sacrifices to Artemis the 1
Huntress and to Eny alius," and arranges the funeral
games in honour of those who have fallen in war, and
makes memorial offerings to Harmodius and Aristo-
geiton. Only private law-suits are brought before 2
him in which resident aliens, ordinary and privileged,
and foreign consuls are concerned ; he has to take
the list of cases and divide it into ten portions
and assign one portion by lot to each tribe, and to
assign the jurymen for each tribe to the Arbitrators.
He himself brings forward cases in which resident aliens 3
are concerned, on charges of acting without their pro-
tectors ^ or of lacking a protector, and as to estates
and heiresses ; and all other actions that in the case
of citizens are brought in by the Archon, in the case
of resident aliens are introduced by the War-lord.
LIX. The Lawgivers are responsible, first, for 1
preparing lists of the days on which the jury-courts
are to sit, and then for giving them to the officers, for
these follow the arrangements that the Lawgivers
* A metoikos (other than the isoteleis, who for taxation
and military service ranked with citizens) had to be enrolled
under a citizen, whose sanction was necessary for his actions
if important.
Μ l6l
ARISTOTLE
2 €Τ6 δε τάς ^Ισαγγελίας ^ΙσαγγέΧλουσιν^ €ΐς τον
Βημον, καΐ τάς καταχαροτονίας /cat τά^ προβολάς
αττασα? ^ισαγουσιν ούτοι, και γραφας τταρανομων,
και νόμον μη Ιτητη^€ΐον deivai, καΐ ττροε^ρικην
3 και €τηστατικΎ]ν καΙ στρατηγοΐς evOvvas. βίσΐ Se
και γραφαΐ προς αυτούς ών τταράστασις τίθεται,
ξενίας καΐ Βωροξενίας {αν τις δώρα 8ούς αποφυγή
την ζβνίαν) και συκοφαντίας και δώρων και
φευ^βγγραφης και φβυΒοκλητείας και βουλευσεως
4 και αγραφιου και μοιχείας. εισάγουσιν δε και
τα? δοκιμασίας ταΓ? άρχαΐς άττάσαι?, και τους
απεφηφισμενους υπό των δημοτών, και τάς κατα-
6 γνώσεις τάς εκ της βουλής. εισάγουσι δε και
8ίκας ιΒίας, εμπορικάς και μεταλλικάς, και Βουλών,
αν τις τον ελεύθερον κακώς λεγη. και επι-
κληροΰσι ται? άρχαΐς ούτοι τά δικαστήρια τά τ^ ιδία
6 και τα δτ^/χοσια. και τά σύμβολα τά προς τάς
πόλεις ούτοι κυροϋσι, και τάς 8ίκας τάς από τών
συμβόλων εισάγουσι, και τά φευ^ομαρτύρια τά'
εζ 'Αρείου πάγου.
7 Ύούς δε 8ικαστάς κληροΰσι πάντες* οι εννέα άρ-
χοντες Βεκατος δ' ο γραμματεύς 6 τών θεσμοθετών,
τους της αύτοϋ φυλής έκαστος.
1 LX. Τα μεν ούν περί τους θ' άρχοντας τούτον
έχει τόν τρόπον, κληροΰσι δε και άθλοθετας 8εκα
άνΒρας, ενα τής φυλής εκάστης, ούτοι δε δοκτι-
μασθεντες άρχουσι τετταρα ετη, και Βιοικοΰσι
την τε πομπήν τών ΥΙαναθηναίων και τόν aycDva
^ <&s άν Tivfsy (ίσαγγέλλωσι Blass: eic. . . . δημοί' seel.
Wilamowitz-Kaibel. * τ suppletum a Kaibel.
* τά suppletum a Bernadakis.
* πάντΐί coni. Kenyon : iruvras cod.
162
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lix. 2— lx. 1
assign. Moreover it is they who bring before the 2
People indictments, and bring in all votes of re-
moval from office, preliminary informations sent on
by the Assembly, impeachments for illegal procedure,
proceedings against inexpedient legislation, a suit
against a President or a Superintendent, and audits
imposed on Generals. Also they hear indictments for 3
which a fee is paid, on charges of alien birth, alien
corruption (that is, if a person charged with alien
birth secures his acquittal by bribery), malicious
information, bribery, false entry of public debts,
personation of a witness, conspiracy, non-registration,
adultery. They also introduce " the tests of qualifica- 4
tion for all offices, and claims to citizenship rejected
by vote of the deme, and verdicts of guilty passed
on from the Council.^ They also introduce private 5
actions in commercial and mining cases, and actions
against slaves for slandering a freeman. And they
assign the public and the private jury-courts by lot
among the magistrates. They ratify contracts with 6
other states, and bring into court suits arising under
those contracts, and prosecutions for false witness
instituted by the Areopagus.
All the Nine Archons with the Lawgivers' Clerk, 7
making ten, elect by lot the jurymen, each electing
those of his own tribe.
LX. These are the functions of the Nine Archons. 1
They also elect by lot ten men as Stewards of the
Games, one from each tribe, who when passed as
qualified hold office for four years, and administer the
procession of the Panathenaic Festival, and the con-
" i.e. before the bodies that checked these qualifications,
see Iv. 2-4. * See xliv. 2 fin.
163
ARISTOTLE
της μουσικής /cat τον γυμνικον ά^ώι^α και την
ιππο8ρομίαν, καΐ τον π€ττλον ποιούνται, και τους
αμφορ€Ϊς ποιούνται μετά της βουλής, και το eXaiov
2 τοις άθληταΐς άπο8ι8όασι. συλλέγεται δε τό^
ελαιον άπο των μορίων εισπράττει 8έ τους τά
χωρία κεκτημένους εν οΐς αϊ μορίαι είσιν 6 άρχων,
τρι ημικοτύλια απο του στελέχους εκάστου, πρό-
τερον δ επώλει τον καρπόν η πόλις, και ει τις
εξορύζειεν ελαιαΐ' μορίαν η κατάζειεν, εκρινεν η
εξ Αρείου πάγου βουλή, και ει του καταγνοίη,
θανάτω τούτον εζημίουν. εζ ου δβ το ελαιον 6
το χωρίον κεκτημένος άποτίνει, 6 μεν νόμος εστίν,
η δε κρίσις καταλελυταΐ' το δ'^ ελαιον εκ του
κτήματος, ουκ άπο των στελεχών, εστί τη πόλει.
3 συλλεζας ουν 6 άρχων το εφ^ εαυτού γιγνόμενον
τοις τα/χιαι? παρα8ίΒωσιν εις άκρόπολιν, και ουκ
εστίν άι^α^δτ^ι^αι πρότερον εις "Αρειον πάγον πριν
αν άπαν τταραδώ τοις τα/χιαι?. οι 8ε ταμίαι τον
μεν άλλον χρόνον τηροΰσιν εν άκροπόλει, τοΖς δε
ΙΙαναθηναίοις άπομετροΰσι τοις άθλοθεταις, οι δ'
αθλοθεται τοις νικώσι των αγωνιστών, εστί γάρ
άθλα τοις μεν την μουσικήν νικώσιν άργύριον^ και
χρυσά, τοις δε την εύανΒρίαν άσπίΒες, τοις δε τον
γυμνικον αγώνα και την ιπποΒρομιαν ελαιον.
1 LXI. ^ειροτονοΰσι δε και τάς προς τον πόλεμον
αρχάς άπάσας, στρατηγούς 8εκα, πρότερον μεν
άφ' εκάστης* φυλής ενα, νυν δ' εζ απάντων, και
τούτους 8ιατάττουσι τη χειροτονία, ενα μεν επί
^ 5k τό Richards : τοδ cod. * δ' : yap coni. Blass.
* Wilamowitz-Kaibel : apyvpia cod.
* έκάστηί supplevit Kenyon : αφφυ\η$ cod.
" See xlix. 3 n.
164
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lx. 1— lxi. l
test in music, the gymnastic contest and the horse-
race, and have the Robe** made, and in conjunction
with the Council have the vases ^ made, and assign the
olive-oil to the competitors. The oil is procured from 2
the sacred trees ; and the Archon levies it from the
owners of the farms in which the trees are, three
quarters of a pint from each trunk. Formerly the state
used to sell the fruit, and anybody who dug up or cut
down a sacred olive-tree was tried by the Council of
Areopagus, and if found guilty punished vnth death ;
but ever since the olive-oil has been provided as rent by
the owner of the farm, though the law still stands, the
trial has gone out ; and the state's claim to the oil
is calculated on the estate and not on the number
of trees.'' So the Archon collects the tribute of oil 3
accruing in his year, and passes it on to the Treasurers
at the Acropolis, and he is not allowed to go up to
the Areopagus before he has handed the full quantity
over to the Treasurers. These have it in their keeping
in the Acropolis always, except that at the Pan-
athenaic Festival they dole it out to the Directors
of the Games and these to the victorious competitors.
For the prizes are for the victors in music silver money
and gold vessels, for those in manly beauty shields,
and for those in the gymnastic contest and the horse-
race olive-oil.
LXI. They also elect by show of hands all the 1
military officers — ten Generals, formerly one from
each tribe, but now from all the citizens together, and
the vote decides the assignment of duties to these
* In athletic contests the prize was a vase of oil and a
garland of foliage from the sacred olive-trees.
■^ i.e. the amount per tree stated above is only approxi-
mately calculated.
165
ARISTOTLE
Tovs όπλίτας, os ηγείται των οπλιτών αν εξίωσι,
€va δ €πΙ την χωράν, os φνλάττ€ΐ, καν πόλεμος
ev Trj χωρά γίγνηται πολεμεί ούτος• 8νο δ' επΙ τον
Ueipaiea, τον μεν εις την Μουνυχίαν τον δ' εις
την Άκτην, οΐ της φυλακής^ επιμελούνται τών^
εν ΙΙειραιεΐ' ενα δ' επι τάς συμμορίας, δς τους
τε τριήραρχους καταλέγει και τάς άντώόσεις αύτοΐς
ποιεί και τα? διαδικασία? αύτοΐς εΙσάγει• τους δ'
άλλους προς τα παρόντα πράγματα εκπεμπουσιν.
2 επιχειροτονία δ' αυτών εστί κατά την πρυτανείαν
εκάστην, ει 8οκοΰσιν καλώς άρχειν καν τίνα άπο-
χειροτονησωσιν , κρίνουσιν εν τω 8ικαστηρίω, καν
μεν άλω τιμώσιν δ τι χρη παθεΐν η άποτεΐσαι, αν
δ αποφυγή πάλιν άρχει, κύριοι 8ε εισιν οται/
ηγώνται και 8ησαί τόν^ άτακτοΰντα και εκ-
κηρΰζαι* και επιβολην επιβάλλειν ουκ ειώθασι 8ε
επιβάλλειν.
3 ^ειροτονοΰσι 8έ και ταζιάρχους 8εκα, ενα της
φυλής εκάστης• ούτος δ' ηγείται τών φυλετών και
λοχαγούς καθίστησιν.
4 Ύ^ειροτονοϋσι 8ε και ιππάρχους 8ύο εζ απάντων
ούτοι δ' ηγούνται τών ιππέων, 8ιελόμενοι τάς
φυλάς ε' εκάτερος• κύριοι 8έ τών αύτώΐ' είσιν ώνπερ^
οι στρατηγοί κατά τών οπλιτών, επιχειροτονία 8ε
γίνεται και^ τούτων.
5 ^ειροτονοΰσι 8έ και φυλάρχους ι',' ενα της
^ φνλακηί coni. Kenyon, φνλης secundum codicem dedit.
* των Wilamowitz-Kaibel : καίτων cod.
•'' Tiv cod. : corr. Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
* κ-ηρνξαι cod. : corr. Blass.
' (ΙσΙ» ώντΓΐρ Wilamowitz-Kaibel : wvirepeiaiv cod.
• και suppleuit Gertz.
' nnmerum i' suppleuit Richards.
166
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxi. 1-5
— one being appointed to the heavy infantry, who
commands them on foreign expeditions ; one to the
country, who guards it and commands in any war
that takes place in it ; two to Peiraeus, one of them
to Munychia and the other to the Point, who super-
intend the protection of the population of Peiraeus ;
one to the Symmories,'* who enrols the Captains of
triremes and carries out their exchanges and intro-
duces their claims for exemption ; and the others they
dispatch on expeditions as occasion arises. A con- 2
firmatory vote is taken in each presidency upon the
satisfactoriness of their administration ; and if this
vote goes against any officer he is tried in the jury-
court, and if convicted, the penalty or fine to be
imposed on him is assessed, but if he is acquitted he
resumes office. When in command of a force they
have power to punish breach of discipline with im-
prisonment, exile, or the infliction of a fine ; but a
fine is not usual.
They also elect by show of hands ten Regimental 3
Commanders, one of each tribe ; these lead their
fellow-tribesmen and appoint company-commanders.
They also elect by show of hands two Cavalry 4
Commanders from the whole body of citizens ; these
lead the Knights, each commanding a division con-
sisting of five tribes, and their powers are the same as
those of the Generals over the heavy infantry. The
Cavalry Commanders' election also is submitted to a
confirmatory vote.
They also elect by show of hands ten Tribal Com- 5
" The 20 companies in which the 1200 richest citizens
were enrolled for payment of the ΐίσφορά or property-tax
levied to meet emergency expenses of war.
167
ARISTOTLE
φνλης, τον ηγησόμ€νον των Ιππβων^ ωσττβρ οι
ταζίαρχοί τών οπλιτών.
6 ^eipoTOVouat 8e καΐ εΙς Αημνον ΐππαρχον, δς
e77t/xeAetTai τών ίττττβων τών iv Αημνω.
1 ^(ΐροτονοΰσι Se καΐ ταμίαν της Παράλου καΐ
νϋν^ της του "Αμμωνος.
1 LXII. At δε κληρωτοί άρχαΐ ττρότβρον μ€ν ήσαν
at μβν μ€τ evvia αρχόντων €Κ της φυλής δλης
κληρουμ€ναι, at δ' ei^ Θησβίω κληρούμ^ναι δι-
ηροΰντο ets" τους 8ημους• €π€ώη δ' €πώλουν οΐ
8ημοι, καΐ ταύτας €κ της φυλής δλης κληροΰσι,
πλην βουλευτών καΐ φρουρών τούτους δ' etj τους
8ημους άποΒώοασι.
2 Μισθοφοροΰσι δβ πρώτον ο 8ημος ται? μ€ν
άλλαί? €κκλησίαις Βραχμην, τη δε κυρία ivvea
οβόλους^' €π€ίτα τα δικαστήρια τρεις όβολούς• €ΪΘ'
η βουλή π€ντ€ οβολούς. τοις Se πρυτανεύουσιν €ΐς
σίτησιν όβολός προστίθεται [δέκα προστίθενται].*
έ'ττειτ' εις σίτησιν λαμβάνουσιν εννέα άρχοντες
τετταρας όβολούς έκαστος, και παρατρεφουσι
κήρυκα και αύλητην επειτ' άρχων εις Σ^αλαμΐνα
Βραχμην της ημέρας, άθλοθεται δ εν πρυτανείω
^ειπνοΰσι τον 'Έικατομβαιώνα μήνα orar η τά
Eiat'a^Tyvaia, αρζαμενοι από της τετρα8ος ιστά-
μενου, άμφικτύονες εις Αηλον ^ραχμην της ημέρας
εκάστης εκ Αηλου λαμβάνουσι.^ λαμβάνουσι δε
^ τών ί-πττέων suppleuit Kenyon.
* νυν Blass: erasuni, δίχα legit Kenyon.
' 6β6\ουί suppletum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
« Blass,
' λαμβάνουσι suppleuit Kenyon (cf. Ivii. 2).
168
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxi. 5— lxii. 2
manders, one for each tribe, to lead the cavalry as the
Regimental Commanders lead the heavy infantry.
They also elect by show of hands a Cavalry Com- 6
mander for Lemnos, to take control of the cavalry in
that island.
They also elect by show of hands a Treasurer of 7
the Paralus," and at the present day a Treasurer of
the ship of Ammon.
LXII. The officials elected by lot were formerly 1
those elected from the whole tribe together with the
Nine Archons and those now elected in the temple of
Theseus who used to be divided among the demes ;
but since the demes began to sell their offices, the
latter also are elected by lot from the whole tribe,
excepting members of the Council and Guards ^ ;
these they entrust to the demes.
Payment for public duties is as follows : first, the 2
People draw a drachma for ordinary meetings of the
Assembly, and a drachma and a half for a sovereign
meeting <= ; second, the Jury-courts half a drachma ;
third, the Council five obols ; and those acting as
president have an additional obol for food. Also the
Nine Archons get four obols each for food, and have
to keep a herald and a flute-player as well ; and the
archon for Salamis gets a drachma a day. Games-
directors dine in the Prytaneum in the month of
Hecatombaeon, during the Panathenaic Festival,
from the fourth of the month onward. Amphictyons
for Delos get a drachma a day from Delos. All the
" One of the state triremes used for embassies, etc. The
other, the Salaminia, was superseded by the one named
after Zeus Ammon, specially used to convey missions to
Cyrene on the way to the shrine of Zeus Ammon.
* Possibly the guards of the docks, mentioned at xxiv. 3.
" See xliii. 4.
169
ARISTOTLE
/cat οσαι αποστέλλονται άρχαΐ ei? Σιάμον η Υικΰρον
η Αημνον η "Ιμβρον els σίτησιν άργύρι,ον.
3 ApxeLv δε τα? μβν κατά πόλβμον αρχάς ε^εστι
ττλβονάκίς, των δ' άλλων ονΒβμίαν, πλην βου-
λευσαι δι?.
1 LXIII. Τα δε Βικαστήρια κληροΰσιν οι θ' άρ-
χοντες κατά φυλάς, 6 δε γραμματεύς των θεσμό -
2 θετών της Βεκάτης φυλής. ^ εϊσο8οί δε elatv εΙς
τα δικαστήρια δε'κτα, μία τη φυλή εκάστη, και
κληρωτήρια είκοσι, δυο τη φυλή εκάστη, καΐ
κιβώτια εκατόν, 8εκα τη φυλή εκάστη, και έτερα
κιβώτια εις ά^ εμβάλλεται τών λα;!^οντων δικαστών
τα ττινακια, και ύ8ρίαι δυο και βακτηρίαι παρα-
τίθενται κατά την εί'σοδον' εκάστην δσοιπερ οι
δικασται, και βάλανοι εις την υδριαν εμβάλλονται
ισαι ται$• βακτηρίαις, γεγραπται δε ε'ν ταΓ? βαλάνοις
τά στοιχεία άπο του ενδεκάτου, του λ,* οσαπερ αν
3 μελλη τά δικαστήρια πληρωθήσεσθαι. Βικάζειν δ'
εζεστιν τοις υπέρ λ' ετΐ7 γεγονόσιν, όσοι αυτών μη
οφειλουσιν τω 8ημοσίω η άτιμοι είσιν εάν 8ε τι?
8ικάζη οίς^ μη εζεστιν, ενδείκνυται και εις το
8ικαστηριον εισάγεται, εάν δ' άλω προστιμώσιν
αύτώ οι δικασται ο τι άν 8οκη άζιος είναι παθεϊν
η άποτισαι• εάν δε αργυρίου τιμηθη δει αύτον δε-
^ Tjj δΐκάτΎ} φν'ΚΎΐ ? Richards.
^ κιβώτια δέκα ei's ά (uel ors)alii: κιβω Cod.
^ Kenyon : Ιζοδοί' Hommel •. e . . . cod.
* Kenyon: post λ inserit τριακοστού (inter pretans) cod.
^ ψ Richards.
° 'The dicasts in each tribe are distributed over all the
10 divisions into which all the dicasts are divided. In each
tribe all the tickets {πινάκια) bearing the names of the dicasts
in the division A are placed in the first κιβωτών, those of
170
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxii. 2— lxiii. 3
officials sent to Samos, Scyros, Lemnos or Imbros also
get money for food.
The military offices may be held repeatedly, but 3
none of the others, except that a man may become a
member of the Council twice.
LXIII. The Jury-courts are elected by lot by the 1
Nine Archons by tribes, and the Clerk of the Law-
givers from the tenth tribe. The courts have ten 2
entrances, one for each tribe, twenty rooms, two for
each tribe, in which courts are allotted to jurors, a
hundred small boxes, ten for each tribe," and other
boxes into which the tickets of the jurymen drawn by
lot are thrown, and two urns. Staves are placed at
each entrance, as many as there are jurymen, and
acorns to the same number as the staves are thrown
into the urn, and on the acorns are written the letters
of the alphabet, starting with the eleventh, lambda, as
many as the courts that are going to be filled. Right 3
to sit on juries belongs to all those over thirty years
old who are not in debt to the Treasury or dis-
franchised. If any unqualified person sits on a jury,
information is laid against him and he is brought
before the jury-court, and if convicted the jurymen
assess against him whatever punishment or fine he is
thought to deserve ; and if given a money fine, he has
division Β in the second, and so on for all the 10 divisions.
According to the number of dicasts required, an equal
number of tickets is draΛvn by lot from each of the 100
κφώτια. Each ticket so drawn has a court assigned to it
by lot ; and the tickets are now all placed in the second set
of 10 κίβώτια, all tickets assigned to dicasts of any special
court being placed in the κιβωτών which bears the letter
corresponding to that court. The names of all the dicasts
selected to serve are thus distributed over the several courts
that are to sit on the day in question ' (Sandys). See further
ch. Ixiv.
171
ARISTOTLE
SeaOaL €ως αν εκτίσΊ] τό re πρότερον οφλημα €φ'
ώ βνβΒζίχθη και δ τι αν αύτω προστιμ-ήσ-η τό
4 ^ικαστιηριον . €χ€ΐ δ' ζκαστος δικαστή? ev πινάκιον
ττύζινον, Ιπιγεγραμμένον τό όνομα τό iavrov πα-
τρόθβν και τοΰ 8'ημου και γράμμα ev των στοι-
χ€ΐων μ^χρι τοΰ κ• νβνβμηνται γαρ κατά φυλάς
δεκτά μ€ρη οι δι/cασταt, παραπλησίως Ισοι iv
€Κάστω τω γράμματι.
5 Εττειδάν δε ό θεσμοθίτιις €πικληρώ(Γη τά γράμ-
ματα α δει ττροσπαρατίθεσθαι τοις Βικαστηρίοις,
€π€θηκ€ φβρων 6 υπηρέτης €φ' €καστον τό Βικα-
στηριον το γράμμα το λαχόν.
Only fragments of the remaining pages of the ms.
survive, much defaced. The most legible passages are
here appended, gaps having been filled in without note
where the restoration is generally accepted or is very
probable.
1 LXIV. Τά δε κιβώτια τά δέκα κείται ev τω
€μ7Γροσθ€ν της εισόδου κα^' €κάστην την φυλην.
βπιγβγραπται δ εττ αϋτώι^ τά στοι^^εΐα μ^χρι τοΰ
κ. εττειδάν δ' €μβάλωσιν οι δικασται τά πινάκια
€ΐς το κιβώτιον ε0' ου αν η βττιγεγραμμένον το
γράμμα το αύτο owep im τω πινακίω €στιν αύτω
των στοιχείων, Βιασείσαντος τοΰ ύττηρ4του έλκει 6
θεσμοθέτης εζ εκάστου τοΰ κιβωτίου ττινάκιον εν
2 ούτος δε καλείται εμπήκτης, και εμττηγνυσι τά
πινάκια τά εκ τοΰ κιβωτίου εις την κανονίΒα
εφ 'ής τό αυτό γράμμα επεστιν όπερ επι τοΰ
κιβωτίου, κληροΰται δε ούτος ϊνα μη άει 6 αυτός
εμπηγνύων κακουργη. εισι δε κανονίΒες πεντε^
172
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxiii. 3— lxiv. 2
to go to prison until he has paid both the former debt,
for which the information was laid, and whatever
additional sum has been imposed on him as a fine by
the court. Each juryman has one box-wood ticket, 4
with his own name and that of his father and deme
written on it, and one letter of the alphabet as far as
kappa ; for the jurymen of each tribe are divided
into ten sections, approximately an equal number
under each letter.
As soon as the Lawgiver has drawn by lot the 5
letters to be assigned to the courts, the attendant
immediately takes them and affixes to each court its
allotted letter.
LXIV. The ten boxes lie in front of the entrance for 1
each tribe. They have inscribed on them the letters
as far as kappa. When the jurymen have thrown
their tickets into the box on which is inscribed the
same letter of the alphabet as is on the ticket itself,
the attendant shakes them thoroughly and the Law-
giver draws one ticket from each box. This attendant 2
is called the Affixer, and he affixes the tickets taken
from the box to the ledged frame on which is the
same letter that is on the box. This attendant is
chosen by lot, in order that the same person may not
always affix the tickets and cheat. There are five
^ πέντ€ Blass, 5έκα alii : lacunam cod.
173
ARISTOTLE
3 iv €κάστω των κληρωτηρίων. όταν Se ζμβάλτ}
τους κύβους, 6 άρχων την φυλην κλ-ηροΐ κατά
κληρωτηριον. elal 8e κύβοι χαλκοΐ μελανές καΙ
Χζυκοί• όσους δ' αν hlrj λαχ^ΐν Βίκαστάς, τοσούτοι
€μβάλλοντα(, λευκοί, κατά ττάντ€ πινάκια €Ϊς, οι
δε μΙΧανβς τον αύτον τρόπον, επεώάν δ' i^aiprj^
τους κύβους, καλβΐ τους ξίληχότας 6 κηρυζ'
4 υπάρχει he και 6 €μπ'ήκτης βίς τον αριθμόν. 6 Sc
κληθ€ΐς και ύπακούσας e'A/cet βάλανον e/c της
ύΒρίας, και όρεξας αύτην άνβχων το γράμμα, Bei-
κνυσιν πρώτον μεν τω άρχοντι τω εφζστηκότι• 6
Be άρχων βττειδάν ιΒη, εμβάλλει το πινάκιον αύτοΰ
€ΐς το κιβώτιον οπού αν η επιγεγραμμενον το
αύτο στοιχεΐον όπερ εν τη βαλάνω, ΐν^ εις οίον
άν λάχη εισίη και μη εΙς οίον άν βούληται, μηΒε
η συναγαγεΐν εις Βικαστηριον ους άν βούληται τι?.
6 παράκειται Be τω άρχοντι κιβώτια δσαπερ άν
με?<λη τά Βικαστηρια πληρωθησεσθαι, έχοντα στοι-
χεΐον εκαστον όπερ άν fj επι του Βικαστηριου
εκάστου είληχός.
1 LXV. Αυτός Βε Βείζας πάλιν τω υπηρέτη €?τ'
εντός εισέρχεται της κιγχλίΒος.^ 6 Βε υπηρέτης
ΒίΒωσιν αύτω βακτηρίαν ομόχρων τω Βικαστηρίω
εφ* ου τό αυτό γράμμα εστίν όπερ εν τη βαλάνω,
ίνα α.ναγκαΐον η αύτω εισελθεΐν εις δ εϊληχε Βικα-
στηριον εάν γάρ εις έτερον εισίη εξελέγχεται υπό
2 του χρώματος της βακτηρίας• τοις γάρ Βικα-
στηρίοις χρώματα^ επιγεγραπται εκάστω επι τω
σφηκίσκω της είσόΒου. ό Βε λαβών την βακτηρίαν
^ ^ξΐλ-τϊ alii : e . . . cod.
' primae sententiae supersunt tantum paucae literae incertae.
* χρώμα edd. e schol. Aristoph. Plut. 277.
174
. ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxiv. 3— lxv. 2
ledged frames in each of the balloting-rooms. When 3
he has thrown in the dice, the Archon casts lots for
the tribe for each balloting-room ; they are dice of
copper, black and white. As many white ones are
thrown in as jurymen are required to be selected, one
white die for each five tickets, and the black dice
correspondingly. As he draws out the dice the herald
calls those on whom the lot has fallen. Also the
Affixer is there corresponding to the number. The 4
man called obeys and draws an acorn from the urn
and, holding it out with the inscription upward, shows
it first to the superintending Archon ; when the
Archon has seen it, he throws the man's ticket into
the box that has the same letter written on it as the
one on the acorn, in order that he may go into what-
ever court he is allotted to and not into whatever
court he chooses and in order that it may not be
possible to collect into a court whatever jurymen a
person wishes. The Archon has by him as many 5
boxes as courts are going to be filled, each lettered
with whichever is the letter assigned by lot to each
court.
LXV. And the man himself having again shown it 1
to the attendant then goes inside the barrier, and the
attendant gives him a staff of the same colour as the
court bearing the same letter as the one on the acorn,
in order that it may be necessary for him to go into
the court to which he has been assigned by lot ; for if
he goes into another, he is detected by the colour of
his staff, for each of the courts has a colour painted 2
on the lintel of its entrance. He takes the staff and
175
ARISTOTLE
jSaSt^ei et? το Si/caarr^piov το όμόχρων μ€ΐ' τύ]
βακτηρία €χον Be το αυτό γράμμα όπερ iv τω
βαλάνω. €7Τ€ΐ8άν δ' είσ^λθτ], τταραλαμβάνεί σνμ-
βολον 8ημοσία πάρα του βίληχότος ταντην την
3 αρχήν. €ΐτα την τ€ βάλανον /cat την βακτηρίαν^
iv τώ Βίκαστηρίο) τούτον τρόπον εΙσεΧηΧυθότες.
τοις δ' άπολαγχάνουσιν άττοδιδόασιν οΐ εμπηκται
4 τα πινάκια, οΐ he ύπηρ4ται οι δημόσιοι από της
φνλης 4κάστης τταραδιδόασι τα κιβώτια, ev €πι το
8ικαστήριον εκαστον, ev ω eveuTi τα ονόματα της
φυλής τα όντα ev Ικάστω των δικαστηρίων,
παραόιόόασι he τοις είληχόσι ταύτα άττοδιδοι^αι
τοΓ? δικασται? iv έκάστω [τώ]^ Βικαστηριω αριθμώ
τά πινάκια όπως iK τούτων σκοποϋντες απο•
Βώώσι τον μισθόν.
1 LXVI. Έπβιδάν Se πάντα πλήρη η τά δικα-
στήρια, τίθεται iv τω πρώτω των δικαστηρίων
β' κληρωτήρια και κύβοι χαλκοί ev οίς επι-
γεγραπται τά χρώματα των δικαστηρίων, και
€Tepoi κύβοι iv οΐς ioTiv των αρχών τά ονόματα
iπιγeγpaμμeva. λαχόντες be τών θεσμοθετών δυο
χωρίς εκατερων τους κύβους iμβάλλoυσιv , ο μεν
τά χρώματα εις το εν κληρωτήριον, 6 δε τών
αρχών τά ονόματα εις το έτερον, η 8 αν πρώτη
λάχη τών αρχών, αύτη αναγορεύεται ύπο τοΰ
κήρυκος οτι χρήσεται τω πρώτω λαχόντι δικα-
στή ρ ίω. . . .
Ofcc. Ixvi. 2-lxviii. 2 (ms. pp. S3, 34) only fragments
remain, variously put together and supplemented by
editors.
176
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxv. 2— lxviii. 1
goes to the court of the same colour as his staff and
having the same letter as is on the acorn. And when
he has come into it he receives a token publicly from
the person appointed by lot to this office. Then 3
with the acorn and the staff they take their seats
in the court, when they have thus entered. And to
those to whom the lot does not fall the Affixers give
back their tickets. And the public attendants from 4
each tribe hand over the boxes, one to each court,
in which are those names of the tribe that are in
each of the courts. And they hand them over to the
persons appointed by lot to restore the tickets to
the jurymen in each court by number, in order that
according to these when they examine them they
may assign the pay.
LXVI. When all the courts are full, two ballot- ]
boxes are placed in the first of the courts, and copper
dice with the colours of the courts painted on them,
and other dice with the names of the offices written
on them. And two of the Lawgivers are chosen by
lot, and throw the two sets of dice in separately, one
throwing in the coloured dice into one ballot-box and
the other the names of the offices into the other. And
to whichever of the offices the lot falls first, it is
proclaimed by the herald that this will use the first
court allotted. ...
^ βακτ-ηρίαν <,^χοΐ'τε$ Kaei^'ovffii'y Kenyon : <άποηθέασιν>
Thalheim.
^ si recte legitur, dittographiam seel. ed.
177
ARISTOTLE
2 LXVIII. . . . μζτα τον γ' (άττοδιδού? γαρ γ'
λαμβάνει) ίνα φηφίζωνται ττΟΛ>τ€ς' ου γαρ βστί
3 λαβ(ΐν σνμβολον ovSevi eav μη φηφίζηται. elal δε
αμφορείς δυο Κ€ίμ€νοι iv τω 8ικαστηρίω, 6 μ^ν
χαλκούς ό δε ξύλινος, διαιρετοί όπως μη λάθτ]
υποβάλλων τις φηφους, ει? ους φηφίζονται οΐ
δικτασται, ό μ€ν χαλκούς κύριος ό δε ζυλινός άκυρος,
€χων 6 χαλκούς επίθημα ^ιβρρινημένον ωστ αυτήν
μόνην χωρ€Ϊν την φηφον, ίνα μη δυο ο αυτός
4 ζμβάλλη. ε'ττειδάν δε 8ιαφηφίζ€σθαι μβλλωσιν οι
οικασταί, 6 κηρυζ αγορεύει πρώτον αν βπισκη-
πτωνται οι αντιΒικοι ταΐς μαρτυρίαις' ου γαρ
€στιν €πισκήφασθαι όταν άρζωνται Βιαφηφίζβσθαι.
εττειτα πάλιν ανακηρύττει " η τ€τροπημ4νη του
προτ€ρον λέγοντος η δε πλήρης του ύστερον
λέγοντος." 6 δε Βικαστης λαβών άμα^ εκ του
λυχνείου τάς φηφους, πιεζων τον αύλίσκον της
φηφου και ου δεικνύων τοις άγωνιζομενοις ούτε
το τετροπημενον ούτε το πλήρες, εμβάλλει την
μεν κυριαν εις τον χαλκοΰν αμφορέα την δε άκυρον
εις τον ζύλινον.
1 LXIX. ΐΐάντες δ' επειδά»^ ωσι 8ιεφηφισμενοι,
λαβόντες οι ύπηρεται τον αμφορέα τον κύριον
εξερώσι επι αβακα τρυπήματα έχοντα δσαιπερ
εισιν αι φηφοι, Ιν^ αύται φανεραΐ προκειμεναι
εύαριθμητοι ώσιν, και τα τρυπητά και τα πλήρη
8ηλα τοις άντώίκοις. οι δε επι τάς φηφους είλη-
χοτες 8ιαριθμοΰσιν αυτά? ε'ττι τοΰ άβακος, χωρίς
μεν τας πλήρεις χωρίς δε τάς τετρυπημενας.
' και αναγορεύει ο κηρυζ τον αριθμόν τών φήφων,
^ \aβ6μevos alii : λα | . . . cod.
178
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxviii. 2— lxix. 1
LXVIII. . . . <a copper token marked with a> 2
3 (for on giving this up he gets three obols), so that
they all may vote ; for nobody can get a token if
he does not vote. And there are two jars placed in 3
the court, one of copper and one of wood, separate
so that a man may not secretly throw in pebbles
undetected, into which the jurymen put their votes,
the copper jar to count and the wooden jar for
pebbles not used, the copper jar having a lid with
a hole in it only large enough to take just the
pebble alone, so that the same man may not throw in
two. And when the jury are about to give their 4
verdict, the herald first asks whether the litigants
wish to challenge the evidence of the witnesses ; for
they are not allowed to challenge it after the voting
has begun. Then he proclaims again, ' The pebble
with the hole through it is a vote for the first speaker,
and the whole pebble one for the second speaker.'
And the juryman when taking the pebbles out of the
lamp-stand presses the pebble against the lamp-stand
and does not let the parties to the action see either the
perforated pebble or the whole one, and throws the
one that he wishes to count into the copper vessel and
the one that he discards into the wooden one.
LXIX. And when all have voted, the attendants 1
take the vessel that is to count and empty it out on to
a reckoning-board with as many holes in it as there
are pebbles, in order that they may be set out visibly
and be easy to count, and that the perforated and
the whole ones may be clearly seen by the litigants.
And those assigned by lot to count the voting-pebbles
count them out on to the reckoning-board, in two
sets, one the whole ones and the other those per-
forated. And the herald proclaims the number of
179
ARISTOTLE
τοΰ μεν Βιώκοντος τάς τ€τρυπημ€νας του 8e
φζνγοντος τα? πλήρεις• οττοτίρω δ' αν πλείων
γενηται, οντος νικά, άν 8e ΐσαι, 6 φεύγων.
2 €π€ΐτα πάλιν τιμώσι, άν Scrj τιμησαι, τον αντον
τρόπον φηφιζόμενοι, το μεν σύμβολον απο-
δίδοντες βακτηρίαν 8ε πάλιν παραλαμβάνοντες' ή
δε τίμησίς εστίν προς ημίχονν ν8ατος εκατερω.
επεώάν δε αντοΐς fj δεδικασμένα τα εκ των νόμων,
απολαμβάνουσιν τον μισθον εν τω μέρει ου ελαχον
180
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, lxix. 1-2
votes, the perforated pebbles being for the prosecutor,
and the whole ones for the defendant ; and whichever
gets the larger number wins the suit, but if the votes
are equal, the defendant wins. Then again they
assess the damages, if this has to be done, voting in
the same way, giving up their ticket and receiving
back a staff; as to assessment of damages each
party is allowed to speak during three pints of water.
And when they have completed their legal duties as
jurymen, they take their pay in the division to which
each was assigned by lot. . . .
181
INDEX L— PROPER NAMES
{References are to chapters except that 'fr.' denotes one of the fragments
printed before c. 1.)
Acastus, 3
Acherdusian, 38
Acte, 42, 61
Aegeus, fr. 2, fr. 6
Aegospotami, 34
Agyrrhius, 41
Alcmaeon, 13
Alcmaeonidae, 1, 19, 20, 28
Alexias, 34
Alopece, 22, 45
Ammon, 61
Ambracia, 17
Anacreon, 18
Anaphlystius, 29
Anchirnolus, 19
Angele, 34
Anthemion, 7
Antidotus, 26
Antiphon, 32
Anytus, 27, 34
Aphidnn, 34
Apollo, fr. 1, 55
Archestratus, 35
Archinus, 17, 34, 40
Arginusae, 34
Argos, 17, 19
Ariphron, 22
Aristaechmus, 4
Aristeides, 22-24, 28, 41
Aristion, 14
Aristocrates, 33
Aristodiciis, 25
Aristogeiton, 18, 58
Aristomachus, 32
Artemis, 58
Asclepius, 56
Athena, 14, 47
Brauron, 54
Bucolium, 3
Callias, 32, 34
Callibius, 37, 38
Callicrates, 28
Cedon, 20
Cephisophon, 54
Charmos, 22
Chios, 24
Chronos, 12
Cimon, 25-28
Cineas, 19
Clazoinenae, 41
Cleisthenes, 20«•., 28, 41
Cleitophon, 29, 34 ^
Cleomenes, 19, 20
Cleon, 28
Cleophon, 28, 34
Codridae, fr. 7
Codrus, 3
CoUytus, 14, 22 ,
Corneas, 14
Conon, 25
Creusa, fr. 1
Cronos, 16
Cylon, fr. 8
Cypselidae, 17
Damasias, 18
Damonides, 27
Decelea, 34
183
ARISTOTLE
Delos, 54, 56, 62
Delphi, 19
Delphinium, 57
Demaretus, 38
Dionysia, 54, 56, 57
Dionysus, 3
Diphilus, 4
Draco, 3, 4, 7, 41
Dracontides, 84
Eetionea, 87
Egypt, 11
Eleusis, 39, 40, 54
Bnyalius, 58
Ephialtes, 25 f., 28, 35, 41
Epilycenm, 3
Epimenides, 1
Erechtheus, fr. 2
Bretria, 15, 33
Euboea, 33
Eucieides, 39
Eumelides, 45
Eumolpidae, 39, 57
Geraestus, 22
Gorgilus, 17
Hagnon, 28
Harmodias, 18, 58
Harpactides, 19, 45
Hegesias. 14
Hegesistratus, 17
Hellenes, 23
Hephaestus, 54
Heracleides, 41
Hermocreon, 22
Herodotus, 14
Hipparchns, 17-19, 22
Hippias, 17-19
Hippomenes, fr. 7
Homer, fr. 4
Hymettus, 16
Hypsechides, 22
Imbros, 62 •
Ion, fr. 1, 3, 41
Ionia, 5
lonians, fr. 1
lophon, 17
Isagoras, 20, 21, 28
Laciadae, 27
Leimone, fr. 7
Leipsydrion, 19
Lemnos, 61 f.
Lenaeum, 57
Leocoreum, 18
Lesbos, 24
Lycomedes, fr. 6
Lycurgus, 13, 14
Lycus, fr. 2
Lygdainis, 15
Lysander, 34
Lysicrates, 26
Lysimacbus, 21, 23, 45
Marathon, 22
Maronea, 22
Medon, 3
Megacles, /r. 8, 13 f., 22
Megara, fr. 2, 14, 17
Melobius, 29
Miltiades, 26, 28
Mnesilochus, 83
Mnesitheides, 26
Mimycbia, 19, 38, 42, 61
Myron, 1
Naxos, 15
Neocles, 23
Nicias, 28
Nicodemus, 22
Nisus, fr. 2
Oea, 27
Olympians, 12
Paeanians, 14, 38
Palladium, 57
Pallas, fr. 2
Pallenis, 15, 17
Panathenaea, 53, 60, 62
Pandion,/r. 2
Paiigaeus, 15
Paralus, 61
Parnes, 19
Pausanias, 23, 38
Peiraeus, 35, 38, 89, 40, 54, 61
Peisander, 32, 61
Peisistratus, 13-17, 22, 41
Pelargicum, 19
Pericles, 26 f.
Phaenippus, 22
Phayllns, 38
Pheidon, 10
Philoneos, 17
Phormisius, 84
Phreatto, 57
184
INDEX I. TO ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION
Phye, 14
Phyle, 37, 38, 41
Point, 42, 61
Poseidon, 67
Pylos, 27
Pythia, 19, 21
Pythodorus, 27, 29, 35, 41
Rhaicelos, 15
Rhinon, 38
Salamis, 17, 22, 23, 27, 54, 62 f.
Samoa, /r. 6, 24, 62
Scyllaeum, 22
Scyros, fr. 6, 62
Sicily, 28, 29
Simonides, 18
Solon, 2, 5-14, 17, 22, 28, 35, 41, 47
Sophonides, 25
Soter, 56
Spartiates, 19
Tanagra, 25
Telesines, 22
Thargelia, 56
Thebes, 15
Themistocles, 22-25
Tbeopompus, 33
Theramenes, 28, 33 f.,
Theseum, 15, 62
Theseus, Jr. 0, 41
Thettalos, 17 f.
Thrasybulus, 37, 40
Thucydides, 28
Timonassa, 17
Timosthenes, 23
Xanthippus, 22, 38
Xenaenetus, 40
Xerxes, 22
Xuthus, fr. 1
Zeus, 55, 56
185
INDEX II.— SUBJECTS
(References are to chapters and sections. Notes will sometimes le Jound
under the first reference.)
άβαξ, 69. 1
αγορά, 38. 1, 51. 3, 51 2, 57. 4
ayopai, 48. 4
άγοράι/ομοι, 51. 1
S.yoς, 1. 1, 20. 2
άγραφίου -γραφή, 59. 3
aypoiKOi, 13. 2
αδόκιμο;, 49. 1
άδύι/ατοί, 49. 4
ά^ίφνγία, 1. 1
άθλοβί'ται, (50. 1, 3, 62. 2
a'lKtia, 52. 2
άκον'σιοι φόΐΌΐ, 57. 3
αμιπτΓΟι, 49. 1
αμφικτνον€ς eU Δήλον, 62. 2
αμφορείς, 60. 1, 68. 3
άΐ'αρχία, 13. 1
άμδραττοδισταί, 52. 1
άι/τίδοσίϊ, 56. 3, 61. 1
άτΓοδβ'κται, 48. 1
άίΓοκοτΓτ) χρβών, 6. 1, 2, 10. 1, 11. 2,
4, 13. 3
άποστοσίου δίκη, 58. 3
άποτίμ-ημα, 56. 7
άττροστασίου δίκτ), 58. 3
Άρίιοπαγΐται (etc.), 3. 6, 4. 4, 8. 2,
23. 1, 26. 1, 57. 4
άρβσΐϊ, 57. 3
αρμοστεί, 37. 2
άρτοιτώλαι, 59. 3
όρ;(»)γ6'ται, 21. 6
άρχιθίιοροί, 56. 3
opxireKTOi-es ejrl τάϊ caCs, 46. 1
άρχωΐ' «ττώΐ'νμος, 3. 2, .06
άσίβ^ίας ypaφaί, 57. 2
άστννομόι, .50. 2
άτί'λίΐα, 56. 3
άτίλίϊ xupiof, 16. 6
186
ατιμία, 67. 5
αϋτόχ6ΐρ, 39. 5
άφε'σιμοϊ, 43. 3
άψυχων δίκαι, 57. 4
βακτηρία, 63. 2, 64. 4
βάΚανος, 63. 2, 64. 4
βασίλειο; στοά, 7. 1
Βασιλειίϊ, 41. 3
βασιλΕΪ»? άρχωμ, 57. 1
βου\€νσ(ως γραφή, 57. 3, 59. 3
βουλή, 43. 2 ff.
γάμος (Ιίρός), 3. 5
γονίων κάκωσις, 57. 6
γραμματ€ΐα λβλευκωμενα, 47. 3
γραμματείς, 54. 3
γυμνικός άγων, 60. 1, 3
&ΐκα, οι, 38. 1, 3, 41. 2
δίκά^ειμ, 27. 5
Βημαγωγοί, 28, 41. 2
δήμαρχος, 21. 5, 54. 8
δ>)μ€υσΐϊ, 67. 5
δημιοϊ, 45. 1
δημιουργοί, 13. 2
δήμοι, 21. 4
δημόσιοι', 63. 3
δημόσιος, 47. 5, 48. 1
δημότης, 21. 4
δημοτικοί, 16. 9
διαδικασία, 56. 6, 61. 1, 67. 2
διαιτηταί, 53. 1, 4, 5, 55. 5, 58. 2
διάκριοι, 13. 4
διαλλάκτης, 3S, 4
διαμ(τρ«ω, 67. 3, 4
διδάσκαλοι, 42. 3
δίδραχμου, 10. 2
INDEX II. TO ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION
δικαστήρια, 03. 1 ff.
Διοΐ'υσια, 56. 4, 5
διωβολία, 28. 3
διώβολον, 41. 3
δοκιμασία, 49. 1
δούλων δίκη, 63. •5
δρνφακτοι, ϊ>0. 2
δωροξίνία, 59. 3
δώρων -γραφή, 59. 4
€νκύκλιοϊ, 26. 2, 43. 1
εισαγγελία, 8. 5, 29. 4, 43. 4, 52. 2
εισαγωγεΐϊ, 52. 2
έκθύματα, 54. 6
€κκλτ)σία, 43. 4
έκττ)μοροι, 2. 2
Ελαιοι/, 60. 2
έλληΐΌταμίαι, 30. 2
έμμηνοι δίκαι, 52. 2 f.
εμττηκττ)?, 64. 2 f. , 65. 3
εμτΓΟρικαί δίκαι, 59. 4
εμτΓορίου εττιμεληταί, 51. 4
ίνα-γίσματα, 58. 1
Ιι/δει^ϊ, 29. 4, 52. 1
ένδεκα, 52. 2
ίνδημοι αρχαί, 24. 3
έ|ετασΐί, 31. 2
έ^οττλασία, 15. 3
έτΓίεικείϊ, 26. 1, 27. 4, 28. 1, 36. 2
έττίκληροϊ, 9. 2, 42. 5, 56. 6
έπιστατικτ) γραφή, 59. 3
επιτάφιος άγώι/, 58. 1
(πίτροπος, 56. 7
έπώι/υμο?, 53. 4, 7
ιρανικοί, δίκαι, 52. 2
έταιρεΐαι, 20. 1, 34. 3
εΰβυνοι, 48. 4
εύπατρίδαι, 13. 2
εφ>)ί3οι, 42. 2 ff., 53. 4
ζ^νγίσιον τε'λοϊ, 7. 4
^υγίττ)?, 4. 3, 7. 3, 12, 26. 2
^ωωι/ δίκαι, 57. 4
Θαργήλια, 56, 5
θεσμοθε'ται, 59. 1
θίωρικόν, 43. 1, 47. 2
βήτεϊ, 7. 3, 4
θόλος, 43. 3, 44. 1
ϊερομι/τ}μων, 30. 2
ίεροτΓοιοί, 30. 2, 54. 6
ΐκετηρίαι, 43. 6
'ίτΓτταρχοϊ, 4. 2, 30. 2, 3. 3, 44.4, 61.
ίττπεΐί, Ι'η-τΓοι, 4. 3, 6. 2, 7. 3, 38. 2,
49. 1, 68. 4
Ιπποδρομία, 60. 1, 3
ΐσοτελεΐϊ, 58. 2
κανηφορ^ΐν, 18. 2
Κήρυκες, 39. 2, 57. 1
κλεψΰδραι, 67. 2
κλήρος, 4. 1, 8. 1, 62. 1
κλοττη, 54. 1
κοιί'ωΐΊΚαΙ δίκαι, 52. 2
κοΉ-ρολόγοι, 50. 2
κορυνηφόροι, 14. 1
κοσμ-ητής, 41. 2
κρηνών έπιμεληταί, 43. 1
κυαμοϊ, 8. 1, 22. 5, 24. 3, 32. 1
κύρβεΐϊ, 7. 1
κωλακρίται, 7. 3
κωμωδοί, 56. 3
λαμπάδω»» αγώνες, 57. 1
λτ)τουργία, 27. 3, 29. 5, 56. 3
λί'βος, 7. 1, 55. 5
λογισταί, 48. 3, 54. 2
λοχαγοί, 61. 3
λνχνεΐον, 68. 4
λωτΓοδυ'της, 52. 1
μάντεις, 54. 6
μαστιγοφόροι, 35. 1
μεσόγειος, 21. 4
μέταλλα, 22. 7, 47. 2, 59. 5
μέτοικοι, 43. 5, 57. 3, 58. 2
μέτρα, 10. 1, 51. 2
μετρονόμοι, 51. 2
μηδισμός, 25. 3
μισβός, 27. 2, 4, 30. 1, 33. 1, 41. 3, 49.
1, 62. 2
μνά, 4. 2, 10. 2, 49. 4, 56. 4
μνησικακεΐν, 39. 6, 60. 2
μοιχεία, 57. 3, 59. 3
μορίαι, 60. 2
μύδροι, 23. 5
μυλωθροί, 51. 3
μιίσται, 56. 4
μυστήρια, 39. 2, 57. 1
νανκραρία, 8. 3, 22. 5
^ενία, 59. 3
όδοτΓΟίοί, 54. 1
οροί, 12. 4
ορφανοί, 24. 3, 54. 1, 56. 6 f.
187
ARISTOTLE
όστρακοφορία, 43. 5
όχ€τοί, 50. 2
παιδοτριβαί, 42. 3
παλαιόττλουτοι, 6. 2
παράλιοι, 13. 4, 21. 4
παράνοια., 54. (3
παραΐ'όμωμ -γραφή, 25. 4, 40. 2, 46. 4,
59. 2 ^
ττεδιακοι, 13. 4
ττελάται, 2. 2
π^ιτακισχιλιοι, 29. 5-32. 2
ΤΓβΐ'τακόσιοι, 25. 2
π€ντακοσίθμί&ιμνοι., 4. 3, 7. 3, 8. 1,
2(5. 2, 47. 1
πβντίτηρίδίς, 54. 7
πβττλοϊ, 49. 3, (ίΟ. 2
νινακίον, 48. 4, ()3. 2, 66. 2
πολΕμαρχο!, 08. 1
πρόδρομοι, 49. 1
προβδρικτ) -γραφή, 59. 2
πρόεδροι, 44. 2
προικοϊ St'ictj, 52. 2
πρόξ(νοι, 54. 3, 58. 2
προστάται τοΰ £^μου, 28. 1 ff.
πρυταΐ'ίϊοΐ', 3. 5, 24. 3, 62. 2
ιτυρκαϊά, 57. 3
πιαληταί, 47. 2, 52. 1
σ6ΐσα)(ίίία, 6. 1, 12. 4
σίτησίϊ, 62. 2
OΊτoφυλαίce?, 51. 3
σταθμοί, 10. 1, 2, 51. 2
στατ^ρ, 10. 2
tTTeAe^os, 60. 2
στοά βασι'λβιος, 7, 1
στρατηγοί, 61. 1
στρατιωτικά, 43. 1, 47. 2, 49. 3
συκοφανταί, 35. 2, 59. 3
σύμβοΚον, 59. 7, 65. 2, 68. 2, 69. 2
συμμ€ΐ^ΐϊ, 3. 5
σνμμορίαι, 61. 1
σφηκισκός, 65. 2
σφραγίς, 44. 1
σωφροι/ιστης, 42. 2
Tei'xij, 18. 5, 23. 4, 37. 1, 50. 2
τίλώι-αι, 52. 3
Τίτρακόσιοι, οι, 29. 1, 31. 3ff., 32. 1,
2, 37. 1, 41. 2
τ€τταράκοΐ'τα, οι, 53. 1, 5
το^όται, 24. 3
τρα•γω8οί, 56, 3
τραπί^ιτικαΐ δίκαι, 52. 3
τραν'ματοϊ δίκαι, 57. 3
τριάκοντα, οΊ, 34. 2-41. 3
τρι-ηραρχικαϊ δίκαι, 52. 2
τριηροτΓοιοι, 46. 1
τρισχι'λιοι, οί, 36. 1-37. 1
TpiTTves, 8. 3, 21. 3
τριώβολοί', 41. 3
-τύραννοι, 41. 2
vSpia, 63. 2, 64. 4
vStap, 66. 2, 67. 2, 4
φαρμάκων 8ίκαι, 57. 3
φόΐΌϊ, 7. 1, 16. 8, 39. 5, 57. 2, 3
φρατριαι, ρ. 1 § 5, 21. 6
φυ-γή, 57. 3, 67. 5
φυλαι, 8. 3, 21. 3
φΰλαρχοι, 30. 2, 31. 2, 49. 2, 61. 5
φι;λο|3ασιλ€Ϊϊ, 8. 3, 41. 2, 58. 4
φυλοκριΐ'ίϊΐ', 31. 1
χορηγία, 28. 4
χορηγοί, 53. 3, 54. 8, 56. 3 ff.
Xpeiyv αποκοπή, 6. 1, 10. 1, 11. 2, 4,
13. 3
φαΚτρίαι, 50. 2
ψ6υδ6γγροφη, 57. 3
ψίυδοκλητβία, 59. 3
φίυδομαρτνρία, 59. 6
189
THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS
INTRODUCTION
I. Place of the Evdemian Ethics in the
Aristotelian Corpus
All the extant books attributed to Aristotle (in-
cluding probably the recently recovered treatise
on the Athenian Constitution) belong to the group
of his works designated by ancient authorities άκρυα-
τικυΐ λόγοι, ' lecture-courses.' These are scientific
treatises, in places hardly more than mere outlines,
though for the larger part fully written out argu-
ments ; presumably they are records of Aristotle's
doctrine made for his pupils, and preserved in the
library of the Peripatetic School. The other class of
his writings, now lost, were more popular exposi-
tions intended for the general reader ; some of them
were in dialogue form. They were published, and
they are alluded to as βκδ^δο/χά'οι λόγοι.
The former group includes three works on the
philosophy of conduct, entitled the Eudemian Ethics,
the Nicomachean Ethics and Magna Moralia. The
two former are full scientific treatises, in eight and
ten Books respectively. Magna Moralia is a smaller
work, more discursive in style, of which only two
Books survive, the latter part being lost ; its contents
correspond partly with the Eudemian and partly with
the Nicomachean Ethics ; it was probably compiled
190
EUDEMIAN ETHICS
by a Peripatetic of the generation after Aristotle.
Eudemus was the pupil of Aristotle who followed
his doctrine most closely ; Nicomachus was Aristotle's
son, who fell in battle when a mere lad. Both may
have been the compilers of the treatises that bear
their names : Cicero (De Finibus v. 12) says that
the Nicomachean Ethics, though attributed to Aristotle
himself, can well have been by his son, and Diogenes
of Laerte quotes from it as by Nicomachus. But the
early commentator Porphyry speaks of both works as
' dedicated to ' the persons whose names they bear.
Whatever the truth may be, the Nicomachean Ethics
has always been accepted as the authoritative ex-
position of Aristotle's moral science ; and it seems
probable that the Eudemian, so far as it differs,
represents an earlier stage of its development."
This view is not necessarily precluded by the fact
that in some places the Eudemian Ethics is fuller in
expression or more discursive than the Nicomachean.
II. The Eudemian-Nicomachean Books
For about one third of the whole the two works
overlap, the Eudemian Books IV., V., VL being
identical with the Nicomachean V., VI., VII. ; these
are given in the mss. and editions of the latter work
only. Scholars have debated to which they really
belong, some holding that they fit the argument of
" This is the view of Jaeger, followed by Burnet in his
Essays and Addresses and by Mansion ; but the Eudemian
Ethics is regarded as later than the Nicomachean by Spengel,
Susemihl 1900, and Stocks (in the Oxford Aristotle vol. ix.),
as it was by Burnet in his earlier work, his edition of N.E.
Magna Moralia is put last by almost all scholars, but first
of the three treatises by Schleiermacher and Arnim.
191
ARISTOTLE
the Eudemian and that the corresponding parts of
the Nicomachean have been lost, others the opposite.
But all Aristotle's treatises are so loosely put together
that the arguments for neither view are convincing.
It is more probable • that the three common Books
represent his final doctrine, except in so far as they
are modified by other parts of his works — thus the
excursus on the ethical value of pleasure in E.E. VI.
= N.E. VII. was doubtless superseded by the more
accurate treatment of the topic at the beginning of
N.E. X.
III. The Eudemian Ethics : Outline of Contents
AND Comparison with the Nicomachean
Book I. introduces the subject — the nature of
Happiness or Well-being, the supreme End or Aim
of human conduct. This is a practical study : know-
ledge of the good is an aid to its attainment. The
different views that prevail are crystallized in thl^e
typical Lives, the philosopher's life of thought, tiie
statesman's life of action, the voluptuary's life of
pleasure. The Platonic theory of an Absolute Good
is of questionable philosophic validity, and in any
case has no bearing on practical life.
Book II. c. i. defines Happiness as consisting in
the right exercise of the functions of man's nature,
moral and intellectual. The contents of E.E. so far
correspond with those of N.E. Book I. ; the remainder
of Book II. with N.E. II. and III. i.-v. It examines
the nature of Moral Goodness or \lrtue, which is
defined as a fixed disposition of character that in
action or emotion steers a middle course between
too much and too little. The various virtues are
192
EUDEMIAN ETHICS
tabulated, with the vices of excess and defect that
correspond to each. The problem of the Freedom
of the Will is studied in the light of the psychology
of Volition and Purpose.
Book III. discusses the Virtues and some minor
Graces of Character seriatim, each with its corre-
sponding pair of Vices. The list tallies with that in
N.E. III., vi. if. and IV., except that it inserts the
virtue of Mildness between Temperance and Liber-
ality, and adds to the minor Graces of Character
Nemesis (righteous indignation at another's un-
deserved good or bad fortune), Friendliness and
Dignity, while it omits Gentleness and Agreeable-
ness {N.E. IV., v., vi.).
(Books IV., v., VI. are omitted in mss. and editions
of the Eudemian Ethics, as they are the same as
Books v., VI., VII. of the Nicomachean ; the first of
these three Books deals with Justice, thus completing
the examination of the Moral Virtues ; the second
treats the Intellectual Virtues of Prudence or
Practical Wisdom and Theoria or Speculative Wisdom ;
the third forms an appendix to the section on Moral
Virtue — it examines Weakness of Will and studies
the psychology of Pleasure — a subject again treated
differently and more accurately in N.E. X. init.)
The subject of Book VII. is Friendship. The term
includes all forms of friendly mutual regard, whether
between equals or superior and inferior, relatives or
other associates, and whether based on the motive of
utility or the pleasure of society or respect for worth.
The psychology of friendship is analysed in relation
to that of self-love.
In N.E. VIII. and IX. Friendship is discussed at
greater length with fuller detail ; the arrangement
ο 1.93
ARISTOTLE
of the topics is different but there is perhaps no
striking discrepancy of view.
E.E. VIII. notices the epistemological aspect of
Virtue (treated in N.E. I., ix., but differently) ; and
discusses the ethical bearing of Good Luck (more
fully dealt with in a different connexion in c. iii. of
N.E. yiI.=E.E. VI.), and there follows an essay on
Kalokagathia, Moral Nobility (a virtue merely alluded
to without analysis in N.E., as a necessary quality of
the Great-spirited man, 1124 a 4 and 1179 b 10);
it is treated as the consummation of the particular
virtues. In conclusion there is a glance at Theoria,
the activity of Speculative Wisdom, as the highest
life of man ; at Book II. init. this was coupled with
Moral Conduct as constituting happiness. There is
nothing corresponding to the full treatment of
Theoria as the consummation of human well-being
that is given in N.E. X. vii., viii., or to the transition
from ethics to politics (glancing at the importance of
public education) which concludes that Avork.
IV. Text, MSS. and Editions
The Eudemian Ethics is not contained in the two
best MSS. of Aristotle, the 10th c. Laurentianus
(denoted by the sign K^) and the 12th c. Parisiensis
(L^) ; we derive it chiefly from Vaticanus (P**), a
13th c. copy of K^, and the early 15th c. Marcianus
(Mb), not so good a text as P'' but an indispensable
adjunct to it — according to Jackson, who refers to
the text of these two mrs. as ' the Greek tradition.'
Other later copies certainly contain more errors, and
are of little value as actual traditions of a sound text
— some of their variants may be mere conjectural
194
EUDEMIAN ETHICS
corrections ; their readings are only occasionally given
in this edition.
The 13th c. Latin translation attributed to William
of Moerbeke follows the Greek very closely, and is
almost equivalent to another ms. ranking in value
next to Vaticanus and Marcianus ; it is occasionally
adduced in this edition either in Latin or in its original
Greek Λvhen this can be inferred with certainty.
There is an old Latin version of Book VIIL c. ii.
with Magna Moralia Book IL c. viii., entitled De
Bona Fortuna, printed in a Latin Aristotle of 1482,
which indicates an independent Greek text of that
passage.
The earliest printed edition of Aristotle is the
Aldine, Venice 1498. The foundation of all modern
work on the text is the monumental Berlin edition,
with a Latin translation, scholia and indices, published
by the Academia Regia Borussica in 1831 and the
following years. The text, edited by Bekker, forms
Volumes I. and Π. which are paged consecutively,
the Eudemian Ethics occupying pp. 1214-1249 ; the
Berlin pages, the columns (indicated by a and b) and
the numbering of the lines are shown in the margin
of the present text.
Fritsche's edition of the Eudemian Ethics (Ratisbon
1851) has an introduction on the authorship and
contents, a text with explanatory notes, illustrative
quotations and critical notes, a Latin translation and
a Greek index.
The Teubner text of Susemihl (Leipzig 1884) has
useful critical notes, collecting the corrections of other
scholars published in the learned journals.
Henry Jackson contributed a valuable study of the
text and contents of Book VH. cc, i.,ii. to The Journal
195
ARISTOTLE
of Philology xxxii. pp. 170 ff. ; and also supplied a
number of printed notes to the Oxford translator,
J. Solomon.
Solomon's translation, in Volume IX. of the Oxford
Aristotle 19^5, is the most recent work on the book.
Mr. Solomon in his footnotes gives full references
to the corresponding passages of the Nicomachean
Ethics and Mag?ia Moralia ; and his notes on the
readings of the Greek that he has adopted make
his work a valuable critical edition : they include
conjectures of the translator himself, of Professor
Ross the general editor of the series, and of other
scholars, among them the notes of Henry Jackson
referred to above.
In view of the comparatively scanty amount of
work on the text hitherto published, the present
editor has thought himself justified in making a
considerable number of conjectural emendations of
his own. Some freedom has been used in incor-
porating these and those of other scholars in the
text ; it seems in keeping with the purpose of this
series to present the reader directly with what
Aristotle probably wrote, leaving him to glance at
the critical notes to discover what he is represented
as having written by his copyists. At the same time
in the interests of scholarship emended passages in
the text are marked by a number referring to the
corresponding note.
Similarly, the style of the translation is intended
to make it serve as an aid to a student reading
the original. It is as interpretative as >vas possible
without becoming a mere paraphrase ; it is not
intended as a substitute for tlie Greek, which miglit
take the form either of a rigidly literal version or
196
EUDEMIAN ETHICS
of a rendering into idiomatic English conveying the
sense but ignoring the form of the original.
The following signs are used in the critical notes :
MSS.
ph =Vaticanus.
M*^ = Marcianus.
cet. =all the other mss. collated by editors where
their readings agree,
v.l. = the reading of one or some of these other
MSS.
Guil. = the Latin version of William of Moerbeke.
Γ =the conjectured Greek original of this.
B^ =De Bona Fortuna.
The following abbreviations are used for the names
of some editors and commentators quoted for the
text :
Aid. = editio princeps Aldina.
Bek. =Bekker.
Bus. =Busolt.
Bz. =Bonitz.
Cas. =Casaubon.
Fr. = Fritsche.
lac. = Henry Jackson.
Rac. =the present editor.
Ras. =Rassow.
Ric. = Richards.
Sol. = Solomon.
Sp. ^Spengki'. <^^ Η
Sus. =Susemihl.
Syl. = Sylburg.
Vict. = Victorius.
H. R.
November 1934.
197
ΗΘΙΚί2Ν ΕΤΔΗΜΙ$2Ν Α
1214 a
Ι. Ό μβν ev Αήλω παρά. τω θζώ την αντοΰ 1
γνώμην άποφηνάμ€νος συνβγραφβν €πΙ το προ-
πύλαυον του Αητώου SlcXouv ώς^ ονχ υπάρχοντα
πάντα τω αύτώ το re αγαθόν καΐ το καλόν και το
rjSij, ποιησας
5 κάλλίστον το Βικαίότατον, λωστον δ' iyiaiveiv,
πάντων ηΒιστον δ'^ ου τίς ipa το τυχ€Ϊν.
ημβΐς δ' αύτω μη συγχωρώμβν η γαρ ευδαι/χονια
κάλλίστον καΐ άριστον απάντων ούσα η^ιστόν
ioTLV.
Πολλών δ' όντων θ βω ρημάτων α π€ρΙ €καστον 2
10 πράγμα καΐ πβρί ίκάστην φύσιν άπορίαν €χ€ΐ καΐ
δειται σκ€φ€ως, τά μ€ν αυτών συντΐίν^ί προς το
γνώναί μόνον, τά he καΙ π^ρΐ τάς κτησ€ίς^ καΐ
π€ρΙ τάς πράζεις του πράγματος, όσα μ^ν οΰν 3
€χ€ΐ φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικην, ΧεκτΙον κατά
τόν €π ψάλλοντα καιρόν 6 τι πβρ αν οίκ€Ϊον η* τη
^ ώ? add. Sp.
* δ' hie Vr. : ante ήδιστον aut cm. codd.
' χρ-ήσΐΐί Sp. * Ric. : 6 τι vep οίκΰον 1]v.
" Theognis (255 f. with sHght variation, quoted also in
N.E. i., 1099 a 27).
198
THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS
BOOK I
1 I. The man " who at Delos se^ forth in the precinct Books i. ix.
of the god his own opinion co^^iposed an inscription ^ess.
for the forecourt of the temj,{j of Leto in which he ii>troduc-
distinguished goodness, beauty and pleasantness as (cci.-vi.) :
not all being properties of the same thing. His Η^^^^^''^'"*'
verses are :
Justice * is fairest, and Health is best,
But to win one's desire is the pleasantest.
But for our part let us not allow that he is right ;
for Happiness ^ is at once the pleasantest and the
fairest and best of all things whatever.
2 About every thing and every natural species there its mode of
are many views that involve difficulty and require ^""ΐ"ΐ**''^'θ">
examination ; of these some relate only to our ΙίηοΛν-
ledge of the thing, others deal also with modes of
3 acquiring it and of acting in relation to it. As to
all those views therefore that involve only specula-
tive philosophy, we must say whatever may be proper
to the inquiry when the suitable occasion occurs.
* Or ' Righteousness ' ; the term includes more than
justice.
" Or ' Well-being ' ; the Greek word is entirely non-
committal, and does not necessarily denote a state of feeling,
consciousness of welfare.
199
ARISTOTLE
1214 a
15 μζθόΒω. πρώτον 8e σκ€τττ4ον iv tlvl to ev ζην 4
και πώς κτητόν, πότβρον φνσ€ί γίνονται πάντ€ς
€ύοαιμον€ς οι τνγχάνοντ€ς ταύτης της προσηγορίας,
ωσπβρ μεγάλοι και μικροί και την χροιάν δια-
φεροντ€ς, η δια μαθήσεως , ώς οΰσης επιστήμης
τίνος της ευδαιμονίας, η δια τίνος ασκήσεως
20 {πολλά γαρ οϋτε κατά φνσιν οϋτε μαθοΰσιν αλλ'
εθισθεΐσιν υπάρχει τοις άνθρώποις, φαΰλα μεν
τοις φαύλως εθισθεΐσι, χρηστά Βέ τοις χρηστώς) ;
η τούτων μεν κατ' ο^δβ^α τών τρόπων, ΒυοΙν δέ 5
θατερον, ήτοι καθά'^-'ρ οι νυμφόληπτοι και θεό-
ληπτοι τών άνθρώπ(^ν, επιπνοία Βαιμονίον τινός
25 ωσπερ ενθουσιάζοντες , η δια την τύχην (πολλοί
γαρ ταυτον φασιν eivai την εύ^αιμονίαν και την
εύτυχίαν) ,
Ότι μεν οΰν η παρουσία^ δια τούτων απάντων η 6
τινών η τίνος υπάρχει τοις άνθρώποις, ουκ ά^ηλον
αττασαι γαρ αι γενέσεις σχεδόν πίπτουσιν εις
ταιίτα? τάς αρχάς {και γάρ τάς^ από της διανοίας
30 αττασας• προς τα? απ επιστήμης αν τις συναγάγοι
πράξεις) . τό δ' εύδαιμονεΐν και τό ζην μακαρίως 7
και καλώ? εϊη αν εν τρισι μάλιστα τοις etvai
! οοκοΰσιν αίρετωτάτοις• οι μεν γάρ την φρόνησιν
μεγιστον είναι φασιν aya^ov, οι 8ε την άρετήν, οι
8ε την η8ονην. και προς την εύ8αιμονίαν ενιοι 8
1214 b Trepi του μεγέθους αυτών 8ιαμφισβητοΰσι, συμ-
βάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον θατερου μάλλον εις
^ ν.1. παρουσία rijs €ύδαιμονίαί. ^ τάϊ add. Cas.
" The Greek term here still retains the general sense that it
has in Plato. In the Nicomachean Ethics it is limited to
aoo
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. i. 4-8
4 But we must consider first what the good hfe con-
sists in and how it is to be obtained — whether all of
those who receive the designation ' happy ' acquire
happiness by nature, as is the case with tallness and
shortness of stature and differences of complexion,
or by study, which would imply that there is a science
of happiness, or by some form of training, for there are
many human attributes that are not bestowed by
nature nor acquired by study but gained by habitua-
tion—bad attributes by those trained in bad habits
and good attributes by those trained in good ones.
5 Or does happiness come in none of these ways, but
either by a sort of elevation of mind inspired by
some divine ροΛνβΓ, as in the case of persons possessed
by a nymph or a god, or, alternatively, by fortune ?
for many people identify happiness Avith good for-
tune.
6 Now it is pretty clear that the presence of happi-
ness is bestowed upon men by all of these things, or
by some or one of them ; for almost all the modes in
which it is produced fall under these principles, in-
asmuch as all the acts that spring from thought may
be included with those that spring from knowledge.
7 But to be happy and to live blissfully and finely its three
may consist chiefly in three things deemed to be "tftuents
most desirable : some people say that Wisdom °
is the greatest good, others Goodness * and others
8 Pleasure. And certain persons debate about their
importance in relation to happiness, declaring that one
contributes more to it than another — some holding
Practical Wisdom, prudentia, ' prudence,' as distinct from
θεωρία, sapientia, ' speculative wisdom.'
* It must always be remembered that the Greek term is
less limited in meaning than ' virtue,' and may denote
excellence in any department, not only moral goodness.
201
ARISTOTLE
1214 b ^ ^ , , , ^ • ^
αντην, OL μβν ώς ονσαν μΐΐζον αγαθόν την
φρονησίν της aperrjg, οΐ δε ταύτης την άρ€την,
OL δ αμφοτέρων τούτων την η^ονην καΐ τοις μβν
5 €Κ ττάντων δο/cer τούτων, τοις δ' e/c hvolv, τοις δ
ev ivL TLVi τούτων elvai το ζην €ν^>αιμ6νως .
II. Yiepl δτ) τούτων €πιστησαντας άπαντα τον 1
Βυνάμενον ζην κατά την αντον ττροαίρεσιν ^βσ^αι
TLva σκοπόν του καλώς ζην, ήτοι τιμήν η δο^αν
η πλοντον η τταώείαν, ττρός δν άττοβλεττων ττοιησεται
10 πάσας τάς πράξεις {ώς τό γ€ μη συντ€τάχθαι τον
βίον προς τι τέλος αφροσύνης πολλής σημεΐον
εστίν), μάλιστα δτ) δέΐ πρώτον εν αύτω ^ιορίσασθαι 2
μήτε προπετώς μήτε ραθύμως εν τίνι τών ημέτερων
το ζην εν και τίνων άνευ τοις άνθρώποις ουκ
ενδέχεται τοΰθ^ ύπάρχειν. ου γαρ ταύτον ών τ
15 άνευ ούχ οΐόν τε uyiatVeii' και το i5yiatVetv, ομοίως 3
δ' έχει τοΰτο και εφ^ έτερων πολλών ώστ ούΒέ
τό ζην καλώς και ών άνευ ου Βυνατον ζην καλώς.
έ'στι δε τών τοιούτων τα μεν ουκ ί'δια της uyteia? 4
ούΒε της ζωής άλλα κοινά πάντων ώς ειπείν, και
20 τών εζεων και τών πράξεων, οΐον άνευ του αναπνεΐν
η εγρηγορεναι η κινήσεως μετεχειν ούθεν αν
νπάρζειεν ήμΐν ούτ^ άγαθον ούτε κακόν, τα δ
ίδια μάλλον περί εκάστην φύσιν, ου γάρ ομοίως
οίκεΐον προς εύεξίαν τοις είρημενοις κρεωφαγια
και τών περιπάτων οι μετά ^εΐπνον. α 8εΐ μη
» C/. Ν.Ε. i., 1094 a 22, 1095 a 22-26.
202
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. i. 8— ii. 4
that Wisdom is a greater good than Goodness,
others the reverse, and others that Pleasure is a
greater good than either of them ; and some think
that the happy hfe comes from them all, others from
two of them, others that it consists in some one of
them.
1 II. Havingthen inregard to this subject established its essential
that everybody able to live according to his own pur-
posive choice should set before him some object for
noble living to aim at"— either honour or else glory
or wealth or culture^— on which he Mdll keep his eyes
fixed in all his conduct (since clearly it is a mark
of much folly not to have one's life regulated with
2 regard to some End), it is therefore most necessary
first to decide within oneself, neither hastily nor
carelessly, in Avhich of the things that belong to us
the good life consists, and what are the indispensable
conditions for men's possessing it. For there is a
distinction between health and the things that are
3 indispensable conditions of health, and this is simi-
larly the case with many other things ; consequently
also to live finely is not the same as the things with-
4 out which living finely is impossible. And in the
latter class of things some that are indispensable
conditions of health and life are not peculiar to
special people but common to practically all men —
both some states and some actions — for instance,
without breathing or being awake or participating
in movement we could not possess any good or any
evil at all ; whereas others are more peculiar to
special types of natural constitution — for instance,
eating meat and taking walking exercise after
dinner are not closely related to health in the same
way as the conditions mentioned. And these facts
203
ARISTOTLE
1214 b
25 λάνθαναν^ έ'στι γαρ ταντ αίτια της άμφισβητ'ησ€ως 5
7T€pt του βύΒαιμονΐΐν τι εστί καΐ yiVerai δια τίνων
ών avev γαρ ούχ οΐόν re €ύ8αιμον€Ϊν eViot ^eprj
της ΐύΒαιμονίας eti^at νομίζονσιν.
III. Πάσα? μ^ν ονν τάς δό^α? Ιτησκοττ^Ιν όσας 1
€.χουσι τινβς ττβρί αύτης ττερίζργον . ττολλά γαρ
30 φαίνεται και τοις παώαρίοις και τοις κάμνονσι
και τταραφρονοΰσι nepl ών άν ούθεις νουν €χων
Βιαττορησειεν, SdovTai γαρ ου λόγων, αλλ' οι μβν
ηλικίας iv fj μεταβαλοΰσιν^ οι he κολάσβως
ιατρικής η πολιτικής (κόλασις γαρ η φαρμακεία
των πληγών ουκ Ιλάττων εστίν) • ομοίως he 2
1215 a ταυται? oi)he τας των πολΧών, εική γαρ λεγουσι
σχehov περί απάντων και μάλιστα περί ταύτης,
τάς hε των σοφών^ έπισκεπτεον μόνας• άτοπον
γαρ προσφερειν λόγον τοις λόγου μηhev hεoμ€Voις
αλλά πάθους* επει δ' είσιν άπορίαι περί εκάστην 3
5 πραγματείαν οίκεΐαι, hηλov οτι και περί βίου του
κρατίστου και ζωής της άριστης είσίν ταύτας ουν
καλώς έχει τάς hόξaς εζετάζειν, οι γάρ τών
αμφισβητούντων έλεγχοι τών εναντιουμενων αύταις^
λόγων άπohείζεις είσίν.
Έιτι hε προ έργου το τά τοιαύτα μη λανθάνειν 4
μάλιστα προς α hei συντείνειν πάσαν σκεφιν, εκ
10 τίνων evhεγετaι μετασχεΐν του ευ και καλώς ζην
^ & , . . \ανθάνΐΐν hie Rac. : supra post ψύσιν.
" Sp. : μ€ταβά\\ονσιν.
' ταντη$ . . . σοφών add. Ρ*• marg. (δέ add. Rac).
* vtidovs lac. * Rac. : αύτοΐί.
° In the Mss. this clause comes before the preceding one,
' for instance, eating meat . . . mentioned.'
" Cf. N.E. i., 1095 a 28-30, b 19 ff.
204.
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. ii. 5— iii. 4
5 must not be overlooked," for these are the causes of
the disputes about the real nature of happiness and
about the means of procuring it ; for some people
regard the things that are indispensable conditions
of being happy as actual parts of happiness.
1 III. Now to examine all the opinions that any Considered
people hold about happiness is a superfluous task.'' "^the"*'''^
For children and the sick and insane have many nature of
opinions which no sensible man would discuss, for '''^ρ^""^*"
these persons need not argument but the former
time in which to grow up and alter and the latter
medical or official chastisement (treatment with
3rugs being chastisement just as much as flogging
2 is). And similarly it is also superfluous to examine
the opinions of the multitude " either ; for they talk
at random about almost everything, and especially
about happiness. We ought to examine only the
opinions of the wise '^ ; for it is out of place to apply
reasoning to those who do not need reasoning at all,
3 but experience. But since every subject has special
difficulties related to it, it is clear that there are such
in regard to the highest life and the best mode of
existence ; it is then well to examine the opinions
putting these difficulties, since the refutations ad-
vanced by those who challenge them are demon-
strations of the theories that are opposed to them.
4 Moreover to notice such matters is especially are of prac-
advantageous with a view to the subjects to which γΟγ'^η,Γ^"*
all inquiry ought to be xlireeted — the question what attainment.
are the ipeans that make it possible to participate
> in living Λν^Ι and finely (if ' blissfully ' is too invidious
" Cf. N.E. i., 1095 b 19.
** The words translated ' happiness ' and ' the opinions of
the wise ' are conjectural insertions in the Greek.
205
ARISTOTLE
121V
{el To^ μακαριως επιφθονώτβρον ΐίπβΐν), καΐ προς
την ελτΓίδα την irepl €καστα γβνομβνην άν των
€τηακών. el μ€ν γαρ ev τοις δια τνχην γι,νομίνοις 5
■ί) Ύοΐς δια φνσι,ν το καλώς ζην eoTLV, άν^λτηστον
αν €'ίη πολλοίς, ου γάρ εστί δι' eπLμeλeίaς η
15 κτησις ovSe^ ctt' αύτοΐς ούδε' της αυτών πραγ-
ματείας• el δ ev τω αύτον ποιόν τίνα elvat καΐ 6
τα? κατ αύτον πράζεις, κοινότερον αν εΐη το
αγαθόν καΐ deiOTepov, κοινότερον μεν τω πλείοσιν
€νΒ4χεσθαι μετασχεΐν, deioTepov he τω κεΐσθαι
την εύ^αιμονίαν τοΐς^ αυτούς παρασκευάζουσι
ποίούς τίνα? καΐ τας πράξεις.
20 IV. "Εσται δε φανερά τα πλείστα των άμφισ- 1
βητουμενων καΐ Βιαπορουμενων άν καλώς όρισθη
τι χρη νομίζειν είναι την ενΒαιμονίαν, πότερον εν
τω ποιόν τίνα μόνον efvat την φυχην, καθάπερ
Ttre? ωηθησαν τών σοφών και πρεσβυτέρων, η
25 8εΐ μεν και ποιόν τίνα ύπάρχειν αυτόν, μα?0(ον 8ε
8εΐ τάς πράξεις eii^at ποιας τινας.
Αιηρημενων δε τών βίων και τών μεν ουδ'* 2
αμφισβητούντων της τοιαύτης ευημερίας αλλ'
αλλω?' τών αναγκαίων χάριν σπουΒαζομενων , οΐον
τών περί τάς Τ€;)^να9 τα? φορτικάς και τάς
βάναυσους^ και τών περί χρηματισμόν {λέγω δε
30 φορτικάς μεν τάς προς 8όξαν π ραγματευομενας
μόνον, βάναυσους δε τα? εδραία? και μισθαρνικάς,
^ το Vict., τφ τό Fr. : τφ.
* ουδέ om. Sp. ^ » ουδέ διά. Ρ»>.
* ν.1. έν TOis : if τφ . . . ιταρασκΐυάζΐΐν ? Rac.
* ούδ' add. Βζ. * Sp. ws.
' Sp. : καΐ ταί βαναύσονί post χρηματισμόν.
" The word ψυχή, usually rendered * soul,' has no term
exactly corresponding to it in English, as it denotes the whole
206
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. in. 4— iv. 2
an expression) — and with a view to the hope that we
may have of the things that are good in the various '
5 departments. For if hving finely depends on things
that come by fortune or by nature, it would be be-
yond the hopes of many men, for then its attainment
is not to be secured by effort'^ and does not rest with
men themselves and is not a matter of their own
6 conduct ; but if it consists in oneself and one's own
actions having a particular quality, the good would
be more common and more divine — more common
because it would be possible for more people to share
it, and more divine because happiness would then be
in store for those who made themselves and their
actions of a particular quality.
1 IV. Most of the points debated and the difficulties Character or
raised ΛνΙΙΙ be clear if it be satisfactorily determined '='^"'^"'^*•
what the proper, conception of happiness is — does
it consist merely in a person's possessing some par-
ticular quality of spirit," as some of the sages and
the older thinkers held, or although a particular
personal character is indeed an indispensable con-
dition, is a particular quality of conduct even more
V; necessary ?
'2 There are various different modes of life, and some Three
do not lay any claim to well-being of the kind under ^>'Ρ"^''' •'^'^^•
consideration, but are pursued merely for the sake
of things necessary — for instance the lives devoted
to the vulgar and mechanic arts and those dealing
with business (by vulgar arts I mean those pursued
only for reputation, by mechanic the sedentary and
wage-earning pursuits, and by arts of business those
vitality of a living creature, with the unconscious factors of
nutrition and growth as well as conscious feelings or emo-
tions and thoughts.
207
ARISTOTLE
1216 8
χρημαηστικας 8e τάς προς ωνάς αγοραίας^ και
πράσ€ΐς καττηλικάς), των δ' ets" άγωγην εύδαι/ζ,ο-
νίκην ταττομενων τριών όντων των καΐ πρότ€ρον
ρηθζντων αγαθών' ώς μβγίστων τοις άνθρώποίς,
3δ apcTTJs και φρονησίως και ηΒονης, Tpeis ορώμ^ν
καΐ βίους οντάς ους οι ζζουσίας^ τυγχάνοντ€ς
i2i5h προαιρούνται ζην ατταντ^ς, πολιτικον φιλοσοφον
άπολαυστικόν . τούτων γαρ 6 μβν φιλόσοφος 3
βούλ^ται TTcpi φρόνησιν et^at και την θ^ωριαν την
TTepi την άληθβιαν, ό 8e πολιτικός π€ρι τάς πράζ^ις
τάς καλάς {αύται δ' eloiv αΐ άπο της άρβτης), 6
ό Ο απολαυστικός π€ρι τάς η^ονάς τάς σωματικάς .
δίόττερ eVepos"' eTcpov* ζύ^αίμονα προσαγορβύβι, 4
καθάπβρ βλβχθη και πρότ€ρον, και^ ^Αναξαγόρας
μβν 6 ]ίλαζομ€νιος βρωτηθβΐς τις ό €ύ^αιμον€στατος ,
ούθβίς " €Ϊπ€ν " ών συ νομίζζΐς, αλλ άτοπος αν
τις σοι φανβίη." τούτον δ άπβκρινατο τον τρόπον
10 €Κ€Ϊνος όρων τον €ρόμ€νον αδύνατοι^ ύπολαμβάνοντα
μη μβγαν οντά και καλόν η πλούσιον ταύτης
τνγχάν€ΐν της προσηγορίας, αυτός δ ίσως ώετο
τον ζώντα άλύπως και καθαρώς προς το Βικαιον
η τίνος θεωρίας κοινωνοΰντα θ^ίας, τούτον ως
άνθρωπον βιπ€Ϊν^ μακάριον eti^ai.
15 V. TLepi πολλών μ€ν οΰν και έτερων ου paSiov 1
^ Sol. : irpbs ayopat μέν.
^ Sp. : έπ έξονσίαί : etr' ίξουσίαΐ <6»'Tes> τυ-γχάνοντεί ? Rac,
* irepoi add. Ras. * irepov Rac, : ^repov τόν.
* και add. ? Sus. ' eiireh <5e(»'> ? Ric.
« See 1214 a 30-b 5.
* Perhaps the Greek should be emended to give ' those
who happen to be in power.'
* i.e. active citizenship : ' statesmanship ' is too lofty a
term.
208
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. iv. 2— v. 1
concerned with market purchase and retail selling) ;
but on the other hand, the things related to the happy
conduct of life being three, the things already men-
tioned'* as the greatest possible goods for men —
gopdjiess, .wisdom and pleasure, we see that there are
also three ways of life in which those to whom: for-
,ΐίΐηε gives opportunity * invariably choose to live, the
life of politics,'' the life of philosophy, and the life
3 of enjoyment. Of these the philosophic life denotes
being concerned with the contemplation of truth, the
political life means being occupied with honourable
activities (and these are the activities that spring
from goodness), and the life of enjoyment is con-
4 cerned with the pleasures of the body. Owing to this,
different people give the name of happy to different
persons, as was said before too ; and Anaxagoras ^
of Clazomenae when asked ' Who is the happiest
man t ' said ' None of those whom you think, but
he would seem to you an odd sort of person.' But
Anaxagoras answered in that way because he saw
that the man who put the question supposed it to
be impossible to receive the appellation ' happy '
without being great and beautiml or rich, whereas
he himself perhaps thought that the person who
humanly speaking enjoys bliss is he that lives by the
standard of justice without pain and in purity, or
participates in some form of divine contemplation.*
1 V. While there are many different things as to Various
opinions
" The physical philosopher, 500-428 b.c, born at Clazo- ^^*^,"*^''
menae in Ionia, taught at Athens.
« i.e. the man who displays the virtues of Temperance,
Justice and Wisdom (the fourth cardinal virtue, Courage, is
omitted), enhanced by pleasure or freedom from pain. This
passage illustrates how Aristotle prepared the way for the
hedonism of Epicurus.
Ρ 209
ARISTOTLE
1215 b , ^ ^ , ^ X r - «-
TO κρΐναι καλώς, μάλιστα Be TTcpi o5 ττασι ραστον
€?ναι δο/cet καΐ τταντος ανθρώπου το ^νώναι, τι
των iv τώ ζην alperov, καΐ λαβών αν τι? εχοι
πλήρη την έπιθνμίαν. πολλά γάρ εστί τοιαύτα
τών άποβαινόντων δι' ά προΐ^νται το ζην, οίον
20 νόσους π^ριω^υνίας χ€ΐμώνας• ώστ€ Βηλον οτι
καν εζ άρχης alpeTov ην, el τις αϊρεσιν εδιδου,
δια γ€ ταΰτα το μη γενέσθαι, προς δε τούτοι? ό^ 2
βίος δν ζώσιν έτι τταιδε? οι^τε?' καΐ γάρ €πΙ τούτον
άνακάμφαι πάλιν ούδει? αν υπομείνειβν ευ φρονών.
20 ετι δε πολλά τών τε μη^εμίαν εχόντων ή^ονην η 3
λυπην, καΐ τών εχόντων μεν η^ονην μη καλην
δε, τοιαΰτ' εστίν ώστε το μη είναι κρεΐττον είναι
Toy ζην. όλως δ' ε'ί τι? άπαντα συναγαγοι όσα 4
πράττουσι μεν και πάσχουσιν άπαντες, εκόντες
μεντοι μηθεν αυτών δια το /χηδ' αυτού χάριν, και
30 προσθείη χρόνου πλήθος άπεραντόν τι, ου μάλλον
ενεκ αν τι? τούτων ελοιτο ζην η μη ζην. αλλά 5
μην ουδέ δια T17V της τροφής μόνον ηΒονην η την
τών αφροδισίων, άφαιρεθεισών τών άλλων η8ονών
άς το γινώσκειν η βλεπειν η τών άλλων τις
αισθήσεων πορίζει τοις άνθρώποις, οι)δ αν ει?
35 προτιμήσειε το ζην μη παντελώς ων άνδράττοδον,
Βήλον γάρ οτι τω ταύτην ποιουμενω την αιρεσιν
ούθεν αν Βιενεγκειε ■)/ενε'σ^αι θηρίον ή άνθρωπον
1216 a ο γοΰν εν ΑΙγύπτω βοΰς, δν ως Άπιν τιμώ)σιν, εν 6
πλείοσι τών τοιούτων εξουσιάζει πολλών μοναρχών.^
^ <Tis> ό . . . ; Cas. ^ Γ : μοναρχιών.
" C/. Soph. O.C. 1225 μη ψυναι τόν άπαντα viKqi λ070ΐ'.
210
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. v. 1-7
which it is not easy to make a right judgement, this
is especially the case with one about which every-
body thinks that it is very easy to judge and that any-
body can decide — the question which of the things
contained in being alive is preferable, and which when
attained would fully satisfy a man's desire. For
many of life's events are such that they cause men
to throw life away, for instance, diseases, excessive
pains, storms ; so that it is clear that on account of
these things any way it would actually be preferable,
if someone offered us the choice, not to be born at
2 all." And in addition, the kind of life that people
live while still children is not desirable — in fact no
sensible person could endure to go back to it again.
3 And further, many of the experiences that contain no
pleasure nor pain, and also of those that do contain
pleasure but pleasure of an ignoble kind, are such
that non-existence would be better than being alive.
4 And generally, if one collected together the whole
of the things that the whole of mankind do and ex-
perience yet do and experience unwillingly, because
not for the sake of the things themselves, and if one
added an infinite extent of time, these things would
not cause a man to choose to be alive rather than
5 not alive. But moreover, also the pleasure of food!
or of sex alone, with the other pleasures abstracted!
that knowledge or sight or any other of the senses !
provides for human beings, would not induce any- |
body to value life higher if he were not utterly ■
slavish, for it is clear that to one making this choice
there would be no difference between being born a
6 beast or a man ; at all events, the ox in Egypt, which
they reverence as Apis, has a greater abundance of
7 such indulgences than many monarchs. Nor like-
211
ARISTOTLE
1216 a
ομοίως 8e ovhk δια την του KadevSeiv YjSovrjV' τι 7
γαρ 8ιαφβρ€ΐ KaOevSeiv aveyeprov νττνον άπο τη?
πρώτης ημέρας μ^χρι της τελευταία? €τών αριθμόν
5 χιλίων η όποσωνονν ,^ η ζην οντά φυτόν; τά γονν
φυτά. τοιαύτης τινός eoiKe μζτ€χ€ΐν ζωής, ώσττ^ρ
και τά τταιδία* και γό,ρ ταύτα κατά την πρώτην
iv τη μητρί^ yiveaiv πζφυκότα μβν διατελεί
καθ^ύ^οντα δε τον ττάντα χρόνον. ώστ€ φαν^ρόν 8
εκ των τοιούτων οτι διαφεύγει σκοπούμενους τΊ
10 τό ευ και τι τό aya^oi' τό iv τω ζην.
Ύόν μ€ν οΰν ^Αναζαγόραν φασίν άποκρίνασθαι 9
προς τίνα Βιαποροΰντα τοιαΰτ* άττα και Βΐΐρωτώντα
τίνος evcK αν τις eXoiTo ■}/εΐ'ε'σ^αι μάλλον η μη
yeveadai " του " φάναι " θβωρησαι τόν ούρανόν
και την ττερι τόν δλον κόσμον τάζιν." οΰτος μ€ν
15 οΰν επιστήμης τινός €V€K€v την αιρεσιν ω€το
TtjLttW είναι τοΰ ζην οι δε ΈαρΒανάπαλλον 10
μακαρίζοντ€ς η Ί1μιν8υρί8ην τόν Έυβαρίτην η
των άλλων Tim? των ζώντων τόν άπολαυστικον
βίον, ούτοι δε πάντες iv τω γαίρ^ιν φαίνονται
τάττ€ΐν την €ύΒαιμονίαν• έτεροι δε' τινε? οΰτ αν 11
20 φρόνησιν ούΒ€μίαν οϋτ€ τάς σωματικός η^ονάς
ζλοιντο μάλλον η τά? πράζβις τα? απ αρετής•
αιροϋνται γοΰν ου μόνον evioi Βόζης χάριν αύτας
αλλά και μη μέλλοντας βύΒοκιμησζίν. αλλ' οι 12
ττολλοι των πολιτικών ουκ αληθώς τυγχάνουσι
^ ν. Ι. ^TU)f άρίθμων χίλιον αριθμόν τ) όττοσονονν : ΐτων χιλίων
il όποσωνονν? (exciso αριθμόν gloss, ad όττοσονονν erratum)
Rac. * μήτρφ V.
" See 1215 b 6 η.
* A mythical king of Assyria, proverbial for luxury, cf.
N.E. i., 1295 b 22.
212
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. v. 7-12
wise would anyone desire life for the pleasure of
sleep either ; for what is the difference between
slumbering without being awakened from the first
day till the last of a thousand or any number of years,
and living a vegetable existence ? any way plants seem
to participate in life of that kind ; and so do children
too, inasmuch as at their first procreation in the
mother, although alive, they stay asleep all the time.
8 So that it is clear from considerations of this sort
that the precise nature of well-being and of the good
in life escapes our investigation.
9 Now it is said that when somebody persisted in
putting various difficulties of this sort to Anaxagoras "
and went on asking for what object one should choose
to come into existence rather than not, he replied
by saying, ' For the sake of contemplating the
heavens and the whole order of the universe.'
Anaxagoras therefore thought that the alternative
of being alive was valuable for the sake of some kind
10 of knowledge ; but those who ascribe bliss to Sar-
danapallus ^ or Smindyrides of Sybaris " or some of
the others living the life of enjoyment, all appear for
11 their part to place happiness iti delight ; while a
different set would not choose either wisdom of any
kind or the bodily pleasures in preference to the actions
that spring from goodness : at all events, some people
choose those actions not only for the sake of reputa-<ii\)^Sf^0ff'^
tion but even when they are not going to get
12 any credit. But the majority of those engaged in
politics are not correctly designated * politicians,' for
" Greek colony in S. Italy. For SmindjTides, who
travelled with 1000 slaves in attendance, see Herod vi. 127,
Athenaeus, v. p. 273.
213
35
ARISTOTLE
1216 a
της ττροσηγορι,ας' ου γάρ elai πολιτικοί κατά τον
25 aXrjOeiav, ο μ€ν γάρ πολιτικός των καλών €στι
ττραξζων προαιρετικός αυτών χάριν, οι 8e πολλοί
χρημάτων και πλεονεξίας ένεκεν άπτονται του
ζην οϋτως.
E/C μεν οΰν τών ειρημενων φανερον δτι πάντες 13
επι τρεις βίους φερουσι την εύ^αιμονίαν , πολιτικον
φιλοσοφον άπολαυστικόν . τούτων δ' η μεν περί
30 τα σώματα και τάς απολαύσεις ηΒονη και τίς και
ποια τις γίνεται και δια. τίνων ουκ ά^ηλον, ώστ
ου τίνες εισΧ δει ζητεΐν ημάς^ αλλ' ει συντείνουσί
τι προς εύΒαιμονίαν η μη, και πώς συντείνουσί,
και ποτερον, ει 8εΐ προσάπτειν τω ζην καλώς'
η8ονάς τινας, ταύτας 8εΐ προσάπτειν η τούτων
μεν άλλον Tti^o, τρόπον ανάγκη κοινωνεΐν, ετεραι
ο εισίν at' rjSovai δι' ας ευλόγως οΐονται τον
εύΒαίμονα ζην ήΒεως και μη μόνον άλύπως.
Αλλά περί μεν τούτων ύστερον επισκεπτεον , ΐ4
περί ο αρετής και φρονησεως πρώτον θεωρησωμεν
την τε φύσιν αυτών εκατερου τίς εστί και πότερον
40 μόρια ταύτα της aya^Ty? ζωής εστίν*' αυτά η αΐ
1216 b πράξεις αϊ άπ αυτών, επεώη προσάπτουσιν αυτά
καν ει μη πάντες εις την εύ^αιμονίαν αλλ' ουν οΐ
λόγου άξιοι τών ανθρώπων πάντες.
Χωκράτης μεν οΰν ό πρεσβύτης ωετ είναι τέλος 15
το γινώσκειν την άρετην, και επεζητει τί εστίν η
5 hικaιoσύvη και τί η ανδρεία και εκαστον τών
^ Ft. : αύτά$. * Βζ. : κα\ά$.
' αί add. Rac. ■• Rac. : έστΙν ή.
" The Greek word is specially associated with sensual
pleasures.
" The promised discussion does not occur, but see N.E.
vii„ 1153 b 7-25.
314
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. v. 12-15
they are not truly political, since the political man is
one who purposely chooses noble actions for their own
sake, whereas the majority embrace that mode of life
for the sake of money and gain.
13 What has been said, therefore, demonstrates that f'^?°P^,
all men ascribe happiness to three modes of life — the threetypi-
political, the philosophic, and the life of enjoyment." "*' ^'^'^^•
Among these, the nature and quality of the pleasure
connected with the body and Avith enjoyment, and
the means that procure it, are not hard to see ;
so that it is not necessary for us to inquire what these
pleasures are, but whether they conduce at all to
happiness or not, and how they so conduce, and, if it
^^ (be the case that the noble life ought to have some
pleasures attached to it, whether these are the pleas-
ures that ought to be attached, or whether these
must be enjoyed in some other way, whereas the
pleasures which people reasonably believe to make
^. ithe happy man's life pleasant and not merely pain-
■ "^ less are diiferent ones.
14 But these matters must be examined later. ^ Let Eihicsa i
us first consider Goodness and Wisdom ^ — what subject /
the nature of each is, and also whether they them-
selves or the actions that spring from them are
parts of the good life, since that they are connected
with happiness is asserted, if not by everybody,
at all events by all of mankind who are worthy of
consideration.
15 Accordingly Socrates the senior ^ thought that the
End is to get to know virtue, and he pursued an
Inquiry into the nature of justice and courage and
" See 1214 a 33 note ; but practical wisdom is specially
implied here.
•* Gf. 1235 a 37. A younger Socrates was a pupil of Plato.
215
ARISTOTLE
121β b
μορίων αντης. enoUi 8e^ ταυτ' ευλόγως' βττιστημας
γαρ ωετ' etvaL πάσας τάς άρ€τάς, ώσθ α^α
σνμβαίν€ίν ei8eVat re την SiKaLoavvrjV και eivat
δίκαιον a/ia yap μ^μαθ-ηκαμεν την γεωμ^τριαν
καΐ οΙκοΒομίαν καΐ εσμεν οικοδόμοι και γβωμετραΐ'
10 διοττερ εζι^τει τι iartv άρετη αλλ ου ττώ? yiverat
και €κ τίνων, τοΰτο δε em /xei' των εττι,στημών 16
σνμβαΙν€ί των θεωρητικών, ούθεν γαρ έτερον
τελος'^ εστί της αστρολογίας ονΒε της ττερί φύ-
σεως επιστήμης ονΒε γεωμετρίας πλην το γνωρισαι
και θεωρησαι την φύσιν των πραγμάτων των
15 υποκείμενων ται? επιστημαις [ου μην άλλα ίίατα
σνμβεβηκος ονθέν κωλύει προς πολλά των avay-
](αίων eti^ai χρησίμους αύτάς ημΐν), των δε Π
ποιητικών επιστημών έτερον το τέλος της επι-
στήμης και γνώσεως, οίον uyteta μεν ιατρικής,
ευνομία 8ε η τι τοιονθ^ έτερον της πολιτικής,
καλόν μεν οΰν και το γνωρίζειν εκαστον τών 18
■20 καλών, ου μην άλλα περί y'^ άρετης ου το ειδει^αι
τιμιώτατον τί eoTtl•" άλλα το γινώσκειν εκ τίνων
εστίν, ου γάρ εΐ^εναι βουλόμεθα τί εστίν άνΒρεία
άλλ' eti^at άν8ρεΐοι, ούδε τί εστί δικαιοσύνη άλλ
ttvai δίκαιοι, καθάπερ και uytatVeti^ μα?<λον η
γινώσκειν τί εστί το uyiatVetl•" και εδ εχειν την
25 ^^*•^ μάλλον η γινώσκειν τί εστί το ευ εχειν.
^ Fr. : yap. ^ rdXos add. Cas.
* Ric. : ye wepi.
" The Greek term primarily denotes biology, rather than
physics in the modern sense (with which contrast the modern
216
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. v. 15-18
each of the divisions of virtue. And this was a
reasonable procedure, since he thought that all the
virtues are forms of knowledge, so that knowing
justice and being just must go together, for as soonl ν
as we have learnt geometry and architecture, we>"
are architects and geometricians ; owing to which
he used to inquire what virtue is, but not how and
16 from what sources it is produced. But although this
does happen in the case of the theoretical sciences, \ i-j, — ψ
inasmuch as astronomy and natural science ** and .' V
geometry have no other End except to get to know
and to contemplate the nature of the things that are
the subjects of the sciences (although it is true that
they may quite possibly be \iseful to us accidentally
17 for many of our necessary requirements), yet the
End of the productive sciences is something different
from science and knowledge, for example the End
of medicine is health and that of political science
ordered government, or something of that sort,
different from mere knowledge of the science.
18 Although, therefore, it is fine even to attain a know-
ledge of the various fine things, all the same neverthe-
less in the case of goodness it is not the knowledge of
its essential nature that is most valuable but the
ascertainment of the sources that produce it. For
our aim is not to know what courage is but to be
courageous, 'not to know what justice is but to be
just, in the same way as we want to be healthy rather
than to ascertain what health is, and to be in good
condition of body rather than to ascertain what good
bodily condition is.
limitation of the term 'physiology,' and of 'physic' in the
sense of medicine) ; accordingly it does not here include
astronomy.
217
ARISTOTLE
1216 b / , X / /
VI. IleLpaTeov Se Trepl τούτων πάντων^ ζ'ητ€Ϊν 1
την ττίστιν δια των Χόγων, μαρτυρίοίς καΐ τταρα-
^^ίγμασί χρώμ€νον τοις φαινομβνοις. κράτιστον
μβν γαρ ττάντα? άνθρώττονς φαίνβσθαι συνάμα -
λογοΰντας τοις ρηθησομβνοις, el 8e μη, τρόπον
30 ye TLva ττάντας.^ oirep μζταβίβαζόμβνοι ποιησονσίν
€χ6ΐ γαρ έκαστος οΙκβΖόν τι προς την άλήθβιαν,
€ζ ών άναγκαΐον heLKvvvaL πως π^ρΐ αυτών e/c
γαρ των αληθώς μβν λεγομένων ου σαφώς Se
προΐοΰσιν έ'σται και το σαφώς, μ^ταλαμβάνουσιν
ael τά γνωριμώτ€ρα τών^ ^Ιωθότων Aeyea^at
35 συγκεγυμίνως . Βιαφβρουσι δ οι λόγοι π€ρι 2
€κάστην μίθο^ον οΐ τ€ φιλοσόφως λ^γόμβνοι καΐ οι
μη φίλοσόφως• διόττερ και τώ πολιτικώ* ου χρη
νομίζ€ΐν πζρίεργον efrai την τοιαύτην θβωρίαν δι
■^ς ου μόνον το τι φαν^ρόν αλλά και το δια τι•
φιλόσοφον γαρ το τοιούτο π€ρΙ ίκάστην μέθο^ον.
40 heiTai μίντοι τοϋτο πολλής εύλαβζίας. €ΐσι γάρ 3
1217 a τιν€ς οΐ δια το hoKelv φιλοσόφου elvai το μηθ^ν
€ΐκη λβγβιν άλλα jnera λόγου πολλάκις λανθάνουσι
λ€γοντ€ς αλλότριους λόγους της πραγματείας και
κενούς [τοΰτο hk ποιοΰσιν ότ€ μεν δι αγι^οιαν ore 4
δε δι' άλαζονείαν), ύφ^ ών άλίσκβσθαι συμβαίνει
και τους έμπειρους και δυνάμενους πραττειν ύπο
5 τούτων τών μητ εχόντων μήτε Βυναμενων διανΌΐαι/
άρχιτεκτονικην η πρακτικην, πάσχουσι δε τοΰτο 5
^ πάντα (vel 27 χρωμ^ΐΌν$) Sp. * Vic. : ττάντωί.
* <άΐ'τί> των ? Ric. * Ric. : τών πολιτικών.
« Or perhaps ' led on step by step.'
* i.e. practical men often think that any string of arguments ^
constitutes philosophy, though the arguers may be mere j
charlatans.
218
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. vi. 1-5
1 VI. And about all these matters the endeavour The method
must be made to seek to convince by means oftoobsirvj^
rational arguments, using observed facts as evi- ^^^cts and
dences and examples. For the best thing would be their ^'^
if all mankind were seen to be in agreement with the reasons.
views that will be stated, but failing that, at any
rate that all should agree in some way. And this
they will do if led to change their ground,** for every-
one has something relative to contribute to the
truth, and we must start from this to give a sort
of proof about our views ; for from statements that
are true but not clearly expressed, as we advance,
clearness will also be attained, if at every stage we
adopt more scientific positions in exchange for the
2 customary confused statements. And in every in-
vestigation arguments stated in philosophical form
are different from those that are non-philosophical ;
hence we must not think that theoretical study of
such a sort as to make manifest not only the nature
of a thing but also its cause is superfluous even for
the political student, since that is the philosophic pro-
cedure in every field of inquiry. Nevertheless this
3 requires much caution. For because to say nothing
at random but use reasoned argument seems to
mark a philosopher, some people often without being
detected advance arguments that are not germane
to the subject under treatment and that have nothing
4 in them (and they do this sometimes through ignor-
ance and sometimes from charlatanry), which bring
it about that even men of experience and practical
capacity are taken in by these people, who neither
possess nor are capable of constructive or practical
5 thought.^ And this befalls them owing to lack of
219
ARISTOTLE
1217 a ^ ^ ^ ^ , / , V ./
δι' άπαώζυσίαν άτταιδευσια γαρ εστί ττβρι €καστον
ττραγμα το μη hvvaaOaL κρίναν τους τ' οικείου?
λόγους του πράγματος καΐ τους αλλότριους.
10 καλώ? δ' €χ€ΐ καΐ το χωρίς κρίν€ΐν τον της αίτιας 6
λόγον καΐ το Ββικνυμενον, δια re το ρηθέν αρτιως,
ΟΤΙ 7τροσ€χ€ΐν ου het ττάντα τοΓ? δια των λόγων
άλλα τΓολλάκι? μάλλον τοις φαίνομίνοις {νΰν δ
όττότ' αν λύ€ίν μη βχωσυν αναγκάζονται τηστ€υ€ΐν
15 τοις €ΐρημ€νοις) , καΐ διότι ττολλακι? το^ υττο του
λόγου δεδεΐχθαι δοκούν αληθές μβν cotlv ου μβντοι
δια ταύτην την αίτίαν δι' ην φησιν ό λόγος, εστί
γαρ δια φβύΒους αληθές δεΐ^αι• δηλον δ' eV των
αναλυτικών .
VII. ΙΙξπροοιμιασμβνων δε και τούτων, λίγωμ^ν 1
άρζάμ€νοι πρώτον απο τών πρώτων, ωσπ€ρ
20 €Ϊρηται, ου σαφώς λ^γομ^νων , ζητοΰντ€ς έττειτα'
σαφώς eipelv τι βστιν τ^ ευδαιμονία, ομολογείται 2
δ')7 μεγιστον eit'ai και άριστον τοϋτο τών aya^cul•'
Tcur ανθρωπίνων (ανθρώπινον he λεγομεν οτι ταχ
αν ε'ίη και βελτίονός τίνος άλλου τών όντων
ευδαιμονία, οίον θεοΰ) • τών* γαρ άλλων ζωών, οσα 3
25 χείρω την φύσιν τών ανθρώπων εστίν, ούθέν
κοινωνεί ταύτης της προσηγορίας• ου γάρ εστίν
ευδαίμων ίππος οΰδ' όρνις ουδ' ιχθύς ούδ άλλο
τών όντων ούθέν ο μη κατά την επωνυμιαν εν
τη φύσει )Μ€Τ6χ€ΐ θείου τιΐ'ό?, άλλα κατ' άλλτ^ν
^ Rac. : τό μέν, * πρώτων <τών> ? Ric.
' ίττειτα Ras. : ίπΐ τό {<.irpoi4vai> eVt ro ? Ric).
* Rac. : ruv μ^ν.
" § 1 above.
" i.e. a proposition that logically follows from premisses
220
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. vi. 5— vii. 3
education-^for in respect of each subject inability
to distinguish arguments germane to the subject
6 from those foreign to it is lack of education. And
it is also well to judge separately the statement of
the cause and the demonstrated fact, both for the
reason stated just now," that it is not proper in
regard to all things to attend to theoretical argu-
ments, but often rather to the facts of observation
(whereas now when men are unable to refute an
argument they are forced to believe what has been
said), and also because often, although the result
that seems to have been proved by the arguments is
true, it is not true because of the cause asserted in
the argument. For it is possible to prove truth by
falsehood, as is clear from Analytics.^
1 VTI. These prefatory remarks having also been Happiness
made, let us proceed by starting first from the first good^attakT-
statements, which, as has been said,*' are not clearly ^^e by
expressed, afterwards seeking to discover clearly
2 the essential nature of happiness. Now it is agreed
that happiness is the greatest and best of human
goods (and we say ' human ' because there might
very likely also be a happiness belonging to some
3 higher being, for instance a god) ; since none of the
other animals, which are inferior in nature to men,
share in the designation ' happy,' for a horse is not
happy, nor is a bird nor a fish nor any other existing
thing whose designation does not indicate that it
possesses in its nature a share of something divine,
but it is by some other mode of participating in things
that are false may be a true one : see Anal. Pr. ii., 53 b 26 if..
Anal. Post, i., 88 a 20 if. Aristotle's simplest example is
the syllogism ' A man is a stone, but a stone is an animal,
therefore a man is an animal.'
" 1216 b32 ff.
221
ARISTOTLE
1217 a,^,^
Tiva των aya^cul•" μ^τοχην το μ€ν β4λτίον ζγι το
δβ χ€Ϊρον αυτώΐ'.
30 'Αλλ' OTL τούτον €χ€ΐ τον τρόπον ύστερον 4
επίσκ€πτ€ον. νυν 8e Χέγωμ^ν^ οτι των aya^oir
τα. μβν iariv άνθρώπω πρακτά τά δ' ου πρακτα.
τοΰτο δε Χεγομ€ν οΰτω διότι evia των όντων ούθεν
μ€Τ€χ€ί κινήσεως, ωστ ουδέ των^ ayaQdv, koj?
ταΰτ' Ισως άριστα την φύσιν εστίν, eVia δε ττρακτα
3/) μεν, άλλα πρακτα κρείττοσιν ημών. επειδή δε 5
Βιχώς λέγεται το πρακτόν [και γαρ ων ένεκα
ττράττομεν και α τούτων ένεκα /χετε'χει πράζεως,
οίον και την υγιειαν και τον πλοΰτον τίθεμεν των
πρακτών και τά τούτων πραττόμενα χάριν, τα
^' ύytεt^'ά και τά χρηματιστικά) , SijXov οτι και
40 την εύ8αιμονίαν των άνθρώπω πρακτών άριστον
θετεον.
1217 b VIII. Έκεπτεον τοίνυν τι το άριστον και ποσαχώς 1
λεyεται/ εν τρισι δη μάλιστα φαίνεται δό^αι?
ειΐ'αι τοΰτο. ^ασι yap άριστον μεν είναι πάντων
αυτό το dya^ov, αυτό δ' εΓν'αι το o.ya^oi' ω υπάρχει
5 τό τε πρώτω είναι τών αγαθών και το αίτιω τη
παρουσία τοις άλλοις του άγαθοΐς^ είναι• ταύτα δ' ^
ύπάρχειν^ αμφότερα τη ιδε'α τοΰ άγαθοΰ {λέγω δε
αμφότερα το τε πρώτον τών aya^cov και το τοΓ?
άλλοι? αίτιον dya^ois• τη παρουσία τοΰ αγαθοΐς
^ vulg. \^•/ομβν. * τώ»» Κ,πρακτών^ ? Ric.
' ίίθ(<τοι> ? Ric. * Rac. : Xeyerai ττοσαχώ^.
® Vic. : ά-γαθά. • Fr. : virapxei.
" This promise is not kept.
*" Ίδια is here used in its Platonic sense, as a synonym for
elSos, class-form, to denote the permanent immaterial reality
that underlies any group of things classed together in virtue
of possessing a common quality. An ίδ^α is jjcrceptible
i22
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. vii. 3— viii. 2
good that one of them has a bettei• Hfe and another
a worse.
4 But the fact that this is so must be considered
later.* At the present let us say that among things
good some are within the range of action for a human
being and others are not. And we make this dis-
tinction for the reason that some existing things do
not participate in change at all, and therefore some
good things do not, and these are perhaps in their
nature the best things ; and some things, though
practicable, are only practicable for beings superior
5 to us. And inasmuch as ' practicable ' has two
meanings (for both the Ends for which we act and the
actions that we do as m^eans to those Ends have to
do with action — for example we class among things
practicable both health and wealth and the pursuits
that are followed for the sake of health and wealth,
healthy exercise and lucrative business), it is clear
that happiness must be set down as the best of the
things practicable for a human being.
1 VIII. We must consider, therefore, what the best piato's
is, and in how many senses the term is used. The of q^^'j
answer seems to be principally contained in three refuted.
views. For it is said that the best of all things is the
Absolute Good, and that the Absolute Good is that
which has the attributes of being the first of goods and
of being by its presence the cause to the other goods of
2 their being good ; and both of these attributes, it is
said, belong to the Form'' of good (I mean both being
the first of goods and being by its presence the cause to
the other goods of their being good), since it is of that
only by the mind, but the word does not denote the content
of a mental perception, as does the derivative ' idea ' in
ordinary English.
223
ARISTOTLE
1217 b
eivai)• μάλιστα re γαρ τάγαθον XeyeaOaL κατ
10 €Κ€ίνης αληθώς {κατά μ€τογΎ]ν γάρ καΐ ομοιότητα
τάλλα αγαθά εκείνης βΐναή, καΐ ττρώτον των
ά)/α^ώΐ', αναιρουμένου γάρ του μετεχομενου άν-
αιρβΐσθαι και τά μετέχοντα της ί8εας (ά λέγεται
τω jLtexe^etr εκείνης), το δε πρώτον^ τούτον εχειν 3
τον τρόπον προς το ύστερον ώστ eti^at αυτό το
15 αγαθόν την ιδεαν» του άγαθοΰ' και γάρ χωριστην
ett'ttt των μετεχόντων, ώσπερ και τάς άλλα? Ι^εας.
' Εστί μεν ουν το Βιασκοπεΐν περί ταύτης της 4
8όζης ετέρας τε διατριβής και τά πολλά λογικω-
τερας εζ ανάγκης• οΐ γάρ άμα αναιρετικοί τε και
κοινοί λόγοι κατ* ούΒεμίαν είσιν άλλην επιστήμην.
20 61 δε δει συντόμως ειπείν περί αυτών, λεγομεν^ 5
ΟΤΙ πρώτον μεν το eirat ιδεαι^ μη μόνον άγαθοΰ
άλλα και άλλου ότονοΰν λέγεται λογικώς και
κενώς {επεσκεπται δε πολΧοΐς περί αύτοϋ τρόποις
και εν τοις εζωτερικοις λόγοις και εν τοις κατά
φιλοσοφίαν)• εττειτ' ει και οτι /χάλιστ' είσιν at 6
25 ιδε'αι και άγαθοΰ ιδε'α, μη ποτ* ούδε χρήσιμος
προς ζωην άγαθην ουδέ προς τάς πράζεις.
Πολλαχώ? γάρ λέγεται καΐ ίσαχώς τω οντι το 7
aya^ov. τό τε γάρ 6ν, ώσπερ εν άλλοι? ^ιηρηται,
σΐ7/Ααινει τό μεν τι εστί το δε ποιόν τό δε ποσόν
τό δε ττότε και προς τούτοις τό μεν εν τω
30 κινεΐσθαι τό δε εν τω κινεΐν και τό άγαθόι/ εν
εκάστη τών πτώσεων εστί τούτων, εν ουσία μεν
^ ττρύτΐρον Sp. ^ Χ^-^ωμβν ? Rac.
" The use of this phrase by Aristotle elsewhere seems to
show that it denotes doctrines, recorded in books or familiar
invdebate, that were not peculiar to the Peripatetic school.
224.
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 2-7
Form that goodness is most truly predicated (inas-
much as the other goods are good by participation
in and resemblance to the Form of good) and also
it is the first of goods, for the destruction of that
which is participated in involves the destruction of
the things participating in the Form (which get
3 their designation by participating in it), and that is
the relation existing between what is primary and
what is subsequent ; so that the Form of good is
the Absolute Good, inasmuch as the Form of good
is separable from the things that participate in it,
as are the other Porms also.
4 Now a thorough examination of this opinion belongs a. The idea
to another course of study, and one that for the most does not
part necessarily lies more in the field of Loeic, for «"'^t,
that is the only science dealing with arguments that
5 are at the same time destructive and general. But
if we are to speak about it concisely, we say that in
the first place to assert the existence of a Form not
only of good but of anything else is an expression of
logic and a mere abstraction (but this has been con-
sidered in various ways both in extraneous discourses **
6 and in those on philosophical lines) ; next, even
granting that Forms and the Form of good exist in the
fullest sense, surely this is of no practical value for
the good life or for conduct.
7 For ' good ' has many senses, in fact as many as i. 'good'
' being.' For the term ' is,' as it has been analysed in several' '^^
other works, signifies now substance, now quality, now categories ;
quantity, now time, and in addition to these meanings
it consists now in undergoing change and now in caus-
ing it ; and the good is found in each of these cases ^ —
* i.e. categories. The last two specified are elsewhere
designated Kiveiv and κιν€Ϊσθαι, Action and Passion.
Q 225
ARISTOTLE
1217 b
ό νους και 6 deos, iv 8e τω ττοιω το Βικαιον, ev
8e τω ττοσω το μετρίον, iv 8e τω πότβ ό καιρός,
το δε ^ώάσκον καΐ το Βώασκόμ€νον rrepl κίνησιν.
ώστΓ€ρ οΰν ovSe το ον ev τι εστί Trepl^ τα. είρημβνα, 8
35 όντως ovSe το aya^ov, ovSe €7Τίστημη εστί ju.ia
οντ€ τον οντος οντ€ τον αγαθόν, αλλ' ουδέ τα
όμοίοσχημόνως λ€γόμ€να αγαθά /χια? εστί θβωρησαι,
οίον τον καιρόν η το μ4τριον, αλλ' έτερα eTepov
καιρόν Oewpei και έτερα eTepov μάτριον, οίον nepl
τροφην μev τον καιρόν και το μ€τριον ιατρική και
40 γνμναστικη, Trepi δε τάς πολ€μικας 7τράζ€ΐς
στρατηγία, και όντως έτερα ττερι ίτίραν ιτραζιν,
1218 a ώστε σχολί^ αντό ye το aya^oi^ θeωpησaι ρ,ια?.
"Έιτι ev οσοις υττάρχει το rrpoTepov και ύστερον, 9
ονκ εστί κοινον τι παρά ταντα και τοντο^ χωριστόν
ειι^ y'^P <^*^ '^'' '^^^ ττρώτον πρότ€ρον, npoTepov γαρ 10
5 το /cotrov /cat χωριστόν δια το άναιρονμ4νον τον
κοινον avaipelaOai το ττρώτον. οΐον ει το διττλάσιον
•πρώτον τών πολλαπλασίων, ονκ evhe^eTai το
πολλαπλάσιον το Koivfj κaτηγopovμevov ειΐ'αι
χωριστόν εσται γαρ τον Βιπλασίον πpότepov^ ει
σvμβaίveL το κοινον είναι την ιδε'αν, οίον ει
χωριστόν πoιησeι€ τις το κοινον ει ycip εστί
10 δικαιοσιίνι^ aya^ov και ανδρεία, έ'στι τοίνυν, φασίν,
αντό τι aya^ov το ονν αυτό πρόσκζίται προς τον 11
λόγον τον κοινον. τοΰτο δε τι αν eϊη πλην ότι
άι'διον και χωριστόν ; αλλ' ούδεν ρ,αλλον λevκόv
τταρά Vic. * τούτων Sp.
' lacunam hie Sus.
226
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 7-11
in essence, as mind and God, in quality justice, in
quantity moderation, in time opportunity, and as
instances of change, the teacher and the taught.
8 Therefore,] ust as being is not some one thing in respect
of the categories mentioned, so neither is the good, and
there is no one science either of the real or of the good.
But also even the goods predicated in the same u. even in
category, for example opportunity or moderation, do ftTfg'th^e^"'^^
not fall within the province of a single science to study, subject of
but different sorts of opportunity and of moderation ββΓβ'ηοββ ;
are studied by different sciences, for instance oppor-
tunity and moderation in respect of food are studied
by medicine and gymnastics, in respect of military
operations by strategics, and similarly in respect of
another pursuit by another science ; so that it can
hardly be the case that the Absolute Good is the
subject of only one science.
9 Again, wherever there is a sequence of factors, a prior iii. aseries
and a subsequent, there is not some common element ^^^;^°°
0 beside these factors and that element separable ; for separately
then there would be something prior to the first in ^^^^ '"^ '
the series, for the common and separable term would
be prior because when the common element was de-
stroyed the first factor Avould be destroyed. For ex-
ample, if double is the first of the multiples, the
multiplicity predicated of them in common cannot
exist as a separable thing, for then it will be prior to
double, if it is the case that the common element is
the Form, as it would be if one were to make the
common element sepai-able : for if justice is a good,
and courage, there is then, they say, a Good-in-itself,
1 so the term ' in itself ' is added to the common defini-
tion. But what could this denote except that the
good is eternal and separable ? Yet a thing that is
227
ARISTOTLE
1218 a ^ Ν , , ^ ^ , f /
TO ττοΧλας ημέρας XevKov rod /Ltiav rj^epav ωστ'
ovSe (to ά)/αθόι^ μάλλον αγαθόν τω aiSiov elvai•
15 oi5Se>^ Srj TO kolvov aya^ol•» ταύτό ttj ιδέα* ττάσι
γαρ νπάρχ€ί κοινόν.
Άνάτταλιν δε και SeiKTeov η ώς νυν SeiKvvovaL ]
το αγαθόν αυτό. νυν μεν γαρ €Κ των μη'^ ομο-
λογουμένων εχειν το αγαθόν, e^ εκείνων τα
όμολογούμενα είναι αγαθά Βεικνύουσίν οΐον^ εζ
αριθμών οτι η δικαιοσύνη και ή uyteta αγαθόν,
τάζεις γαρ και αριθμοί, ώς τοις άριθμοΐς και
20 ταΐς μονάσιν aya^or υπάρχον δια το είναι το εν
αυτό τάγαθόν.*^ δει δ' εκ των όμολογουμενων οίον ]
i5yieta§• ισ-χύος σωφροσύνης οτι και εν τοις άκινή-
τοις μάλλον το καλόν ττάντα γάρ τάδε τάζις και
■ηρεμία• ει άρα, εκείνα μάλλον, εκείνοις γάρ υπ-
άρχει ταύτα μδίλλον. — παράβολος δε και η από- 1
25 δει^ι? οτι το εν αύτο το αγαθόν ότι οι αριθμοί
εφίενται αύτοΰ^• οϋτε γάρ ώς εφίενται λεγουσι^
φανερώς άλλα λι'αι^ απλώς τοϋτό φασι, και ορεζιν
είναι πώς αν τις ύπολάβοι εν οΐς ζωη μη υπάρχει;
δει δε ττερι τούτου πραγματευθηναι, και μη άζιοΰν 1
μηθεν άλόγως ο' και μετά λόγου πιστεΰσαι ου
30 ρά8ιον. — τό τε φάναι πάντα τά όντα εφίεσθαι ενός
τίνος άγαθοΰ ουκ αληθές' εκαστον γάρ ίδιου αγαθού
ορέγεται, οφθαλμός οφεως, σώμα ύyιειαs■, οϋτως
άλλο άλλου.
^ <τό ά7α^ό»' . . . οΰδβ> Ras,
* μη add. Zeller, ^ οϊον add. Ilac.
* Fr. : άΎαθόν.
* αυτοί' add. ? Ric. (supra post dirt Fr.).
' Sp. : \iyovTa.i. ' Sp. ζ Λ.
" The words rendered ' the good is . . . eternal' are a con-
jectural insertion.
228
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 11-15
white for many days is no more white than a thing Ι,^ρ-ρ^*^™'*'^
that is white for one day, so that the good is no more afiect
good by being eternal « ; nor yet therefore is the 1"»''^^ :
common good the same as the Form, for it is the
common property of all the goods.
2 Also the proper method of proving the Absolute v. general
Good is the contrary of the method now adopted. At p,.ovVd from
present it is from things not admitted to possess ^^H^!^}^^^^'
goodness that they prove the things admitted to be versa-,
good, for instance, they prove from numbers that
justice and health are good, because they are arrange-
ments and numbers — on the assumption that good-
ness is a property of numbers and monads because
3 the Absolute Good is unity. But the proper method
is to start from things admitted to be good, for in-
stance health, strength, sobriety of mind, and prove
that beauty is present even more in the unchanging ;
for all these admitted goods consist in order and rest,
and therefore, if that is so, the things unchanging are
good in an even greater degree, for they possess order
4 and rest in a greater degree. — And it is a hazardous vi. unity of
way of proving that the Absolute Good is unity to say „ηρ^νβ(ΐ,
that numbers aim at unity ; for it is not clearly stated
how they aim at it, but the expression is used in too
unq.ualified a manner ; and how can one suppose that
5 things not possessing life can have appetition ? One
ought to study this matter carefully, and not make
an unreasoned assumption about something as to
which it is not easy to attain certainty even with the
aid of reason. — And the statement that all existing vil. and not
things desire some one good is not true ; each thing ^-^^ '" ^*'^^•
seeks its own particular good, the eye sight, the
body health, and similarly another thing another
good.
229
ARISTOTLE
1218 a
"Ort μ€ν οΰν ουκ eariv αυτό tl^ αγαθόν, e^et 1
απορίας τοιαύτας, και οτι ου χρησιμον ttj πολιτικ-η,
35 αλλ' (,'διοΓ τι aya^ov, ωσπ€ρ και ταΓ? αλλαι?, οίον
γυμναστιΚΎ\ eve^ia.
^'Έιτι και το ev τω λόγω γβγραμμβνον η γαρ ]
ουδε/χια χρησιμον αυτό το του αγαθού ειδο? η
ττάσαις ομοίως.
"Ετι ου ττρακτόν.
Ομοίως δ' ουδέ το κοινον αγαθόν οντ€ αυτό' ]
1218 b aya^oi' eWiv (/cat γαρ αν μικρω ύττάρζαι άγαθω)
ούτ€ ττρακτόν• ου γαρ οττως ύττάρζζΐ το οτωοϋν υπ-
άρχον η ιατρική πραγματεύεται αλλ' όπως ύγι'εια,
ομοίως δε και των άλλων τεχνών εκάστη, άλλα 1
> 7Γθλλα;(α)$• τό aya^oi^, και έ'στι τι αύτου καλόν',''
και το μεν πρακτόν τό δ' ου πρακτόν. πρακτόν δε τό
τοιούτον aya^ov, τό oi5 ένεκα, ουκ έ'στι δε τό εν»
τοΓ? άκιντ^τοις•.
Φανερον OW* οτι οϋτε η ιδέα τάγαθοϋ τό
ζητούμενον αυτό τό aya^ol•» εστίν οϋτε τό κοινόν
(το /χεν yap άκίνητον και ου πρακτόν, τό δε κινητόν
10 ρ,εΓ αλλ ου πρακτόν). τό δ' ου ένεκα ώς τέλος
άριστον και αίτιον των ύφ* αυτό και πρώτον
πάντων ώστε τοΰτ αν ειη αυτό τό aya^oi', τό 2
τέλος τών άνθρώπω πρακτών. τοΰτο δ' εστί τό
υτΓΟ την κυρίαν πασών, αϋτη δ' εστί πολιτική και
οικονομική και φρόνησις• Βιαφερουσι γαρ αύται
15 αι ε^ει? 77ρό? τα? άλλα? τω τοιαΰται είΐ'αι {προς δ'
^ τό ? Rac. ' ίτι . . . πρακτόν seel. Wilson.
* αυτό τό ? Rac. * καΐ . . . κα\6ι> secl. Sus.
^ οΰν add. Brandis.
° This sentence reads like a mere note. The reference
seems to be to 1217 b 16-1218 a 32, especially 1217 a 19-25.
230
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 16-20
16 Such then are the difficulties indicating that b. The idea
the Absolute Good does not exist, — and that it is no practical
of no use for political science, but that this has a "»? i^. ^'' "^'"^
special good of its own, as have the other sciences '
also — for instance the good of gymnastics is good
bodily condition.
17 "* Further there is also what has been written in the
discourse : either the Class-form of the good is in
itself useful to no science, or it is useful to all alike.
Further it is not practicable.
18 And similarly the good as universal also is not an nor is the
Absolute Good (for universality might be an attribute f,n°verLi.
of even a small good), and also it is not practicable ;
for medical science does not study how to pro-
cure an attribute that belongs to anything, but how
to procure health, and similarly also each of the other
19 practical sciences. But ' good ' has many meanings,
and there is a part of it that is beautiful, and one
form of it is practicable but another is not. The sort
of good that is practicable is that which is an obj ect
aimed at, but the good in things unchangeable is not
practicable.
It is manifest, therefore, that the Absolute Good we For practice]
are looking for is not the Form of good, nor yet the Man's aim
ffood as universal, for the Form is unchangeable and ^"^^ '^J}^.
■ ■ Λ Λ 11 . 1 Till constitutes
impracticable, and the universal good though change- his Absolute
able is not practicable. But the object aimed at as ^°°''•
End is the chief good, and is the cause of the subordi-
20 nate goods and first of all ; so that the Absolute Good
would be this — the End of the goods practicable for
man. And this is the good that comes under the
supreme of all the practical sciences, which is Politics
and Economics and Wisdom ; for these states of
character differ from the others in the fact that they
231
ARISTOTLE
1218 b
άλΧηλας e'i τι ^ιαφ^ρουσιν varepov XeKTCov). on 21
δ' αίτιον το TeXos των νφ' αυτό δτ^λοΓ η διδασκαλία*
ορισάμενοι γαρ το τ€λος ταλλα SeiKvvovoLv otl
€καστον αυτών aya^oi', αϊτιον γαρ το οΰ evcKa•
οίον €Tr€L8ri το ύγιαίν^ιν τοδι, ανάγκη τοδι* eti^ai
20 το συμφέρον προς αύτην, το δ ύγίζίνον της ύγιβιας
αίτιον ώς κίνησαν, καίτοι^ του eii^at αλλ' ου του
αγαθόν elvai την uytetav. έτι oi)hk Ββίκνυσιν ούθζΐς 22
ΟΤΙ a.ya^oi' η uyieia {άν μη σοφιστής η και μη
ιατρός, ούτοι γαρ τοις αλλότριοι? λόyoιί σοφίζονται) ,
ώσττ€ρ οΰδ' άλλην άρχην ού^^μίαν.
25 Το δ ώς τέΧος^ αγαθόν άνθρώπω καΐ το άριστον
των ττρακτών σκ€7ττ€ον ττοσαχώς το άριστον πάν-
των,* €7T€iSrj τοΰτο άριστον, μετά ταΰτα άλλην
λαβοΰσιν άρχην .^
^ τοδί ? Sp. : τύδε.
^ καίτοι Ross: καΐ τύτε (και τόδε ? Ric).
^ τό δέ TeXos ώί vel ώί δε το τ4λοί Ric.
* ττάντων Κ.λέ'γΐταΙ'^ ? Rac.
* έπειδη . . . αρχήν secl. ? Rac. (μΐτά . . . αρχήν seel. Sus.).
« See 1141 b 21-1 142 a 11 (E.E. ν. = Λ^.£'. vi. viii. init.).
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 20-22
are supreme (whether they differ at all from one
!1 another must be discussed later on "). And that the
End stands in a causal relation to the means sub-
ordinate to it is shown by the method of teachers ;
they prove that the various means are each good by
first defining the End, because the End aimed at is
a cause : for example, since to be in health is so-and-
so, what contributes to health must necessarily be
so-and-so ; the wholesome is the efficient cause of
health, though only the cause of its existing — it is
12 not the cause of health's being a good. Furthermore
nobody proves that health is a good (unless he is a
sophist and not a physician — -it is sophists that
juggle with irrelevant arguments), any more than he
proves any other first principle.
After this we must take a fresh starting-point ^ and
consider, in regard to the good as End for man and
in regard to the best of practicable goods, how many
senses there are of the term ' best of all,' since this
is best.
" This clause and the last clause of the sentence render
words that look like an interpolation patched into the text
from the opening sentence of Book II.
233
1218 b
30 Ο
I. Μετά δε ταΰτ* αλλην λαβοΰσιν άρχην πβρί τών J
ίπομένων XcKreov.
Πάντα 817 τάγα^ά τ} €κτ6ς η iv^ Φ^ΧΤ]} '^^^^
τούτων αίρ£τώτ€ρα τά iv τ-fj φνχτ], καθάπβρ Si-
αιρούμβθα καΐ iv τοις €ζωτ€ρίκοΐς λόγοις. φρόνη-
35 σις γαρ καΐ άρ^τη καΐ η^ονη iv φνχτ], ων -η evta η
ττάντα τβλος etvai δοκει ττασιν. τών δε iv φνχτ]
τά μβν έ'^ει? η Βυνάμ€ΐς elaL, τά δ' ivipyeiai καΙ
κινήσεις.
Ταύτα Srj όντως ύποκβίσθω, και πβρι αρετής \
ΟΤΙ iaTiv η βέλτιστη διάθεσι? η ^ζις η δυι^α^υ-ΐ?
i2\9 Λ εκάστων όσων iστί τις χρησις η έργον. SrjXov δ'
εκ της iπaγωγης• εττι πάντων γαρ οϋτω τίθεμεν
οίον ιματίου αρετή εστίν, και γαρ έργον τι και
χρησίς εστίν, και ή βέλτιστη εζις του ιματίου
αρετή εστίν ομοίως δε και πλοίου και οικίας και
5 τών άλλων, ώστε και φυχής, εστί γάρ τι έργον
αύτης. και της βελτίονος Βή εζεως έστω βελτιον [
το έργον, και ως εχουσιν at εζεις προς άλλήλας,
οϋτω και τά έργα τά από τούτων προς άλληλα
εχετω. και τέλος εκάστου το έργον φανερον 4
^ iv add. Camot : ή <.iv σώματι ή ei'> Sus. (et infra αίρ^τώτατα
Rac).
234
BOOK II
1 I. After this Ave must take a fresh starting-point Ethical
and discuss the subjects that follow. (^^Ο^νΧΓγΙ
Now all goods are either external or within the ofHappiness
spirit, and of these two kinds the latter are prefer- from'fnnc-
able, as we class them even in the extraneous dis- **°'* °^ ™*°•
courses." For Wisdom and Goodness and Pleasure
are in the spirit, and either some or all of these are
thought by everybody to be an End. And the
contents of the spirit are in two groups, one states or
faculties, the other activities and processes.
2 Let these assumptions, then, be made, and let it be Goodness
assumed as to Goodness that it is the best disposition ^p®g^"foi?*'
or state or faculty of each class of things that have function
some use or work. This is clear from induction, for
we posit this in all cases : for instance, there is a
goodness that belongs to a coat, for a coat has a par-
ticular function and use, and the best state of a
coat is its goodness ; and similarly with a ship and
a house and the rest. So that the same is true also
3 of the spirit, for it has a work of its own. And there-
fore let us assume that the better the state is the
better is the work of that state, and that as states
stand in relation to one another so do the works
4 that result from them. And the work of each thing
« See note on 1217 b 23.
23.5
ARISTOTLE
1219 a
τοίνυν €Κ τούτων otl βίλτιον το βργον της βξεως'
10 το γαρ τέλος άριστον ώς τβλος, υπόκειται, γαρ
τέλος το βελτιστον καΐ το εσχατον ου ένεκα τάλλα
πάντα' δτι μεν τοίνυν το έργον βελτιον της εζεως
και της διαθέσεως, 8ηλον.
Αλλά το έργον λέγεται 8ιχώς' των μεν γάρ 5
εστίν έτερον τι το έργον πάρα την χρησιν, οΐον
οικοδομικής οικία αλλ' ουκ οικο^όμησις και Ια-
15 τρικης ύγίεια αλλ' ούχ ύγιαι^σι? οΰδ' ιάτρευσις ,
των δ' η χρησις έργον, οΐον οφεως δρασις και μαθη-
ματικής επιστήμης θεωρία, ωστ ανάγκη ων έργον
η χρησις την χρησιν βελτιον eivat της εζεως.
Ύούτων δε τούτον τον τρόπον Βιωρισμενων, 6
λεγομεν δτι το αύτο^ έργον του πράγματος και
20 της αρετής (αλλ' ούχ ωσαύτως), οΐον σκυτοτομικης
και σκυτεύσεως υπόδημα' ει Βή τις εστίν αρετή
σκυτική' και σπουδαίος σκυτεύς,^ το έργον εστί
σπου^αΐον ύπόΒημα• τον αυτόν δε τρόπον και επι
των άλλων.
Ετι έστω φυχής έργον το ζην ποιεΐν, τοΰτο* η
25 δε χρήσις και εγρήγορσις (ό γάρ ύπνος αργία τις
και ησυχία) • ωστ επεί το έργον ανάγκη εν καΐ
ταύτό είναι της φυχής και της αρετής, έργον αν
εΐη τής αρετής ζωή σπουδαία, τοΰτ αρ' ε'στι το
^ αυτό add. Rac, (ταύτό ante τό ίρ-γον Cas.).
* Rac. : σκ\τικΎΐ$. ^ Sp. : σιτου^αίου σκύτίωί.
* Wilsons τοΰ.
2S6
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. i. 4-7
is its End; from this, therefore, it is plain that the
work is a greater good than the state, for the End
is the best as being an End, since the greatest good
is assumed as an End and as the ultimate object for
the sake of which all the other things exist. It is
clear, therefore, that the work is a greater good than
the state and disposition.
But the term ' work ' has two meanings ; for (which is not
some things have a work that is something diiFerent ^productive
from the employment of them, for instance the work Process),
of architecture is a house, not the act of building,
that of medicine health, not the process of healing
or curing, whereas with other things their work
is the process of using them, for instance the work
of sight is the act of seeing, that of mathematical
science the contemplation of mathematical truths.
So it follows that with the things whose work is the
employment of them, the act of employing them must
be of more value than the state of possessing them.
And these points having been decided in this way,
we say that the same work belongs to a thing and to
its goodness (although not in the same way) : for
example, a shoe is the work of the art of shoemaking
and of the act of shoemaking ; so if there is such
a thing as shoemaking goodness and a good shoe-
maker, their work is a good shoe ; and in the same
way in the case of the other arts also.
Again, let us grant that the work of the spirit is to and its
cause life, and that being alive is employment and actioTcon-
beine awake (for sleep is a kind of inactivity and «titutes
X .ιΛ .1.• .1 1/• Happmeas.
rest) ; with the consequence that smce the work oi
the spirit and that of its goodness are necessarily
one and the same, the work of goodness would be
good life. Therefore this is the perfect good, which
237
ARISTOTLE
1219 a
reXeov αγαθόν , δπβρ ην η ^ύ^αιμονία. ^rjXov δε 8
e/c των ύποκ€ΐμ€νων {ην μέν γαρ η ^ν^αιμονία το
30 άριστον, τα 8e τβλη iv φνχη καΐ τα άριστα των
aya^col•', τα iv αντη^ δβ η βζις η €ν€ργ€ΐα), inel
βέΧτιον η €ν€ργ€ία της Βίαθ€σ€ως καΐ της ββλτίστης
€^€ω$• ή βέλτιστη eVepyeta η δ' άρβτη βέλτιστη
^ζ^^} την^ της αρετής ενεργειαν' της φνχης άριστον
etvai. ην δε καΐ η ευδαιμονία το άριστον εστίν 9
35 άρα η ευδαιμονία φυχής άγα^η?* ενέργεια, επει
δε ην η ευδαιμονία τελεόν τι, και εστί ζωη καΐ
τελεα και ατελής, και αρετή ώσαυτω? (τ^ μεν γαρ
ολη, η δε μόριον), ή δε των ατελών ενέργεια
άτελτ^9, ε'ίη άν ή ευδαιμονία ζωής τελείας ενέργεια
κατ' άρετήν τελείαν.
Οτι δε το γένος και τον δρον αυτής λεγομεν 10
40 καλώ?, μαρτύρια τα Βοκοΰντα πάσιν ήμΐν. τό τε
1219 b yap βΰ ττράττειν και το ευ ζην τό αυτό τω εν-
^αιμονεΐν, ων εκάτερον^ χρήσίς εστί και ενέργεια,
και ή ζωή και ή ττράξις• καΐ γαρ ή πρακτική
χρηστική εστίν, 6 μεν γαρ χαλκεύς ποιεΐ χαλινον
χρήται δ ο ιππικός. και τό μήτε μίαν ήμεραν
5 είμαι* εύΒαίμονα μήτε τταΓδα μήθ^ ήλικίαν πάσαν
(διό και τό Υίόλωνος έχει καλώς, τό μή ζώντ*
εύΒαιμονίζειν αλλ' όταν λά^τ^ τέλος)• ούθεν γαρ
ατελές• εϋ8αιμον, ου γαρ δλον. έτι δ' οί έπαινοι 11
^ τά eV avry Sus. : αύτη aut αντη.
* τψ add. ? Ric. ^ Βζ. : ivepyda ή aut ή,
* ά-γαθτι Sp.
* ΐκάτΐρον ? Kic. : ΐκαστον.
• ■ημέρα.ν <,€ϋδαίρί.ονα ποκΐν μήτ'> elvai Fr.
« Cf. 1218 b 7-12.
238
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. i. 8-11
8 as we saw is happiness. And it is clear from the
assumptions laid down (for we said that happiness is
the greatest good and that the Ends or the greatest
of goods are in the spirit, but things in the spirit
are either a state or an activity) that, since an ac-
tivity is a better thing than a disposition and the
best activity than the best state, and since goodness
is the best state, the activity of goodness is the
9 spirit's greatest good. But also we saw that the
greatest good is happiness. Therefore happiness
is the activity of a good spirit. And since we saw "
that happiness is something perfect, and life is
either perfect or imperfect, and the same with good-
ness (for some goodness is a whole and some a part),
but the activity of imperfect things is imperfect, it
would follow that happiness is an activity of perfect Definition of
life in accordance with perfect goodness. Happiness.
0 And that our classification and definition of it are Definition
correct is evidenced by opinions that we all hold, by^^common
For we think that to do well and live well are the same Sense.
as to be happy ; but each of these, both life and
action, is employment and activity, inasmuch as active
life involves employing things — the coppersmith
makes a bridle, but the horseman uses it. There is
also the evidence of the opinion that a person is not
happy for one day only,^ and that a child is not happy,
nor any period of life " (hence also Solon's advice holds
good, not to call a man happy while he is alive, but
only when he has reached the end), for nothing incom-
1 plete is happy, since it is not a whole. And again,
* A single happy day does not make one a happy {i.e.
fortunate) man.
* It is a mistake to say that youth (or maturity, or old age)
is the happy time of life.
239
ARISTOTLE
1219 b
της άρ€τ-ης δια τα epya, καΐ τά εγκώμια των
10 έργων (και στεφανοννται οι νικώντες, αλλ ονχ ol
Βννάμενοί νικαν μη νικώντες hi), και το κριναν
€Κ των έργων οττοϊός τις εστίν. έτι δια τι η ]
ευδαιμονία ουκ επαινείται ; οτι δια ταυτην τάλλα,
η τω εις ταυτην αναφερεσθαι η τω μόρια eiP'ai
αύτης. διό έτερον ευδαιμονισμός και ετταινος και
15 εγκώμιον το μεν γαρ εγκώμιον λόγος τοΰ καθ
εκαστον έργου, 6 δ' έπαινος τοΰ^ τοιούτον eiv'ai
καθόλου, 6 δ' εύΒαιμονισμός τέλους.^ και το ]
απ ορούμενον δ' ενίοτε 8ηλον εκ τούτων δια τι
77θτ' ούθεν βελτίους οΐ σπουδαίοι των φαύλων τον
ημισυν τοΰ βίου, όμοιοι γαρ καθεύ8οντες πάντες.
20 αίτιον δ' ΟΤΙ αργία φνχης 6 ύπνος αλλ ουκ ενέργεια.
διό και άλλο ει τι μόριόν εστί φυχης, οΐον το ]
θρεπτικόν, η τούτου άρετη ουκ εστί μόριον της
δλης αρετής, ώσπερ ούδ' η του σώματος• εν τω
ύπνω γαρ μάλλον ενεργεί το θρεπτικόν, το δ
αισθητικόν και τό* όρεκτικον ατελή εν τω ύπνω.
όσον δε τοΰ πη* κινεΐσθαι μετεχουσι, και αι φαν-
25 τασίαι βελτίους αί των σπουδαίων, εάν μη διά
νόσον ή πήρωσιν.
Μέτά ταύτα περί φνχής θεωρητεον ή γάρ αρετή ]
φυχής, ου κατά συμβεβηκός. επεί δ' άνθρωπίνην
άρετήν ζητοΰμεν, ύποκείσθω δυο μ^ρη φνχής τά
λόγου μετέχοντα, ου τον αυτόν 8ε τρόπον μετεχειν
90 λόγου άμφω, άλλα τω μεν το επιτάττειν τω δε
1 τοΰ add. Βζ, ^ Βζ. : τέ\ο%. » τό add. Rac.
* πχ, ? (cf. Ν. Ε. 1029 b 9) Cas. : μτ?.
240
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. i. 11-15
there are the praises given to goodness on account
of its deeds, and panegyrics describing deeds (and it
is the victorious who are given Avreaths, not those
who are capable of winning but do not win) ; and
there is the fact that we judge a man's character
12 from his actions. Also why is happiness not praised ?
It is because it is on account of it that the other things
are praised, either by being placed in relation to it
or as being parts of it. Hence felicitation, praise
and panegyric are different things : panegyric is a
recital of a particular exploit, praise a statement of a
man's general distinction, felicitation is bestowed on
13 an end achieved. From these considerations light
is also thrown on the question sometimes raised —
what is the precise reason why the virtuous are for
half their lives no better than the base, since all men
are alike when asleep ? The reason is that sleep is
14 inaction of the spirit, not an activity. Hence the
goodness of any other part of the spirit, for instance
the nutritive, is not a portion of goodness as a whole,
just as also goodness of the body is not ; for the
nutritive part functions more actively in sleep, where-
as the sensory and appetitive parts are ineffective in
sleep. But even the imaginations of the virtuous, so
far as the imaginative faculty participates in any mode
of motion, are better than those of the base, provided
they are not perverted by disease or mutilation.
L5 Next we must study the spirit ; for goodness is a Psychology
property of the spirit, it is not accidental. And since ^θίηΐ"^"'*^
it is human goodness that we are investigating, let us
begin by positing that the spirit has two parts that
partake of reason, but that they do not both partake
of reason in the same manner, but one of them by
having by nature the capacity to give orders, and the
R 241
ARISTOTLE
1219 b
τό^ ττζίθ^σθαί καΐ άκον€ΐν ττ^φυκάναι (et he τι
iarlv irepws άλογον, άφ^σθω τούτο το μοριον) .
διαφέρει δ' ovdev οντ el /χερισττ^ τ) φνχη οϋτ et 16
a^eprjs, e^et μεντοι hvva^ei,g διαφόρους και τα?
eLpημevaς, ώσττερ ev τω καμπύλω το κοίλον και
35 το κνρτον ά^ίαχώριστον, και το ev9v καΐ το Xev-
κόν, καίτοι το evdv ου XevKov αλλ ή^ κατά σνμ-
β€βηκ6ς και ουκ ουσία ttj αύτοϋ.^ άφ-ηρηται* 17
δ€ και e'i τι άλλο εστί μ€.ρος φνχης, οίον το
φυτικόν.^ ανθρωπινής yo-p^ Φ^Χΐ^ '''^ βιρημ€να
μόρια Ί'δια, διό ο?3δ' αί άρ€ται αί τοΰ θρεπτικού
40 και αύζητικοΰ^ ανθρώπου• Sei yap, el fj άνθρωπος,
λoyισμόv et'eivai προς^ '^PXV^ '<^<^^ ττραζιν, άρχει
1220 a δ' ό λογισμός ου λογισμού αλλ' ορέξεως και
παθημάτων ανάγκη αρα ταυτ' εχειν τα μ^ρη- 18
και ώσπερ η ευεξία σύγκειται εκ των κατά μόριον
αρετών, ούτω και η της φυχης άρετη η τέλος.
^Αρετής δ' €ΐδτ7 δυο, η μεν ηθική η 8ε διανοητική- IS
5 επαινοΰμεν γάρ ου μόνον τους δικαίους αλλά και
τους συνετούς και τους σοφούς. επαινετον γαρ
ύπεκειτο η* άρετη η το έργον, ταύτα δ ουκ
ενεργεί αλλ' είσιν αυτών ενεργειαι. επει δ αί 2C
διανοητικαι μετά λόγου, αί μεν τοιαΰται τοΰ λογον
έχοντος ο επιτακτικόν εστί της φυχης ^ λόγον
^ τψ μ^ν . . , τ6 . . . τφ δέ . . . τό Ric. : το μέν . . . τφ
. . . τό δέ . . , τφ.
2 άλλ' 7) Ric. : άλλα.
^ Ric. ; ουσία τον αντοΰ [ουσία τό αυτό Βζ.).
* άφ-ηρήσθω Fr. : άφίίσθω Βζ. * Vict. : φυσικόν.
* Γ : δέ. ' Βζ. : όρΐκτικοΰ.
* Ric. : καΐ (ώ$ Sus.). * ή Sol. : -η.
" i.e. the part ' connected with nutrition and growth,'
man's animal life, which is irrational absolutely, and not
242
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. i. 15-20
other to obey and listen (let us leave out any part
6 that is irrational in another way "). And it makes
no difference whether the spirit is divisible or is un-
divided yet possessed of different capacities, namely
those mentioned, just as the concave and convex
sides in a curve are inseparable, and the straight-
ness and whiteness in a straight white line, although
a straight thing is not white except accidentally and
7 not by its own essence. And we have also abstracted
any other part of the spirit that there may be, for
instance the factor of growth ; for the parts that we
have mentioned are the special properties of the
human spirit, and hence the excellences of the part
dealing with nutrition and growth are not the special
property of a man, for necessarily, if considered as a
man, he must possess a reasoning faculty for a prin-
ciple and with a view to conduct, and the reasoning
faculty is a principle controlling not reasoning but
8 appetite and passions ; therefore he must necessarily
possess those parts. And just as a good constitution
consists of the separate excellences of the parts of the
body, so also the goodness of the spirit, as being an
End, is composed of the separate virtues.
9 And goodness has two forms, moral virtue and Moral and
intellectual excellence ; for we praise not only the ooo^dnessl^
just but also the intelligent and the wise. For we
assumed ** that what is praiseworthy is either good-
ness or its work, and these are not activities but possess
0 activities. And since the intellectual excellences
involve reason, these forms of goodness belong to the
rational part, which as having reason is in command
merely in the sense of not possessing reason but being capable
of obedience to it.
" Cf. 1218 a 37 if., 1219 b 8 ff., 15 £F.
243
ARISTOTLE
1220 a
10 e^et, at δ ηθίκαΐ του αλόγου μ€ν άκολουθητίκοΰ
δε κατά φύσιν τω Χόγον βχοντί' ου γαρ Χάγομβν
ποίος τι? το ήθος, οτι σοφός η Β^ινός, αλλ' otl
πράος ύ] θρασυς.
Mera ταΰτα σκ€πτ€ον πρώτον π^ρΐ άρζτης ηθι- 2
κης τι €στι καΐ ποία μόρια αυττ^? (et? τοϋτο γάρ
15 ανηκται) και γίνεται δια τίνων, hel Βη ζητίΐν ωσ-
πβρ iv τοις άλλοις €χοντ€ς τι ζητοΰσι πάντβς,
ώστβ δει δια των αληθώς μέν λ&γομ€νων ου σαφώς
δε πβιράσθαι λαβείν το καΐ^ αληθώς και σαφώς,
νυν γάρ ομοίως εχομεν ώσπερ αν €ΐ εΙΒείημεν' και 2!
uytetal•' οτι η άριστη διαθεσι? του σώματος και
ϋΟ Κορισκον^ οτι* ο τών iv τη αγορά μελάντατος• τι
μεν γαρ εκατερον τούτων ουκ ΐσμεν, προς μεντοι
το ειδει^αι τί εκάτερον αύτοΖν^ προ έργου το ούτως
εχειν. — ύποκείσθω hrj πρώτον η βέλτιστη διά^εσι? 2!
ύπο τών βέλτιστων γίγνεσθαι και πράττεσθαι τα*
άριστα περί εκαστον απο της εκάστου αρετής,
25 οίον πόνοι τε άριστοι και τροφή άφ^ ων γίνεται
ευεξία, και από της ευεξίας πονονσιν άριστα' ετι 2^
πάσαν διάθεσίΓ υπό τών αύτώι^ γίγνεσθαι τε"" και
φθείρεσθαι πώς προσφερομένων, ώσπερ ι5')/ιεια υπό
τροφής και πόνων και ώρας• ταΰτα δε δτ^λα εκ
της επαγωγής, και η άρετη άρα η τοιαύτη διά-
30 θεσίς εστίν η γινεταί τε ύπό τών άριστων περί
φυχην κινήσεων /cat άφ^ ^ς πράττεται τα άριστα
της φυχής έργα καΐ πάθη' και ύπό τών αυτών 2ί
^ το και Ric. : και τό.
* ΐΐδ€ίημ(ΐ' add. Sp. ^ Rac. : Κορίσκο^,
* ότι add. Sp. * rec. Μ*": αύτη^.
* τά add. Rac. ' re add. Rac.
» Cf. 1240 b 25 n.
244
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. i. 20-2δ
of the spirit ; whereas the moral virtues belong to
the part that is irrational but by nature capable of
following the rational — for in stating a man's moral
qualities we do not say that he is wise or clever but
that he is gentle or rash.
}1 After this we must first consider Moral Goodness — Moral
its essence and the nature of its divisions (for that is Jh virtue
the subject ηοΛν arrived at), and the means by which (Bk. ii. fin.)
it is produced. Our method of inquiry then must be and genesis.
that employed by all people in other matters when
they have something in hand to start with — we must
endeavour by means of statements that are true but
not clearly expressed to arrive at a result that is both
52 true and clear. For our present state is as if we
kncAv that health is the best disposition of the body and
that Coriscus " is the darkest man in the market-place ;
for that is not to know what health is and who Coriscus
is, but nevertheless to be in that state is a help to-
13 wards knowing each of these things. — Then let it first
be taken as granted that the best disposition is pro-
duced by the best means, and that the best actions
in each department of conduct result from the excel-
lences belonging to each department — for example,
it is the best exercises and food that produce a good
condition of body, and a good condition of body en-
24 ables men to do the best work ; further, that every
disposition is both produced and destroyed by the
same things applied in a certain manner, for example
health by food and exercises and climate ; these points
are clear from induction. Therefore goodness too is a fuller de-
the sort of disposition that is created by the best virtue" °^
movements in the spirit and is also the source of the
production of the spirit's best actions and emotions ;
ί5 and it is in one way produced and in another way
245
ARISTOTLE
1220 a
ττώς /xer ytVerat πώς δε φθείρΐταί, καΐ ττρος ταΰτα
Ύ] χρησις αντης νφ^ ών καΐ αϋζβται καΐ φθβίρβται
ττρος ά ββλτίστα Βιατίθησίν. σημβΐον δ δτι, ττερι
35 η^βα καΐ λυπηρά καΐ η άρ€τη και η κακία• at
γαρ κολάσει? Ιατρζΐαι ονσαι. καΐ γινόμΐναι δια των
evavTicov, καθάπβρ βπΐ των άλλων, δια τούτων
elaiv.
II. "Οτι μ€.ν τοίνυν η ηθική άρ€τη π€ρΙ rjSea ]
καΐ λυπηρά εστί, ^ηλον. εττει δ εστί το ήθος —
1220 b ώσπ€ρ καΐ το όνομα σημαίνει δτι άπό εθους έχει
την επίΒοσιν, εθίζεται δε ύττ' αγωγής το μη
εμφυτον^ τω πολλάκις κινεΐσθαί πως ούτως η^η^
ενεργητικόν (ο εν τοις άφύχοις ούχ όρώμεν, ουδέ
γάρ αν μυριάκις ρίφης άνω τον λίθον ουδέποτε
Γ) ποιήσει τοΰτο μη βία)- — διό έστω το^ ήθος τοΰτο,
φυχής κατά επιτακτικόν λόγον δυνάμενη* άκολουθεΐν
τω λόγω ποιότης. λεκτεον Βή κατά τί της φυχής i
ποι αττα^ ήθη. εσται δε κατά τε τάς δυν-α/χει? ί
των παθημάτων καθ^ ας πώς^ παθητικοί λέγονται
και κατά τάς εζεις καθ^ άς προς τα πάθη τοιούτοι^
10 λέγονται τω πάσχειν πως ή απαθείς ειρ'αι.
Μετά ταΰτα ή ^ιαίρεσις εν τοις Βιειλεγμενοις^ 4
των παθημάτων και των 8υνάμεων και των έξεων.
^ Fr. : εθίζεται δέ το ύττ' ά-γω-γηί μη έμφυτου.
" ήδη Rac. : ^077 το. * τό add. llac.
* Sp. (cf. Stob. Eel. eth. p. 36) : δυναμένου δ'.
* ΤΓΟί' ά,ττα Sol. {τΓοι άττα τα ? Rac, ΊΓθώτη$ τα Sp.) : ττοΓ' &ττα.
* Rac. : ώϊ. ' τοιούτοι Ric. : ταΰτα.
* Ras. : άιτη\\α•γμένοι^.
" e.g. fever, which is caused by heat, is cured by cold
(the contrary doctrine to homoeopathy, shnilia similibus
curantnr).
^ ηθοί derived from ίθο$ by lengthening of e to ?; : cf. N.E.
246
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. i. 25— ii. 4>
destroyed by the same things, and its employment
of the things that cause both its increase and its de-
struction is directed towards the things towards which
it creates the best disposition. And this is indicated The hedon-
by the fact that both goodness and badness have to '^^^'^ factor.
do with things pleasant and painful ; for punishments,
which are medicines, and which as is the case with
other cures " operate by means of opposites, operate
by means of pleasures and pains.
1 II. It is clear, therefore, that Moral Goodness has
to do with pleasures and pains. And since moral
character is, as even its name implies that it has its
growth from habit, ** and by our often moving in a
certain way a habit not innate in us is finally trained
to be operative in that way (which we do not observe
in inanimate objects, for not even if you throw a stone
upwards ten thousand times will it ever rise upward
unless under the operation of force) — let moral char- The moral
acter then be defined as a quality of the spirit in accord- character.
ance with governing reason that is capable of following
2 the reason. We have then to say what is the part
of the spirit in respect of which our moral characters
3 are of a certain quality. And it will be in respect of
our faculties for emotions according"to which people
are termed liable to some emotion, and also of the
states of character according to which people receive
certain designations in respect of the emotions, be-
cause of their experiencing or being exempt from
some form of emotion.
4 After this comes the classification, made in previous
discussions," of the modes of emotion, the faculties
II, ill. 4. This clause and the one following interrupt the
construction of the sentence.
" Perhaps a reference to N.E. 1105 b 20, inserted in the
belief that the Eudemian Ethics is the later work.
247
ARISTOTLE
1220 b
Aeyo» δε πάθη μ€ν τά τοιαύτα, θνμον φόβον αιδώ
βπιθυμίαν, δλως οΐς έ'ττβται ώς βπΐ το πολύ η
αισθητική η^ονη η λύπη καθ^ αυτά• και κατά μβν 5
15 ταύτα ουκ έ'στι ποιότης [αλλά πάσχ€ΐΥ, κατά δε
τάς Βυνάμ^ις ποιότης- λέγω δε^ Βυνάμας καθ^ ας
λέγονται κατά τά πάθη οι ενεργούντες, οίον άργιλος
ανάλγητος ερωτικός αισχυντηλός αναίσχυντος,
εζεις Se elaiv οσαι α'ίτιαί είσι του ταύτα η κατά
λόγον ύπάρχειν η εναντίως, οίον ανδρεία σωφροσύνη
20 δείλια ακολασία.
III. Αιωρισμενων δε τούτων ληπτεον δτι εν 1
ατταντι συνέχει και διαιρετοί εστίν υπέροχη και
ελλειφις και μέσον, και ταύτα η προς άλληλα η
προς ημάς, οίον εν γυμναστική, εν ιατρική, εν
25 οικοδομική, εν κυβερνητική, και εν οποιαοϋν πράξει
και επιστημονική και αν επιστημονική και τεχνική
και ατεχνω- η μεν γάρ κίνησις συνεχές, ή 8ε 2
πράξις κίνησις. εν πάσι δε το μέσον το προς
ημάς βελτιστον τοΰτο γάρ εστίν ώς η επιστήμη
κελεύει και 6 λόγος. πανταχού δε τοΰτο καΐ
30 ποιεί την βελτίστην εξιν. και τοΰτο Βηλον δια
της επαγωγής^και τοΰ λόγου• τά γάρ εΥαντια
φθείρει άλληλα• τά δ' άκρα και άλλτ^λοι? και τω
μέσω ει^αι^τια, το γάρ μέσον εκάτερον προς
εκατερον εστίν, οΐον το ίσον τοΰ μεν ελάττονος
μείζον τοΰ μείζονος δε ελαττον. ώστ ανάγκη 3
την ηθικην άρετην περί μεσ' άττα εΓι/αι και
35 μεσοτητα τίνα. ληπτεον άρα η ποία μεσάτης
^ pravum glossema Rac.
^ δ€ Sus. : δέ ras.
" This interpolation was made by an editor who derived
ΐΓοιότη^ from TTou'iv,
248
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. ii. 4— m. 3
and the states of character. By emotions I mean
such things as anger, fear, shame, desire, and gener-
ally those experiences that are in themselves usually
5 accompanied by sensory pleasure or pain. And to
these there is no quality corresponding [but they are
passive]." But quality corresponds to the faculties :
by faculties I mean the properties acting by which
persons are designated by the names of the various
emotions, for instance choleric, insensitive, erotic,
bashful, shameless. States of character are the states
that cause the emotions to be present either rationally
or the opposite : for example courage, sobriety of
mind, cowardice, profligacy.
1 III. These distinctions having been established, it Virtue and
must be grasped that in every continuum that is divis- ^eaif In*^'^*^
Ible there is excess and deficiency and a mean, and conduct.
these either in relation to one another or in relation to
us, for instance in gymnastics or medicine or archi-
tecture or navigation, and in any practical pursuit of
whatever sort, both scientific and unscientific, both
2 technical and untechnical ; for motion is a continuum,
and conduct is a motion. And in all things the mean
in relation to us is the best, for that is as knowledge
and reason bid. And everywhere this also produces
the best state. This is proved by induction and
reason : contraries are mutually destructive, and ex-
tremes are contrary both to each other and to the
mean, as the mean is either extreme in relation to the
other — for example the equal is greater than the less
3 and less than the greater. Hence moral goodness
must be concerned with certain means and must be
a middle state. We must, therefore, ascertain what
sort of middle state is goodness and with what sort of
249
1220 b
ARISTOTLE
αρ€τη καΐ Ttepl ποία μβσα. είληφθω Sr) τταρα- '■.
Βείγματος χάριν, και θεωρβίσθω 'ίκαστον €κ της
υπογραφής'
1221 a
10
οργιλότης
θρασντης
αναισχυντία
ακολασία
φθόνος
KepSos
ασωτία
αλαζονεία
κολακβία
αρέσκεια
τρνφερότης
χαυνότης
Βαπανηρία
πανουργία
αοργησια
δβιλια
καταπληζις
αναισθησία
άνώνυμ,ον
ζημία
άνελευθερία
ειρωνεία
απέχθεια
αύθάδεια
κακοπάθεια
μικροφυχία
μικροπρέπεια
πραοτης.
άν8ρεία.
αιδώ?.
σωφροσύνη.
νεμεσις.
Βίκαιον.
ελευθεριοτης.
φιλία,
σεμνότης .
καρτέρια .
μεγαλοφυχία.
μεγαλοπρέπεια .
φρόνησις.
τα μεν πάθη ταύτα και τοιαύτα συμβαίνει ταΐς δ
φυχαΐς, πάντα hk λέγεται τα μεν τω ύπερβάλλειν
15 τα οε τω ελλειπειν . όργίλος μεν γάρ εστίν ο
μάλλον η 8εΐ όργιζόμενος και θάττον και πλείοσιν
η οις δει, άόργητος^ 8ε ο ελλείπων και οΐς και
οτε και ως• και θρασύς μεν ο μήτε ά χρη φοβούμενος
μηθ^ οτε μήθ^ ως, 8ειλ6ς 8ε 6 και ά μη 8ει και
Ότ ου 8ει και ως ου 8ει. ομοίως 8ε και ακόλαστος β
20 και^ ο επιθυμητικος και 6* υπερβάλλων πάσιν δσοις
1 Rac. (cf. Ν.Ε. 1108 a 7 et 1100 b 33): afaXyrjaia.
^ Rac, : άι>άλyηros. ' [καί] Bz. * [καΐ ό] Vict,
" This place is filled in N.E. 1108 a 7 by άοίκγησία,
Spiritlessness, lack of irascibility, and perhaps the Greek
should be altered to that here,
250
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. iii. 4-6
4 means it is concerned. Let each then be taken by
way of illustration and studied with the help of the
schedule :
Irascibility
Rashness
Shamelessness
Profligacy
Envy
Profit
Prodigality
Boastfulness
Flattery
Subservience
Luxuriousness
Vanity
Extravagance
Rascality
Spiritlessness "
Cowardice
Diffidence
Insensitiveness
(nameless *)
Loss
Meanness
Self-depreciation
Surliness
Stubbornness
Endurance **
Smallness of Spirit
Siiabbiness
Simpleness
Gentleness
Courage
Modesty
Temperance
Righteous Indignation
The Just
Liberality
Sincerity "
Friendliness
Dignity
Hardiness
Greatness of Spirit
Magnificence
Wisdom.
5 These and such as these are the emotions that the The Vices oi
spirit experiences, and they are all designated from Jjeflct.*"
being either excessive or defective. The man that
gets angry more and more quickly and with more
people than he ought is irascible, he that in respect
of persons and occasions and manner is deficient in
anger is insensitive ; the man that is not afraid of
things of which he ought to be afraid, nor when nor as
6 he ought, is rash, he that is afraid of things of which he
ought not to be afraid, and when and as he ought not
to be, is cowardly.^ Similarly also one that is a prey
to his desires and that exceeds in everything possible
* In JV.E. 1108 b 2 έπιχαιρ^κακία. Malice, rejoicing in
another's misfortune.
" N.E. IV. vii. shows that sincerity in asserting one's own
merits is meant.
** ' Submission to evils ' (Solomon) : not in N.E.
' The shameless and diffident are omitted here; see the
table above.
251
ARISTOTLE
1221a
εν84χ€ται, αναίσθητος 8e 6 ελλείπων /cat μη^^ όσον
βελτίον καΐ κατά την φνσι.ν ετηθυμών, αλλ' άττα^η?
β ωσπερ λίθος. κερΒαλεος δε ο ττανταχόθεν ττλεον- 7
εκτικός, ζημίώ8ης 8e 6 εΐ μη^ μη^αμόθεν αλλ'
όλιγαχόθεν. άλαζών 8e ο πλείω των υπαρχόντων
3 25 προσποιούμενος, ε'ίρων 8e ο ελάττω. καΐ κόλαζ 8
μεν ο πλείω συνεπαινών η καλώς έχει, άπεχθητίκός
'^ δε ο ελάττω. καΐ το μεν λίαν προς ηΒονην
αρέσκεια, το δ ολΐ)/α και μόγις αυ^άδεια. ert δ' 9
6 μεν μη^εμίαν υπομένων λυπην, μηΒ^ ει βελτιον,
30 τρυφερός, 6 8ε πάσαν ομοίως ως μεν απλώς ειπείν
ανώνυμος, μεταφορά δε λέγεται σκληρός και
ταλαίπωρος και κακοπαθητικός . χαΰνος δ' 6 Κ
μειζόνων άζιών αυτόν, μικρόφυχος δ' ο ελαττόνων.
ετι δ' άσωτος μεν 6 προς άπασαν- 8απάνην
υπερβάλλων, ανελεύθερος δε ό προς αττασαν»
(■- 35 ελΧείπων. ομοίως δε και ό μικροπρεπης και 6 11
σαλάκων, 6 μεν γαρ υπερβάλλει το πρέπον, 6 δ'
ΐί\ ελλείπει του πρέποντος. και 6 μεν πανούργος
πάντως και πάντοθεν πλεονεκτικός, ό δ' εύήθης
5 ούδ' όθεν δει. φθονερός δε τω λυπεΐσθαι επΙ 12
πλείοσιν εύπραγίαις η δει, και ya/a οΐ άζιοι ευ
40 πράττειν λυποΰσι τους φθονερούς ευ πράττοντες •
ο δ' ενάντιος άνωνυμώτερος , εστί δ' ό υπερβάλλων
1221 b τώ" /χή λυπεΐσθαι μη8' επΙ τοις άναζίοις ευ
πράττουσιν, αλλ' ευχερής ώσπερ οι γαστρίμαργοι
προς τροφην, ο δε 8υσχερης κατά τον φθόνον
εστίν. — το δε προς εκαστον μη κατά συμβεβηκός 13
^ (ί μη add. Fr. (άλλ' <e!' 7e> Bussemaker).
'^ τφ Sp. : iwi τφ.
" Envy in § 12 comes here in the schedule.
252
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. iii. 6-13
is profligate, and one that is deficient and does not
desire even to a proper degree and in a natural way,
but is as devoid of feeling as a stone, is insensitive."
7 The man that seeks gain from every source is a
profiteer, and he that seeks gain if not from no source,
yet from few, is a waster.^ He that pretends to have
more possessions than he really has is a boaster, and
he that pretends to have fewer is a self-depreciator.
8 One that joins in approval more than is fitting is a
flatterer, one that does so less than is fitting is surly.
To be too complaisant is subservience ; to be com-
plaisant seldom and reluctantly is stubbornness.
9 Again, the man that endures no pain, not even if it is
good for him, is luxurious; one that can endure all pain
alike is strictly speaking nameless, but by metaphor
10 he is called hard, patient or enduring. He that rates
himself too high is vain, he that rates himself too low,
small-spirited. Again, he that exceeds in all ex-
penditure is prodigal, he that falls short in all, mean.
11 Similarly the shabby man and the swaggerer — the
• latter exceeds what is fitting and the former falls
below it. The rascal grasps profit by every means
and from every source, the simpleton does not make
12 profit even from the proper sources. Envy consists
in being annoyed at prosperity more often than one
ought to be, for the envious are annoyed by the pros-
perity even of those who deserve to prosper ; the
opposite character is less definitely named, but it is
the man that goes too far in not being annoyed even
at the prosperity of the undeserving, and is easy-
going, as gluttons are in regard to food, whereas his
opposite is difficult-tempered in respect of jealousy, —
13 It is superfluous to state in the definition that the
'' The prodigal and mean in § 10 comes here in the schedule.
253
ARISTOTLE
1221 b
δ ούτως e^eiv πβρίίργον διορι'ζειν^• ού^^μία γαρ
επιστήμη οϋτ€ θεωρητική ούτε ποιητική οντ€
λέγει οντε πράττει τοΰτο προσΒιοριζουσα, άλλα
τοΰτ εστί προς τάς συκοφαντίας των τεχνών τάς
λογικάς. απλώς μεν οΰν Βιωρίσθω τον τρόπον 14
τούτον, άκριβεστερον δ' δταν περί τών εζεων
λέγω μεν τών αντικείμενων.
10 Αυτών Βε τούτων τών παθημάτων εΐ8η κατ-
ονομάζεται τώ Βιαφερειν κατά την υπερβολην η
χρόνου η του μάλλον η προς τι τών ποιουντων
τά πάθη. λέγω δ' οΐον όζΰθυμος μεν τω θάττον 15
πάσχειν η δβι, χαλεπός δε και θυμώΒης τω
μάλλον, πικρός δβ τω φυλακτικός etvat της όργης,
15 πληκτης δε καΐ λοώορητικός ταΐς κολάσεσι ταΙς
άπό της όργης. όφοφάγοι δε και γαστρίμαργοι 16
και οίνόφλυγες τω προς όποτερας τροφής άπολαυσιν
€χειν την διίρ'α/χιν' παθητικην παρά τον λογον.
Ου δει δ' άγνοεΐν Οτι IVta τών λεγομένων ουκ 17
εστίν εν τω πώς λαμβάνειν , αν πώς λαμβανηται
20 τό^ μάλλον πάσχειν. οΐον μοιχός ου τω μάλλον
η δει προς τάς γαμετάς πλησιάζειν {ου γάρ εστι^),
άλλα μοχθηρία τις αύτη ηΒη^ εστίν, συνειλημμενον
γάρ τό τε πάθος λέγεται και τό τοιόν^ε εΓι^αι•
ομοίως δε και η ύβρις. διό και άμφισβητοΰσι, 18
συγγενεσθαι μεν φάσκοντες αλλ' ου μοιχ^νσαι,
25 άγνοοϋντες γάρ η άναγκαζόμενοι, και πατάζαι
μεν αλλ' ούχ ύβρίσαι• ομοίως δε και επι τά άλλα
τά τοιαύτα.
1 ττροσδωρίζΐΐν ? (ut De Interpr. 17 a 36, Met. hi., 1005
b21) Rac.
2 Ric. τφ. * Rac. : δή.
"In Book III. * roiofde— μοχθ-ηρόν.
254
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. in. 13-18
specified relation to each thing must not be accidental ;
no science whether theoretical or productive makes
this addition to the definition either in discourse or in
practice, but this addition is aimed against the logical
L4 quibbling of the sciences. Let us then accept these
simple definitions, and let us make them more precise
when we are speaking about the opposite dispositions.**
But these modes of emotion themselves are divided Sub-species
into species designated according to their difference ° "'*^'
in respect of time or intensity or in regard to one
15 of the objects that cause the emotions. I mean for
instance that a man is called quick-tempered from
feeling the emotion of anger sooner than he ought,
harsh and passionate from feeling it more than he
ought, bitter from having a tendency to cherish his
anger, violent and abusive owing to the acts of retalia-
te tion to which his anger gives rise. Men are called
gourmands or gluttons and drunkards from having an
irrational liability to indulgence in one or the other
sort of nutriment.
17 But it must not be ignored that some of the vices Some Vices
mentioned cannot be classed under the heading of '^ ^°'"*^"
manner, if manner is taken to be feeling the emotion
to excess. For example, a man is not an adulterer
because he exceeds in intercourse with married
women, for ' excess ' does not apply here, but
adultery merely in itself is a vice, since the term
denoting the passion implicitly denotes that the man
18 is vicious '' ; and similarly with outrage. Hence men
dispute the charge, and admit intercourse but deny
adultery on the ground of having acted in ignor-
ance or under compulsion, or admit striking a blow
but deny committing an outrage ; and similarly in
meeting the other charges of the same kind.
255
ARISTOTLE
1221 b
IV. Έ>ι,λημμ€νων 8e τούτων, μβτά ταΰτα XcKTeov 1
OTL ineiSr) Svo μ4ρη της φυχης καΐ αϊ άρ€ταΙ κατά
ταΰτα Βιτ^ρηνται, και αϊ /xev του λόγον €χοντος
30 Βιανοητικαί,^ ών epyov άλτ^^εια, η πβρί του πώς
€χ€ΐ η TrepL γβν^σβως, αϊ δε του αλόγου βχοντος
δ ορ^ξιν [ου γαρ οτιοΰν μίρος €χ€ΐ της φυχης 2
ορβξιν el μζριστη βστιν), ανάγκη 8η φαΰλον το
ήθος και σττου^αΐον eivai τω Βιώκβιν και φεύγβιν
ήΒονάς τίνα? και λύττας. SrjXov Se τοϋτο e/c των
35 διαιρέσεων των rrepi τα πάθη και τάς 8ννάμ€ΐς
και τάς Ίξ^ις. αι μ^ν γαρ 3υνάμ€ΐς και αϊ ^ξβις
τών^ παθημάτων , τα δε πάθη λύπη και ηΒονη
Βιώρισταΐ' ώστε δια τε ταΰτα και δια τάς 3
€μπροσθ€ν θέσεις συμβαίνει πάσαν ηθικην άρβτην
πβρι η8ονάς είναι και λύπας. πάσα γαρ φυχη'
40 ύφ οίων πεφυκε γινεσ^αι χειρών και βελτίων,
1222 Λ προς ταΰτα και περί ταΰτά εστίν ή έξις.* δι' 4
η8ονάς δε και λύπας φαύλους φαμεν είναι, τω
διώκειν και φεύγειν η ώς μη δει η ας μη δει.
διο και διορίζονται πάντες^ προχείρως άττά^ειαν
και ηρεμίαν περί ήΒονάς και λύπας είναι τα?
5 αρετας, τάς δε κακίας εκ των εναντίων.
V. Επει δ υ770κ:ειται άρετη είναι η τοιαύτη \
εζις άφ* ης πρακτικοί των βελτίστων και καθ^ ην
άριστα διάκεινται περί το βελτιστον, βελτιστον δε
και άριστον το κατά τον ορθόν λόγον, τούτο δ'
^ [διανοηηκαί] ? Ilac. * <amai> των Bus.
^ ττάσηί yap ψνχηί Βζ.
* Βζ. : ηδονή. 6 [ττάι/τίί] Spengel : rtvey ? Sus.
" Cf. 1220 b 7-20. " See 1218 b 37 ff.
2.56
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. iv. 1— v. 1
1 IV. These points having been taken, we must The hedon-
next say that since the spirit has two parts, and the anaiysed'!*"^
virtues are divided between them, one set being
those of the rational part, intellectual virtues, whose
work is truth, whether about the nature of a thing or
about its mode of production, while the other set
belongs to the part that is irrational but possesses
2 appetition (for if the spirit is divided into parts,
not any and every part possesses appetition), it
therefore follows that the moral character is vicious
or virtuous by reason of pursuing or avoiding certain
pleasures and pains. This is clear from the classifica-
tion " of the emotions, faculties and states of char-
acter. For the faculties and the states are con-
cerned with the modes of emotion, and the emotions
3 are distinguished by pain and pleasure ; so that it
follows from these considerations as well as from the
positions already laid down that all moral goodness
4 is concerned with pleasures and pains. For our
state of character is related to and concerned with
such things as have the property of making every
person's spirit worse and better. But we say that
men are wicked owing to pleasures and pains,
through pursuing and avoiding the wrong ones or
in the wTong way. Hence all men readily define the
virtues as insensitiveness or tranquillity in regard to
pleasures and pains, and the vices by the opposite
qualities.
1 V. But since it has been assumed ^ that goodness
is a state of character of a sort that causes men to be
capable of doing the best actions and gives them the
best disposition in regard to the greatest good, and
the best and greatest good is that which is in accord-
ance with right principle, and this is the mean be-
s 257
ARISTOTLE
1222 a , , , , , ^
10 ean το μίσον υπερβολής και eXXeiijiews της προς
ημάς, άναγκαΐον αν €Ϊη την ηθικην άρ€την κατ' αύτην
ίκάστην^ μεσότητα elvai καΐ^ π€ρΙ μ^σ" άττα iv
ηοοναΐς και λυτται? και rjSeai και λνττηροΐς. έ'σται 2
δ η μεσάτης oTe μεν ev ηΒοναΐς {και γαρ ύπβρβολη
και ζλλβιφις), ore δ' iv λντταις, 6τβ δ' iv άμφοτ€ραις .
1". ο γαρ ύττβρβάλλων τω χαίρ€ΐν τω -qSei ύπβρβάλλβι
και ο τω λυπεΐσθαι τω ivavTico, και ταντα η
απλώς η προς τίνα ορον, οΐον όταν μάλλον η* ως
οι πολλοί• 6 δ' αγαθός ως δβι. — evret δ' €στί τις 3
ζζις αφ ης τοιούτος βσται 6 βχων αύτην ώστε
του αυτού πράγματος 6* μ€ν άπο8€χ€σθαι την
20 νπβρβολην ό* δε την ελλβιφιν, ανάγκη ώς ταύτ
άλληλοις ivavTia και τω μ€σω, οϋτω και τάς
εζ^ις άλλ-^λαι? ivavτίaς elvai και τη άρ€τη.
Σινμβαίν€ΐ μέντοι τα? άι/τι^εσει? evda μέν 4
φανερωτερας eWt πάσας, 'ένθα δε τάς επι την
νπερβολήν, ένιαχού δε τάς iπι την ζλλβιφιν.
25 αίτιον δε της ivavτιώσεως δτι ουκ aei iπι ταύτα' fi
της άνισοτητος η όμοιότης^ προς το μέσον, αλλ'
ότέ μβν θάττον αν μεταβαίη άπο της υπερβολής
ετΓΐ την μ4σην e^iv, ότε δ' από της ε'λλει'^εω?, ης
ος^ πλέον ά77ε';ι^ε(.* οΰτος δοκτει ivavτιώτεpoς
elvai, οίον και περί το σώμα iv μεν τοις πόνοις
νγιεινότερον η υπερβολή της iλλείφεως και
30 €γγύτερον τού μέσου, iv δε τη τροφή ή ελλειφις
*• Ric. : καθ' αυτόν ΐκαστον. ^ καΐ Sus. : ί}.
' μάλλον ή lac. : μη. * ό (bis) Βζ. : ου.
^ ταντα <^ρχ€ταί> vel <ήκει^ Ric,
' Βζ. : ^ ομοώτητο$. ' 5s add. Sus.
* απέχων Μ•».
258
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. v. 1-6
tween excess and deficiency relative to ourselves, it
would necessarily follow that moral goodness corre-
sponds with each particular middle state and is
concerned with certain mean points in pleasures
2 and pains and pleasant and painful things. And
this middle state will sometimes be in pleasures (for
even in these there is excess and deficiency), sometimes
in pains, sometimes in both. For he that exceeds
in feeling delight exceeds in the pleasant, and he that
exceeds in feeling pain exceeds in the opposite — and
this whether his feelings are excessive absolutely
or excessive in relation to some standard, for in-
stance are felt more than ordinary men feel them ;
whereas the good man feels in the proper way. —
3 And since there is a certain state of character which
results in its possessor's being in one instance such
as to accept an excess and in another such as to
accept a deficiency of the same thing, it follows that
as these actions are contrary to each other and to the
mean, so also the states of character that cause them
are contrary to each other and to virtue.
4 It comes about, however, that sometimes all the one of
oppositions are more evident, sometimes those on the extremes
side of excess, in some cases those on the side of maybe mor
5 deficiency. The cause of this contrariety is that the the virtue"
resemblance does not always reach the same point than the
of inequality in regard to the middle, but sometimes
it may pass over more quickly from the excess,
sometimes from the deficiency, to the middle state,
the person farther removed from which seems to
be more contrary : for instance, with regard to the
body excess is more healthy and nearer the middle
than deficiency in the case of exercises but deficiency
6 than excess in the case of food. Consequently the
259
ARISTOTLE
1222 a
νπ€ρβολης• ώστ€ καΐ αϊ ττροαψζτικαΐ e^etg at 6
φίλογυμναστικαΐ φίλοϋγί€Ϊς μάλλον eaovrat καθ^
€κατ€ραν την atpeaiv, €νθα μ€ν οι ττολνττονώτβροι^
βνθα δ OL ΰποσταηκώτζροι,^ καΐ ivavrios τω
35 μ€τριω και τω ώς ο λόγος ένθα μ€ν 6 άπονος
καΐ ουκ άμφω, evda Se^ ο απολαυστικός καΐ
ούχ ο πβίνητίκός. συμβαίνει δε τοϋτο διότι "η 7
φύσις ευθύς ού προς άπαντα ομοίως άφεστηκε του
μέσου, αλλ' ^ττον μεν φιλόπονοι εσμεν μάλλον δ'
απολαυστικοί• ομοίως δε ταυτ' e^ei και περί
40 φυχης. εναντιαν δε τίθεμεν την εζιν εφ^ ην τε 8
αμαρτάνομεν μάλλον και εφ' ην οι πολλοί, η δ'
έτερα ώσπερ ουκ ούσα λανθάνει, δια γαρ το ολίγον
αναίσθητος εστίν, οίον όργην πραότητι και τον 9
1222 b opyAor τω πράω' καίτοι εστίν υπερβολή και επι
το ΐλεων ειν-αι και το* καταλλακτικόν είναι και
μη όργίζεσθαι ραπιζόμενον, αλλ' ολίγοι οΐ τοι-
ούτοι, επ* εκείνο δε πάντες ρεπουσι μάλλον διό
και ού κολακικον^ ό θυμός.
5 Έττει δ' εΐληπται η Βιαλογη των εζεων καθ' 10
έκαστα τα πάθη fj και* ύπερβολαι και ελλείφεις,
και των εναντίων εζεων καθ' ας εχουσι κατά τον
ορθόν λόγον [τις δ' ό ορθός λόγος και προς τίνα
δει ορον αποβλέποντας λέγειν τό μέσον ύστερον
επισκεπτεον) , φανερόν οτι πάσαι αϊ ηθικαΐ άρεταΐ
^ αΐ πολνπονώτβραί Βζ. * αί ύττοστατικώτΐραι Βζ.
' Βζ. : δέ και. * τό , . . τ6 Βζ. : τφ . . , τψ.
' καταλλακτίκόν Fr., ΐΰκ6\αστον ? Ric.
• 17 "fti Ras. : καϊ αί.
"In respect of amount of exercise.
* In respect of amount of food.
' A probable alteration of the Greek gives ' is not ready
to make up a quarrel.' ■* See 1249 a 21 if.
£60
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. v. 6-10
states of will favourable to athletic training will be
variously favourable to health according to the two
different fields of choice — in the one case '^ the
over-energetic men (will be nearer the mean than
the slack ones) , in the other ^ the too hardy <will
be nearer the mean than the self-indulgent ones) ;
and also the character contrary to the moderate and
rational will be in the one case the slack and not
both the slack and the over-energetic, and in the
other case the self-indulgent and not the man who
7 goes hungry. And this comes about because from the
start our nature does not diverge from the mean in the
same way as regards everything, but in energy we are
deficient and in self-indulgence excessive ; and this is
8 also the same with regard to the spirit. And we class
as contrary to the mean the disposition to which we,
and most men, are more liable to err ; whereas the
other passes unnoticed as if non-existent, because its
9 rarity makes it not observed. For instance we count
anger the contrary of gentleness and the passionate
man the contrary of the gentle ; yet there is also
excess in the direction of being gentle and placable
and not being angry when struck, but men of that
sort are fe\^, and everyone is more prone to the other
extreme ; on which account moreover a passionate
temper is not a characteristic of a toady."
10 And since we have dealt with the scheme of RecapituU-
states of character in respect of the various emotions *^'"°'
in which there are excesses and deficiencies, and of
the opposite states in accordance with which men
are disposed in accordance with right principle
(though the question what is the right principle
and what rule is to guide us in defining the mean
must be considered later '^, it is evident that all the
261
ARISTOTLE
1222 b
10 καΐ κακίαι Trepl ηΒονών καΐ λυπών νττζρβολάς καΐ
eAAeti/iets" etat, /cat rjSoval /cat λΰπαι άπο των
€ΐρημ€νων βζ^ων /cat παθημάτων γίνονται, άλλα 11
μην η γ€ βζΧτίστη e^t? η περί έκαστα μίση iaTLV.
Βηλον τοίννν ΟΤΙ at aperat η ττασαι η τούτων τινίς
€σονται των μ^σοτητων.
15 VI. Αάβωμ€ν ονν αλλτ^ν άρχην της €πιούσης 1
σκ€φ€ως. etat δτ^ ττασαι μέν αϊ ούσίαι κατά
φνσιν TLveg άρχαί, διο /cat ίκάστη ττολλά δύνα-
ται τοιαύτα yevvav, οίον άνθρωπος ανθρώπους /cat
ζωον^ δλως ζώα καΐ φυτόν φυτά. προς 8e τούτοις 2
ο y' άνθρωπος /cat πράζ^ών τινών ioTiv άρχη
20 μόνον τών ζώων τών γαρ άλλων ούθβν ύποιμ^ν
αν πράττ€ΐν. τών δ' αρχών οσαι τοιαϋται, δθ€ν 3
πρώτον αϊ κινησ€ΐς, κύριαι λέγονται, μάλιστα δε
δt/cαtωs■ άφ^ ων μη evhi^eTai άλλως, ην Ισως 6
θεός άρχει, iv δε rat? άκινήτοις άρχαΐς, οίον iv 4
ταΐς μαθηματικαΐς, ουκ εστί το κυριον καίτοι
25 λέγεται γ€ καθ^ ομοιότητα• και γαρ βνταΰθα
κινούμενης της άρχης πάντα μάλιστ* αν τα δει-
κννμενα μεταβάλλοι, αυτά δε δι'^ αυτά ου μετα-
βάλλει άναιρούμενον θάτερον^ ύπο θατερου αν μη τώ
την ύπόθεσιν άι^ελεΐι^ και hi εκείνης δεΓ^αι. ο δ 5
άνθρωπος άρχη κινήσεως τίνος' η γαρ πραζις
30 κίνησις. επει δ' ώσπερ εν τοις άλΧοις η άρχη
^ Sus. : ζψον bv.
* 5k δι' ? Ric. ^ Rieckher : αναιρουμένου θατέρου,
" The writer proceeds to distinguish the strict sense of
^PXVt ' origin or cause of change ' (which applies to man as
capable of volition and action) from its secondary sense,
'cause or explanation of an unchanging state of things'
(which a))plies to the ' first principles ' of mathematics).
* e.g. if αρχή A led to Β and C, of which C was absurd.
262
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. v. 10— vi. 5
forms of moral goodness and badness have to do with
excesses and deficiencies of pleasures and pains,
and that pleasures and pains result from the states
11 of character and modes of emotion mentioned. But
then the best state in relation to each class of thing
is the middle state. It is clear, therefore, that the
virtues will be either all or some of these middle
states.
1 VI. Let us, therefore, take another starting-point Freedom of
for the ensuing inquiry." Now all essences are by iuiman con-
nature first principles of a certain kind, owing to which f^uct is con-
each is able to generate many things of the same sort necessary.
as itself, for example a man engenders men, and in
2 general an animal animals, and a plant plants. And
in addition to this, obviously man alone among
animals initiates certain conduct — for we should not
3 ascribe conduct to any of the others. And the first
principles of that sort, which are the first source of
motions, are called first principles in the strict sense,
and most rightly those that have necessary results ;
doubtless God is a ruling principle that acts in this
4 way. But the strict sense of ' first principle ' is not
found in first principles incapable of movement, for
example those of mathematics, although the term is
indeed used of them by analogy, for in mathematics
if the first principle were changed virtually all the
things proved froiti it would change, though they
do not change owing to themselves, one being
destroyed by the other, except by destroying the
5 assumption and thereby establishing a proof. ** But
man is a first principle of a certain motion, for
action is motion. And since as in other matters
then C by refuting A would refute the other consequence Β
(Solomon).
263
ARISTOTLE
1222 b
aiTta €στί των δι' αύτην όντων η γινομένων ,
Set νοησαί καθάπ^ρ €πΙ των άποΒ€ίζ€ων. el γαρ 6
ζχοντος τον τριγώνου δυο όρθάς ανάγκη το τ€τρά-
γωνον €χ€ΐν τ€τταρας όρθάς, φανβρον ώς αίτιον
τούτου το δυο όρθάς €χ€ίν το τρίγωνον el δε ye
3& μβταβάλλοι^ το τρίγωνον, ανάγκη καΐ το τ€τρά-
γωνον μβταβάλλζίν, οίον el τρ€Ϊς, e^, el Be τέτ-
ταρας,^ οκτώ' καν el μη μeτaβάλλei^ τοιούτον δ'
eoTL, κάκ€Ϊνο τοιούτον άναγκαΐον eii^ai.
ΔηλοΓ δ ο eπιχeιpoΰμev οτι άναγκαΐον €κ των 7
αναλυτικών νυν δ' ovTe μη Xeγeιv οντ€ Xeγeιv
ακριβώς οΐόν τ€ πλην τοσούτον. el γαρ μηθ€ν
40 άλλο αίτιον του το τρίγωνον ούτως e^eiv, αρχή
τι? O.V eΊη τοΰτο και αίτιον τών ύστ€ρον. ωστ 8
eXnep εστιι/ eVia τών όντων €vSeχόμ€va έναντίως
exeiv, ανάγκη και τάς αρχάς αυτών etvai τοιαύτας'
1223 a €κ γάρ τών e^ ανάγκης άναγκαΐον το συμβαίνον
εστί, τα he γe evτeΰθev evheχeτaι yev'eo^ai εττι*
τάναντία. και ά* e(^' αύτοΐς εστί τοις άνθρώττοις,
ΤΓολλά τών τοιούτων, και άρχαι τών τοιούτων
eloiv αυτοί. ώστε όσων πpάζeωv 6 άνθρωπος 9
5 εστίν αρχή και κύριος, φavep6v οτι evheχeτaι και
^ινεσ^αι και μή, και οτι ε(^' αύτώ ταϋτ εστί
yι^'eσ^αι και μή, ων γe κύριος ε'στι του είναι και
^ μ€ταβάλ\(ΐ Ilic.
* Sp. : τέττηρίί. ' Ric. : μ€ταβάλ\θί,
* έττΐ add. Βζ. » Fr. : δ.
» C/. ^ηαί. Ροίί. Ι. i.
264
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. vi. 5-9
the first principle is a cause of the things that exist
or come into existence because of it, we must think
6 as we do in the case of demonstrations. For example,
if as the angles of a triangle are together equal to
two right angles the angles of a quadrilateral are
necessarily equal to four right angles, that the angles
of a triangle are equal to two right angles is clearly
the cause of that fact; and supposing a triangle
were to change, a quadrilateral would necessarily
change too — for example if the angles of a triangle
became equal to three right angles, the angles of a
quadrilateral would become equal to six right angles,
or if four, eight ; also if a triangle does not change
but is as described, a quadrilateral too must of
necessity be as described.
7 The necessity of Avhat we are arguing is clear from
Analytics " ; at present we cannot either deny or
affirm anything definitely except just this. Sup-
posing there were no further cause of the triangle's
having the property stated, then the triangle would
be a sort of first principle or cause of the later stages.
8 Hence if in fact there are among existing things some
that admit of the opposite state, their first principles
also must necessarily have the same quality ; for of
things that are of necessity the result is necessary,
albeit the subsequent stages may possibly happen
in the opposite way. And the things that depend on
men themselves in many cases belong to this class
of variables, and men are themselves the first prin-
9 ciple of things of this sort. Hence it is clear that Therefore
all the actions of which a man is the first principle vlce^are"*^
and controller may either happen or not happen, voluntary.
and that it depends on himself for them to happen
or not, as he controls their existence or non-existence.
265
ARISTOTLE
1223 a
τοΰ μη elvaL. δσα δ βφ αντώ ear ι ποί€Ϊν τη μη
TTOLciv, αίτιο? τούτων αντος^ εστίν, και όσων αίτιο?,
€^' αι5τω. €7Γ6ΐ δ' η τ€ αρετή καΐ η κακία και τα 10
10 άττ' αυτών έργα τα μεν επαινετά τά δε φεκτα
{φεγεται γαρ καΐ επαινείται ου τά} εξ ανάγκης η
τύχη? η φύσεως υπάρχοντα αλλ' όσων αύτοι "αί-
τιοι εσμεν, όσων γαρ αλλάς αίτιος εκείνος και τον
φόγον και τον επαινον €χει), 8ηλον οτι και η αρετή
15 και η κακία περί ταΰτ εστίν ων αύτος αίτιος και
άρχη πράζεων. ληπτεον άρα ποιων αύτος αίτιο? 1 1
Λταί άρχη πράζεων. πάντες μεν Srj όμολογοΰμεν,
οσα μεν εκούσια και κατά προαίρεσιν την έκαστου,
εκείνων'^ αίτιον eivai, οσα δ' ακουσία, ουκ αυτόν
αίτιον, πάντα δ' οσα προελόμενος, και εκών Βηλον
οτι. 8ηλον τοίνυν οτι και η αρετή και η κακία τών
20 εκουσίων αν εΐησαν.
VII. Αηπτεον άρα τι το εκούσιον και τι το 1
άκούσιον, και τι εστίν η προαίρεσις, επεώη η
άρετη και η κακία ορίζεται τούτοις• και* πρώτον
σκεπτεον το εκούσιον και το άκούσιον. τριών 8η 2
τούτων εν τι 8όζειεν άν^ eivai, ήτοι κατ ορεζιν η
•2ό κτατά προαίρεσιν η κατά Siavoiav, το μεν εκούσιον
κατά τούτων τι, το δ ακούσιοι^ πάρα τούτων τι.
αλλά μην ή ορεζις εις τρία διαι/3€Γται, ei? βούλησιν 3
^ Βζ. : oiVoj. ^ Fr. : διά τά.
' Fr. : ίκ€Ϊνοι>. * καΐ add. Fr. * Άν add. Sp.
266
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. vi. 9— vii. 3
But of things which it depends on him to do or not
to do he is himself the cause, and what he is the
10 cause of depends on himself. And since goodness
and badness and the actions that spring from them
are in some cases praiseworthy and in other cases
blameworthy (for praise and blame are not given
to things that we possess from necessity or fortune
or nature but to things of which we ourselves are
the cause, since for things of which another person
is the cause, that person has the blame and the
praise), it is clear that both goodness and badness
have to do with things where a man is himself the
11 cause and origin of his actions. We must, then, ascer-
tain what is the kind of actions of which a man is
himself the cause and origin. Now we all agree
that each man is the cause of all those acts that are
voluntary and purposive for him individually, and
that he is not himself the cause of those that are
involuntary. And clearly he commits voluntarily
all the acts that he commits purposely. It is clear,
then, that both goodness and badness will be in the
class of things voluntary.
1 VII. We must, therefore, ascertain what voluntary the
, . 1 τ 1 , . • l• • VOLUNTAItY
and mvoluntary mean, and what is purposive choice, (cc. vii ix).
since they enter into the definition of goodness and acung°by
badness. And first we must consider the meaning of impulse,
xTl• ijj. whether in
2 voluntary and mvoluntary. Now they would seem to the form of
refer to one of three things — conformity with appe- appetite
tition, or with purposive choice, or with thought :
voluntary is Avhat conforms with one of these and in-
3 voluntary is what contravenes one of them. But
moreover there are three subdivisions of appetition —
267
ARISTOTLE
1223 a
/cat θνμον /cat έττιθυμίαν , ώστε ταύτα hLaiperiov•
/cat πρώτον τό^ κατ ίτηθυμίαν.
lS,o^eLe δ' αν παν το κατ €πίθνμίαν ίκούσιον 4
eti^at. το γαρ ακονσιον παν hoKel elvai βίαιον,
30 το 8e βίαιον λυπηρόν, /cat παν δ άναγκαζόμβνοι
ποιονσιν η πάσχονσιν , ωσπβρ /cat Ένηνός φησί'
παν γαρ άναγκαΐον πραγμ άνιαρον ζφν
ώστ' et Tt λυπηρον βίαίον /cat et Tt* βιαιον λύπη- 5
ρόν το δε παρά την €πίθυμίαν παν λνπηρόν {η
35 γαρ επιθυμία τον rjheos), ώστε βίαιον /cat άκονσίον.
το άρα κατ βπιθνμίαν ίκονσιον ει^αντ/α γαρ ταϋτ
άλληλοι?. έτι 1^ μοχθηρία ά8ικώτ€ρον πάσα 7ΓOtεt, 6
■jj δ' άκρασία μοχθηρία δo/cεt εtvαt• ό δ άκρατης
οίος κατά' Ti^f βπιθυμίαν παρά τον λογισμόν
πράτταν, ά/cpατευεταt δ' όταν Ινβργη κατ αύττ^ν'•
1223 b ώσ^' 6 άκρατης άδt/C7^σεt τω πραττ€ΐν κατ
€πιθυμίαν . το δ' α,δt/cεt^' Ικούσιον*• €κών άρα
πράζ^ι, και ίκούσιον το κατ €πιθυμιαν. και γαρ
άτοπον €1 hiKaioTepoi έσονται οι άκρατ€Ϊς γινό-
/xε^Όt/ — ε/c μβν τοίννν τούτων δό^ειει/ αν το κατ 7
5 επιθυμίαν ίκούσιον elvai• e/c δε τώι^δε τουναντίον ,
άπαν γάρ ο ίκών τις πράττει βουλόμενος πράττει,
^ τό add. Cas. ^ ei τι rec. Ρ•' : d.
' olos κατά Sp. : δ κατά. et oios infra ante ττράττΐΐν.
* τό δ' . . . ΐκούσιον hie Rac. : supra ante ώσθ' ό άκρατψ.
* /cat 7άρ • • . -/ιν&μ^νοι Supra post τφ πράττ€ΐν κατ έιτιθνμίαν
tr. ? Rac.
" Quoted also Met. 1015 a 28 and (without author's name)
Rhet. 1370 a 10, and = Theognidea 472 (but that has χρημ
άνιαρόν); probably by the elder Evenus of Paros,^. 460 b.c.
(Bowra, CI. Rev. xlviii. 2).
* In the Mss. this sentence precedes the one before.
268
I EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. vii. 3-7
' wish, passion and desire ; so that we have to dis-
: tinguish these. And first we must consider con-
;' formity with desire.
ΐ: It would seem that everything that conforms with (to yield to
: J. . 1, 1-.•^ ii,• • Λ Λ. which can
desire is voluntary, tor everything involuntary bs shown
(seems to be forced, and what is forced and everything as both
that people do or suffer under necessity is painful, and in-
as indeed Evenus says : voluntary),
For all necessity doth cause distress — <*
so that if a thing is painful it is forced and if a thing
is forced it is painful ; but everything contrary to
t desire is painful (for desire is for what is pleasant),
so that it is forced and involuntary. Therefore what
conforms with desire is voluntary, for things con-
trary to and things in conformity with desire are
opposite to one another. Again, all wickedness
makes a man more unrighteous, and lack of self-
control seems to be wickedness ; and the uncontrolled
I man is the sort of man to act in conformity with desire
contrary to calculation, and he shows his lack of
control when his conduct is guided by desire ; so
that the uncontrolled man will act unrighteously by
acting in conformity with desire. But unrighteous
action is voluntary. ** Therefore he will be acting
voluntarily, and action guided by desire is voluntary.
Indeed it would be strange if those who become
ί uncontrolled will be more righteous." — From these or of anger
considerations, then, it would appear that what is in sa°me^^
conformity with desire is voluntary ; and from this the reason),
opposite ** follows, for all that a man does voluntarily
ί
<^ This sentence would come in better above, after ' acting
in conformity with desire.'
"* Viz. that what is against desire is involuntary.
269
ARISTOTLE i
/cat δ jSouAerat ίκών, βουλίται δ ονθ^Ις ο oterat
elvai κακόν, άλλα /χι^ι^ ο άκρατβυόμ^νος ονχ α
βονΧζταί TTOLel, το yap τταρ' δ οΓεται βΙΧηστον
elvai ττράτταν δι' Ιττιθυμίαν άκρατ€ύ€σθαί ioTLV
10 ώστε α/χα σνμβησβταί τον αυτόν εκόντα και άκοντα
πράττ€ΐ,ν. τοΰτο δ' αδύνατον, έτι δ ό εγκρατής 8
hiKaioTTpayqaei,, καΐ μάλλον της άκρασίας' η γαρ
€γκράτ€ΐα άρβτή, ή δ' άρβτη δικαιοτέρου? ποιεί.
€γκρατ€ν€ται δ' δταν ττράτττ] τταρα την βτηθυμίαν
κατά τον λογισμόν. ώστ ει το ρ-έν δικαΐ07Γρα•)/εΓν
15 €κούσίον, ώσττερ και το άδικειν {αμφω γαρ δοκει
ταύτα εκούσια είναι, και ανάγκη ει θατ^ρον
ίκούσιον και θάτβρον), το δε παρά την βτηθυμίαν
άκονσιον, άμα άρα 6 αύτος το αυτό ττράζα εκών
και άκων.
Ό δ' αυτό? λόγο? και ττερι θυμοΰ• άκρασία γάρ 9
και εγκράτεια και θυμοΰ δοκει είναι ώσττερ και
20 ζττιθυμίας, και το παρά τον θυμον λνπηρόν και
βίαιον η κάθίζίς, ώστ' ει το βίαιον άκουσιον, το
κατά τον θυμον ίκούσιον αν eh] πάν. €θΐκ€ δε
και 'Ηράκλειτο? λε'γειν ει? τήν Ισχύν του θυμοΰ
βλίφας ΟΤΙ λυπηρά η κώλυσις αυτού• " χαλεττόν
yap " ^τ^σι " θυμώ μάχεσθαι, φυχης γάρ ώνεΐται."
25 ει δ' αδύνατον το αύτό^ εκόντα και άκοντα πράττουν 1
άρ,α και'' κατά το αυτό τοΰ πράγματος, μάλλον
ίκούσιον το κατά βούλησιν τοΰ κατ ^πιθυμίαν
^ Ρ*>: τό αυτόν Μ*»: rbv αντόρ edd. ** και Βζ. : το.
" The natural philosopher of Ephesus,yi. c. 513 b.c. His
sentence ended δ τι yap olv XPvtv yivfcdai, ψνχψ uvehai,
lamblichus, Protrepticus, p. 140.
270
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. vii. 7-10
he wishes to do, and what he wishes to do he does
voluntarily, but nobody wishes what he thinks to be
bad. But yet the uncontrolled man does not do
what he wishes, for being uncontrolled means acting
against what one thinks to be best owing to desire ;
hence it will come about that the same person is
acting voluntarily and involuntarily at the same
8 time. But this is impossible. And further, the
self-controlled man will act righteously, or more
righteously than lack of control will ; for self-control
is goodness, and goodness makes men more righteous.
And a man exercises self-control when he acts against
his desire in conformity with rational calculation.
So that if righteous action is voluntary, as also un-
righteous action (for both of these seem to be volun-
tary, and if one of them is voluntary it follows of
necessity that the other is also), whereas what is
contrary to desire is involuntary, it therefore follows
that the same person will do the same action volun-
tarily and involuntarily at the same time.
9 The same argument applies also in the case of or of wish
passion ; for there appear to be control and lack of in^oives^**"
control of passion as well as of desire and what is contra-
contrary to passion is painful and restraint is a '''*^*''°°)•
matter of force, so that if what is forced is involun-
tary, what is in accordance with passion Λνΐΐΐ always
be voluntary. Even Heracleitus " seems to have in
view the strength of passion when he remarks that
the checking of passion is painful ; for ' It is difficult
(he says) to do battle with passion, for it buys its wish
10 at the price of life.' And if it is impossible to do the
same act voluntarily a,nd involuntarily at the same
time and in respect of the same part of the act,
action guided by one's wish is more voluntary than
271
ARISTOTLE
1228 b
καΐ θυμόν. τ€κμηρίον δε'• ττολλά γαρ πράττομ€ν
βκόντζς avev οργής καΐ €ττιθυμίας.
AetVerat άρα el το βουλόμενον καΐ ίκούσιον 11
30 ταύτο σκβφασθαί. φαίν€ταί δε καΐ τοΰτο aSvvarov.
ύττόκβίταί γαρ ημΐν καΐ ^οκ€Ϊ η μοχθηρία άδικω-
ripovg TTOieZv, rj δ' άκρασία μοχθηρία τι? φαίνεται.
σνμβήσ€ται δε τουναντίον βούλ^ται μβν γαρ ονθίΐς
α o'leTat eivai κακά, ττράττΐΐ δ όταν γίνηται^
άκρατης' ει ουν το μβν aSiKelv €Κούσιον, το δ'
35 eKovoLOv το κατά βούλησιν, όταν άκρατης •)/εν7^ται,
ovK€TL άδικτ^σει, αλλ' εσται δικαιότερο? η πριν
γενέσθαι άκρατης, τοΰτο δ' άδυνατοΓ. οτι μεν
τοίνυν ουκ εστί το εκούσιον το κατά ορεζιν ττράτ-
τειν οι)δ' άκουσιον το παρά την ορεζιν φανερόν.
VIII, "Οτι δ' ού8έ κατά ττροαίρεσιν, ττάλιν εκ 1
τώνδε δτ^λον. το μεν γάρ κατά βουλησιν ώς ουκ
άκουσιον^ απεδείχθη, άλλα μάλλον^ παν ο βου-
1224 a λεται και εκούσιον άλλ οτι κ:αι μη βουλομενον
εν^εχεταί πράττειν εκόντα, τοΰτο δε'δεικται μόνον.*
πολλά δε βουλόμενοι πράττομεν εζαίφνης, προαιρεί-
ται δ' ουδει? ουδει^ εξαίφνης.
5 Ει δε ανάγκη μεν ην τριών τούτων εν τι είναι 2
το εκούσιον, η κατ* ορεζιν η κατά προαίρεσιν η
^ So]. : "γίνηται.
* οΰχ ώϊ (κούσων ? Rac. {ούχ ώ? ά.κ. Ras. : ojs ά/c. ουκ. Βζ.).
* μάλλον <δτι> ? RaC. * [μόνον] Sol.
" Or, altering the text, ' It was proved not that acting in
accordance with one's wishes is the same as acting volun-
tarily, but rather that all one wishes is also voluntary although
it is possible to act voluntarily without wishing — this is all
that has been proved ; but many things that we wish — — '
" Cf. 1223 a 23 ff.
272
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. vn. 10— viii. 2
action guided by desire or passion. And a proof of
this is that we do many things voluntarily without
anger or desire.
It remains, therefore, to consider whether acting
as we wish and acting voluntarily are the same.
This also seems impossible. For it is a fundamental
assumption with us, and a general opinion, that
wickedness makes men more unrighteous ; and lack
of self-control seems to be a sort of wickedness.
But from the hypothesis that acting as we wish and
acting voluntarily are the same the opposite will
result ; for nobody wishes things that he thinks to
be bad, yet he does them when he has become un-
controlled, so if to do injustice is voluntary and the
voluntary is what is in accordance with one's wish,
then when a man has become uncontrolled he will no
longer be acting unjustly but will be more just than
he was before he lost control of himself. But this is
impossible. Therefore it is clear that acting volun-
tarily does not mean acting in accordance with
appetition nor acting involuntarily acting in op-
position to appetition.
VIII. Also it is clear from the following considera- nor is it
tions that voluntary action does not mean acting in p„^polive.
accordance with purposive choice. It was proved <*
that acting in accordance with one's wish is not
acting involuntarily, but rather everything that one
wishes is also voluntary — it has only been proved that
it is possible to do a thing voluntarily without wish-
ing ; but many things that we wish we do suddenly,
whereas nobody makes a purposive choice suddenly.
But if as we said ^ the voluntary must necessarily Therefore
be one of three things — what is in conformity with ap- gx^jygiQn
petition, or with purposive choice, or with thought — ,
τ 273
ARISTOTLE
1224 a
Kara SidvoLav, τούτων δε τα δυο μτ] εστί, λείττεται
ev τω Βιανοονμενόν πως πράττ€ΐ,ν elvai το ίκούσιον.
€TL Be μΛκρόν προαγαγόντ€ς τον λόγον ^τηθώμ^ν 3
τέΧος τω ττβρί τον βκουσίου καΐ ακουσίου Βιορισμω,
10 hoKei γαρ το βία καΐ μτ) βία τι TTOLeiv οΙκεΐα τοις
€ίρ'ημ€νοίς elvai• τό re γαρ βίαιον άκούσιον και
το άκούσιον τταν βίαιον elvat φαμέν. ώστβ Trepl
του βία σκ€7ττ€ον πρώτον τι εστί και πώς €χ€ΐ
προς το ίκούσιον /cat άκούσιον. Sofcei δη τό 4
βίαιον καΙ τό άναγκαΐον άντίΚ€Ϊσθαι, καΐ η βία
15 καΐ ή ανάγκη, τω €κουσίω και ttj πβιθοΐ €πι
των πραττομάνων. καθόλου he τό βίαιον και την
ανάγκην και €.πι τών άφύχων Xeγoμev• και γαρ
τον λίθον άνω και το πυρ κάτω βία και άναγκαζό-
μeva φ4ρ€σθαι φaμev, ταΰτα^ δ όταν κατά την
φύσ€ΐ^ και την καθ* αυτά ορμην φ€ρηται, ου βία
— ου μην οι)δ' εκούσια λέγεται, αλλ ανώνυμος
20 η άντίθεσις, όταν δε παρά ταύτην, βία φαμεν.
ομοίως δε και επι εμφνχων και επι τών ζώων 5
όρώμεν βία πολλά και πάσχοντα και ποιοΰντα,
όταν παρά την εν αύτώ ορμην έξωθεν τι κινη. ev
μεν τοις άφύχοις άπλη η άρχη, ev δε τοις εμφύχοις
πλεονάζει• ου γάρ άει η όρεζις και ό λόγος συμ-
25 φωνεΐ. ώστ επι μεν τών άλλων ζώων απλούν 6
τό βίαιον, ώσπερ επι τών άφύχων {ου γαρ έχει
^ Fr, : τοΰτο, * ν.1. φνσιν.
274
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 2-6
and if it is not the two former, it remains that volun- «f. i323 a 21)
tariness consists in acting with some kind of thought, voluntary
3 Moreover, let us put a conclusion to our delimitation ^^^^"jjj °"
of the voluntary and involuntary by carrying the
argument a little further. Acting under compulsion Compulsion
Ο ^ is irom
and not under compulsion seem to be terms akin without;
to the ones mentioned ; for we say that everything
forced is involuntary and everything involuntary is
forced. So we must first consider the exact meaning
of ' forced,' and how what is forced is related to the
4 voluntary and involuntary. It seems, then, that in
the sphere of conduct ' forced ' or ' necessary,' and
force or necessity, are the opposite of ' voluntary,'
and of persuasion. And we employ the terms force
and necessity in a general sense even in the case of
inanimate objects : we say that a stone travels up-
wards and fire downwards by force and under neces-
sity, whereas when they travel according to their
natural and intrinsic impulse we say that they do
not move under force — although nevertheless they
are not spoken of as moving voluntarily : the state
opposite to forced motion has no name, but when
they travel contrary to their natural impulse we say
5 that they move by force. Similarly also in the case
of living things and of animals, we see many being
acted on by force, and also acting under force when
something moves them from outside, contrary to the
impulse within the thing itself. In inanimate things
the moving principle is simple, but in living things it
is multiple, for appetition and rational principle are whereas the
6 not always in harmony. Hence whereas in the case fmpu!se°by
of the other animals the factor of force is simple, yeason is
as it is in the case of inanimate objects, for animals and '
do not possess rational principle and appetition in ^ο^^^^^^^ν
275
ARISTOTLE
1224 a
λόγον καΐ ope^Lv Ιναντίαν, άλλα τ^ ope^et ζτ^)' ev
ο ανθρώττω eveariv αμφω, καΐ ev tlvl -ηλίκία, "^
και το πράττ€ΐν άττοΒίΒομ^ν {ου γαρ φαμ€ν το
παιΒίον 7τράττ€ίν, ovSe το θηρίον, άλλα, τόν^ η8η
30 δια λογισμόν πράττοντα) . δο/cet δή το βίαιον 7
άτταν λυπηρον eivai, καΐ ούθ€ΐς βία μίν ίτοιεΙ
"χαίρων he. διό ττβρι τον Ιγκραττ] καΐ τον άκρατη
πλείστη άμφισβητησίς εστίν. Ιναντίας γαρ ορμάς
€χων αύτος ίκάτ^ρος^ αύτω πράττ€ί, ώσθ^ ο τ'
€γκρατΎ]ς βίΟ-, φασίν, άφελκων^ αντον άττό των
35 rjSewv Ιτηθυμών^ [αλγβΐ γαρ άφέλκων ττρος αντι-
τ€ΐνονσαν την ορεζιν), 6 τ άκρατης βία παρά τον
λογισμόν. 'ήττον Se δο/cet λνπβΐσθαι, η γάρ eVt- 8
θνμία του η^βος, fj άκολουθβΐ χαίρων ωσ&* 6
άκρατης μάλλον €κών καΐ ου βία, οτι ου λυπηρώς.
η δε τταθώ τη βία και ανάγκη άντιτίθ€ται, 6 δ'
1224 b εγκρατής βφ α ττεττεισται ά'γεται/ καΐ πορ€υ€ται
ου βία άλλ' βκών η δ' Ιτηθυμία ου ττεισασα ayet,
ου γαρ /χετεχει λόγου, οτι μ€ν ουν SokoOgcv ούτοι 9
μόνον* βία και άκοντες notelv, και δια tiV αΐτίαν,
ότι κα^ ομοιότητα τίνα του βία, καθ* ην και επι
5 των αφυχων λ^γομεν, (ϊρηται. ου μην άλλ' ei ίο
τι? προσθειη^ το iv τω 8ιορισμω ηροσκείμενον
^ lac. : άλλ' 6ταν. * Sp. : ?«αστο5.
' Sp. : άφέλκβι.
* Bek. : έττιθυμιών {των ζ,των^ ήδ^ων επιθυμιών Fr.)•
* &^ΐται ? Sol. {όρμψ ? Ric): Λγβι.
• Rac. : μόνοι. ' Sp. : ιτροσθτϊ.
" Or ' conduct.'
276
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 6-10
opposition to it, but live by their appetition, in man
both forms of force are present — that is, at a certain
age, the age to which we attribute action ** in the
proper sense ; for we do not speak of a child as
acting, any more than a wild animal, but only a person
who has attained to acting by rational calculation.
7 So what is forced always seems to be painful, and no
one acting under force acts gladly. Consequently there
is a great deal of dispute about the self-controlled
man and the uncontrolled. For each of them acts
under a conflict of impulses within him, so that the
self-controlled man, they say, acts under force in
dragging himself away from the pleasures that he
covets (for he feels pain in dragging himself away
against the resistance of appetition), while the un.-
controlled man acts under force in going contrary
8 to his rational faculty. But he seems to feel less
pain, because desire is for what is pleasant, and he
follows his desire ; so that the uncontrolled man
rather acts voluntarily and not under force, because
not painfully. On the other hand persuasion is
thought to be the opposite of force and necessity ;
and the self-controlled man is led towards things
that he has been persuaded to pursue, and proceeds
not under force but voluntarily ; whereas desire
leads a man on without employing persuasion, since
9 it possesses no element of rational principle. It has,
then, been stated that these men only seem to act
under force and involuntarily ; and we have shown
the reason — it is because their action has a certain
resemblance to forced action, just as we speak of
forced action even in the case of inanimate objects
10 too. Yet nevertheless if one added there also the
addition made in our definition, the statement is
277
ARISTOTLE
1224 b
κακ€Ϊ, λύεται το λ^χθβν. όταν μβν γάρ τι των
ζξωθζν τταρά την ev αντω όρμην Kivfj η Ύ]ρ€μίζ'η,
βία φαμβν, όταν 8e μη, ου βία• iv δε τω ΙγκρατέΙ
10 /cat ακρατ€Ϊ η καθ αύτον ορμή ivovaa ayei {αμφω
γαρ €χ€ΐ), ωστ ου βία ού^έτ€ρος αλλ' ίκών δια
ye ταύτα πράττοί αν ουδ' άναγκαζόμ€νος, την 11
γάρ έξωθεν άρχην την παρά την όρμην η €μποΒί-
ζουσαν η κινούσαν ανάγκην λ4γομ€ν, ώσπβρ et τις
λαβών την χ^ΐρα τύπτοι τινά άντιτβίνοντος και
16 τω βούλβσθαι και τω €πιθυμ€Ϊν• όταν δ' €σωθ€ν
η αρχή, ου βία. eVt^ και ή8ονή και λύπη iv
άμφοτ€ροις eveoTiv και γάρ 6 €γκρατ€υόμ€νος 1 2
λυπβΐται παρά την επιθυμίαν πράττων ή8η και
χαίρει την am ελπίΒος η^ονήν δτι ύστερον ώφελη-
θήσεται η και ή8η ωφελείται ύγιαίνων, και ό
20 άκρατης χαίρει μεν τυγχάνων άκρατευόμενος ου
επιθυμεί λυπεΐται 8έ την άττ' ελπίδος λύπην, οΐεται
γαρ κακόν πράττειν. ώστε τό μεν βία εκάτερον 13
φάναι ποιεΐν έχει λόγον, και δια την όρεζιν και
δια τον λογισμόν εκάτερον άκοντα ποτέ πράττειν
κεχωρισμενα γάρ όντα εκάτερα εκκρουεται υπ*
25 άλλτ^λωι^. όθεν και επι την όλην μεταφερουσι
φυχήν, ότι επι^ των εν φυχη τι τοιούτον όρώσιν.
επι μεν ουν των μορίων ενδερ^βται τοϋτο λέγειν, η 14
δ όλη εκοΰσα φυχη και του άκρατους και του
1 Sus.: 6τι. 2 δτ-ί f πι Sol. : δτι.
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 10-14
refuted. For we speak of a thing as being forced
to act when something external moves it or brings
it to rest, acting against the impulse within the thing
itself — when there is no external motive, we do not
say that it acts under force ; and in the uncontrolled
man and the self-controlled it is the impulse present
in the man himself that drives him (for he has both
impulses), so that as far as these considerations go
neither of them Avould be acting under force, but
11 voluntarily ; nor yet are they acting of necessity,
for by necessity we mean an external principle that
either checks or moves a man in opposition to his
impulse — as if A were to take hold of B's hand and
with it strike C, B's will and desire both resisting ;
whereas when the source of action is from within, we
12 do not speak of the act as done under force./ Again,
both pleasure and pain are present in both cases ; for
a man exercising self-control both feels pain when he
finally acts in opposition to his desire and enjoys the
pleasure of hoping that he will be benefited later on,
or is even being benefited already, by being in good
health ; and the uncontrolled man enjoys getting
what he desires owing to his lack of self-control,
but feels prospective pain because he thinks he is
13 doing a bad thing. Hence it is reasonable to say
that each does what he does under compulsion, and
that each is at one point acting involuntarily, from
motives both of appetition and of rational calculation
— for calculation and appetition are things quite
separate, and each is pushed aside by the other.
Hence men transfer this to the spirit as a whole,
because they see something of this sort in the ex-
14 periences of the spirit. Now it is admissible to say
this in the case of the parts, but the spirit as a whole
279
ARISTOTLE
1224 b
€γκρατοΰς πράττ€ί, βία δ' ovBerepog,^ άλλα των
ev βκΐίνοίς τι., evret /cat φύσ^ι αμφότερα εχομεν
30 καΐ γαρ 6 λόγος φύσει υπάρχει" οτί εωμενης της
γενέσεως και μη πηρωθείσης ei'eWat, και ή επι-
θυμία ΟΤΙ ευθύς εκ γενετής ακολουθεί και eVeaTti^•
σχεΒον 8ε τούτοις δυσι το φύσει 8ιορίζομεν, τω τε 15
δσα ευθύς γινομενοις ακολουθεί πάσι, και δσα
εωμενης της γενέσεως εύθυπορεΐν yiVerat ημΐν,
35 οίον πολιά, και γήρας και ταλλα τα τοιαύτα, ώστε
μη κατά φύσιν εκάτερος πράττει πώς,^ απλώς Be
κατά φύσιν εκατερος, ου την αύτην. αΐ μεν οΰν 16
περί τον εγκρατή και άκρατη άπορίαι αύται,* περί
του βία πράττειν η αμφότερους η τον έτερον,
ώστε η μη εκόντας η άμα βία και εκόντας,^ εΐ
hk το βία άκούσιον,^ άμα εκόντας και άκοντας
1225 a πράττειν σχεδόν 8ε εκ των είρημενων 8ηλον ημΐν
ως άπαντητεον.
Αεγονται δε κατ' αλλοΓ τρόπον βία και άναγκα• 17
σθεντες πραζαι ού διαφωνούντος του λόγου και
της όρεζεως, όταν πράττωσιν ο και λυπηρόν και
5 φαΰλον ύπολαμβάνουσιν άλλα' μη τούτο πράτ-
τονσιν^ 7Γλΐ7}/αι η Βεσμοι η θάνατοι ώσιν ταύτα
γάρ φασιν άναγκασθεντες πράξαι. η ού, αλλά 18
πάντες εκόντες ποιοΰσιν αυτά ταύτα,' εζεστι γάρ
^ ούδίτέρον ? Rac. * υπάρχει Ras. : άρχων.
» ττώ? add. ante μη Sus., hie Sol. (cf. 1225 a 12 ed.).
* αύται add. Bus. * Sp. : άκοντα!.
• Bz. : έκούσιον. ' Rac. : άλλ' &v.
* Sp. : νράττωσι. * Sp. : atVo τούτο.
280
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 14-18
both in the uncontrolled and in the self-controlled
man acts voluntarily, and in neither case does the
man act under compulsion, but one of the parts in
them so acts — for we possess by nature both parts ;
since rational principle is a natural property, because
it will be present in us if our growth is allowed and
not stunted, and also desire is natural, because it
15 accompanies and is present in us from birth ; and
these are pretty nearly the two things by which we
define the natural — it is what accompanies every-
body as soon as he is born, or else what comes to
us if development is allowed to go on regularly, for
example grey hair, old age, etc. Therefore each of
the two persons in a way acts not in accordance with
nature, but absolutely each does act according to
nature, though not according to the same nature.
16 The difficulties, then, raised about the uncontrolled
and the self-controlled man are these : do both, or
does one of them, act under compulsion, so that
they either act not voluntarily or else voluntarily
and under compulsion at the same time — and if what
is done under compulsion is involuntary, act volun-
tarily and involuntarily at the same time ? And it
is fairly clear from what has been said how these
difficulties are to be met.
17 But there is another way in which people are said Mixed acts
to act under compulsion and of necessity without Voluntary
disagreement between rational principle and appe- s^^^caufed
tition, when they do something that they consider iay over-
actually painful and bad but they are faced by nwtfvesf
flogging or imprisonment or. execution if they do not
do it ; for in these cases they say that they are acting
18 under necessity. Possibly, however, this is not the
case, but they all do the actual deeds willingly, since
281
ARISTOTLE
1225 a
μη ποί€Ϊν αλλ' eKcluo νττομ^Ιναι το πάθος. έ'τι 19
LOWS τούτων τά μ€ν φαίη τις άν τά δ' ου. δσα
10 μβν γαρ εφ' αύτω των τοιούτων μη ύττάρζαι η
νπαρξαι,^ καΐ^ οσα πράττβι α μη βούλ€ταί ίκών
πραττ€ΐ και ου βία• οσα 8e μη βφ* αύτώ των
τοιούτων, ^ια πως, ου μεντοι y απλώς οτι ουκ
αύτο τοΰτο προαιρείται ο πράττει αλλ' ου eve-
κα• €π€ΐ και iv τούτοις εστί τι? Βιαφορά. el γαρ 20
15 iv-a μη λάβη φηλαφών άποκτείνη, γελοίος άν εϊη
ει λεγοι οτι βία και άναγκαζόμενος, άλλα 8εΐ
μείζον κακόν και λυπηρότερον είναι δ πείσεται
μη ποιιησας. ούτω γαρ άναγκαζόμενος και η^ βία
πράξει η ου φύσει όταν κακόν άγαθοΰ ένεκα η
μείζονος κακοΰ απολύσεως πράττη, και άκων ye•
20 ου γαρ εφ αύτω ταύτα. διό και τόν έρωτα 21
πολλοί άκούσιον τιθεασιν και θυμούς ενίους και
τα φυσικά, ότι ισχυρά και ύπερ την φύσιν και
συγγνώμην εχομεν ως πεφυκότα ^ιάζβσ^αι την
φύσιν. και μάλλον άν 8όζειε βία και άκων
πραττειν ίνα μη άλγη ισχυρώς η ίνα μη ήρεμα,
2•'' και όλως ϊνα μη άλγη η Ινα χαίρη. τό γαρ εφ^
1 μη πραξαι ή πραξαι Sp. ^ καΐ (vel άύ) Βζ, : Μ.
' Βζ. : μη.
' Or ' for in those of such acts which it rests with himself
to do or not.'
* i.e. in blind-man's-l>uff, μνΐνδα or χα\κη μυΐα.
283
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 18-21
it is open to them not to do them but to endure
19 the penalty threatened. Moreover, perhaps someone
might say that in some cases these actions are done
of necessity and in others not. For in cases where
the presence or absence of such circumstances de-
pends on the agent himself," even the actions that he
does without wishing to do them he does willingly
and not under compulsion ; but where in such cases
the circumstances do not rest with himself, he acts
under compulsion in a sense, though not indeed
under compulsion absolutely, because he does not
definitely choose the actual thing that he does but
the object for which he does it ; since even in the
20 objects of action there is a certain difference. For
if someone were to kill a man to prevent his catching
him by groping for him,** it would be ridiculous for
him to say that he had done it under compulsion
and of necessity — there must be some greater and
more painful evil that he will suffer if he does not
do it. It is when a man does something evil for
the sake of something good, or for deliverance from
another evil, that he will be acting under necessity
and by compulsion, or at all events not by nature ;
and then he will really be acting unwillingly, for
21 these actions do not rest with himself. On this
account many reckon even love as involuntary, and
some forms of anger, and natural impulses, because
their power is even" beyond nature ; and we pardon
them as naturally capable of constraining nature.
And it would be thought that a man is acting more
under compulsion and involuntarily when his object
is to avoid violent pain than when it is to avoid mild
pain, and in general more when his object is the
avoidance of pain than when it is to gain enjoyment.
283
ARISTOTLE
1225 a
αύτω, els ο avayerat όλον, τοντ iarlv δ ή αύτον
φύσις οία re φ€ρ€ίν• δ δε μη οία re μη8' iarl
της ξκβίνου φύσει ορέξεως η λογισμού, ουκ εφ^
αντώ. διό και τους ενθουσιώντας και προλέγοντας, 22
καιττερ οιανοιας έργον ττοιονντας, δμως ου φαμεν
30 εφ^ αύτοΐς eii^at οϋτ^ ειπείν α εΐπον ούτε ττραξαι
α έπραξαν, αλλά μην ούΒε δι' επιθυμίαν ώστε 23
ψ Siavoiai τίνες και πάθη ουκ εφ" ήμΐν είσΐν
η πράξεις αϊ κατά τάς τοιαύτας 8ιανοίας καΐ
λογισμούς, αλλ' ωσπερ Φιλόλαο? εφη εΐναί τινας
λόγους κρείττους ημών.
Ώστ ei το εκούσιον και άκούσιον και προς το
3ό ρια έ'δβι σκεφασθαι, τοΰτο μεν ούτω 8ιηρησθω (οι
γαρ /χάλιστ' εμπο^ίζοντες το εκούσιον . . .* ώ? ^ια
πράττοντες, αλλ' εκόντες).
IX. Εττει δε τοϋτ" έχει τέλος, και ούτε τη ι
ορεξει ούτε τη προαιρεσει το εκούσιον ώρισται,
\ZZbh λοιπόν 8η όρίσασθαι τό^ κατά την 8ιάνοιαν. ho κει 2
οη εναντίον eit-ai το εκούσιον τω άκουσίω, και το
εώότα η δν η ω η ου ένεκα {ενίοτε γάρ οι8ε μεν
ΟΤΙ πατήρ αλλ ούχ ίνα άποκτείνη αλλ' ίνα σώση,
ωσπερ αί Πελιάδε?, ήτοι ώς το8ι* μεν πόμα αλλ'
5 ώς φίλτρον και οΐνον, το δ' ην κώνειον) τώ
αγνοοΰντα^ και ον και ω και δ δι' άγνοιαν, μη
^ ^ ? Ric. : και. " lacunam edd.
» το e Μ. Μ. 1188 b 26 Sp. : τα.
* τοδί Fr. : δτι. ^ Ricckher : ayvoovpri.
" Pythagorean philosopher contemporary with Socrates.
* Some words seem to have been lost here (αλλά suggests
that they contained a negative).
" The daughters of Pelias, King of lolchus, cut him up
and boiled him, having been told by Medea (who wanted
Jason to leave his throne) that this would restore his youth.
284
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. viii. 21— ix. 2
• For what rests with himself — and it wholly turns. on
this — means what his nature is able to bear ; what
his nature is not able to bear and what is not a
matter of his own natural appetition or calculation
22 does not rest with himself. On this account also
in the case of persons who are inspired and utter
prophecies, although they perform an act of thought,
nevertheless we do not say that saying what they
said and doing what they did rested with themselves.
23 Nor yet do we say that what men do because of
desire rests with themselves ; so that some thoughts
and emotions, or the actions that are guided by such
thoughts and calculations, do not rest with ourselves,
but it is as Philolaus " said — ' some arguments are
too strong for us.'
Hence if it was necessary to consider the voluntary
and involuntary with reference also to acting under
compulsion, let this be our decision of the matter
(for those who cause most hindrance . . . the volun-
tary . . .** as acting under compulsion, but voluntarily).
1 IX. Now that this is concluded, and as the volun- Definition of
tary has been found not to be defined by appetition, andTn^^'^^
nor yet by purposive choice, it therefore remains to voluntary.
define it as that which is in accordance with thought, in ignorance
2 Now the voluntary seems to be the opposite of '^^l^f i^
the involuntary ; and acting with knowledge of involuntary.
either the person acted on or the instrument or
the result (for sometimes the agent knows that it is
his father but does not intend to kill him but to save
him — as the Peliads " did — or knows that what he
is oiFering is a drink but oifers it as a love-charm or
wine, when really it is hemlock) seems to be the
opposite of acting without knowing the person acted
on, the instrument and the nature of the act, through
285
ARISTOTLE
1225 b
κατά συμβββηκός. το 8e δι' άγνοιαν /cat ο και ω
και ον ακονσιον. το evavTiov άρ ίκούσιον. οσα 3
μεν ονν e^' iavTW ον μη πράτταν ττράττα μη
αγνοών /cat 8t' αυτόν, ίκούσια ταϋτ ανάγκη elvai,
10 /cat το εκουσιον τοΰτ eoTLv οσα δ αγνοών και
δια το άγνοξίν, άκων. inci he το €πιστασθαι και 4
το βιδεναι Sittov, ev μβν το €χ€ΐν, ev be το χρησθαι
τη επιστήμη, 6 έχων μη χρώμενος he εστί μεν
ώς hiKatws αν^ αγνοών Χεγοιτο, εστί δ' ώς ου
hiKaiwg, οίον ει δι' a/ieAeiai' μη εχρητο. ομοίως
15 hε και μη έχων τις φεγοιτο άν, ει δ pdhiov η
αναγκαΐον ην μη εχει^ δι' a/xeAeial•' η ήhovηv η
λύττην. ταυτ' οΰν TrpoohiopiOTiov.
Υ\ερι μεν οΰν του εκουσίου και ακουσίου hi-
ωρισθω^ τοϋτον τον τρόπον.
Χ. ΐίερί hε προαιρέσεως μετά τοΰτο λεγωμεν, ΐ
hιaπopησavτες πρώτον τω λόγω περί αύτης.
20 hιστάσειε γαρ άν τις εν τω γένει πεφυκε και εν
ποίω ^εΓρ'αι αύτην χρή, και πότερον ου ταύτόν
το εκούσιον και το προαιρετόν η ταύτόν εστίν,
μάλιστα δε Aeyerat παρά Ttt'OiP' και ζητοΰντι 2
hόζειεv* άν hυoΐv etvat θάτερον η προαίρεσις, ήτοι
δό^α η ορεζις' αμφότερα γάρ φαίνεται παρακολου-
25 θοΰντα. ΟΤΙ μεν οΰν ουκ εστίν ορεζις, φανερόν. 3
' ac add. Ras. ^ et-η μη ίχοι ? Ric.
' δίτιρήσθω ? Rac. * Fr. : δόξΐΐΐ δ'.
" Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' Let this
be our decision.'
* The term denotes not the deliberate choice of an object
but the selection of means to attain an object : see § 7.
286
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. ix. 2— x. 3
ignorance and not by accident. But to act through
ignorance of the act, the means and the person acted
3 on is involuntary action. Therefore the opposite is
voluntary. It follows then that all the things that
a man does not in ignorance, and through his own
agency, when it is in his power not to do them, are
voluntary acts, and it is in this that the voluntary
consists ; and all the things that he does in ignorance,
and through being in ignorance, he does involun-
4 tarily. But since to understand or know has two
meanings, one being to have the knowledge and the
other to use it, a man who has knowledge but is not
using it would in one case be justly described as
acting in ignorance but in another case unjustly —
namely, if his non-employment of the knowledge
were due to carelessness. And similarly one would
be blamed for not having the knowledge, if it were
something that was easy or necessary and his not
having it is due to carelessness or pleasure or pain.
These points therefore must be added to our defini-
tion.
Let this, then, be our mode of definition " about the
voluntary and involuntary.
1 X. Next let us speak about purposive choice, *' Purpose.
first raising various diflliculties about it. For one
might doubt to which class it naturally belongs
and in what class it ought to be put, and whether
the voluntary and the purposely chosen are diiferent
2 things or the same thing. And a view specially
put forward from some quarters, which on inquiry
may seem correct, is that purposive choice is one
of two things, either opinion or appetition ; for
3 both are seen to accompany it. Now it is eVi- it is not
dent that it is not appetition ; for in that case it X^e It i*"'
287
ARISTOTLE
1225 b ^^
η γαρ βούλησις αν ^ίη η βπι,θνμία η θυμός- ονθ-
ei? γαρ opeyerat μηθβν ττζττονθώς τούτων, θυμός
μ€ν ούν και Ιτηθυμία και τοις θηρίοις υπάρχει,
ττροαιρεσίς δ ου. ert 8e καΐ οΐς ύττάρχ^ι αμφω
ταΰτα, πολλά καΐ ανβυ θυμοΰ καΐ επιθυμίας προ-
αιρούνται- και €v τοις πάθβσιν 6ντ€ς ου προ-
30 αιροϋνται άλλα καρτβροΰσιν. έτι Ιπιθυμία μεν και
θυμός del μετά λύπης, προαιρούμβθα he ττολλά
και άνευ λύπης. άλλα μην ovSe βούλησις και 4
προαίρβσις ταύτόν βούλονται μέν γαρ evia και
των αδυνάτων ζΐΒότζς, οΐον ^ασιλευειι^ τ€ πάντων
ανθρώπων και αθάνατοι eivai, προαιρείται δ' ούθ-
35 €ΐς μη άγνοών ότι άhύvaτov, ούδ' όλως ο 8υνα-
τον μεν, μη εφ* αύτω δ' οϊεται πράξαι η μη
πράζαι. ώστε τοντο μεν φανερόν, ότι ανάγκη^
το προαιρετον των εφ* αύτω τι eii^ai. ομοίως 8ε 5
1226 a δτ^λοϊ^ ΟΤΙ ού8έ 8όξα, ουδ' απλώς ει τις οϊεταί τι-
των γαρ εφ* αύτω τι ην^ το προαιρετον, 8οξάζομεν
δε πολλά και των ούκ όντων εφ* ημιν, οίον την
οιάμετρον άσύμμετρον^- ετι ούκ εστί προαίρεσις
5 αληθής η φευΒής. ούΒε 8ή ή των εφ* αύτω όν- 6
των πρακτών 8όζα fj τυγχάνομεν οΐόμενοι 8εΙν τι
πραττειν ή ού πραττειν κοινόν hk περί Βόζης
τούτο και βουλήσεως . ούθεις γαρ τέλος ούθεν 7
προαιρείται, αλλά τά προς το τέλος, λέγω δ' οίον
^ Ρ** : ava-yKT) μ(ν Μ •>, ίνά-γκΎ) Tjv Fr.
^ Βζ. : ehai. * Rac. : σύμμΐτρον.
•" 1223 a 16-19.
* The Mss. give ' commensurable,' but there is no point in
specifying an untrue opinion. C/. N.E. 1112 a 22 irepl δή
288
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. χ. 3-7
would be either wish or desire or passion, since nobody not passion
wants to get a thing without having experienced
one of those feelings. Now even animals possess
passion and desire, but they do not have purposive
choice. And again, beings that possess both of
these often make choices even without passion and
desire ; and while they are experiencing these feel-
ings do not make a choice but hold out. Again,
desire and passion are always accompanied by pain,
4 but we often make a choice even without pain. But nor '** '*
■L • • J. _li. • i_ wish, nor
moreover purposive choice is not the same as wish opinion,
either ; for men wish for some things that they know
to be impossible, for instance to be king of all man-
kind and to be immortal, but nobody purposively
chooses a thing knowing it to be impossible, nor in
general a thing that, though possible, he does not
think in his own power to do or not to do. So that
this much is clear — a thing purposively chosen must
necessarily be something that rests with oneself.
5 And similarly it is manifest that purposive choice is
not opinion either, nor something that one simply
thinks ; for we saw " that a thing chosen is something
in one's own power, but we have opinions as to many
things that do not depend on us, for instance that
the diagonal of a square is incommensurable ^ with
6 the side ; and again, choice is not true or false. Nor since it|
yet is purposive choice an opinion about practicable means only,
things within one's own power that makes us think not to Ends;
that we ought to do or not to do something ; but
this characteristic is common to opinion and to wish.
7 For no one purposively chooses any End, but the
means to his End — I mean for instance no one
των άϊδίων ούδύ^ βουλεύβται, οίον irepi του κόσμου, ή τηί διαμέτρου
καΐ τηί wXevpds δτι άσύμμ€τροι (where Κ*" has σύμμετροι).
υ 289
ARISTOTLE
1226 a
ovdeis ύγιαίν€ΐν προαψ€Ϊταί, αλλά περιττατ^Ιν "η
10 καθησθαι του vyiaiveLV eveKcv, ουδ' €ύΒαίμον€Ϊν,
αλλά χρηματίζ^σθαι η KLvSvveveiv του eu8at/Aovetv
eve/ca, και όλως 8ηλοΐ aet ό^ ττροαιρούμβνος τι τ€
καΐ τίνος eVe/ca προαιρβΐται, έ'στι 8e το jLtel•» τίνο?^
ου eVe/ca προαιρείται άλλο, το 8e τι, ο ττροαιρύται
€V€Ka άλλου, βουλβται he ye μάλιστα το τίλος, 8
15 /cat δοξάζει* Selv καΐ ύγιαίνζίν καΐ eu πράττ€ΐν.
ώστ£ φαν€ρ6ν διά τούτων οτι άλλο καί Βόζης καΐ
βουλησβως. βούλ^σθαι μεν γαρ* καΐ Βοξάζξΐν^
μάλιστα του τέλους, προαίρεσις δ' ουκ εστίν.
"Οτι μεν ουν ουκ έ'στιν ουτ€ βούλησις ούτε Βόζα 9
οϋθ^ ύπόληφις απλώς ή ττροαίρεσις, ^ηλον τι hk
διαφέρει τούτων; και ττώς έχει προς το εκούσιον ;
άμα hk Βηλον έ'σται και τι εστί προαίρεσις. εστί 10
20 δτ) των δυνατών και είναι «:αι μ-η τά μεν τοιαύτα
ώστε ενΒεχεσθαι βουλεύσασθαι περί αυτών, περί
ενίων δ' ουκ ενδέχεται, τά μεν γαρ δυνατά μεν
εστί και eivai και μη είναι, αλλ' ουκ εφ* ημΐν
αυτών η γενεσις εστίν αλλά τά ρ.εν διά φύσιν τά
25 δε δι' άλλα? αίτια? γίνεται• περί ων ουδει? αν
ουδ' εγχειρησειε βουλευεσθαι μη άγνοών. περί 11
ενίων'' δ' ενδέχεται μη μόνον το είναι και μη, αλλά
κται το' βουλεύσασθαι τοις άνθρώποις' ταύτα δ'
εστίν οσα εφ^ ημΐν εστί πράζαι η μη πράζαι. διό
ου βουλευόμεθα περί τών εν ΊνδοΓ?, ούδε πώς αν
30 ό κύκλος τετραγωνισθείη • τά μkv γάρ ουκ εφ'
^ 6 add. Fr. ^ rlvos <?j'e/ca> ? Rac. * Vic. : δοξάί^ίΐν.
* yap add. Sp. * Sp. : δόξα.
' sic Sol. : ων. "> lacunam hie edd.
" See p. 199, note c.
290
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. χ. 7-11
chooses to be healthy, but to take a walk or sit down
for the sake of being healthy, no one chooses to be
well off," but to go into business or to speculate for
the sake of being well off ; and generally, one who
makes a choice always makes it clear both what his
choice is and what its object is, ' object ' meaning
that for the sake of which he chooses something else
and ' choice ' meaning that which he chooses for the
8 sake of something else. Whereas clearly it is speci-
ally an End that a man wishes, and the feeling that
he ought to be healthy and prosperous is an opinion.
So these considerations make it clear that purposive
choice is diff"erent from both opinion and wish.
Forming wishes and forming opinions apply specially
to one's End ; purposive choice is not of Ends.
9 It is clear, then, that purposive choice is not either but it arisei
wish or opinion or judgement simply ; but in what deliberate
does it differ from them ? and how is it related to «pinion
the voluntary ? To answer these questions will make by wish^
10 it clear what purposive choice is. Now of things
that can both be and not be, some are such that it is
possible to deliberate about them, but about others
it is not possible. Some things can either be or not
be but their coming into being does not rest with us,
but in some cases is due to the operation of nature
and in others to other causes ; and about these
things nobody would deliberate unless in ignorance
11 of the facts. But with some things not only their
existence or non-existence is possible, but also for
human beings to deliberate about them ; and these
are all the things that it rests with us to do or not
to do. Hence we do not deliberate about affairs in
India, or about how to square the circle ; for affairs
in India do not rest with us, whereas the objects of
291
ARISTOTLE
1226 a , ; , _,
ημΐν,^ τα oe npoaipera /cat πρακτά των e^' ημΐν
όντων εστί, το δ' δλως ου πρακτόν {fj και SrjXov
δτι ovSe 8όξα απλώς η ττροαίρζσίς ioTLv). αλλ' 12
ovSe των' ήμΐν πρακτών πβρί άττάντων. διο καΐ 13
άπορήσβιεν αν τις, τι 8ή ποθ' οΐ μεν Ιατροί βου-
35 λενονταί περί ων εχονσι την ετηστήμην οΐ δε
γραμματικοί ου; αΐτιον δ' δτι Βιχτ] γινομένης
της αμαρτίας {η γαρ λογιζόμενοι άμαρτάνομεν, η
κατά. την αϊσθησιν αυτό Βρώντες) εν μεν τη ια-
τρική άμφοτερως ενδέχεται άμαρτεΐν, εν δε τη
1226 b γραμματική κατά την αΐ'σ^τ^σιι^ και ττραζιν, περί
■ής αν σκοπώσιν, εις άπειρον^ ηξουσιν. επεώη 14
ούν ούτε 8όζα ούτε βούλησις η* προαίρεσίς εστίν
ως εκατερον, ουδ άμφω {εξαίφνης γαρ προαιρείται
μεν ούθείς, Βοκεΐ δε Βεΐν^ πράττειν και βούλονται) ,
s ώ?* εξ άμφοΐν άρα• άμφω γαρ υπάρχει τω προ-
αιρουμενω ταύτα. άλλα πώς εκ τούτων σκε-
τττεον ^ηλοΖ δε πως και τό όνομα αυτό. η γάρ Ι5
προαίρεσις αΐρεσις μεν εστίν, ούχ απλώς 8ε, αλλ'
έτερον πρό έτερου• τοΰτο δε ούχ οΐόν τε αΐ'ει»
σκεφεως και βουλής, διό εκ Βόξης βουλευτικής
εστίν η προαίρεσις.
10 ΙΙερΙ μεν 8η του τέλους ού8εις βουλεύεται, άλλα 16
τούτο κείται πάσι, περί δε τών εις τοΰτο τεινόν-
των, ποτερον τόδε η τόδε συντείνει, ή 8ε8ογμενον
τοΰτο πώς εσται. βουλευόμεθα δε πάντες'' τοΰτο
* 11. 30-33 traiecit Βζ. : mif, το δ' δ\ω$ ού πρακτόν• άλλ' ουδέ
nepi των έν ήμΐν ττρακτών nepl άττάντων y και δηλον οτι ουδέ δόξα
άττλώϊ ή ττροαίρΐσίί έστι• τα δ( προαιρετά και πρακτά τών iv ήμΐν
όντων 4στίν, δώ κτλ.
^ τών Rac. : wepi τών έν,
' (is άκρψη πεϊραν Bus. * ή Βζ. : έστι.
* δ(ϊν add. ? Sus, « [ώ$] aut <δη\ον> ών Sp.
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. χ. 11-16
choice and things practicable are among things rest-
ing with us, and squaring the circle is entirely im-
practicable (and thus it is clear that purposive choice
12 is not simply opinion either). But purposive choice
does not deal with all the practicable things resting
13 with us either. Hence one might also raise the
question, why is it exactly that, whereas doctors de-
liberate about things in their field of science, scholars
do not ? The reason is that since error occurs in two
ways (for we err either in reasoning, or in perception
when actually doing the thing), in medicine it is
possible to err in both ways, but in grammar error
only occurs in our perception and action, to investi-
gate which would be an endless undertaking.
14 Since then purposive choice is not either opinion
nor wish separately, nor yet both (for no one makes
a deliberate choice suddenly, but men do suddenly
think they ought to act and wish to act), therefore
it arises as from both, for both of them are present
15 with a person choosing. But how purposive choice
arises out of opinion and wish must be considered.
And indeed in a manner the actual term * choice '
makes this clear. ' Choice ' is ' taking,' but not
taking simply — it is taking one thing in preference to
another ; but this cannot be done without considera-
tion and deliberation ; hence purposive choice arises
out of deliberative opinion.
16 Now nobody deliberates about his End — this
everybody has fixed ; but men deliberate about the
means leading to their End— does this contribute to
it, or does this ? or when a means has been decided
on, how will that be procured ? and this deliberation
7 M": πάντωί pn (sed cf. N.E. 1113 a 5 ΐκα.στο%).
2.93
ARISTOTLE
1226 b
€ως αν et? ημάς άναγάγωμ€ν της γ^νέσ^ως την
αρχήν, el δή προαιρείται μβν μηθίΐς μη πάρα- Γ
15 σκ€υασαμ€νος μη^€ βονλβυσάμβνος ei^ χείρον η
βελτιον, βουλευβται^ δ' όσα e^' ήμΐν earl των
ουνατών καΐ eivai καΐ μη των προς το τβλος,
Βηλον ΟΤΙ ή προαίρ^σις μίν βστιν ορ^ζις των Ιφ'
αύτω βουλβυτίκή. άπαντα^ γαρ βονλ^υόμβθα α
και προαιρούμ^θα, ου μέντοι γε α βουλΐυόμεθα
πάντα προαιρονμβθα. λέγω δε βουλευτικήν ης
20 αρχή και αίτια βονλ^υσίς ε'στι, και ορέγεται δια
το βουλενσασθαι . διό οντε εν τοις άλλοις ζωοις U
εστίν η προαιρεσις οϋτε εν πάση ηλικία ούτε
πάντως* έχοντος ανθρώπου• ουδέ γαρ το βουλεύ-
σασ^αι, οι5δ' ύπόληφις του δια τι, αλλά ^οξάσαι
μεν ει ποιητεον ή μή ποιητεον ούθεν κωλύει πολ-
25 λοΐς ύπάρχειν το 8ε δια λογισμού ούκετι. εστί γαρ π
τ6^ βουλευτικον της φυχής το θεωρητικον αίτια?
τινός• η γαρ οΰ ένεκα μία των αίτιων εστίν
το μεν γαρ δια τι αίτια, οΰ δ' ένεκα εστίν ή
γίγνεταί τι, τοϋτ αίτιοι^ φαμεν efvai, οΓον του
)3αδιζ€ΐι^ ή κομώή των χρημάτων, ει τούτου ένεκα
30^3αδιζ€ΐ. διό οι? μηθεις κείται σκοπός, ου
βουλευτικοί, ώστ επει το μεν εφ* αύτω ον ή 2(
ττράττειν ή μή πράττειν εάν τις πράττη ή άπρακτη
δι' αύτον και μή δι' άγνοιαν, εκών πράττει ή
1 Fr. : ή. 2 ^_ι_ βoύ\fτaι.
' Βζ, : άττοιτί S.
* Βζ. : παντόί (τταιτόι <.\oyoi>> Sp.). * τό add. Sus.
294
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. χ. 16-20
as to means we all pursue until we have carried the
starting-point in the process of producing the End
17 back to ourselves. If, then, nobody chooses without
first preparing, and deliberating as to the comparative
merits of the alternatives, and a man deliberates as
to those among the means to the End capable of
existing or not existing that are within our power.
it is clear that purposive choice is deliberative Definition of
appetition of things within one's power. For we chofce!' '^
deliberate about everything that we choose, although
of course we do not choose everything that we de-
liberate about. I call appetition deliberative when
its origin or cause is deliberation, and when a man
18 desires because of having deliberated. Therefore
the faculty of purposive choice is not present in
the other animals, nor in man at every age nor in
every condition, for no more is the act of deliberation,
nor yet the concept of cause : it is quite possible
that many men may possess the faculty of forming
an opinion whether to do or not to do a thing without
also having the power of forming this opinion by
19 process of reasoning. For the deliberative faculty is peiibera-
the spirit's power of contemplating a kind of cause — ^"'"'
for one sort of cause is the final cause, as although
cause means anything because of which a thing
comes about, it is the object of a thing's existence or
production that we specially designate as its cause :
for instance, if a man walks in order to fetch things,
fetching things is the cause of his walking. Con-
sequently people who have no fixed aim are not
20 given to deliberation. Hence inasmuch as if a man
of his own accord and not through ignorance does or
refrains from doing something resting with himself
either to do or not to do, he acts or refrains from
295
ARISTOTLE
1226 b ,
απρακτβΐ, πολλά 8e των τοιούτων ■πράττομ€ν ου
βουλ€νσάμ€νοι ovSe προνοησαντ€ς, ανάγκη το μ€ν
προαιρβτον ατταν» €κούσιον elvai, το δ' 4κούσιον
35 μτ]^ προαψβτόν, καΐ τά μεν κατά ττροαίρεσίν πάντα
€κουσια et^at, τά δ' Ικονσια μη πάντα κατά
προαίρεσιν. άμα δ' e/c τούτων φανερον καΐ οτι 21
καλώς διορίζονται ot των α^ικημάτων^ τά μεν
ακούσια τά δ' εκούσια^ τά δ' e/c προνοίας
1227 Λ νομό θ βτοΰσ IV ' el γάρ και μη Βιακριβοΰσιν, αλλ'
άπτονται ye πη της αληθείας. άλλα περί μεν 22
τούτων εροϋμεν εν τη περί των 8ικαίων επισκεφεί'
η 8ε προαίρεσις δτι ούτε απλώς βούλησις ούτε
8όζα εστί, 8ηλον, άλλα δό^α τε και ορεζις όταν
ό εκ τον βουλεύσασθαι συμπερανθώσιν.
Έιπει 8ε βουλεύεται άει 6 βονλενόμενος ενεκά
τίνος, και εστί σκοπός τις άει τω βουλευομενω
προς ον σκοπεί το συμφέρον, περί μεν του τέλους
ούθεις βουλεύεται, άλλα τοΰτ' εστίν άρχη και
ύποθεσις, ώσπερ εν ταΐς θεωρητικαΐς επιστημαις 23
10 υποθέσεις {εΐρηται 8έ περί αυτώΐ' εν μεν τοις εν
ο-ρχη βραχεως, εν 8ε τοις άναλυτικοΐς δι' ακρί-
βειας)• περί 8ε τών προς το τέλος φερόντων η
σκέφις και μετά τέχνης και άνευ τέχνης πάσίν
εστίν, οίον ει πολεμώσιν η μη πολεμώσι τούτω*
βουλευομένοις . εκ προτέρου 8ε μάλλον ecrrai το 24
8ι' δ, τοϋτ εστί το ου ένεκα, οίον πλούτος η
1Γ) η8ονη η τι άλλο τοιούτον δ τυγχάνει ου ένεκα.
^ μη ζ,&ΤΓαρ^ ? Sus. ^ Βζ. : παθημάτων.
' Rac. : τα μίν εκούσια τά δ' ακούσια.
* τούτφ Fr. {TovT<f)l ? Rac.) : τοντο.
' Not in E.E., but cf. N.E. 1135 a 16 fF.
296
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. χ. 20-24
acting voluntarily, but yet we do many such things
without deliberation or previous thought, it neces-
sarily follows that, although all that has been pur-
posively chosen is voluntary, ' voluntary ' is not the
same as ' chosen,' and, although all things done
by purposive choice are voluntary, not all things
21 voluntary are done by purposive choice. And at the
same time it is clear from these considerations that
the classification of offences made by legislators as in-
voluntary, voluntary and premeditated is a good one ;
for even if it is not precisely accurate, yet at all events
22 it approximates to the truth in a way. But we will
speak about this in our examination of justice." As
to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely
identical with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion
plus appetition when these follow as a conclusion
from deliberation.
But since one who deliberates always deliberates Deliberation
for the sake of some object, and a man deliberating considers
always has some aim in view with reference to which Ends!
he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates
about his End, but this is a starting-point or assump-
23 tion, like the postulates in the theoretic sciences
(we have spoken about this briefly at the beginning
of this discourse, and in detail in Analytics ^) ;
whereas with all men deliberation whether technical
or untechnical is about the means that lead to their
End, e.g. when they deliberate about whether to go
24 to war or not to go to war with a given person. And
the question of. means will depend rather on a prior
question, that is, the question of object, for instance
wealth or pleasure or something else of that kind which
happens to be our object. For one who deliberates
" See 1214 b 6 ff., and Anal. Post, i., 72 a 20 and context.
297
ARISTOTLE
1227 a
povXeveraL γαρ 6 βουλξυόμζνος el^ άττό του τέλους
έσκετΓται r)^ on e/cetae^ συντείνει οττως εΙς αυτόν
αναγάγγ)* η τ^* ατ3τό§• δυι^αται teVai* προς το τέλος,
το 8ε τέλος εστί φύσει μεν άεΐ αγαθόν καΐ περί 25
ού κατά μέρος βουλεύονται {οΐον ιατρός βουλεύσαιτο
20 άν ει δω' φάρμακον , και στρατηγός που στρατό -
πε8εύσηται) οϊς αγαθόν το τέλος το απλώς άριστον
εστίν παρά φύσιν δε και κατά* ^ιαστροφην ού το 26
αγαθόν άλλα το φαινόμενον aya^ov. α'ίτιον δ' οτι
των όντων τοΐς^ μεν ουκ εστίν εττ' άλλω χρησασθαι
η προς α πεφυκεν, οΐον 6φει• ού γάρ οΐόν τ' ι8εΐν
25 ού μη εστίν όφις, οΰδ' άκοΰσαι ού μη εστίν άκοη'
αλλ' άπο επιστήμης ποιησαι και ού μη εστίν η
επιστήμη. ού γάρ ομοίως της uytetas• η αύτη
επιστήμη και νόσου, αλλά της μεν κατά φύσιν
της δε παρά φύσιν. ομοίως δε και ή βούλησις 27
φύσει μεν του αγαθού εστί, παρά φύσιν δε και
30 του κακού, και βούλεται φύσει μεν το αγαθόν,
παρά φύσιν δε και κατά^" 8ιαστροφήν και τό
κακόν.
Άλλα μην εκάστου γε φθορά και διαστροφή
ούκ εις τό τυχόν αλλ' εις τά εναντία και τά μεταζύ.
ού γάρ εστίν εκβήναι εκ τούτων, επει και η
απάτη ούκ εις τά τυχόντα γίνεται, αλλ' εις τα
35 εναντία οσοις εστίν εναΐ'τια, και εΙς ταύτα των
εναντίων α κατά την επιστήμην εν'αν'τια εστίν.
1 Mb^. 2 ^add. Fr. ^ » Rac: ΐκΰ.
* Ric. : ayayrj. ^ 7] add. Rac.
* Uvai add. Rac. ' Sp. : δφ-η.
* κατά add. Syl. : δια στροφην lac, διαστροφή Fr.
" Ric. : τά. " κατά add. Syl.
2.98
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. χ. 24-27
deliberates if he has considered, from the standpoint
of the End, either what tends to enable him to bring
the End to himself or how he can himself go to the
25 End." And by nature the End is always a good and wish for
a thing about which men deliberate step by step (for ^'"^^
example a doctor may deliberate whether he shall
give a drug, and a general where he shall pitch his
camp) when their End is the good that is the absolute
26 best ; but in contravention of nature and by perver-
sion not the good but the apparent good is the End.
The reason is that there are some things that cannot
be employed for something other than their natural
objects, for instance sight — it is not possible to see a
thing that is not visible, or to hear a thing that is not
audible ; but a science does enable us to do a thing
that is not the object of the science. For health
and disease are not the objects of the same science
in the same way : health is its object in accordance
with nature, and disease in contravention of nature.
27 And similarly, by nature good is the object of wish,
but evil is also its object in contravention of nature ;
by nature one wishes good, against nature and by
perversion one even wishes evil.
But moreover with everything its corruption and
perversion are not in any chance direction, but leads
to the contrary and intermediate states. For it is
not possible to go outside these, since even error
does not lead to any chance thing, but, in the case
of things that have contraries, to the contraries, and
to those contraries that are contrary according to
" i.e. he works back in thought from his intended End
to some means to its attainment that is already within his
power.
299
ARISTOTLE
1227 a ^ ^
ανάγκη άρα καΐ την άττάτην και την προαίρ€σιν 2ί
ατΓΟ του jxeaov €πΙ τα ev'avTta γίν^σθαι (ei^av'Tta
8e τω μέσω το πλέον καΐ το ελαττον). — αίτιον δε
το -qhv καΐ το λνττηρόν οντω γαρ εχ€ΐ ωστ€ τη
<ο φνχη φαίνεσθαί το μεν η^ύ aya^or καΐ το η^ιον
άμεινον, καΐ το λνττηρόν κακόν και το λυπηρότερον
1227 b χείρον, ώστε και εκ τούτων Βηλον οτι ττερί ή^ονάς 2ί
και λυττας η άρετη και η κακία' περί μεν γαρ
τα προαιρετά τυγχάνονσιν ονσαι, η Βε προαίρεσις
περί το αγαθόν και κακόν και τα φαινόμενα,
:> τοιαύτα δβ φύσει ήΒονη και λύπη.
Ανάγκη τοίνυν, επεώη η άρετη μεν ή ηθική 30
αύτη τε μεσάτης τίς εστί και περί η^ονάς και
λύπας πάσα, η δε κακία εν υπερβολή και ελλείφει
και περί ταύτα τη άρετη, την άρετην eii/αι την
ηθικην εζιν προαιρετικην μεσότητος της προς ημάς
10 εν η8εσι και λυπηροΐς καθ^ οσα ποιος τις λέγεται
το ήθος η χαίρων η λυπούμενος [6 γαρ φιλόγλυκυς
η φιλόπικρος ού λέγεται ποιος τι? το ήθος).
XI. Ύούτων δε Βιωρισμενων λεγωμεν πότερον 1
η άρετη άναμάρτητον ποιεί την προαίρεσιν καΐ το
τέλος ορθόν ούτως ώστε ου ένεκα δει προαιρεΐσθαι,
15 17» ώσπερ δοκεΐ τισί, τον λόγον. έστι δε τούτο
εγκράτεια, αύτη γαρ ού διαφθείρει τόν λόγον έστι
δ άρετη και εγκράτεια έτερον, λεκτέον δ' ύστερον 2
" This division of contraries is unusual : elsewhere {e.g.
Met. K, 1061 a 18) Aristotle merely states that contraries
are the objects of the same science.
* The connexion of pleasure and pain with virtue is here
clearer than in N.E., and forms part of the definition (Stocks).
300
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 11. χ. 28— χι. 2
28 their science." It therefore necessarily follows that perverted by
both error and purposive choice take place from pain.
the middle point to the contraries (the contraries
of the middle being the more and the less). — And
the cause is pleasure and pain ; for things are so
constituted that the pleasant appears to the spirit
good and the more pleasant better, the painful bad
29 and the more painful worse. So from these things
also it is clear that goodness and badness have to do
with pleasures and pains ; for they occur in con-
nexion with the objects of purposive choice, and this
has to do with good and bad and what appears to be
good and bad, and pleasure and pain are by nature
things of that kind.
30 It therefore follows that since moral goodness is Definition of
itself a middle state and is entirely concerned with q °^ness or
pleasures and pains, and badness consists in excess Virtue.
and defect and is concerned with the same things as
goodness, moral goodness or virtue is a state of
purposively choosing the mean in relation to ourselves
in all those pleasant and painful things in regard to
which according as a person feels pleasure or pain
he is described as having some particular moral qual-
ity ^ (for a person is not said to have a particular
moral character merely for being fond of sweets or
savouries).
1 XI. These things having been settled, let us say Virtue and
whether goodness makes the purposive choice correct vo'iuntary,
and the End right in the sense of making the agent moral
choose for the sake of the proper End, or whether appties to
(as some hold) it makes the rational principle right. ^^^1^°*^^®
But what does this is self-control — for that saves the Λvhich'dβ-
rational principle from being corrupted ; and good- Character,
2 ness and self-control are different. But we must
301
ARISTOTLE
1227 b
π€ρΙ αυτών, inel οσοις ye δοκίΐ τον λόγον ορθόν
παρ€χ€ίν rj άρβτη, τοΰτο αίτιον η μβν €γκράτ€ία
τοιούτον, των €παίν€τών δ' η εγκράταα. λβγωμ,βν 3
20 Se προαπορησαντ€ς . έ'στι γαρ τον μβν σκοττον
ορθόν €Lvat, iv δε τοις ττρος τον σκοττον δια-
μαρτάν€ΐ.ν• εστί δε τον μβν σκοττον ημαρτησθαι,
τά δε TTpos eKelvov ττβραίνοντα ορθώς εχειν»• /cat
μ-ηΒβτζρον. ττοτίρον δ τ] άρβτη ττοιεΓ τον σκοττον^ 4
η τα προς τον σκοττον; τίθέμβθα hrj οτι τον
σκοττον, διότι τούτου ουκ έ'στι συΧΚογισμος ούδε
25 Χόγος, άλλα δτ] ώσττ€.ρ άρχη τοΰτο υττοκ^ίσθω.
οϋτ€ γαρ ιατρός σκοττβΐ ει δει ύγιαίν^ιν ύ] μη,
αλλ' ει ττ€ριττατ€Ϊν η μη, οϋτ€ 6 γυμναστικός ει
δει ει5 εχειν» τ) μη, αλλ' ει τταλαισαι ■^ μή. ομοίως 5
ουο αΛΛτ^ ουθ€μία ττερι του τεΛου?. ωσττ^ρ
γαρ ταΐς θζ,ωρητικαις αι ύποθεσας αρχαί, οΰτω
30 και ταΐς• ττοιητίκαΐς το τέλος άρχη και ύπόθεσις-
επβώη δεΓ τοϊ'δι^ ύγιαίνειν, ανάγκη τοδι ύττάρξαι
ει εσται εκείνο, ωσττερ εκτει, ει έστι το τριγωνον
δυο όρθαί, ανάγκη τοδι είναι, τη? /χει» our νοησεω? 6
αρχή το τε'λο?, τη? δε ττράζεως η της νοήσεως
τελευτη. ει ουν ττάσης ορθότητας η ό λόγος η η
35 άρετη αίτια, ει μη 6 λόγος, δια την άρετην αν
^ σκοπόν <όρ^όΐ'> ? Rac.
* άλλί; <Ηχρη> ? Rac. ^ Sp. : τόδ(.
" Or, altering the text, * makes the aim right.'
802
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. xi. 2-6
speak about this later, since all who do hold that good- and not to
ness makes the rational principle right think so on which may
the ground that that is the nature of self-control be done
ο . 11. TT • under com-
3 and self-control is a praiseworthy thing. Having pulsion.
raised this preliminary question let us continue. It
is possible to have one's aim right but to be entirely
wrong in one's means to the end aimed at ; and it is
possible for the aim to have been wrongly chosen
but the means conducing to it to be right ; and for
4 neither to be right. But does goodness decide the
aim " or the means to it ? Well, our position is that
it decides the aim, because this is not a matter of
logical inference or rational principle, but in fact this
must be assumed as a starting-point. For a doctor
does not consider whether his patient ought to be
healthy or not, but whether he ought to take walking
exercise or not, and the gymnastic trainer does not
consider whether his pupil ought to be in good
condition or not, but whether he ought to go in for
5 wrestling or not ; and similarly no other science
either deliberates about its End. For as in the
theoretic sciences the assumptions are first principles,
so in the productive sciences the End is a starting-
point and assumption : since it is required that so-
and-so is to be in good health, if that is to be secured
it is necessary for such-and-such a thing to be pro-
vided— ^just as in mathematics, if the angles of a
triangle are together equal to two right angles,
such-and-such a consequence necessarily follows.
6 Therefore the End is the starting-point of the pro-
cess of thought, but the conclusion of the process of
thought is the starting-point of action. If, then, of
all Tightness either rational principle or goodness is
the cause, if rational principle is not the cause of
303
ARISTOTLE
1227 ^ , , „
όρθον elrj το reXos, αλλ' ου τα ττρος το τέλος,
τέλος δ' εστί το ου ένεκα• εστί γαρ ττασα προαίρεσις 7
Τίνος καΐ ενεκά τίνος, ου μεν οΰν ένεκα το μέσον
εστίν, ου αίτια η άρετη τώ^ ττροαιρείσθαϊ^' εστί
μεντοι η προαίρεσις ου τούτου, άλλα των τούτου
40 ένεκα, το μεν ούν τυγχάνειν τούτων άλλης Βυ- 8
1228 a νάμεως οσα ένεκα του τέλους δει ττράττειν, του
hk το τέλος ορθόν εΐναί της προαιρέσεως -rf άρετη
αίτια, καΐ δια τοΰτο εκ της ττροαψεσεως κρίνομεν 9
ποΐός τις, τοΰτο δ' εστί το τίνος ένεκα ττράττεί
αλλ' ου τι ττράττει. ομοίως δε και η κακία των εν- Κ
ό αντίων ένεκα ττοιεί την προαιρεσιν. ει* Βή τις, εφ^
αύτω ον πράττειν μεν τα καλά άπρακτεΐν δε τα
αισχρά, τουναντίον ττοιεΓ, Βηλον otl ου σττουΒαΙός
εστίν ούτος 6 άνθρωπος. ωστ ανάγκη την τε
κακίαν εκούσιον εΐναί καΐ την άρετην ούΒεμία
γάρ ανάγκη τα μοχθηρά ττράττειν. δια ταύτα 11
10 καΐ φεκτον η κακία καΐ η άρετη επαινετόν τά
γάρ ακούσια αισχρά και κακά ου φεγεται^ ούΒε
τά αγαθά επαινείται,'^ άλλα τά εκούσια. ετι
πάντας επαινοΰμεν και φεγομεν εις την προαίρεσιν
βλέποντες μάλλον η εις τά έργα {καίτοι αιρετώτερον
η ενέργεια της αρετής), otC πράττουσι μεν φαΰλα
15 και άναγκαζομενοι, προαιρείται δ ούΒείς. ετι διά 12
το μη ράΒιον eirat ιΒεΐν την προαίρεσιν όποια τις,
^ Ft. : τό. * Ric. : νροαιρίΐσθαι οδ iVesa.
* ή Fr. : ον ή. * νροαίρίσιν <eZi'at>. «/ ? Rac.
» Ρ»»: ψΐκτα Mb. « Pb; έτταΐί-ίτά Μ^.
' ^Tt Aid.
304
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. xi. 6-12
the Tightness of the End, then the End (though not
the means to the End) will be right owing to goodness.
7 But the End is the object for which one acts ; for
every purposive choice is a choice of something and
for some object. The End is therefore the object
for which the thing chosen is the mean, of which
End goodness is the cause " by its act of choice —
though the choice is not of the End but of the means
8 adopted for the sake of the End. Therefore though
it belongs to another faculty to hit on the things that
must be done for the sake of the End, goodness is
the cause of the End aimed at by choice being right.
9 And owing to this it is by a man's purposive choice
that we judge his character — that is, not by what he
10 does but what he does it for. Similarly also badness
causes purposive choice to be made from the op-
posite motives. If therefore, when a man has it in
his power to do what is honourable and refrain from
doing what is base, he does the opposite, it is clear
that this man is not virtuous. Hence it necessarily
follows that both badness and goodness are volun-
tary ; for there is no necessity to do wicked things.
11 For this reason badness is a blameworthy thing and
goodness praiseworthy ; for involuntary baseness and
evil are not blamed nor involuntary good things
praised, but voluntary ones are. Moreover we praise
and blame all men with regard to their purpose
rather than with regard to their actions (although
activity is a more desirable thing than goodness),
because men may do bad acts under compulsion,
12 but no one is compelled to choose to do them. More-
over because it is not easy to see the quality of
<» Virtue by choosing the right means to achieve the End
causes the End to be realized.
X 805
ARISTOTLE
1228 a
ια ταύτα e/c των epywv αναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν
οττοΐός τις• α'φ€τώτ€ρον μ€ν ονν η ivepyeia, 13
€παίν€τώτ€ρον δ' η ττροαίρζσις. €κ τ€ των κ^ιμβνων
ονν συμβαίνει ταύτα καΐ ctl ομολογςΐται τοΐς^
φαινομένοις.
^ όμολοΎΐΐ Tois Sp.
306
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, Π. χι. 12-13
a man's purpose we are forced to judge his char-
13 acter from his actions ; therefore activity is more
desirable, but purpose more praiseworthy. And this
not only follows from our assumptions but also is
admitted by reason of observed facts."
" Or, emending the text, ' agrees with observation.'
307
1228 a
. Utl μεν ovv μεσοτητες τ eiai ev rats 1
aperdis καΐ aurat ττροαιρετικαί, καΐ αί ei^avrtai
-'J κακίαι καΐ rives elalv αύται, καθόλου εΐρηται-
καθ €κάστην 8e λαμβάνοντας λέγωμαν εφεζης,
και πρώτον €Ϊ7τωμ€ν Ttepl ανδρεία?.
Σχεδόν δΐ7 hoKei πασιν δ τ avhpeios etvat ττερί 2
φόβους καΐ η ανδρεία μία των αρετών, διείλομεν
δ' ev Trj ^ίαγραφ-η ττρότερον^ θράσος και φόβον^
30 εναντία• καΐ γάρ εστί πως αντικείμενα άλλτ^λοι?.
8ηλον ουν δτι και οΐ κατά τάς εζεις ταύτας 3
λεγόμενοι ομοίως άντικείσονται σφίσιν αύτοΐς,
οίον ό δειλό? {οδτος γάρ λέγεται κατά το φοβεΐσθαι
μάλλον η δει και θαρρεΐν ^ττον ύ] δει) και 6 θρασύς
{και γάρ οΰτος κατά το τοιούτος είναι οιο?
85 φοβεΐσθαι μεν -ήττον η δει θαρρεΐν δε μάλλον η
δει• διό και παρωνυμιάζεται, ό γάρ θρασύς παρά
το θράσος λε'^εται παρωνύμως) . ώστ επει ύ) 4
ανδρεία εστίν η βέλτιστη εζις περί φόβους και
θάρρη, δει δε μηθ^ ούτως ώς οι θρασεΐς (τα μεν
γαρ ελλείπουσι τά δ' ύπερβάλλουσι) μηθ' ούτως
1228 b α>? οΐ δειλοί (και yap ούτοι ταύτο ποιοΰσι, πλην
* τ' ΐΐσΐ Rac. : etVi re. ^ Βζ. : irOTepov.
» Βζ. : φ6βο$.
» 1220 b 39, 1221 a 17-19.
808
/
BOOK III
1 I. It has then been stated in general terms that the mohal
there are middle states in the virtues and that these Virtues.
are purposive, and also that the opposite dispositions
are vices and vv^hat these are. But let us take them
separately and discuss them seriatim. And first let
us speak about Courage.
2 Now almost everybody holds that the brave man cooeaoe, :
is concerned with fears, and that courage is one of ^^^^^^^"
the virtues. And in our schedule <* previously we rashness
distinguished daring and fear as contraries, for they cowardice.
are indeed in a manner opposed to one another.
3 It is clear, therefore, that the persons named after
these states of character will also be similarly
opposed to each other — that is, the coward (for that
is the term that denotes being more afraid than
is proper and less daring than is proper) and
the daring man (for that denotes the character-
istic of being less afraid than is proper and more
daring than is proper — and from this the name is
derived, as the word ' daring ' is cognate with the
4 word ' dare '). So that since courage is the best
state of character in relation to feelings of fear and
daring, and the proper character is neither that of the
daring (for they fall short in one respect and exceed
in another) nor that of the cowardly (for they also
do the same, only not as regards the same things
309
ARISTOTLE
1228 b
ov TTepl ταύτα αλλ' e^ εναντίας, τω μ€ν γαρ Oappeiv
ελλειτΓουσι τω δε φοββΐσθαι νπ€ρβάλλονσί) , hrjXov
ώς ή μβση biadeaig θρασύτητας καΐ δείλια? €στΙν
ανδρεία• αντη γαρ β€λτίστη.
Αοκ€Ϊ δ' 6 avSpcLos άφοβος είναι ώς εττι το 5
5 πολυ, 6 δε δειλό? φοβητικός, καΐ 6 μβν και ττολλά
και ολίγα και μ€γάλα και μικρά φοβ€Ϊσθαι και
σφόΒρα και ταχύ, ό δε το εναντίον η ου φοβεΐσθαι
τ) ηρβμα και μόλις και ολι-^άκι? και μεγάλα' και
ό /χεν υπομένει τα φοβερά σφόδρα, 6 δε ούδε τα
ήρεμα, ποία οΰν υπομένει 6 άνΒρεΐος; πρώτον, 6
10 πότερον τά αύτώ φοβερά η τά ετερω; ει μεν Srj
τά ετερω φοβερά, ούθεν σεμνόν φαίη αν τις είναι•
ει δε τά αύτω, ειτ^ αν αύτώ μεγάλα και ττολλά^
φοβερά• τά δε φοβερά^ φόβου ποιητικά εκάστω ω
φοβερά, οίον ει μεν σφόδρα φοβερά, εΐη αν ισχυρός
ό φόβος, ει δ' ήρεμα, ασθενής• ώστε συμβαίνει
15 τον άνδρειον μεγάλους φόβους και πολλούς φο-
βεΐσθαι.^ εδόκει δε τουναντίον η ανδρεία άφοβον
παρασκευάζειν, τοΰτο δ' είναι ε'ν τω η μηθεν η
ολίγα φοβεΐσθαι και ήρεμα και μόλις, αλλ' ισω? 7
το φοβερόν λέγεται, ώσπερ και το η^ύ και τάγα^όν,
Βιχώς. τά μεν γάρ απλώς, τά δε τινι μεν και η8εα
^ πολλά cm. Μ^.
* τά δ( φοβΐρα add. Βζ, (τά δ^ φοβΐρα τοιούτον add. ? Rac).
' v.l. τΓοιεΐσθαι vulg.
" Or, emending the text, ' of corresponding fear.'
310
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 4-7
but inversely — they fall short in daring and exceed
in being afraid), it is clear that the middle state of
character between daring and cowardice is courage,
for this is the best state.
5 And it seems that the brave man is in general What
fearless, and the coward liable to fear ; and that the th"brave*'^
latter fears things Avhen they are few in number and ^^^ endure?
small in size as well as when numerous and great,
and fears violently, and gets frightened quickly,
whereas the former on the contrary either never
feels fear at all or only slightly and reluctantly and
seldom, and in regard to things of magnitude ;
and he endures things that are extremely formidable,
whereas the other does not endure even those that
6 are slightly formidable. What sort of things, then,
does the brave man endure ? First, is it the things
that are formidable to himself or formidable to
somebody else ? If the things formidable to some-
body else, one >vould not indeed call it anything
remarkable ; but if it is those that are formidable
to himself, what is formidable to him must be things
of great magnitude and number. But formidable
things are productive of fear " in the particular
person to whom they are formidable — that is, if
they are very formidable, the fear they produce will
be violent, if slightly formidable, it will be weak ;
so it follows that the brave man's fears are great
and many. Yet on the contrary it appeared that
courage makes a man fearless, and that fearlessness
consists in fearing nothing, or else few things, and
7 those slightly and reluctantly. But perhaps ' for-
midable ' is an ambiguous term, like ' pleasant '
and ' good.' Some things are pleasant and good
absolutely, whereas others are so to a particular
311
ARISTOTLE
1228 b ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , „ , Ν V V , /
20 «rat aya^a iariv, απλώς δ ov, άλλα τουναντίον
φαΰλα καΐ ονχ rjhea, οσα τοις ττονηροΐς ωφέλιμα,
και δσα rjhea τοις τταώίοίς τ^ παώία. ομοίως 8e 8
και τα φοββρα τα μ€.ν άττλώς εστί, τα δε τινι* α
μ€ν δη ό^ δειλό? φοβείται fj δειλό?, τα μ€ν ovhevi
25 βστι φοβ€ρά, τα δ' •ηρέμα• τα δε τοι? ττλε ιστοί?
φοββρά, και ό'σα ττ^ άνθρωπίντ) φνσ€ί, ταϋθ
απλώς φοβέρα λβγομζν. 6 δ' ανδρείο? ττρο? ταΰτ 9
έχει αφόβως, και νπομενβι τα τοιαύτα φοβερά,
α έ'στι /χέν ώ? φοβ€ρα αντώ εστί δ ώ? ου, ^ μ^ν
άνθρωπος φοβερά, fj δ' ανδρείο? ου φοβ€ρά αλλ
30 η ηρβμα, η ούΒαμώς. έ'στι μβντοι φοββρα ταΰτα•
τοις γαρ πλείστοι? φοββρά. διό /cat επαινείται η 10
'έ'^ι?• ώσττερ yap ό ισχυρός και υγιεινό? έ';)(ει. και
yap ούτοι ου τω ύπο μηθενος ο μεν πόνου τριβεσθαι
ό δ' υπό /χτ7δερ,ια? υπερβολής τοιούτοι εισιν, άλλα
τω υπό τούτων απαθείς είναι η άττλώ? -η -ήρεμα
35 υ0' ων οι πολλοί και* οί ττλεΓστοι. οι ρ.έν οΰν 11
νοσοϋδει? και ασθενεί? και δειλοί και υπό τών
κοινών παθημάτων πάσχουσί τι, πλι^ν θαττόν τε
και μάλλον η οι πολλοί, . . . ' και έτι ύφ* ων οί
πολλοί πάσχουσιν , υπό τούτων απαθείς -η όλως η
ήρεμα.
ΆτΓορεΐται δ' ει τω άνΒρείω ούθεν ε'στι φοβερόν, 12
^ ό add. Fr, ^ οΐ πολλοί <^> καΐ vel οί Αλλοι και ? Ric.
^ <οί δ' vyieivol καΐ Ισχυροί καΐ άνδρύοι ύιτό των μΐ-γίστων
πάσχονσιν, άλλα βραδύτΐρόν re και iJTTov ή οΊ πολλοίς Βζ. (aut
seel, και ίτι . . . ηρέμ,α ut prave e 11. 34 seq. repetita).
° The words ' the healthy, strong and brave . . . mass of
men' are a conjectural addition to the ms. text.
312
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 7-12
person but absolutely are not so, but on the contrary
are bad and unpleasant — all the things that are
beneficial for the base, and all those that are pleasant
8 to children qua children. And similarly some things Analogy
are formidable absolutely and others to a particular and^"
person : thus the things that the coward qua coward 'Strength.
fears are some of them not formidable to anybody
and others only slightly formidable, but things that
are formidable to most men, and all that are formid-
able to human nature, we pronounce to be for-
9 midable absolutely. But the brave man is fearless
in regard to them, and endures formidable things
of this sort, which are formidable to him in one way
but in another way are not- — they are formidable to
him qua human being, but qua brave not formid-
able except slightly, or not at all. Yet such things
really are formidable, for they are formidable to
10 most men. Owing to this the brave man's state
of character is praised, because it resembles that of
the strong and the healthy. These have those char-
acters not because no labour in the one case or
extreme of temperature in the other can crush them,
but because they are not affected at all, or only
affected slightly, by the things that affect the many
11 or the majority. Therefore whereas the sickly and
weak and cowardly are affected also by the afflictions
commonly felt, only more quickly and to a greater
extent than the mass of men, the healthy, strong and
brave, although affected by the very great afflictions,
are affected by them more slowly and less than the
mass of men," and moreover they are entirely un-
affected or only slightly affected by things that affect
the mass.
12 But the question is raised whether to the brave
313
ARISTOTLE
1228 b
ov8 av φοβηθίίη. η ovdkv κωλύει τον €ίρημ€νον
i229& τρόπον; η γαρ avSpeia άκολονθησις^ τω λόγω
eoTLV, ο 8e λόγος το καλόν αίρζΐσθαι /ceAeuei. διό
και ο μη δια τούτον^ ύττομ^νων αυτά, ούτος ήτοι
€ζ€στηκ€ν η θρασνς• 6 δε δια το καλόν άφοβος ΐ;
5 και αν8ρ€Ϊος μόνος, ό μέν ονν δειλό? και α μη
δει φοβ€Ϊται, ό δε θρασύς και α μη δει dappei• ό
δ ανδρείο? άμφω α δει, και ταύτη μέσος εστίν,
α γαρ αν 6 λόγος κελεύι^, ταντα και θαρρβΐ και
φοβζίται• 6 δε λόγος τα μ€γάλα λυπηρά και
φθαρτικά ου κελειίει ύπομβνβιν, αν μη καλά η. 6 U
10 μ€ν οΰν θρασύς, και ει μη κελεύει, ταϋτα θαρρεί,
Ο οε οείΛο? ουο αν κεΛευτ^' ο ο ανορ€ΐος μονός
iav κελεύη.
' Εστί δ' εί'δτ^ αι^δρεια? πέντε λεγόμενα καθ* It
ομοιότητα- τά αυτά γάρ ύπομενουσιν , αλλ' ου δια
τα αυτά. /χια μεν πολιτική• αύτη δ' εστίν η δι'
αιδώ ούσα. δευτέρα η στρατιωτική• αύτη δε δι'
Ιό εμπειριαν και το ειδε'ναι, οΰχ ωσπερ Έωκράτης
€φη, τά δεινά, άλλα* τάς βοηθείας των Βεινών.
τρίτη δ η δι' άπειρίαν και άγνοιαν, δι' ην τά 16
τταιδια και οι μαινόμενοι οι μεν ύπομενουσι τά
φερόμενα^ οΐ δε λαμβάνουσι τους οφεις. άλλη δ'
η κατ ελ-ττιδα, κα^' ην οι τε κατευτυχηκότες
20 ΤΓολλακι? ύπομενουσι τους κινδύνους και οι
μεθύοντες• εύελπώας γάρ ποιεί 6 οίνος, άλλη δε 17
* άκολονθητικη Bus. * V.l. τοΰτο: τούτων Cas.
' Rac. : μύνοί'. * Syl. (άλλα το lac.) : άλλ' δτι.
* ένιφΐρίιμΐνα ? (cf. b 27) Rac.
i
" Plato, Protagoras 360 d.
314
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 12-16
man nothing is formidable, and whether he would The brave
be insensible to fear. Or is it not possible that he when^^'^^
may feel fear in the way described ? For courage is reasonable.
folloAving reason, and reason bids us choose what is
fine. Hence he who endures formidable things not on
account of reason is either out of his mind or daring,
13 but only he who does so from motives of honour
is fearless and brave. The coward, therefore, fears
even things that he ought not to fear, and the daring
man is bold even about things about which he ought
not to be bold, but the brave man alone does both
as he ought, and is intermediate in this respect,
for he feels both confidence and fear about what-
ever things reason bids ; but reason does not bid
him endure things that are extremely painful and
14 destructive, unless they are fine. The daring man,
therefore, faces such things with confidence even if
reason does not bid him face them, and the coward
does not face them even if it does, but only the brave
man faces them if reason bids.
15 There are five kinds of courage so called by analogy, pive
because brave men of these kinds endure the same unreal
things as the really courageous but not for the same courage.
reasons. One is civic courage ; this is courage due
to a sense of shame. Second is military courage ;
this is due to experience and to knowledge, not of
what is formidable, as Socrates said,** but of ways
16 of encountering what is formidable. Third is the
courage due to inexperience and ignorance, that
makes children and madmen face things rushing on
them, or grasp snakes. Another is the courage
caused by hope, which often makes those who have
had a stroke of luck endure dangers, and those who
are intoxicated — for wine makes men sanguine.
315
ARISTOTLE
1229 a
δια ττάθος άλόγιστον, οϊον δι' €ρωτα καΐ θυμόν.
αν τ€ γαρ ipa, θρασνς μάλλον η δειλό?, καΐ
υπομένει ττολΧούς KLvhvvovs, ωσττερ 6 iv Mera-
ττοντίω τον τνραννον άττοκτβίνας καΐ ό iv Κρτ^ττ^
2ό μνθολογονμενος• καΐ δι' οργην καΐ θυμον ωσ-
αύτως' €κστατικ6ν γαρ 6 θυμός, διό και οι άγριοι
σύες^ ανδρείοι Βοκοΰσιν eirai, ουκ 6ντ€ς• όταν γαρ
€κστώσι, τοιούτοι eiaiv, ei Be μτ^, ανώμαλοι,
ώσπερ οι θρασ€Ϊς. όμως δε μάλιστα φυσική η 1
του θυμοΰ• άήττητον γαρ ό θυμός, διό και οΐ
τταϊδε? άριστα μάχονται, δια, νόμον δε η ττολιτικη 1
30 ανδρεία, κατ' άλτ^^ειαν δε ούΒβμία τούτων, άλλα
ττρό? τα? τταρακελευσει? τάς iv τοις κίνδυνοι? χρή-
σιμα ταύτα ττάντα.
Περί δε των φοβερών νυν μεν απλώς είρηκαμεν, 2
βελτιον δε Βιορίσασθαι μόίλλον. δλως μεν οΰν
φοβερά λέγεται τα ποιητικά φόβου, τοιαύτα δ'
35 εστίν οσα φαίνεται ποιητικά λύπης φθαρτικης•
τοις γάρ άλλην τινά προσΒεχομενοις λύπην έτερα
μεν αν τις Ισως λύπη γένοιτο και πάθος έτερον,
φόβος δ' ουκ εσται, οΐον ει τις προορώτο οτι
λυτΓτ^σεται λύπην ην οι φθονοΰντες λυπούνται, η
τοιαύτην οΐαν οί ζηλοΰντες η οι αίσχυνόμενοι.
40 άλλ' ε77ΐ ρ,όναι? ταΓ? τοιαυται? φαινομεναις εσεσ^αι 2
λυτται? φόβος γίνεται όσων η φύσις αναιρετική του
1229 b ζτ^ ν. διό και σφόδρα τίνες οντες μαλακοί περί
ενια ανδρείοι εισι, και ενιοι σκληροί και' καρτερικοί
και δειλοί. και 8η και δοκει σ;^εδόν ίδιον της 2
" Unknown.
316
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 17-22
17 Another is due to some irrational emotion, for
example love or passion. For if a man is in love he
is more daring than cowardly, and endures many
dangers, like the man " who murdered the tyrant at
Metapontium and the person in Crete in the story * ;
and similarly if a man is under the influence of anger
and passion, for passion is a thing that makes him
beside himself. Hence wild boars are thought to
be brave, though they are not really, for they are
so when they are beside themselves, but otherwise
18 they are variable, like daring men. But neverthe-
less the courage of passion is in the highest degree
natural ; passion is a thing that does not know defeat,
owing to which the young are the best fighters.
19 Civic courage is due to law. But none of these is
truly courage, though they are all useful for encour-
agement in dangers.
20 Up to this point we have spoken about things Only
formidable in general terms, but it will be better terror are
to define them more precisely. As a general term the sphere
' formidable ' denotes what causes fear, and that is ° ourage.
a property of things that appear capable of causing
pain of a destructive kind : for persons expecting
some other pain might perhaps experience a different
sort of pain and a different feeling, but will not have
fear — for example if a man foresaw that he was going
to feel the pain felt by the jealous, or the sort of
pain felt by the envious or by those who are ashamed.
21 But fear only occurs in the case of pains that seem
likely to be of the kind whose nature it is to destroy
life. Hence some people who are even very soft
about certain things are brave, and some who are
22 hard and enduring are also cowardly. Moreover it
is thought to be almost a special property of courage
817
ARISTOTLE
1229 b
avSpeias etvat το nepi τον θάνατον καΐ την τούτου
δ λύπην €χ€ΐν πώς' et γάρ τι? €'ίη τοιούτος οίος προς
άλβα? καΐ φνχη καΐ τάς τοιαύτας λνπας ύπομβνζ-
τίκός^ ώς ό λόγος, ακίνδυνους ούσας, προς δε τον
θάνατον καΐ μαλακός καΐ π€ρίφοβος, μη δι' άλλο
τι πάθος άλλα δι' αύτην την φθοράν, άλλο? δε
προς μ€ν e/ceiVa? μαλακός, προς δε τον θάνατον
10 άπα^τ^?, €Κ€Ϊνος μβν αν ειρ'αι δο^ειε δειλό?, ούτος
δ' άι^δρεΓο?. καΐ γάρ κίνδυνος εττι rot? τοιούτοι? 21
λε)/εται μόνοις των φοβερών όταν πλησίον η το
της τοιαύτης φθοράς ποιητικόν, φαίνεται δε
Λτινδυνο? όταν πλησίον φαίνηται}
Τά μ^ν ούν φοβζρά π€ρι όσα φαμ€ν είναι τον
avSpeiov ε'ίρηται 8η ότι τά φαινόμενα ποιητικά
V) λύπης της φθαρτικης, ταΰτα μβντοι πλησίον τε
φαινόμενα και μη πόρρω, και τοσαΰτα τω μεγΐθΐΐ
όντα η φαινόμενα ώστ είναι σύμμ€τρα προς
άνθρωπον έ'νια γάρ ανάγκη παντι φαίν^σθαι 2'
άνθρώπω φοββρά και 8ιαταράττ€ΐν, ούθ^ν γάρ
κωλύει, ώσιτερ θ€ρμά και φυχρά και των άλλων
■ίο Βυνάμ€ων ενια? ύπερ τ^^ιά? είναι και τάς τοΰ
ανθρωπίνου σώματος έ'^ει?, ούτω και των πβρι
την φυχην παθημάτων.
Οί μ€ν ουν* δειλοί και θρασβΐς διαψεύδονται δια
τά? ε^ ει?, τω μ€ν γάρ δειλω τά τε μη φοβερά Βοκ€ΐ
φοβ€ρά είναι και τά ηρβμα σφό8ρα, τω δε θρασίΐ
25 τουναντίον τά τε φοβερά θαρραλέα και τά σφόδρα
ηρ€μα• τω δ' άνδρειω τάληθη μάλιστα, διόττερ ούτ 2.
ει τι? ϋΤΓΟ/χενει* τά φοβερά δι' άγνοιαν, ανδρείο?,
^ ύπομίνετικόί <eZi'ai> ? Ric.
^ Syl. : φαίνίται. ' οβι» add. Βζ.
* ΰτΓομίνΐί Ρ•> : -χοι Μ*», Syl.
318
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 22-25
to be of a certain disposition in regard to death and
the pain of death ; for if a man were such as to be
capable of rational endurance in respect of heat and
cold and pains of that sort that are not dangerous,
but at the same time soft and excessively timid about
death, not because of any other feeling but just
because it brings destruction, while another man was
soft in regard to those pains but impassive as regards
death, the former would be thought a coward and
23 the latter brave. For we speak of danger only in
the case of such formidable things as bring near to
us what causes destruction of that sort, and when this
appears near it appears to be danger.
The formidable things, therefore, in relation to
which we speak of a man as brave are, we have
said, those that appear likely to cause pain of the
destructive kind — provided that these appear close
at hand and not far off, and are or appear to be of
24 a magnitude proportionate to a human being ; for
some things must necessarily appear fearful to every
human being and throw everybody into alarm, since
it is quite possible that, just as heat and cold and some
of the other forces are above us and above the con-
ditions of the human body, so also are some mental
sufferings.
Therefore whereas the cowardly and the daring The
are mistaken owing to their characters, since the extremes,
coward thinks things not formidable formidable
and things slightly formidable extremely formidable,
and the daring man on the contrary thinks formid-
able things perfectly safe and extremely formidable
things only slightly formidable, to the brave man on
the other hand things seem exactly what they are.
25 Hence a man is not brave if he endures formidable
319
ARISTOTLE
1229 b
οίον €1 Tts τους κεραυνούς ύπομβνοι^ φβρομ^νονς^
δια /xai'tat', ουτ el γινώσκων όσος 6 κίνδυνος,
δια θνμόν, οΐον οι KeArot προς τά κύματα όπλα
30 ατταντώσι λαβόντ€ς• καΐ όλως ή βαρβαρική avhpeia
μ€τά θνμοΰ εστίν. eVtot δε /cat hi άλλα? η^ονας 2
νπομβνουσιν και γαρ ο θυμός η^ονην '^χ^ι τινά,
μ€τ ελτΓίδο? γάρ εστί τιμωρίας, αλλ' όμως ουτ^
€L δια ταύτην οϋτ^ el δι' άλλην η^ονην ύπομ€ν€ί
τις τον θάνατον, η φυγην^ μ€ΐζόνων λυπών, ού8€ΐς
35 δικαίως άν^ άνΒρβΐος λέγοιτο τούτων, et γάρ rfv 2
τ^δυ το άποθνησκίΐν, πολλάκις άν δι' άκρασίαν
απ€θνησκον οι ακόλαστοι, ωσπ€ρ και νΰν αύτοΰ
μβν του άποθνησκβιν ουκ όντας τββος, των
ποιητικών δ' αύτοΰ, πολλοί δι' άκρασίαν π^ρι-
πίπτουσιν €ΐ8ότ€ς, ών ούδει? αν* ανδρείο? eivat
8o^€iev, €1 και πάνυ Ιτοίμως^ άποθνησκίΐν.^ ουτ'
40 ei φξύγοντες τό πονβΐν, όπ€ρ ττολλοι ποιοΰσιν, ού8€
τών τοιούτων ούθ€ΐς άν8ρ€Ϊος, καθάπερ και
t230 a Αγάθων φησι
φαύλοι βροτών γάρ του πονίΐν ησσώμίνοι
θαν€Ϊν βρώσιν.
ωσπβρ και τόν Xeipa>va μυθολογοΰσιν οι ποιηται
δια την από του 'έλκους ό^ύνιην ευ^ασ^αι άποθαν^ιν
άθάνατον όντα. παραπλησίως δε τούτοις και όσοι 2
5 δι €μπ€ΐρίαν ύπομ4νουσι τους κιvhύvoυς , όνπ€ρ τρό-
^ ΰτΓομένοι Syl. : υπομένει.
* έΐΓΐφβρομένον$ ? (cf. a 17) Rac.
* <διά> φυ-γψ ? Rac,
* Siv bis add. Sp. ' v.l. (τοΙμο%.
* άποθνΐ}σκΐί Vic. : -κοι ? Rac.
" This appears to be loosely quoted from a verse passage :
S20
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 25-28
things through ignorance (for instance, if owing to The motives
madness he were to endure a flight of thunderbolts), courage.
nor if he does so owing to passion when knowing
the greatness of the danger, as the Celts ' take arms
and march against the waves ' " ; and in general,
the courage of barbarians has an element of passion,
26 And some men endure terrors for the sake of other
pleasures also — for even passion contains pleasure of
a sort, since it is combined with hope of revenge.
But nevertheless neither if a man endures death for
the sake of this pleasure nor for another, nor for the
sake of avoiding greater pains, would any of these
27 persons justly be termed brave. For if dying were
pleasant, profligates would be dying constantly,
owing to lack of self-control, just as even as it is,
when, although death itself is not pleasant, things
that cause it are, many men through lack of self-
control knowingly encounter it ; none of whom
would be thought brave, even though he were thought
to die quite readily. Nor yet are any of those brave
who, as many men do, commit suicide to escape from
trouble, as Agathon * says :
-The base among mankind, by toil o'ercome.
Conceive a love of death.
As also Cheiron," in the legendary story of the poets,
because of the pain from his wound prayed that
28 though immortal he might die. And in like manner
to these, all who face dangers because of experience
cf. N.E. ill. 7. 7. An echo of the story survives in Shake-
speare's metaphor, ' to take arms against a sea of troubles.'
* Athenian tragic poet, friend of Plato.
" The Centaur sage and physician, accidentally wounded
by a poisoned arrow of Heracles, transferred his immortality
to Prometheus,
Υ 321
ARISTOTLE
1230 a
πον σχ^Βόν οι ττλεΐστοι των στρατιωτικών ανθρώ-
πων ύττομένουσιν. αντο γαρ τουναντίον €χ€ΐ η ως
ωετο Έωκράτης, €πιστημην οίόμζνος ett-at την άν-
8peiav. οϋτβ γαρ δια το eiSeVat τα φοβίρα θαρ-
ρονσιν OL βπι τους ιστούς ai^a^att'eiv €7τιστάμ€νοι,
10 αλλ ΟΤΙ Γσασι τα? βοηθίίας τών ^^ινών οντ€ δι' ο
θαρραλεώτβρον αγωνίζονται, τοΰτο avSpeia, και γαρ 2
al•' Ύ] ισχύς και ο πλοΰτος κατά θ€ογνιν avhpeia
τ
eiel•"•
ττας γαρ άνηρ ττενίτ) Β€8μημ€νος.
φαν€ρώς δ ^ evioi δβιλοι 6ντ€ς όμως υττομίνουσι
δι €μπ€ΐριαν, τοΰτο δε οτι ουκ οϊονται κίνΒυνον
15 eit'ai, ίσασι γαρ τας βοηθείας, σημζΐον δε'• οταΐ'
γαρ μη €χ€ΐν οΐωνται βοήθβιαν αλλ' η8η πλησίον
fi το heivov, ούχ ύπομίνουσιν. άλλα πάντων τών 3
τοιούτων αίτιων^ οι δια την αιδώ υπομένοντας
/Μάλιστα φαν€ΐ€ν αν" avSpeloi, καθάπβρ και "Ομηρος
τον "Έικτορά φησιν ύπομέιναι τον κίνΒυνον τον
προς τον 'Α;(ΐλλ€α•
20 "Έικτορα δ' αιδώ? eiXe-
ΐΙουλυΒάμας μοι πρώτος βλαγχξίην άναθήσαι.
και εστιΐ' η πολιτική avSpeia αϋτη. η δ' αληθής ii
οϋτ€ αϋτη οΰ'τ' ςκαίνων ού^αμία, αλλ' όμοια μέν,
ωσπβρ και ή τών θηρίων, α δια τον θυμόν όμόσ€
τη πληγή φάρβται. οϋτβ γαρ οτι ά8οζήσ€ΐ Sei
* δ' add. Rieckher. » [αΙτΙων] ? Ric. : dvdpeiwv Sp.
* άν add. Sus. « και add. Fr.
322
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 28-31
are not brave ; this is how perhaps most of the mili-
tary class face dangers. For the fact is the exact
opposite of the view of Socrates, who thought that
bravery was knowledge : sailors who know how to
go aloft are not daring through knowing what things
are formidable, but because they know how to pro-
tect themselves against the dangers ; also courage
is not merely what makes men more daring fighters,
29 for in that case strength and wealth would be courage
— as Theognis puts it :
For every man by poverty subdued."
But manifestly some men do face emergencies in
spite of being cowards, owing to experience, and
they do so because they do not think that there is
any danger, as they know how to protect themselves.
A proof of this is that when they think that they
have no protection and that the cause of alarm is now
30 close at hand, they turn tail. But among all such
causes, it is when shame makes men face what is
alarming that they would appear to be bravest, as
Homer says Hector faced the danger of encountering
Achilles :
And shame on Hector seized ''
and
Polydamas will be the first to taunt me." »
31 Civic courage is this kind. But true courage is neither
this nor any of the others, though it resembles
them, as does the courage of wild animals, which
are led by passion to rush to meet the blow. For
it is not -from fear that he will incur disgrace that a
" Theognis 177. '' Not in our Homer.
' Iliad xxii. 100.
323
ARISTOTLE
1230 a ^ ^ ,^ , , / „
μ€.ν€ίν φοβούμβνον,^ ovre δι όργήν, ovre δια. το
25 μη νομίζβιν άττοθανεΐσθαι η δια το 8υνάμ€ΐς €χ€ίν
φυλακτικάς• ovSe γαρ οίησ^ται ούτω ye φοβζρόν
eirai ούθβν. αλλ' inetSri πασά y'^ άρβτη προαψ€- 3:
τικϊ^ (τοΰτο δε ττώ? λ€γομ€ν, εϊρηταί ττρότ^ρον,
OTL eVe/cct τινο? πάντα αίρ^ΐσθαι ττοιεΓ, /cai τοΰτό
εστί το ου eVe/ca το «ταλοΓ), δτ^λορ» οτι και τ^
30 avSpeia άρ€τη τι? ούσα €νβκά tlvos ποιησίί τά
φοβίρά ύττομ€ν€ΐν, ώστ οϋτ€ δι ayvoial•' {ορθώς
γαρ μάλλον TTOiet Kpiveiv) οϋτ€ δι' τ^δοΓτ^ν, αλλ'
οτι καλόν', €7Γ€ΐ, αν ye jlit) καλοΓ fj άλλα μανικόν,
ούχ ύττομ€ν€Ζ^' αίσχρόν γάρ.
ΏερΙ ΤΓοΐα μ€ν οΰν €στΙν η avSpeia μζσότης καΐ 3ί
35 τίνων καΐ δια τι, και τά φοβ€ρά τίνα Βυναμιν
€χ€ΐ, σχ€86ν βΐριηται κατά την παρονσαν €φο8ον
Ικανώς.
II. riepi δε σωφροσύνης και ακολασίας μ€τά 1
ταύτα διελε'σ^αι π€ίρατ€ον. λeyeται δ' ο ακόλαστο?
77θλλα;^ώ?. ο τε yap /u,-)^ Κ€κολασμ€νος πως* μηΒ^
1230 Ιατρζύμβνος^ ωσπβρ άτμητος 6 μη τ^τμημένος•
και τούτων 6 μ€ν 8υνατ6ς 6 δ' ά8ύνατος• άτμητον
γάρ τό Te μη 8υνάμ€νον τμηθηναί και το 8υνατόν
μ(.ν μη τ€τμημ€νον δε, τον αύτον δε τρόπον και
τό ακόλαστοι^• και yap τό ρ,ι) πζφυκός Βζχβσθαι 2
5 κόλασιΐ', και τό πΐφυκύς μέν μη Κ€Κολασμ€νον δε
' Cas. : φοβονμίΐΌνί. * 7 add. Μ•".
* Ric. : ΰπομένα, * ττω \'ict.
' Sp. : ϊατιχυάμίΐΌί,
324,
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. i. 31— ii. 2
man ought to stand his ground, nor from motives of
anger, nor because he does not think that he will be
killed or because he has forces to protect him, for in
that case he will not think that there is really any-
32 thing to be afraid of. But, since indeed all goodness
involves purposive choice (it has been said before
what we mean by this — goodness makes a man
choose everything for the sake of some object, and
that object is what is fine), it is clear that courage
being a form of goodness will make a man face for-
midable things for some object, so that he does not
do it through ignorance (for it rather makes him
judge correctly), nor yet for pleasure, but because
it is fine, since in a case where it is not fine but insane
he will not face them, for then it would be base to
,_^do so.
33 i We have now given an account that is fairly ade-
quate for our present procedure of the kind of things
in relation to which Courage is a middle state, and
between what vices and for what reason it is
this, and what is the power that formidable things
exercise.
II. We must next attempt to decide about Tem- Temper-
perance and Profligacy. The term ' profligate ' profligacy
(unchaste) has a variety of meanings. It means its meaning.
the man who has not been (as it were) ' chastized '
or cured, just as ' undivided ' means one that has
not been divided ; and these terms include both one
capable of the process and one not capable of it :
' undivided ' means both that which cannot be
divided and that which though it can be has not been ;
2 and similarly with ' unchaste ' — it denotes both that
which is by nature incapable of chastening and that
which, though capable, has not actually been chast-
325
ARISTOTLE
1230 b ^ ^
TTepl αμαρτίας rrepl a? όρθοπραγ^ΐ 6 σώφρων,
cooTTep ol τταΓδε?" κατά ταντην γαρ ακόλαστοι
λέγονται την άκολασίαν , eVt δ' αλλοι^ τρόπον οΐ 3
8υσίατοι καΐ οι ανίατοι πάμτταν δια. κολάσ€ως.
πλ€οναχώς δε λεγομένης της ακολασίας , οτι μ^ν
10 τΓ€ρι ήΒονάς τινας και λνπας ίίσί, φαν^ρόν, και
ΟΤΙ ev τω Trepi ταύτας 8ιακ€Ϊσθαί πως και άλΑτ^λω^
Βιαφέρουσι και των άλλων 8ΐ€γράφαμ€ν δέ πρότ€-
ρον πώς την άκολασίαν 6νομάζοντ€ς μ€ταφ€ρομ€ν.
τους δε^ άκινητως έχοντας δι' άΐ'αισ^τ^σιαι^ προς 4
ταύτας τάς^ η^ονάς οι μ€ν καλονσιν αναίσθητους,
15 οι δ άλλοι? ονομασι τοιούτοις προσαγορ€υουσιν^ '
εστί δ' ου πάνυ γνώριμον το πάθος ούδ' επιπόλαιον 5
δια το πάντας €πι θάτερον άμαρτάν€ΐν μάλλον και
πάσιν eivai σνμφυτον την τών τοιούτων η^έων ■ήτ-
ταν και αϊσθησιν. μάλιστα δ' eioi τοιούτοι οίους
οΐ κωμω8ο8ώάσκαλοι παράγουσιν άγροίκους, οι
20 ουδέ* τά μέτρια και τα αναγκαία πλησιάζουσι τοις
ηΒέσιν.
ΈτΓβι δ' ο σώφρων εστί π€ρι ηΒονάς, άναγκη &
και π€ρι επιθυμίας τινάς αύτον elvai. δει δή λα-
βείν περί τ ίνας. ου γαρ περί πάσας ουδέ περί
άπαντα τά rjSea 6 σώφρων σώφρων εστίν, άλλα
τη μ€ν 8όζη π€ρι δυο τών αισθητών, π€ρι τ€ το
J5 γβυστόν και το άπτόν, τη δ αλτ^^εια περί το
* Sus. : -yap.
^ ταύταί ras Sp. : ras αύτά,^.
' irpoaayopeuovaiv Κοϊον . . . > S^s. (cf. 1231 b 1).
* ούδ' e<i> vel ούδ' i<s> ? Rac.
" ακόλαστα (lit. ' incorrigible ') often means no more than
' naughty ' (Solomon).
326
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. ii. 2-6
ened in respect of the errors as regards which the
temperate man acts rightly, as is the case with
children ; for of them it is in this sense that the
3 term ' unchaste ' ^ is used, whereas another use of
it again refers to persons hard to cure or entirely in-
curable by chastisement. But though ' profligacy '
has more than one sense, it is clear that the profligate
are concerned with certain pleasures and pains and
that they differ from one another and from the other
vicious characters in being disposed in a certain
manner towards these ; and we described previously
the way in which we apply the term ' profligacy '
4 by analogy.^ Persons on the other hand who owing it» oppo-
to insensitiveness are uninfluenced by these pleas- sltfvenesT
ures are called by some people ' insensitive ' and by ^^'^^•
others are designated by other names of the same
5 sort ; but the state is not a very familiar one nor of
common occurrence, because all men err more in the
other direction, and susceptibility and sensitiveness
to pleasures of this sort are natural to everybody. It
specially attaches to persons like the boors who are
a stock character in comedy — people who steer clear
of pleasures even in moderate and necessary indul-
gences.
6 And since the temperate character is shown in Only some
connexion with pleasures, it follows that it is also the*sphere
related to certain desires. We must, therefore, ascer- of Tem-
tain what these are. For the temperate man is not P®''*"*'®•
temperate about all pleasures nor about everything
pleasant, but apparently about the objects of two
of the senses, taste and touch, and in reality about
*■ This seems to refer to words which must have been lost
at 1221 a 20 (Solomon).
327
ARISTOTLE
1280b ^ ^
ατΓτόν 7T€pl γαρ την δια της οφ^ως ηΒονην των 7
καλών {avev βπιθνιχίας αφροδισίων) η λνττην των
αισχρών, καΐ π€ρί την δια της άκοης τών ev-
αρμόστων η ανάρμοστων, eVt δ€ ττρος τάς δι
οσφρήσεως , τάς τ€ άπο ευωχίας καΐ τάς άπο δυσ-
30 ωΒίας, ουκ εστίν 6 σώφρων ουδέ γαρ ακόλαστος
ουδείς λέγεται τω πάσχειν (ύπο τούτωνΥ η μη
πασχειν ει γοΰν τις η καλόν άνΒριάντα θεώμενος 8
η ιπττον η άνθρωπον, η άκροώμενος αΒοντος, μη
βονλοιτο μήτε εσθίειν μήτε ττίνειν μήτε άφροΒισιά-
ζειν, άλλα τά μεν καλά θεωρεΐν τών δ' αγόντων
35 ακονειν, ουκ αν Βόζειεν ακόλαστος efp'ai, ώσπερ
οι5δ' οι κηλούμενοι παρά ταΐς Έ^ειρήσιν. αλλά 9
περί τα δυο τών αισθητών ταΰτα περί άπερ και
τάλλα θηρία μόνα τυγχάνει αισθητικώς έχοντα και
χαίροντα και λυπούμενα, περί τά γευστά και
απτά, περί Βε τά τών άλλων αισθήσεων' ήΒεα 1C
1231 a σχεδόν ομοίως άπαντα φαίνεται άναισθήτως δια-
κείμενα, οίον περί εύαρμοστίαν ή κάλλος' ούθεν
γαρ ο τι και άζιον λόγου φαίνεται πάσχοντα αύτη
τη θεωρία τών καλών ή τη άκροάσει τών εύαρ-
μοστων, ει μή τί που συμβεβηκε τερατώδες, αλλ*
5 ούΒε προς τά εύώΒη ή 8υσώ8η• καίτοι τάς γε
αισ^ησ6ΐ? όξυτερας εχουσι πάσας, αλλά και τών 11
οσμών ταυται? χαίρουσιν οσαι κατά συμβεβηκός
εύφραίνουσιν , αλλά μή καθ' αύτάς• λέγω δε μή^
καθ αύτάς αΐς ή* ελπίζοντες χαίρομεν ή μεμνημε-
» Fr. 2 pb; αισθητών Μ".
' μη add. Fr. * Fr. : μη.
328
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. ii. 7-11
7 the objects of touch. For the temperate man is
not concerned with the pleasure of beautiful things
(apart from sexual desire) or pain caused by ugly
things, the medium of which is sight, nor with the
pleasure of harmonious sounds or pain of discords
conveyed through the medium of hearing, nor yet
with the pleasures and pains of smell, derived from
good and bad scents ; for neither is anyone termed
profligate because of being sensitive or not sensitive
8 to sensations of that sort — for example, a man would
not be considered profligate if when looking at a
beautiful statue or horse or person, or listening to
someone singing, he did not wish for food or drink
or sexual indulgence but only wished to look at the
beautiful objects or listen to the music, — any more
than the persons held spell-bound in the abode of the
9 Sirens. Temperance and profligacy have to do with
those two sorts of sensory objects in relation to which
alone the lower animals also happen to be sensitive
and to feel pleasure and pain— the objects of taste
10 and of touch, whereas about virtually all the pleasures
of the other senses alike animals are clearly so con-
stituted as to be insensitive — e.g. harmonious sound,
or beauty ; for clearly they are not affected in any
degree worth speaking of by the mere sight of
beautiful objects or by listening to musical sounds,
except possibly in the case of some miraculous occur-
rences. Nor yet are they sensitive to good or bad
smells, although it is true that all their senses are
11 keener than man's ; but even the smells they enjoy
are those that have agreeable associations, and are
not intrinsically agreeable. By smells not intrinsic-
ally agreeable I mean those that we enjoy because
of either anticipation or recollection, for example the
329
ARISTOTLE
1231 a ^ ^^
vol, οίον οφων καΐ ποτών, δι' irepav γαρ rjSovrjv
ίΟ ταύταις χαίρομεν, την τον φαγ^ΐν η metv καθ^
αυτά? 8e otat at των ανθών elaiv (διο ΙμμβΧώς
ζφη Ίίτρατόνικος τα} μέν καλόν οζαν, τα} δβ rjSv).
€7761 καΐ τών πβρί το γ€νστ6ν ου rrepl πασαν 12
TjSovTjv €πτόηται τα θηρία, ουδ' όσων τώ άκρω
της γΧώττης η αΐσθησις, αλλ' όσων τω φάρυγγι,
1Γ) καΐ eoLKev αφη μάλλον η γβυσβί το ττάθος• διο οΐ
οφοφάγοί ουκ βϋχονται την '}'λώτταν ^χ^ιν μακράν
άλλα τον φάρυγγα γβράνον, ώσττ€ρ Φιλόζ€νος 6
Ερυ^ιδο?.^ ωστ€ irepl τα άπτόμβνα ως άττλώς 13
eLTTelv θ^τέον την άκολασιαν , ομοίως δε και ο
ακόλαστο? mepl τας τοιαύτας €στίν• οίνοφλυγ ια
20 γαρ και γαστριμαργια και λα^ΐ'εια και οφοφαγια^
και πάντα τα τοιαύτα περί τάς €ίρημ4νας βστιν
αίσθησης, €ίς άπβρ μόρια η ακολασία διαιρείται.
π€ρι δε τα? δι' οφεως η άκοης η όσφρησ€ως 14
ηΒονάς ούθβις λέγεται ακόλαστο? eav ύπβρβάλλη,
αλλ' άν€υ όι/ειδου? τα? αμαρτίας φ€γομ€ν ταύτα?,
25 και όλως πβρί όσα μη λέγονται €γκρατ€Ϊς• οι δ
άκρατει? ουκ ει'σιν ακόλαστοι ουδέ σώφρονβς.
'Αναίσθητος μ^ν ουν, η όπως δει όνομάζ^ιν, ο U
οϋτως €χων ώστε και ελλείπει^ όσων ανάγκη
κοινωνύν ως €πΙ το πολύ τται^τα? και χαιρβιν ο
δ' υπερβάλλων ακόλαστος . πάντες γαρ τούτοις \{
:io φύσει τε -χαίρουσι και επιθυμίας λαμβάνονσι, και
^ τά , . . τά Cas. : ras . . . ras.
* Syl. : έρύξίΟί, έξ ϋριδο^. ' όψοφα^ία καΐ \ayvtia Ric.
" Α contemporary musician, a number of whose smart
sayings are recorded by Athenaeus viii. 347 f-352 d.
330
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, ΠΙ. π. 11-16
smell of things to eat or drink, for we enjoy these
scents on account of a different pleasure, that of
eating or drinking ; by intrinsically agreeable I mean
scents such as those of flowers (this is the reason of
Stratonicus's* neat remark that the scent of flowers is
beautiful but that of things to eat and drink sweet).
12 For even the pleasures of taste are not all attractive
to animals, nor are those perceived with the tip of
the tongue, but those perceived by the throat, the
sensation of which seems more like touch than
taste ; so that gourmands do not pray that they may
have a long tongue but a crane's gullet, like Philo-
13 xenussonof Eryxis.^ It follows that broadly speaking Profligacy
profligacy must be considered to be related to the t/neuished
objects of touch, and likewise it is with pleasures of from incon-
that sort that the profligate is concerned ; for tip- *'°^"'^®•
pling and gluttony and lechery and gormandizing
and the like all have to do with the sensations speci-
fied, and these are the departments into which pro-
14 fligacy is divided. But nobody is called profligate
if he exceeds in regard to the pleasures of sight or
hearing or smell ; those errors we criticize without
severe rebuke, and generally all the things in-
cluded under the term ' lack of self-control ' : the
uncontrolled are not profligate, yet they are not
temperate.
15 Therefore the person of such a character as to
be deficient in all the enjoyments which practically
everybody must share and must enjoy, is insensitive
(or whatever the proper term is), and he that ex-
16 ceeds in them is profligate. For all people by nature
enjoy these things, and conceive desires for them,
" Mr. Hospitable, son of Mistress Belch — presumably a
character in comedy.
331
ARISTOTLE
1231 a ^
ovK eiGLV ov8e Xeyovrai ακόλαστοι, ου γαρ VTrep-
βαλλονσι τω χαίρ^ιν μάλλον η δβι τνγχάνοντ€ς
και λυττ^ίσθαι μάλλον -η δει μη τνγχάνοντ€ς• οι5δ'
ανάλγητοι, ου γαρ ελλειττουσι τω χαίρ€ΐν η λυ
π€Ϊσθαί, αλλά μά?^ον νττβρβάλλουσιν .
35 Ettci δ' eoTLV ύπβρβολη καΐ ζλλαφι,ς ττ€ρΙ αυτά, 17
8ηλον OTL καΐ μεσάτης, καΐ βέλτιστη αϋτη η e^is,
και αμφοΐν Ιναντία. ωστ' et^ σωφροσύνη η
β€λτίστη βξις πβρί α ο ακόλαστος, η 7Τ€ρΙ τά
ηοβα τα αρημζνα των αισθητών μ^σότης σωφροσύνη
αν €ίη, μ€σοτης ούσα ακολασίας καΐ άι^αισ^τ^σια?•
1231 h η δ' υπερβολή ακολασία, η δ' ελλειφις ήτοι
ανώνυμος η τοις είρημένοις όνόμασι προσαγορβυο-
μ€νη. ακρφβστερον δε π€ρΙ του γένους των 18
ηδονών έσται 8ίαιρ€Τ€ον iv τοις λεγομενοις ύστερον
περί εγκράτειας καΐ άκρασίας.
5 III. Ύον αυτόν Βε τρόπον ληπτεον καΐ περί 1
πραότητας καΐ χαλεπότητος. καΐ γαρ τον πράον
περί λύπην την από θυμοΰ γιγνομενην όρώμεν
οντά, τω προς ταύτην εχειν πώς. Βιεγράφαμεν
οε καΐ άντεθήκαμεν τω όργίλω καΐ χαλεπώ καΐ
αγριω (πάντα γαρ τά τοιαύτα της αυττ]? eWt
10 διαθέσεως) τόν άν8ραπο8ώ8η και τόν άνόργητον^•
σχε8όν γάρ ταύτα μάλιστα καλοΰσι τους μη8^ εφ^ 2
οσοις 8εΐ κινούμενους τόν θυμόν, αλλά προπηλακι-
ζομενους ευχερώς και ταπεινούς προς τάς ολι-
γωρίας' εστί γάρ άντικείμενον τω μεν ταχύ τό
1 Sp.: ώστ€. 2 Rac. (cf. 1220 b 38, 1221 a 17): άνόητον.
" άνά\•γητοι is thrown in as a possible synonym for
αναίσθητοι. See § 15.
* Perhaps in a sentence lost at 1230 b 15.
« See 1220 b 38, 1221 b 12-15.
S32
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. n. 16— iii. 2
without being or being called profligate, for they
do not exceed by feeling more joy than they ought
when they get them nor more pain than they ought
when they do not get them ; nor yet are they
unfeeling," for they do not fall short in feeling joy
or pain, but rather exceed.
17 And since there are excess and deficiency in re-
gard to these things, it is clear that there is also a
middle state, and that this state of character is the
best one, and is the opposite of both the others.
Hence if temperance is the best state of character
in relation to the things with which the profligate
is concerned, the middle state in regard to the pleas-
ant objects of sense mentioned will be Temperance,
being a middle state between profligacy and in-
sensitiveness : the excess will be Profligacy, and the
deficiency will either be nameless or will be denoted
18 by the terms mentioned. ** We shall have to define
the class of pleasures concerned more exactly in our
discussion of Self-control and Lack of Control later on.
1 III. And also the nature of Gentleness and Harsh- gentlk-
ness must be ascertained in the same way. For we r^semuneur
see that the term ' gentle ' is concerned with the of insult.
pain that arises from passion — a man is gentle by
being disposed in a certain way towards that pain.
And in our diagram '^ we opposed to the irascible
and harsh and fierce man (for all such traits belong
to the same disposition) the slavish and spiritless ^
2 man ; for these are perhaps the most usual words
to denote those whose passion is not aroused even at
all the things at which it ought to be, but who undergo
insulting treatment readily and meet slights with
humility ; since as opposed to feeling the pain that
■^ The Mss. give ' slavish and senseless.'
333
ARISTOTLE
1231b ^ ο, , ,
μολίς, τω ο ηρβμα το σφό8ρα, τω δβ ττολύν
15 χ^ρόνον το ολίγον λνπ€Ϊσθαί ταύτην την λνττην rjv
καλοΰμβν θυμόν. εττει δ' ωστηρ καΧ ΙττΧ των 3
αΚΚων β'ίπομζν, και €ντανθ^ €στΙν ύττβρβολή καΐ
ζλλξίφίς (ο μ€ν γαρ χαλξπος τοιούτος βστιν, 6 και
θαττον και μάλλον ττάσχων^ καΐ ττλ^ίω χρόνον καΐ
οτ ου δεΓ καΐ οποίοις ου 8et και €πΙ ττολλοΐς,
20 ο δ ανδρατΓοδώδτ^? τουναντίον) , Βηλον οτι έ'στι
τις και ο^ μ€σος της άνισότητος. irrei ουν ημαρτη- 4
//.evat αμφότβραι at e^et? €Κ€Ϊναι, φαν^ρον οτι €πι-
€ΐκης η μέση τούτων βξις- οϋτ€ γαρ TrpoTcpei
ούθ ύστ€ρίζ€ΐ, οϋτ€ οΐς ου δει οργίζεται οϋτ(
οΐς 8ei ουκ όργίζ€ται. ωοτ inei και ττραότης η
25 βέλτιστη €ξις ττβρι ταύτα τα πάθη εστίν, €Ϊη αν
και ή ττραότης μεσάτης τις, και ο πράος μέσος του
χαλβποϋ και του άν8ραπο8ώ8ους .
IV. Έστι Se και η μ€γαλοφυχία και η μ€γα- 1
λοπρ€π€ΐα και η Ιλ^υθίριότης μ€σότητ€ς, η μεν
ΐλευθεριότης περί χρημάτων κτήσιν και άποβολην.
30 ο μβν γαρ κτήσει μ^ν πάση μάλλον χαίρων η δει
αποβολή he πάση λυπούμενος μάλλον η Sel
ανελεύθερος, ο δ' αμφότερα ήττον η 8εΐ άσωτος,
ο ο άμφω ώς Βεΐ ελευθέριος [τοΰτο 8έ λέγω το
ως οεΐ, και επι τούτων και επι των άλλων, το
ως ο λόγος 6 ορθός), επει δ' εκείνοι μεν είσιν εν 2
3'i υπερβολή και ελλείφει, οπού hk εσχατά εισι, και
μέσον, και τοΰτο βελτιστον, εν 8έ περί εκαστον
τω εΊ8ει το βελτιστον , ανάγκη και την ελευθεριότητα
* ό καΐ . . , πάσχων : olos και . . . ττάσχίΐν Sp.
2 [ό] ? Rac.
" i.e. half-way between excess and defect.
334
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. iii. 2— iv. 2
we call passion quickly, extremely or for a long time
there is feeling it slowly, slightly, or for a short time.
3 And since, as we said in the other cases, so here also
there is excess and deficiency (for the harsh man is
the sort of man that feels this emotion too quickly,
too long, at the wrong time, with the wrong kind of
people, and with many people, while the slavish
man is the opposite), it is clear that there is also some-
body who is at the middle point in the inequality."
4 Since, therefore, both those states of character are
wrong, it is clear that the state midway betAveen them
is right, for it is neither too hasty nor too slow-
tempered, nor does it get angry with the people with
whom it ought not nor fail to get angry with those
with whom it ought. So that since the best state of
character in regard to those feelings is gentleness.
Gentleness also would be a middle state, and the
gentle man Avould be midway between the harsh man
Wand the slavish man.
ί 1 J IV. Greatness of Spirit and Magnificence and f^iberal-
j Liberality are also middle states. Liberality is the ,η^άη be-
mean in regard to the acquisition and expenditure tweenMean-
of wealth. The man who is more pleased than he prciisaiity
ought to be by all acquisition and more pained than '"F;f^g"|.
he ought to be by all expenditure is mean, he that ing.
feels both feelings less than he ought is prodigal,
and he that feels both as he ought is liberal (what I
mean bv ' as he ought,' both in this and in the other
2 cases, is ' as right principle directs '). And since the
two former characters consist in excess and de-
ficiency, and where there are extremes there is also
a mean, and that mean is best, there being a single
best for each kind of action, a single thing, it neces-
sarily follows that liberality is a middle state between
335
ARISTOTLE
1231 b
μ€σοτητα elvat ασωτία? καΐ aveXevdepias Trepl
χρημάτων κτησιν καΐ άποβολην. Βυχώς δε τα 3
χρήματα λέγομ^ν καί την χρηματιστικην η μ€ν
1232 a γαρ καθ^ αυτό χρήσις του κτήματος €στιν, οίον
υποδήματος ή ιματίου, ή δε κατά συμβζβηκος
μβν, ου μύντοι οϋτως ώς αν ει τις σταθμω
χρησαίτο τω ύπο8ήματί, αλλ' οίον ή πώλησις και
ή μίσθωσις- χρήται γαρ fi υπόδημα} 6 δε ^ιλ- 4
r. άργυρος 6 πβρι το νόμισμα ioTiv €σπου8ακώς, το
δε νό/χισ/χα της κτήσβως άντι της κατά συμβίβηκος
χρήσβώς Ιστιν. 6 δ' άνζλ^ύθζρος ^ΐη αν' και 5
άσωτο? περί τον κατά συμβββηκος τρόπον τοΰ
χρηματισμού• και γάρ ε'ττι τοΰ κατά φύσιν χρη-
ματισμού την αϋ^τ^σιΐ' διώκει. 6 δ' άσωτος
10 ελλείπει των αναγκαίων, 6 δ' ελευθέριο? την
7Τ€ριουσιαν 8ώωσιν. αυτών δε τούτων €ΐ8η Γ»
λέγονται Βιαφίροντα τω μάλλον και ήττον π^ρΐ
μόρια• οίον άν^λ^ύθ^ρος φβώωλός και κίμβιξ και
αίσχροκ€ρ8ής, φειδωλό? μέν iv τω μη προΪ€σΟαι,
αισχροκερδής δ' iv τω ότιοΰν προσίεσθαι, κίμβιξ
15 δε 6 σφό8ρα π€ρΙ μικρά 8ιατ€ΐνόμ€νος, παραλογισ-
της δε και άποστερητής ο άδικο? κατ' άνΐλευθζρίαν
και τοΰ ασώτου ωσαύτως λαφύκτης μεν 6 iv τώ 7
ατακτω? άΐ'αλισκειρ', άλoyιστos■ δε ό iv τω μη
υπομ€ν€ΐν τήν από λογισμού λύπην.
V. Yiepi δε μεγαλοψυχίας ε'κ τών τοις μεγάλο- Ι
■Λ) φύχοις άποΒώομενων δει 8ιορίσαι τό ΐ8ιον. ώσπερ'
* <g> υπόδημα Rac. {νηοδήματι V^ic, ύποδήματι <rj ΰπ6δημα>
Sus.) : ΰτΓοδήματοί aut -τα. * ν.1. &ν (Ιη. ^ Βζ. : αίτιον.
" Cf. Pol. I., 1257 a 14, where the use of a shoe for sale is
included with its use for wear under xpfjffit καθ' αί'τό, but dis-
336
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. iv. 2— v. 1
prodigality and meanness as regards getting and
3 parting with wealth. But the terms ' wealth ' and
' art of wealth ' we use in two senses, since one
way of using an article of property, for example
a shoe or a cloak, is proper to the article itself,"
another is accidental, though not as using a shoe for
a weight would be an accidental use of it, but for
example selling it or letting it on hire, for these uses
4 do employ it as a shoe. The covetous man is the
party whose interest centres on money, and money
is a thing of ownership instead of accidental use.
5 But the mean man might be even prodigal in
regard to the accidental mode of getting wealth,
inasmuch as it is in the natural acquisition of wealth
that he pursues increase. The prodigal man lacks
necessities, but the liberal man gives his super-
6 fluity. And of these classes themselves there are
species designated as exceeding or deficient in
respect of parts of the matter concerned : for
example, the stingy man, the skinflint and the profit-
eer are mean — the stingy in not parting with
money, the profiteer in accepting anything, the skin-
flint is he who is very excited about small sums ;
also the man who offends by way of meanness is a
7 false reckoner and a cheat. Similarly ' prodigal '
includes the spendthrift who is prodigal in un-
regulated spending and the reckless man who is
prodigal in not being able to endure the pain of
^calculation.
1 J V. On the subject of Greatness of Spirit we must Μαονλνι-
"^define its characteristic from the attributes of the it implies
-^ all the
' 11/.• ' : ' . < u • virtues.
tinguished from it as ούχ o/xoiws καθ avro, because not its
οικεία χρησιν, ού yap αλλαγή? 'ένΐκα yayovev. The term χρήματα
itself denotes to the Greek ear ' useful things.'
ζ 337
ARISTOTLE
1232 a ^
γαρ και τα άλλα {ά)^ κατά την γξίτνίασιν καΐ
ομοιότητα μ-^χρι τον λανθάνει^ (βιαφ4ρονταΥ
■πόρρω προϊόντα, και vrept την μεγαλοφυχίαν ταντο
συμβ€βηκ€ν. διό ivioTe οι ivavTLOi τον αντοΰ 2
αντιποιούνται, οίον 6 άσωτος τω eXevOepito και 6
25 ανθάΒης τω σ€μνω και ο θρασνς τω avSpeio)• eiVt
γαρ και ττβρι ταύτα και όμοροι μ^χρι τινός, ώσπ^ρ
ο αν8ρ€Ϊος υπομονετικός κιν8ννων και ό θρασνς,
αλλ ο μεν ίοδε ό δ' ώδε* ταντα δε διάφοροι
πλείστον, λόγομεν Se τον μογαλόφνχον κατά την 3
τοΰ ονόματος προσηγορίαν, ώσπορ iv μεγέθοι τινι
30 φνχης και Βννάμει.* ωστ€ και τω σβμνω και τω
μεγαλόπρεποι όμοιος eij^at δο/cet, ότι^ και ττάσαι?
ται? άρεταΐς άκολονθεΐν φαίνεται. και γάρ το 4
ορθώς κρΐναι τά μεγάλα και μικρά των αγαθών
επαινετόν 8οκ€Ϊ 8ε ταΰτ' eii'at μεγάλα ά 8ιώκει
6 την κρατίστην έχων εξιν περί τά τοιαύτα* ή8εα,
35 η 8ε μεγαλοφνχία κρατίστη. κρίνει δ' η περί 5
εκαστον άρετη το μείζον και το ελαττον ορθώς,
άπερ^ ο φρόνιμος αν κελενσειε και η άρετη, ^ ώστε
εττεσθαι αυττ^ πάσας τάς άρετάς, η αντην επεσθαι
ττασαι?.
' Ετι 8οκεΐ μεγαλοφύχον eii^ai το καταφρονητικόν 6
efi^ai. εκάστη δ' άρετη καταφρονητικονς ποιεί τών
1232 b πάρα τον λόγον μεγάλων, οΐον άν8ρεία^ κιν8ννων
{μέγα γάρ ήγεΐσθαι^'^ οιεται «Γναι τών αισχρών
και πλήθος ού πάν φοβερόν), και σώφρων 'η8ονών
' Γγ. 2 Cas_ . ^Qj5 χανθάνειν. » Rac.
* Γ : δvvάμ(ωs. * Sus. : Sre.
• τοιαντα Ric. : τοιαντ εΐναι (e priore linea).
' κάθατΓ(ρ ? Sp.
* ή <τοιαι)τ77> άρΐΤΎ) vel ή φρόνησίί ? Rac,
» ay8pe:os Sp. ιβ τ,^ύσθαι (cf. 1233 a 31) add. Sol.
338
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. v. 1-6
great-spirited man. For just as in the other cases
of things that, owing to their affinity and similarity
up to a point, are not noticed to differ Avhen they
advance further, the same has happened about great-
2 ness of spirit. Hence sometimes the opposite char-
acters claim the same quality, for instance the ex-
travagant man claims to be the same as the liberal,
the self-willed as the proud, the daring as the brave ;
for they are concerned with the same things, and
also are neighbours up to a point, as the brave man
can endure dangers and so can the daring man, but
the former in one way and the latter in another, and
3 that makes a very great difference. And we use the
term ' great-spirited ' according to the designation
of the word, as consisting in a certain greatness or
power of spirit. So that the great-spirited man
seems to resemble both the proud man and the
magnificent, because greatness of spirit seems to go
4 with all the virtues also. For it is praiseworthy to
judge great and small goods rightly ; and those
goods seem great which a man pursues who possesses
the best state of character in relation to such pleas-
5 ures, and greatness of spirit is the best. And the
virtue concerned with each thing judges rightly the
greater and the smaller good, just as the wise man
and virtue would bid, so that all the virtues go with
it, or it goes with all the virtues.
6 Again, it is thought characteristic of the great- indifferent
spirited man to be disdainful. Each virtue makes iarfty^"'
men disdainful of things irrationally deemed great :
for example, courage makes a man disdainful of
dangers, for he thinks that to consider danger a great
matter is a disgraceful thing, and that numbers are not
always formidable ; and the sober-minded man dis-
339
ARISTOTLE
1332 b
μεγάλων καΐ ττολλών, καΐ iXevdepLog χρημάτων,
μβγαλοφνχου δε τοΰτο δο/cet etvai^ δια το rrepl 7
5 ολίγα σττουΒάζζΐν καΐ ταύτα μεγάλα, και ονχ
ό τι^ δο/cet €Τ€ρω τινί. καΐ μάλλον άν φροντίσ€ΐ€ν
ανηρ μεγαλόψυχος τι δο/cet ivl σπονΒαίω η πολ-
λοίς τοις τυγχάνουσιν,^ ώσττερ ^Αντιφών '4φη
προς Αγάθωνα καταψηφισμένος* την άπολογίαν
επαινεσαντα. καΐ το ολίγωρον του μεγαλοφυχου
10 μάλιστ είναι πάθος ΐ8ιον. πάλιν περί Tt/Lt^9 και 8
του ζην και πλούτου, περί ων σπου8άζειν Βοκοΰσιν
οι άνθρωποι, ονθέν φροντίζειν^ περί των άλλων πλην
περί τιμής• και λυποΐτ^ άν^ άτιμαζόμενος και αρχό-
μενος υπό αναξίου, και χαίρει μάλιστα τυγχάνων.
Ούτω μεν ουν ^όζειεν άν eVavrta»? e'xeti', το 9
lii γαρ είναι τε /ActAtCTTa περί τιμήν και καταφρονη-
τικον eti^ai των πολλών /cat Βό^ης^ ούχ όμολογεΐσθαι.
οεΐ οε τοΰτο 8ιορίσαντας ειπείν, εστί γαρ τιμή ίο
και μικρά και μεγάλη 8ιχώς• η γαρ τω υπό πολλών
τών τυχόντων η /cat* ύπό^ τών άξιων λόγου, και
20 πάλιν τω επι τίνι η τιμή 8ιαφερει• μεγάλη γάρ
ου τω πληθει τών τιμώντων ούΒε τω ποιώ μόνον,
αλλά και τω τιμία^" ett-af τη άληθεία 8ε και at
αρχαι και ταλλα aya^a τίμια και afta σπου8ης
ταΰτα όσα μεγάλα αληθώς εστίν, ώστε και άρετη
^ ehai add. Rac. : τοΰτο δοκ(ΐ ant δοκΰ τοΰτο.
* Rac. : δη edd. ^ τυχοΰσιν Cas.
* ν.Ι. κατΐψΐυσμένωί. * φροντίζΐί Cas.
' Ric. (vel Χυττηθησΐταί) : λνπηθήσοιτ &ι>.
' fhai TTjs τών ττολλων δόξηί ? (λαϊ cm. Γ) Rac,
* Ric. : 1j. » ί/7ΓΟ ? Ric. : τφ ύιτδ.
" Sol. (τίμια ? Ric.) : ημίαν.
' Λ variant reading gives 'as Λ. said to A. when he in-
340
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. v. 6-10
dains great and numerous pleasures, and the liberal
7 man wealth. But the reason why this is thought
characteristic of the great-spirited man is because of
his caring about fcAV things and those great ones,
and not about Λvhatever somebody else thinks.
And a great-spirited man would consider more what
one virtuous man thinks than what many ordinary
people think, as Antiphon after his condemnation
said to Agathon when he praised his speech for his
defence.'* And a feeling thought to be specially
characteristic of the great-spirited man is disdain.
8 On the other hand, as to the accepted objects of but loves
human interest, honour, life, wealth, he is thought to i^ono"•"
care nothing about any of them except honour ; it
would grieve him to be dishonoured and ruled by
someone unworthy, and his greatest joy is to obtain
honour.
9 Thus he might therefore be thought inconsistent,
on the ground that to be specially concerned about
honour and to be disdainful of the multitude and of
10 reputation do not go together. But in saying this ot the nobi.
we must distinguish. Honour is small or great in '^""^•
two ways : it differs in being conferred either by
many ordinary people or by persons of consideration,
and again it differs in what it is conferred for, since
its greatness does not depend only on the number or
the quality of those who confer it, but also on its
being honourable ; and in reality those offices and
other good things are honourable and worthy of
serious pursuit that are truly great, so that there is
sincerely praised his defence.' For Antiphon's indictment
as a leader in the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens
see Thuc. viii. 68. Agathon is presumably the tragic poet,
see Plato's Symposium. The anecdote is not recorded else-
where.
341
ARISTOTLE
1232 b ^
ovSe^ia av€v μζγέθους' διό hoKovai μ.€γαλοφύχους
25 not€iv ζκαστη ττβρι ο εστίν εκάστη αύτώι^, ωσπερ
απομβν. αλλ' όμως εστί τίς τταρά τάς άλλας 11
αρετας μια μεγαλοφνχία, ωστε^ καΐ ίδια μεγαλό-
φνχον τούτον λεκτεον τον έχοντα ταυτην. επεί
δ εστίν ενια των aya^cul•- τά μεν τίμια τα. δ' ου/
ως οίωρισθτη ττρότερον, των τοιούτων δ' aya^ojl•'
βστι τά juev μεγάλα κατ αληθειαν τά δε μικρά,
30 'cat τούτων eVtot α^ιοι /cat ά^ιοΰσιν αύτοιί?, εν
τούτοις ζητητεος 6 μεγαλόφυχος. τετραχώς δ' 12
ανάγκη διαφερειν εστί μεν γαρ άζιον είναι
μεγάλων και άζιοϋν εαυτόν τούτων, εστί hk μικρά
και άζιον eti^at" τηλικοντων και άζιοΰν εαυτόν
τούτων, έστι δ άνάτταλιΐ' προς εκάτερα αυτών ό
35 μ^ν γάρ αν εΐη τοιούτος οίος άζιος ων μικρών
μεγάλων* άζιοΰν εαυτόν τών εντίμων άγα^ώι^, ο
8ε άζιος ων μεγάλων άζιοίη αν μικρών εαυτόν,
ό μεν οΰν άξιος μικρών, μεγάλων δ' ά^ιώΐ' εαυτόν, 13
φεκτός• άνόητον γάρ και ου καλόν τό παρά την
aftW* τιη/χάνειν. φεκτός δε fcat οστι? a^tos" ώι^
1233 a υπαρχόντων αύτώ τών τοιούτων μετεχειν μη άζιοΐ
εαυτόν. λείπεται 8ε ενταύθα ενάντιος τούτοις 14
αμφοτεροις όστις ων άζιος μεγάλων άξιοι αυτός
εαυτόν τούτων, και τοιούτος εστίν οίος άζιοΰν^
^ Γ : (cawep. ^ ου add. Sol.
^ elvat (vel eluai τι^α) Ric. : riva.
* [μεγάλων] ? liac
* άξίαν ζ.άξιοΰντα vel ο'ώμ^ρον vel χαννούμ^νον'^ Ric.
• οίον άξιοι Ric. (οΓοϊ άξιοι Sp.).
• See a 39. » i.e. 11. 17 ff.
* Perhaps the lecturer points to a diagram (Solomon).
342.
EUDEMIAN ELTHICS, III. v. io-l4
no goodness without greatness ; owing to which each
of the virtues seems to make men great-spirited in
regard to the things Avith which that virtue is con-
11 cerned, as we said.* But nevertheless there is a
single virtue of greatness of spirit side by side with
the other virtues, so that the possessor of this virtue
must be termed great-spirited in a special sense.
And since there are certain goods which are in some
cases honourable and in others not, according to
the distinction made before,'' and of goods of this
sort some are truly great and others small, and some
men deserve and claim the former, it is among
these men that the great-spirited man must be
12 looked for. And there are necessarily four varieties Four
of claim : it is possible to deserve great things and towardr
to claim them as one's desert ; and there are small iionoiu•.
things and a man may deserve and claim things of .
that size ; and as regards each of these ΐΛνο classes
of things the reverse is possible — one man may be
of such a character that although deserving small
things he claims great ones — the goods held in high
honour, and another man though deserving great
13 things may claim small ones. Now the man worthy
of small things but claiming great ones is blame-
worthy, for it is foolish and not fine to obtain what
does not correspond to one's deserts. And he also
is blameworthy who though worthy of such things
does not deem himself worthy to partake of them
14 although they are available for him. But there is Definition of
left here " the man who is the opposite of both of nj^ty.
these, who being worthy of great things claims them
as his desert,** and is of such a character as to deem
^ The Greek phrase combines the senses of rating one's
deserts high and asserting one's claims.
343
ARISTOTLE
1238 a , , „ , , Ν / / y y
iavTov οΰτος €7ταιν€τος και μ€σος τούτων. €7Τ€ΐ 1ί
5 οΰν π€ρΙ τιμής alpeaiv καΐ χρησιν καΐ των άλ-
λων αγαθών των εντίμων αρίστη εστί δια^εσι? η
μ€γαλοφνχία /cat ου ττερί τα χρήσιμα,^ και τοϋτ
άτΓοδιδο/Λβν τω μβγαλόφυχω ,^ άμα 8e /cat η μβσοτης
[αντη]^ ε7ταίν€τωτάτη , Βηλον otl /cat ή μ€γαλοφυχία
μζσότης άν €Ϊη. των δ' εναντίων, ωσπ^ρ Steypa- U
10 φαμ€ν, Ύ) μ€ν cttl το άζιοΰν ίαυτον αγαθών μβγάλων
άνάζίον οντά χαυνότης {τους τοιούτους γαρ χαυ-
νονς λέγομ^ν όσοι μίγάλων οΐονται άζιοι elvai ουκ
οντές), η δε vrept το άζιον οντά μη άζιοΰν εαυτόν
μεγάλων μικροφυχία {μικρόφυχος* γαρ eti^at 8οκ€Ϊ
όστις υπαρχόντων δι' ά Βικαίως αν άζιοΐτο μη
15 a^toi μηθΐνός μεγάλου εαυτόν), ωστ ανάγκη καΐ
την μ€γαλοφυχίαν βΐναι μ^σότητα χαυνότητος και
μικροφυχίας. ό δε τέταρτος των διορισθέντων γ
οϋτ€ πάμπαν φ^κτος οϋτ€ μ€γαλόφυχος, ire/Jt
ooSev ων €χον^ μέγεθος- οϋτ€ γαρ άζιος οϋτ€ άζιοΐ
μεγάλων, διό ουκ ενάντιος• καίτοι ho^eiev αν
20 εναντίον ett^at τω μεγάλων άζιον οντά μΕγάλων το
μικρών οντά άζιον μικρών^ άζιοΰν εαυτόν, ουκ u
εστί. δ ενάντιος ουδέ' τω μ^μτττος etvai, ως γαρ ό
* ού vepl τα χρ-ήσιμα hic Ric. : post άνοδίδομεν.
* Fr. : TOf μεΎο,λόφνχον. ' Rac.
* Fr. : μικροψύχον.
* ώΐ' έχον Rac. {ίχορ ών Sus.) : ίχων.
• μικρών add. Sus. ' Sp. : οί!τ«.
" Or, emending the text, ' and is as worthy as he claims
to be.'
344
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. v. 14-18
himself worthy " : he is praiseworthy, and he is in
15 the middle between the two. Since, therefore, great-
ness of spirit is the best disposition in relation to the
choice and the employment of honour and of the other
good things that are esteemed, and not in relation
to useful things, and since we assign this to the
great-spirited man, and since also at the same time
the middle state is most praiseworthy, it is clear that
even greatness of spirit must be a middle state.
16 And of the opposites as shown in our diagram, the Vanity.
one in the direction of deeming oneself worthy of
great goods when one is not worthy is vanity (for
the sort of men that fancy themselves worthy of
great things though they are not we call vain), and
the one that is concerned with not deeming oneself
worthy of great things when one is worthy of them
is smallness of spirit (for if a man does not think
himself worthy of anything great although he pos-
sesses qualities which would justly make him con-
sidered worthy of it, he is thought small-spirited) ;
so that it follows that greatness of spirit is a middle
17 state between vanity and smallness of spirit. But Modest Seif-
the fourth of the persons in our classification is ^**^'"^'"•
neither entirely reprehensible nor is he great-
spirited, as he is concerned with nothing possessing
greatness, for he neither is nor thinks himself worthy
of great things ; owing to which he is not the op-
posite of the man of great spirit. Yet thinking
oneself worthy of small things when one is worthy
of small things might be thought the opposite of
thinking oneself worthy of great ones when one is
18 Λvorthy of great ones ; but he is not opposite to the
great-spirited man because he is not blameworthy
34,5
ARISTOTLE
1233 a
λόγος KeXevei €χβι• καΐ 6 αυτός iari rfj φυσ€ΐ τω
μζγαλοφύχφ• ών γαρ αζιοι, τούτων άζιοΰσιν αυτούς
άμφω. και ο μ^ν yerotr' αν μ€γαλόφυχος , αξιώσει 19
25 γαρ ών βστίν άζίος• 6 8e μικρόφυχος, δς υπαρ-
χόντων αύτω μβγαλων κατά τιμήν aya^cDt' ούκ
άξιοι, τι αν €7toUl^ el μικρών αζιος rjv; η'^ γαρ
άν^ μζγάλων άξιων χαΰνος ην,'^ η en €λαττόνων.
ΟΙΟ και ούθβις άν (ϊποι μικρόφνχον et τις μέτοικος 20
ών άρχ€ΐν μη άξιοι ίαυτον αλλ' ύττζίκ€ΐ, αλλ' et
30 τις ^ύγβνης ών και -ηγούμενος μβγα elvai το άρχ€ΐν.
VI. Έστι 8e και ό μ€γαλοπρ€ττης ού -nepi την Ι
τυχοΰσαν πραξιν και ττροαίρβσιν, άλλα την δα-
πάνην/' el μη που κατά μ€ταφοράν λέγομβν άν€υ
8e Βαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια ούκ εστίν, το μεν γαρ
35 πρέπον εν κόσμω εστίν, 6 8ε κόσμος ούκ εκ των
τυχόντων άναλωμάτων, αλλ' εν υπερβολή των
αναγκαίων εστίν. ό 8η εν μεγάλη δαπάνη του 2
πρέποντος μεγέθους προαιρετικός, και της τοιαύτης
μεσότητος και επι τη τοιαύτη rjSovfj^ ορεκτικός,
μεγαλοπρεπής . ό δ' επι τό μείζον και παρά μέλος 3
ί23Ζ\) ανώνυμος• ού μην αλλ' έχουσϊ' τινά γειτνίασιν
ους καλοΰσί τίνες άπειροκάλους και σαλάκωνας.
1 Γ: eiVoi. ''Mb; et Pb.
^ αν οπα. ΜΙ^: ei yap μεγάλων αξίων ζαΰτόν άνάξιον'^ ών Sp.
* post ^ν lacunam Sus.
' άλλα την δαττάν-ην infra post λ^ομεν Ric.
* δαπάντι ? Ric. ' Cas. : έχα.
" The MS. reading hardly gives a sense. An emendation
gives ' for if he conceitedly thought himself worthy of great
things when unworthy,' and supposes a gap in the text before
the following words.
* A probable emendation substitutes ' expenditure ' for
' pleasure.'
* The MS. text gives ' he has a certain set of neighbours
346
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. v. 18— vi. 3
either, for his character is as reason bids, and in
nature he is the same as the great-spirited man, for
both claim as their desert the things that they are
19 worthy of. And he might become great-spirited, Mean-
for he will claim the things that he is worthy of ; ^P^^tedness.
whereas the small-spirited man, who when great
goods corresponding to his worth are available does
not think himself worthy of them, — what would he
have done if his deserts were small ? For either he
woxild have conceitedly thought himself worthy of
20 great things, or of still less.** Hence nobody would
call a man small-spirited for not claiming to hold
office and submitting to authority if he is a resident
alien, but one would do so if he were of noble birth
Viand attached great importance to office.
l) VI. The Magnificent Man also (except in a case Magnifl-
) when we are using the term metaphorically) is not ^''"°'^•
concerned with any and every action and purposive
choice, but with expenditure. Without expenditure
there is no magnificence, for it is what is appro-
priate in ornament, and ornament does not result
from any chance expenditure, but consists in going
2 beyond the merely necessary. Therefore the mag-
nificent man is the man who purposively chooses
the appropriate greatness in great expenditure, and
who even on the occasion of a pleasure ^ of this
3 nature aims at this sort of moderation. There is its excess
no name denoting the man who likes spending to '"^ ^^^ '
excess and inappropriately ; however the persons
whom some people call tasteless and swaggering
have a certain affinity to him." For instance if a
whom some people call . . .' : but -γειτρίασίί is abstract at
1232 a 21 and Pol. i., 1257 a 2. Its concrete use in later Greek,
' neighbourhood '='set of neighbours' (Plutarch, etc.) has
led to corruption here.
347
ARISTOTLE
1233 b
οίον el els γάμον δαπανών τις του αγαπητού,
πλούσιος cor, δο/cet ττρ4ττ€ΐν εαυτω τοιαύτην κατα-
σκίυην οΐαν^ άγαθοΒαιμονιστας ίστιώντι, οντος
5 μ^ν μικροττρβπης, 6 δε τοιοιίτους 8€χομ€νος €Κ€ΐνως
μη 8όζης χάριν μη^€ δι' βζουσίαν όμοιος τω
σαλάκωνι, 6 δε /car' άζίαν και ώς 6 λόγος μβγαλο-
ττρζττης• το γαρ πρ€7τον κατ* άζίαν ίστίν ovdev
γαρ πρ€π€ΐ των παρά την άζίαν. δει δε πρέπον 4
(^καθ έκαστοι')^ είναι* και γαρ του πράττοντος^
κατ άζίαν, και περί ον^ και πβρι δ, οίον π^ρΐ οίκξτου
10 γάμον eTepov το πρέπον και π€ρι ερωμένου• και
αύτω, ειττερ εστί* τοσούτον η τοιούτον, οίον την
θ^ωρίαν ουκ ωοντο^ Θε/χιστοκλεΓ πρέπ^ιν ην έποιη-
σατο Όλυμπίαζΐ, δια την προϋπάρζασαν ταπεινό-
τητα, άλλα Κι/χωΐΊ. ό δ' όπως έτυχαν έχων προς 5
την άζίαν ούθΐΐς^ τούτων.
15 Και ετΓ έλβυθβριότητος ωσαύτως' εστί γάρ τις
οϋτ ελευθέριος ού'τ' ανελεύθερος.^
VII. Σ;^εδόρ' δε και των άλλων έκαστα των περί Ι
το ήθος επαιί'ετώι^ κ:αι φεκτών τα μεν ύπερβολαί
τα δ έλλείφεις τά δε μεσότητές εισι παθητικαί,
οίον ο φθονερός και ό* επιχαιρέκακος. καθ* ας
20 γάρ έξεις λέγονται, 6 μεν φθόνος το λνπεΐσθαι έπι
^ Rac. : οίον. 2 lac.
* Bus. : πρίίΓοντοί. * lac, : καΊ ιτρέττον.
" έστϊ ? lac. : έηΐ, {βστϊ τοσοΰτα και toiovtos, ant ftwtp έστΙ
τοσούτον κα.1 τοιούτον tr. supra post 9 wepi δ Ric.)
* Sp. (vel ψΐτο . . . coinici nomine oniisso) : i^sto.
' ούδύί Γ: δ oi'Seis.
* Cas. : Tis J)s έλΐνθέριοί 6ταν (XtvOepos.
* ό add. Rac.
» i.e. persons who only drink the formal toast (' Here's to
Good Luck '), with which dinner ended.
348
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vi. 3— vii. 1
rich man spending money on the wedding of a
favourite thinks it fitting for him to have the sort
of arrangements that vt'ould be fitting when enter-
taining abstainers," he is shabby, while one who
entertains guests of that sort after the manner of
a wedding feast, if he does not do it for the sake
of reputation or to gain an office, resembles the
swaggerer ; but he that entertains suitably and as
reason directs is magnificent, for the fitting is the
suitable, as nothing is fitting that is unsuitable.
4 But it must be fitting in each particular, that is,
in suitability to the agent and to the recipient and
to the occasion — for example, what is fitting at the
wedding of a servant is not what is fitting at that of
a favourite ; and it is fitting for the agent himself,
if it is of an amount or quality suitable to him—
for example people thought that the mission that
Themistocles conducted to Olympia was not fitting
for him, because of his former low station, but would
5 have been for Cimon.^ But he who is casual in
regard to the question of suitability is not in any of
these classes.
Ο Similarly in regard to liberality : a man may be
(J) neither liberal nor illiberal.
1 1 VII. Generally speaking the other praiseworthy Moderate
' and blameworthy states of character also are ex- tvorth™""''
cesses or deficiencies or middle states, but in respect states of
/• . r. . .1 . J Feeling.
of an emotion : for mstance, the envious man and
the malicious. For — to take the states of character
after which they are named — Envy means being
* The story of Themistocles at the Olympic festival incur-
ring disapproval by vying with Cimon in the splendour of
his equipment and entertainments is told by. Plutarch, Vit.
Them. 5.
34.9
ARISTOTLE
1233 b
τοις κατ άζίαν eu πράττουσίν Ιστιν, το δε του
εττιχαιρζ κάκου ττάθος €στΙν^ αυτό άνώννμον, αλλ'
6 €χων Βηλός eVri^ τω χαίρ^ιν^ ταΓ? παρά την
άζίαν κακοττραγίαις' μέσος δε τούτων 6 ν€μ€ση- 2
τίκος, και ο €κάλουν οΐ αρχαίοι την ν€μ€σίν, το
25 ΑυττζΙσθαι μβν inl ταΐς παρά την άζίαν κακο-
πραγίαις καΐ ^ύπραγίαις, χαίρβιν δ' eVt ται? ά^ιαι?•
δί.0 καΐ deov οϊονται eivai την νάμ^σιν.
Αιδώ? δε μ€σότης άναισχυντίας και καταπλήξεων • 3
ο μβν γάρ μηΒβμιάς φροντίζων 8όξης αναίσχυντος,
ο δε πάσης ομοίως καταπλήζ , ο δε της των
φαινομένων επιεικών αΐ^ήμων.
30 Φίλια δε μεσάτης έχθρας και κολακεία?• 6 μ€ν 4
γαρ €ύχ€ρώς άπαντα προς τάς επιθυμίας ομιλών
κόλαζ, ο δε προς άπάσας άντικρούων άπ€χθητικός ,
ο δε μη* προς αττασαν η8ονην μητ^ ακολουθών μητ^
αντιτβίνων, αλλά προς το φαινόμενον ββλτιστον,
φίλος.
Άί. Σίζμνότης δε μ€σότης αυ^αδεια? και αρέσκεια?• ό
ό μ€ν γάρ μη^έν προς eTepov ζών αλλά^ κατα-
φρονητικός αύθάΒης, 6 δε πάντα προς άλλον και"
πάντων βλάττων άρεσκος, 6 δε τα μίν τα δε μη,
και προς τους άζίους οϋτως €χων, σεμνός.
Ο δ' αληθής και άπλοϋς, ον καλοΰσιν αύθέκαστον, ο
μέσος του είρωνος και αλαζόνος• 6 μεν γάρ επι τά
1234 a χείρω καθ^ αύτοϋ φευΒόμενος μη άγνοών είρων, ό
δ 67Γΐ τά βελτίω άλαζών, 6 δ' ως βχει, αληθής
^ ίστίν Sp. : ΐπΐ rb. * ίστι Cas, : iirl.
' ό χαίρων Hie. ■• /:λ7) Sp. : μήτΐ.
* άλλα Γ : οηι. codd. (nonnulli άκαταφρονητικό^).
* καΐ Sp. : ^ καί.
" The man who calls each thing itself, i.e. what it reall\
is, calls a spade a spade.
350
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vii. 1-6
pained at people who are deservedly prosperous,
while the emotion of the malicious man is itself
nameless, but the possessor of it is shown by his
2 feeling joy at undeserved adversities ; and midway
between them is the righteously indignant man,
and what the ancients called Righteous Indignation
— feeling pain at undeserved adversities and pro-
sperities and pleasure at those that are deserved ;
hence the idea that Nemesis is a deity.
3 Modesty is a middle state between Shamelessness
and Bashfulness : the man who pays regard to
nobody's opinion is shameless, he who regards
everybody's is bashful, he who regards the opinion
of those who appear good is modest.
4 Friendliness is a middle state between Animosity
and Flattery ; the man who accommodates himself
readily to his associates' desires in everything is a
flatterer, he who runs counter to them all shows
animosity, he who neither falls in with nor resists
every pleasure, but falls in with what seems to be the
best, is friendly.
5 Dignity is a middle state between Self-will and
Obsequiousness. A man who in his conduct pays
no regard at all to another but is contemptuous
is self-willed ; he who regards another in everything
and is inferior to everybody is obsequious ; he who
regards another in some things biit not in others,
and is regardful of persons worthy of regard, is
dignified.
6 The truthful and sincere man, called ' downright,'"
is midway betΛveen the dissembler and the charlatan.
He that wittingly makes a false statement against
himself that is depreciatory is a dissembler, he that
exaggerates his merits is a charlatan, he that speaks
351
ARISTOTLE
1234 a ^ , „ / y "\ ' ^ 1 \
/cat καθ' "Ομηρον π€ττννμ€νος• και ολωζ ο μ€ν φιλ-
αλήθης, οΐ δε φίλοφ€υΒ€Ϊς .^
"Εστί δε καΐ η ^ύτραττ^λία μ€σότης, και ο ev- 7
•Ο τράπίλος μέσος του άγροίκον /cat δυστραπελου
/cat τον βωμολόχου. ωσπερ γαρ περί τροφην ο
σικχός του παμφάγου δtα0ε'pεt τω 6 μεν μηθεν η
ολίγα /cat ;^αλε7Γώ9 ττροσίεσθαι, 6 δε πάντα ευχερώς,
οϋτω /cat ό άγροικος έχει προς τον φορτικον και
βωμολόχον 6 μεν γαρ ούθέν γελοΐον αλλ' η^ χαλε-
10 πώς προσίεται, 6 δε πάντα ευχερώς /cat τ^δε'ω?.
δει δ' ούΒετερον, άλλα τα μεν τα δε μή, και κατά
λόγον ούτος δ' ό* ευτράπελος, η δ' ά77όδεtζ•tJ η 8
αυτί]• τ^ '^^ yct/f' ευτραπελία η τοιαύτη, και μη ην
μεταφέροντες λεγομεν, επιεικέστατη έξις, και η
μεσάτης ε'7Γαt^'ετr^, τα δ' άκρα φεκτά. οΰσης δε
1^ 8ιττης της ευτραπελίας [η μεν γαρ εν τώ χαιρειν
εστί τώ γελοίω, και* τώ εις αυτόν εάν η τοιονΒί,
ων εν και το σκώμμά εστt^', η δ' εν τώ Βυνασθαι
τοιαύτα πορίζεσθαι) , ετεραι μεν είσιν άλλτ^λωΐ', α;α-
φότεραι μεντοι μεσότητες• και γαρ 6 8υνάμενος^ 9
τοιαύτα πορίζεσθαι εφ' οιοις^ ησθησεται ο' εύ
^0 κρίνων καν εις αύτον fj το γελοΐον, μέσος εσται
του φορτικού και του φυχροϋ. 6 δ ορός ούτος
βελτίων η το μη^ λυπηρον εt^'αt το λεχθεν τω σκω-
πτομενω οντι οποιωοΰν μάλλον γαρ δει τω εν
μεσότητι οντι άρεσκειν ούτος γαρ κρίνει ευ.
^ Rac. : ό &i φιλοψενδή^.
» άλλ' ij Rac. {y Sp). : αλλά. * ό add. Fr.
* καΐ <δη καΙ> ? Rac. ^ Syl. : τόν δυνάμενον.
• Rac. : Sffots. ' ό add. Fr. * μη add, Cas.
■ The term eorpaveXot means literally ' able to turn easily,'
versatile ; it denotes both ' witty ' and ' easy-going.'
352
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vii. 6-9
of himself as he is is truthful and in Homer's phrase
' sagacious ' ; and in general the one is a lover of
truth and the others lovers of falsehood.
7 Wittiness " also is a middle state, and the witty
man is midway between the boorish or stiff man and
the buffoon. For just as in the matter of food the
squeamish man differs from the omnivorous in that
the former takes nothing or little, and that reluc-
tantly, and the latter accepts everything readily,
so the boor stands in relation to the vulgar man
or buffoon — the former takes no joke except with
difficulty, the latter accepts everything easily and
with pleasure. Neither course is right : one should
allow some things and not others, and on principle,
8 — that constitutes the witty man. The proof of the
formula is the same as in the other cases : wittiness
of this kind (not the quality ^ to which we apply the
term in a transferred sense) is a very becoming sort
of character, and also a middle state is praiseworthy,
whereas extremes are blameworthy. But as there
are two kinds of wit (one consisting in liking a joke,
even one that tells against oneself if it is funny, for
instance a jeer, the other in the ability to produce
things of this sort), these kinds of vnt differ from one
9 another, but both are middle states ; for a man who
can produce jokes of a sort that will give pleasure
to a person of good judgement even though the
laugh is against himself will be midway between the
vulgar man and the frigid. This is a better definition
than that the thing said must not be painful to the
victim whatever sort of man he may be — rather, it
must give pleasure to the man in the middle position,
since his judgement is good.
" Viz. βωμολοχία, ' bufToonery,' N.E. 1128 a 15.
2 A 353
ARISTOTLE
1234» , -^ , , , , /
Πασαι δ αύται αί μεσοτητβς ετταινβται μ€ν, 1
25 ονκ elat δ' aperai, ού8' αί ivavTiat κακίαι, avev
προαψ€σ£ως yap• ταΰτα δε ττάντ earlv iv ται?
των παθημάτων SiaipeaeoLV, €καστον γαρ αυτών
πάθος τι εστίν, δια δε το φυσικά klvai els τάς 1
φυσικάς συμβάϊΧλεται άρβτάς' έ'στι γάρ, ωσπ^ρ
λ€χθΎ}σ€ται iv τοις ύστερον, ίκάσττ) πως άρετη
30 και φυσ€ΐ καΐ άλλως, μετά φρονησεως . 6 μεν ουν 1
φθόνος εΙς ά8ικίαν συμβάλλεται {προς γάρ άλλον
αί πράζεις αί άττ' αύτοΰ) καΐ η νεμεσις εΙς δίκαιο -
συνην καΐ^ η αιδώ? εις σωφροσυνην (διο και ορί-
ζονται iv τω γένει τούτω την σωφροσύνην), ο δ
αληθής και φευ^ης ο μεν εμφρων ο δ' άφρων.
1234 b "Εστί δ' ivavτιώτεpov τοις άκροις το μέσον η ]
iκεΐva άλλι^λοι?, διότι το μεν μετ^ ούΒετερου yii'e-
ται αυτών, τά Se ττολλά/ίΐ? μετ^ αλλήλων, και εισιν
ivίoτε οι αύτοι θρασύδειλοι, και τά μεν άσωτοι τα
δε ανελεύθεροι, και δλως ανώμαλοι κακώς• όταν μεν 1
5 yap καλώς ανώμαλοι ωσιν, μέσοι γίνονται, εν τω
μέσω γάρ iστί πως τά άκρα.
Αί δ' ει^αντιώσει? ου Βοκοΰσιν ύπάρχειν τοις
άκροις προς το μέσον ομοίως άμφότεραι, αλλ οτε
μεν καθ^ ύπερβολην ότε δε κατ^ ελλειφιν. αίτια ]
δε τά τε πρώτα ρηθεντα 8ύο, ολιγότης τε, οίον
10 τών προς τά ηΒεα αναίσθητων , και δτι i^* ο άμαρ-
τάνομεν μάλλον, τοΰτο ivavτιώτεpov ειι^αι ΒοκεΖ• το ]
^ καΐ add. Rac.
« Not in E.E., but cf. N.E. vi., 1144 b 1-17.
* Truthfulness and mendacity contribute to wisdom and
folly as ν^μεσα and φθόνοί do to δικαιοσύνη and αδικία, and
α/δώ{ (and άΐ'αιδ(ία) to σωφροσύνη (and ακολασία).
' Cf. 1229 a 22-b 4.
854
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vii. 10-16
10 All these middle states, though praiseworthy, are Thesepraise-
not virtues, nor are the opposite states vices, for they state7of
do not involve purposive choice ; they are all in the Feeling pro-
classification of the emotions, for each of them is an virtues.
11 emotion. But because they are natural they con-
tribute to the natural virtues ; for, as will be said
in what follows," each virtue exists both naturally
and otherwise, that is, in conjunction with thought.
12 Therefore envy contributes to injustice (for the
actions that spring from it affect another person),
and righteous indignation to justice, and modesty to
temperance (owing to which people even define tem-
perance as a species of emotion), and the sincere and
false are respectively wise and foolish.''
13 And the mean is more opposed to the extremes Extremes
than the extremes are to one another, because the '^ ™®*' '
mean does not occur in combination with either ex-
treme, whereas the extremes often do occur in
combination with one another, and sometimes the
same men are venturesome cowards, or extravagant
in some things and illiberal in others, and in general
14 not uniform in a bad way — for when men lack uni-
formity in a good way, this results in men of the
middle characters, since the mean contains both
extremes.
The opposition existing between the mean and Appendix to
the extremes does not seem to be the same in the
case of both the extremes, but sometimes the greater
opposition is by way of excess, sometimes by way
15 of deficiency. The causes of this are partly the two
first mentioned,^ rarity (for example, the rarity of
people insensitive to pleasant things) and the fact
that the error to which we are more prone seems
16 more opposite to the mean, and thirdly the fact that
§55
ARISTOTLE
12S4 b
8e τρίτον, OTL TO ομοιότβρον "ήττον εναντίον (jyaive-
ται, οίον ττίττονθζ το θράσος προς το θάρσος^ και
ασωτία προς ^λ^νΟβριότ-ητα.
YVepl μ€ν ονν των άλλων αρετών των ετταινετων
€'ίρηταί σχεδόν", π€ρΙ δε 8ικαίοσυνης -η8η XcKTeov.
^ τό θάρσοί irpbs το θράσος Μ^ (sed cf. 1220 b 39) : τό θάρσοί
(potius θράσοί Rac.) wpbs την άνδρΐίαν Βζ.
" Or, ' confidence ' ; but perhaps the Greek should be
altered to give ' courage.'
356
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vii. 15-16
the extreme that more resembles the mean seems
less opposite to it, as is the case with daring in
relation to boldness " and extravagance in relation
to liberality.
We have therefore sufficiently discussed the other
praiseworthy virtues, and must now speak about
Justice.
(Books IV, V, VI are omitted, as they are identical with
Books V, VI, VII of the Nicomachean Ethics.)
357
Η
1234 b
I. YlepL φίλιας, τι iari καΐ ποιόν η, και τις 6 1
φίλος, καΐ Trorepov η φίλια μ,οναχώς Aeyerat η
20 ττλβοναχώς , καΐ el ττλβοναχώς, πόσα εστίν ^ ert 8e
πώς χρηστεον τω φίλω καΐ τι το Βίκαίον το φιλικόν,
επισκεπτβον ούθβνός ήττον των περί τα ηθη καλών
καΐ αιρετών, της τ€ γαρ πολιτικής έργον είναι 2
^οκεΐ ]θΐάλιστα ποιησαι φιλίαν, και την άρετην δια
τοϋτό φασιν eti^ai χρησιμον ου γαρ ενΒεχεσθαι
25 φίλους εαυτοΐς εΐναι τους αδικούμενους υπ* άλΑτ^-
λων. ετι το Βίκαιον και το αδικον περί τους φίλους 3
eti^ai /χάλιστα πάντες φαμεν, και ό αυτός 8οκεΐ
άνηρ eti^at και aya^o? και φίλος, και φιλία ηθική
τις eti^at έξις• και εάν τις βούληται ποιησαι^ ώστε
μη άΒικεΙν, άλις^ φίλους ποιησαι, οι γαρ αληθινοί
30 φίλοι ουκ άΒικοΰσιν. άλλα μην και εάν δίκαιοι 4
ωσιν, ουκ ά8ικήσουσιν• ή ταυτόΐ' άρα ή εγγύς τι ή
δικαιοσύνη και ή φιλία.
Προ? 8έ τούτοις τών μεγίστων aya^cDr τον φίλον 5
eit-ai ύπολαμβάνομεν, την 8ε άφιλίαν και την
ερημιαν Βεινότατον, οτι ό βίος άπας και ή εκον-
1285 a σιος ομιλία μετά τούτων μετ* οΙκείων γάρ η μετά
^ πύσαι daiv Sp. : ποσαχω^ ? Rac. (ττοσαχώ? (στίν vel ττόσα
έστϊν <ΐίδη> Βζ.). * πεΐσαι ? Ric.
* &λΐί lac. : άλλ' είϊ. {dWovs, φί\ον$ ποιήσει Sp., dWovs φίλονί
ΐΓοιησαι Se'iv Fr.)
358
BOOK VII
1 I. Friendship— its nature and qualities, what con- pbiendshu
stitutes a friend, and whether the term friendship its nature
has one or several meanings, and if several, how *"
many, and also what is our duty towards a friend
and what are the just claims of friendship — is a
matter that calls for investigation no less than any
of the things that are fine and desirable in men's
2 characters. For to promote friendship is thought to
be the special task of political science ; and people
say that it is on this account that goodness is a
valuable thing, for persons wrongfully treated by
3 one another cannot be each other's friends. Further-
more we all say that justice and injustice are chiefly
displayed towards friends ; it is thought that a
good man is a friendly man, and that friendship is a
state of the moral character ; and if one wishes to
make men not act unjustly, it is enough to make them
friends, for true friends do not wrong one another.
4 But neither will men act unjustly if they are just ; ^.^
therefore justice and friendship are either the same "
or nearly the same thing.
5 In addition to this, we consider a friend to be one
of the greatest goods, and friendlessness and solitude
a very terrible thing, because the whole of hfe and
voluntary association is with friends ; for we pass
359
ARISTOTLE
1285 a
συγγενών η μςθ" εταίρων συν^ιημβρευομίν , η τέκ-
νων η γονέων η γυναι,κός. και τά ίδια δίκαια τα ι
ττρος τους φίλους εστίν εφ' ημΐν μόνον, τά δε προς
τους άλλους νενομοθετηται καΐ ουκ εφ^ ημΐν.
5 Απορβΐταί 8ε ττολλα περί της φίλιας, πρώτον μεν '
ως οι εζωθεν περιλαμβάνοντες καΐ επΙ πλέον
λέγοντες. 8οκεΐ γαρ τοις μεν το δμοίον τω όμοίω
eit'at φίλον, όθεν εϊρηται
ως αΐεΐ τον ομοιον άγει θεός ως τόν όμοιον
και γαρ κολοιός πάρα κολοίόν . . .
εγνω 8ε φώρ τε φώρα καΐ λύκος λύκον.
10 OL 8ε φυσιολόγοι καΐ την όλην φΰσιν 8ιακοσμοΰσιν ί
ο-ρχην λαβόντες τό τό ομοιον ίεναι προς τό όμοιον,
8ιο Έιμπε8οκλης και την κυν^ εφη καθησθαι επΙ
της κεραμί8ος δια τό εχειν πλείστον όμοιον.
01 μεν οΰν οϋτω τόν^ φίλον λεγουσιν οι 8ε τό ί
εναντίον τω εκαι^τιω φασιν etvat φίλον, τό μεν γαρ
15 ερώμενον και επιθυμητόν ττασιν είναι φίλον, επι-
θυμεΐν^ 8ε ου τό ζηρόν του ξηροΰ άλλα τοΰ^ ύγροΰ
[ουεν ειρηται
ερα μεν όμβρου γαία,
μεταβολή πάντων γλυκύ'
^ ν.1. τό. * Fr. : ένιθνμΐΐ.
' του add, Μ•>.
" Od. χνϋ. 218.
* ' Birds of a feather flock together.' Sc. ll^avet, ' perches ' :
an iambic verse quoted in full M.M. 1208 b 9, and in the
form KoXoidl• ποτΐ κολοών N.E. viii., 1155 a 35, where the
dialect suggests that it is from a Doric poet (unknown).
360
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. i. 5-9
our days with our family or relations or comrades,
6 children, parents or wife. And our private rights
in relation to our friends depend only on ourselves,
whereas our rights in relation to the rest of men
are established by law and do not depend on us.
7 Many questions are raised about friendship — first, ^^Z'"'^"'^*
on the line of those who take in wider considera- on\ikene8s
tions and extend the term. For some hold that like
is friend to like, whence the sayings :
Mark how God ever brings like men together " ;
For jackdaw by the side of jackdaw . . .* ; -
And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow wolf." -
8 And the natural philosophers even arrange the
whole of nature in a system by assuming as a first
principle that like goes to like, owing to which
Empedocles '^ said that the dog sits on the tiling -;
because it is most like him.*
9 Some people then give this account of a friend ; or on con-
but others say that opposite is dear to opposite,
since it is what is loved and desired that is dear to
everybody, and the dry does not desire the dry but
the wet (whence the sayings —
Earth loveth rain/ '
and
In all things change is sweet — "
'^ ' Set a thief to catch a thief.' The origin of the verse is
unknown.
^ Mystic philosopher, man of science and statesman of
Agrigentum (Girgenti), fl. 490 b.c.
* Presumably, like in colour ; true of Greek dogs to-day.
Empedocles does not appear to have gone on to infer pro-
tective mimicry.
f Quoted as from Euripides, N.E. viii., 1 155 a 34 ; the play
is not known. " Euripides, Orestes 234.
361
ARISTOTLE
1235 a
η δε μ€ταβολ'η eiV τουναντίον)' το δ' δμοίον εχθρον
τω όμοίω, καΐ γαρ
Κ€ραμ€νς Κ€ραμ€Ϊ κοτ€ζΐ,
και τα αττό των αυτών τρεφόμενα ττολίμια άλλτ^λοι?
20 ζώα. αύται μ^ν ουν αϊ ύποληφας τοσούτον δι- 10
€στασιν• ol• μεν γαρ το ομοιον φίλον,^ το δ' ivavTLOV
ττολβμιον —
τω nXeovt δ' aiet πολβμων καθίσταται
τουλασσον, βχθρας θ^ ημέρας κατάρχ^ται,
€TL 06 και οί τόποι κ^χωρισμένοι των εναντίων, •η \\
25 he φιλία 8οκ€Ϊ συνάγ€ΐν• οι δε τα εναντία φίλα, και
Ηρακλίΐτος επίτιμα τω ποιησαντι
ως €ρις €Κ τ€ θβών κάξ^ ανθρώπων άπόλοιτο,
ου γαρ αν eti^at άρμονίαν μη οντος 6ζ€ος και βαρ4ος,
ουθ€ τα ςωα άνευ οηΛ€ος και άρρενος ενάντιων
όντων.
Δυο μεν οΰν^ αύται δο^αι περί φιλίας είσί, λίαν 12
30 τε καθόλου κεχωρισμβναι^ τοσούτον, άλλαι δε η8η
εγγυτίρω^ και οικβιότεραι' τών φαινομένων, τοις
μεν γαρ ουκ εν^εχεσθαι 8οκεΐ τους φαύλους ειΐ'αι
φίλους, άλλα μόνον τους αγαθούς• τοις δ' άτοπον
ει μη φιλοΰσιν at μητέρες τα τέκνα {φαίνεται 13
δ τ^δε* και εν τοις θηρίοις ενοΰσα φιλία• προαπο-
35 θνησκειν γοΰν^ αίροΰνται τών τέκνων) . τοις δε το 14
χρησιμον Βοκεΐ φίλον είναι μόνον σημεΐον δ' δτι
^ Fr. : at. 2 φίλον <φασΙ> vel <οωΐ'ταί> Ric.
* Rac. : καΐ {ξκ τ' II. xviii. 107).
* ονν add. Sus. * καΐ Κΐχωρισμ,έναι Cas.
• iyyvTtpaiM^. 7 οίκεώτίραί Rac.: oUdan.
* δ* ^<5e Rac. : 6k (yap Γ), « Fr. : oiV.
362
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. i. 9-14
change being transition to the opposite), whereas
hke hates Uke, for ^^
Potter 'gainst potter hath a grudge," τ^
and animals that hve on the same food are hostile
10 to one another. These opinions, therefore, are thus
widely variant. One party thinks that the like is
friend and the opposite foe —
The less is rooted enemy to the more
For ever, and begins the day of hate,* '
11 and moreover adversaries are separated in locality,
whereas friendship seems to bring men together.
The other party say that opposites are friends, and
Heracleitus " rebukes the poet who wrote —
Would strife might perish out of heaven and earth,"*
for, he says, there would be no harmony without
high and low notes, and no animals without male
and female, which are opposites.
12 These, then, are two opinions about friendship, and or on
being so widely separated they are too general * ; ^"^ "^ '
but there are others that are closer together and
more akin to the facts of observation. Some persons
think that it is not possible for bad men to be friends,'
but only for the good. Others think it strange that
13 mothers should not love their own children (and
maternal affection we see existing even among
animals — at least, animals choose to die for their
14 young). Others hold that only what is useful is oio."
a friend, the proof being that all men actually do
*" Hesiod, Works and Days 25 (' Two of a trade never agree ').
^ Euripides, Phoenissae 539 f. (έχθρας ήμ^ρα? = Ιχ^ρα?, cf.
δούΧιον ^/χαρ = δουλίία, Paley).
' The natural philosopher of Ephesus, β. end of 6th cent.
B.C. ** Iliad xviii. 107.
» i.e. being so absolutely opposite to one another, they are
too sweeping, and do not really correspond with the facts.
363
ARISTOTLE
1235 a ^ ^ ^
KaL οιώκουσι ταΰτα πάντες, τα δε άχρηστα και
αντοί αύτών^ άττοβάΧλουσιν (ωσπερ Ίίωκράτης 6
γέρων έλεγε τον πτνελον καΐ τάς τρίχας καΐ τους
όνυχας παραβάλλων) , καΐ^ τά μόρια οτι ριπτοΰμεν
1235 b τά άχρηστα, καΐ τέλος το σώμα, όταν άποθάντ],
άχρηστος γαρ 6 νεκρός• οΐς δε χρησιμον, φνλάτ-
τουσιν, ωσπερ εν Αίγύπτω . ταΰτα Srj πάντα δοκει ι
μεν ύπεναντία άλληλοις εΐναι. τό τε γαρ ομοιον^
άχρηστον τω ομοίω καΐ εναντιότης ομοιότητας
5 απέχει πλείστον , και το εναντίον άχρηστότατον τω
εναντιω, φθαρτικόν γαρ του εναντίου τό εναντίον,
ετι Βοκεΐ τοις μεν paSiov τό κτησασθαι φίλον, τοις ι
δε σπανιώτατον ■^/ι^ών'αι, και ουκ εν8έχεσθαι άνευ
ατυχίας*, τοις γαρ ευ πράττουσι βούλονται πάντες
8οκεΐν φίλοι είναι- οι δ' ουδέ τοις συν^ιαμένουσιν ]
10 εν ταΐ? ατυ^^ιαι? ά^ιοΰσι πιστευειν, ως εξαπα-
τώντας και προσποιούμενους , ίνα κτήσωνται δια,
της τών ατυχουντων ομιλία? πάλιν εύτυχούντων
φιλίαν.
II. Αηπτεος 8η λόγος^ όστις ημΐν άμα τά τε 1
δοκτουι^τα περί τούτων μάλιστα αποδώσει και τάς
15 απορίας λύσει και τάς εναντιώσεις. τοΰτο δ' εσται
εάν ευλόγως φαίνηται τά εναντία 8οκοΰντα. μάλιστα
γαρ όμολογούμενος ό τοιούτος εσται λόγος τοις
φαινομενοις• συμβαίνει δε μενειν τάς εναντιώσεις
εαν εστί μεν ως αληθές η τό λεγόμενον εστί δ'
ως ου.
Εχει δ άπορίαν και πότερον τό η8ύ η τό aya^ol•' 2
^ ά</)' έαντων lac. * [και] ? Rac.
' δμοιον add. Fr. * Vict. : ΐΰτνχίαί.
' Cas. : λοίττόί. (λοιποί <λ070Γ> Sp., rpoiros Syl.)
364
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. i. 14— ii. 2
pursue the useful, and discard what is useless event
in their own persons (as the old Socrates " used to I
say, instancing spittle, hair and nails), and that wei
throw away even parts of the body that are of no*
use, and finally the body itself, when it dies, as a
corpse is useless — but people that have a use for it
15 keep it, as in Egypt. Now all these factors ^ seem
to be somewhat opposed to one another. For like?i
is of no use to like and opposition is farthest f »
removed from likeness, and at the same time oppo-K*' -
site is most useless to opposite, since opposite is
16 destructive of opposite. Moreover some think that i» it
to gain a friend is easy, but others that it is the '"®'i"®" ^
rarest thing to recognize a friend, and not possible
without misfortune, as everybody wants to be thought
17 a friend of the prosperous ; and others maintain
that we must not trust even those who stay with us
in our misfortunes, because they are deceiving us
and pretending, in order that by associating with
us when unfortunate they may gain our friendship
when we are again prosperous.
1 II. Accordingly a line of argument must be taken
that will best explain to us the views held on these
matters and at the same time solve the difficulties
and contradictions. And this will be secured if the
contradictory views are shown to be held with some
reason. For such a line of argument will be most
in agreement with the observed facts : and in the
upshot, if what is said is true in one sense but not
true in another, both the contradictory views stand
good.
2 There is also a question as to whether what is Friendship
is based on
" Cf. 1216 b 3.
* i.e. likeness, contrariety, utility (Solomon).
365
ARISTOTLE
1235 b ^ ^ ^ , X X « i- >
20 iaTL TO φίλονμ€νον. el μ€ν γαρ φιΧοϋμ^ν ov εττι-
θυμοΰμ€ν (/cat μάλιστα 6 βρως τοιούτον, ovBelg
γαρ
βραστής όστις ουκ aet φιλβΐ),
Ύ) δ' eTn^fyLtia τον η^βος, τανττ) μ€ν το φιλουμβνον
το rjBv, €1 8e ο βονλόμεθα, το aya^of εστί δ
€Tepov το rjSv και το aya^or.
Ilept 8rj^ τούτων και των άλλων των συγγενών 3
25 τούτοι? 7Τ€ΐρατ€ον Siopioai, λαβοΰσιν άρχην τηνΒζ.
το γαρ όρβκτον και βονλητόν η το αγαθόν η το
φαινόμβνον aya^ov. διο και το ηΒν όρεκτόν, φαι-
νόμ€νον γάρ τι aya^ot'• τοΓ? μβν γαρ Βοκβΐ, τοις
δε φαίνεται καν μη SoKjj (ου γάρ ev ταύτω της
φνχης η φαντασία και η δό^α). οτι μβντοι φίλον
30 και το αγαθόν και το rjSv Βηλον.
Τούτου δ€ 8ιωρισμ€νον λητττ4ον ύπόθεσιν CTcpav. 4
των γάρ aya^cui' τά μεν απλώς εστίν aya^ci, τα δε
τινί, απλώς δ' ον• και τά αυτά απλώς aya^a και
απλώς rjSea. τά μεν γάρ τώ νγιαίνοντί φαμεν
σώματι συμφέροντα απλώς efvat σώ/^ατι aya^ci, τα
35 δε τώ κάμνοντι ου, οίον φαρμακείας και τομας'
ομοίως δε και τ^δε'α απλώς σώματι τά τω ύγιαίνοντι 5
και όλοκληρω, οίον το εν τώ φωτί ζην'' και ου το
εν τω σκότει• καίτοι τω οφθαλμιώντι εναντίως.
και οίνος τβίων ούχ 6 τω Βιεφθαρμενω την γλώτταν
υπό οινοφλυγίας , επεί ενίοτε^ όζος παρεγχεουσιν ,
1 Sus. : δέ ν\ om. Mb.
* lac. (cf. Hist. An. 488 a 26 τά μ^ ννκτ^ρόβια . . . τά δ' eu
ΎψφωτΙζ^)'. όραν. ' Ric. : οϋτ€.
, " Euripides, Troades 1051.
* i.e. are different psychological experiences.
366
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 2-5
dear to us is the pleasant or the good. If we hold both good-
dear what we desire (and that is specially character- pfeasant-
istic of love, for "«ss
(absolute or
relative).
None is a lover that holds not dear for aye "),
and desire is for what is pleasant, on this showing
it is the pleasant that is dear ; whereas if we hold
dear what we wish, it is the good ; but the pleasant
and the good are different things.
3 We must therefore attempt to decide about these
matters and others akin to them, taking as a starting-
point the following. The thing desired and wished
is either the good or the apparent good. Therefore
also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent
good, since some people think it good, and to others
it appears good even though they do not think it so
(as appearance and opinion are not in the same part
of the spirit). ** Yet it is clear that both the good and
the pleasant are dear.
4 This being decided, we must make another as-
sumption. Things good are some of them abso-
lutely good, others good for someone but not good
absolutely ; and the same things are absolutely good
and absolutely pleasant. For things advantageous
for a healthy body we pronounce good for the body
absolutely, but things good for a sick body not — for
example doses of medicine and surgical operations ;
5 and likewise also the things pleasant for a healthy
and perfect body are pleasant for the body absolutely,
for example to live in the light and not in the dark,
although the reverse is the case for a man with
ophthalmia. And the pleasanter wine is not the
wine pleasant to a man whose palate has been
corrupted by tippling, since sometimes they pour
set
y
ARISTOTLE
1236 a άλλα τ-η ά^ίαφθόρω αΙσθησ€ΐ. ομοίως 8e /cat εττι 6
φνχης, καΐ ούχ α τοις τταώίοις καΐ τοΐς θηρίοις,
αλλ' α τοΐς καθ^στώσίν αμφοτέρων γοΰν μ€μνη-
μ€νοι ταϋ^' αίρούμ€θα. ώς δ' €χ€ΐ τταώίον καΐ 7
θηρίον προς ανθρωττον καθ€στώτα, όντως e^ei 6
5 φαΰλος καΐ άφρων ττρος τον €ΤΓί€ΐκη καΐ φρόνιμον
τούτοις δε ήΒβα τα κατά τάς ef et?, ταΰτα δ' εστί
τα aya^a καΙ τα καλά.
'Evret ουν το αγαθόν^ πλβοναχώς {το μβν γάρ τω 8
TOLOvh^ elvai λίγομεν αγαθόν, το δε τω ωφβΧιμον
καΐ χρησιμον), eVt δε^ το ή8ύ το μεν απλώς καΐ
10 aya^ov άττλώ?, το δε τινί καί^ φαι,νόμενον aya^oi^,
ώσπ€ρ καΐ €πΙ των άφύχων δι' €καστον τούτων
ενδέχεται ημάς αίρεΐσθαί τι καΐ φιλείν, ούτω* καΐ
άνθρωπον τον μεν γάρ οτι TOLOohe' /cat hi άρετην,
τον δ' ΟΤΙ ωφέλιμος /cat χρήσιμος , τον δ' οτι ■ηΒύς
και δι' Ύ)8ονήν. φίλος δε* yiVeTat όταν φιλούμενος
15 άντιφιλτ] και τούτο μη λανθάνη πως αυτούς.
^Ανάγκη άρα τρία φιλίας εϊΒη είναι, και μήτε 9
καθ* εν άπάσας μη^*^ ώς ει'δη ει^ο? γένους μήτε
πάμπαν λεγεσθαι ομωνύμως. προς μίαν γάρ τίνα
λέγονται και πρώτην, ώσπερ το Ιατρικόν, /cat φυχην
20 Ιατρικην και σώμα λεγομεν και όργανον και έργον,
1 Sp. : τα ayaea. ^ ίτι δέ Βζ. : ίπύ δέ Ρ^, ^πβΐ Μ»•.
^' καΐ Beier : ή (om. Γ), * οντω Βζ. : ώσπερ.
* Ric. : rbf μέν yap τοιόνδε. • lac. : δή.
» Sus.: μήθ'.
368
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. π. 5-9
in a dash of vinegar, but to the uncorrupted taste.
6 And similarly also in the case of the spirit, the really
pleasant things are not those pleasant to children
and animals, but those pleasant to the adult ; at
least it is these that we prefer when we remember
7 both. And as a child or animal stands to an adult
human being, so the bad and foolish man stands
to the good and wise man ; and these take pleasure
in things that correspond to their characters, and
these are things good and fine.
8 Since therefore good is a term of more than one
meaning (for we call one thing good because that is^ ./ '^^^i^
its essential nature, but another because it is service-•
able and useful), and furthermore pleasant includes
both what is absolutely pleasant and absolutely
good and what is pleasant for somebody and ap-
parently good — , as in the case of inanimate objects
we may choose a thing and love it for each of these
reasons, so also in the case of a human being, one
man we love because of his character, and for good-
ness, another because he is serviceable and useful, --
another because he is pleasant, and for pleasure .^-^
And a man becomes a friend when while receiving Definition
affection he returns it, and when he and the other °^ friend.
are in some way aware of this.
9 It follows, therefore, that there are three sorts of Three kinds
friendship, and that they are not all so termed in °^jp"^°*^'
respect of one thing or as species of one genus, nor
yet have they the same name entirely by accident.
For all these uses of the term are related to one
particular sort of friendship which is primary, like
the term ' surgical ' — and we speak of a surgical
mind and a surgical hand and a surgical instrument
and a surgical operation, but we apply the term
2b
3^
ARISTOTLE
1286 a
αλλά κυρίως το πρώτον, πρώτον δ' ου ό^ λόγος Κ
iv πάσιν^ υπάρχει, οίον όργανον ιατρικον ω αν ο
Ιατρός χρησαιτο, €V Se τώ του Ιατρού λόγω ουκ
eoTtv ό του οργάνου. ζητ€Ϊται μβν ουν πανταχού 1
το πρώτον, δια δε τό το καθόλου etvai^ πρώτον
λαμβάνουσυ και τό* πρώτον καθόλου• τοΰτο ο
25 ioTL φίΰ^ος. ώστ€ καΐ π^ρΐ της φιλίας ου δύνανται
πάντ* άποΒώόναί τα φαινόμενα• ου γαρ^ εφ-
αρμόττοντος €νός λόγου ουκ οΐονται τοίς^ άλλα?
φιλίας elvai• at δ' eiat μεν, αλλ' ούχ ομοίως etatv.
οΐ δ' όταν η πρώτη μη εφαρμόττη , ως οΰσαν 1'
καθόλου αν etVep ην πρώτη, ουδ' etvai φιλίας τάς
30 άλλα? φασίν. εστί δε πολλά εί,'δτ^ φιλίας• τών γάρ ^
ρηθίντων ην ηΒη, €π€ΐ8η Βιώρισται τριχώς λεγεσθαι
την φιλίαν, η μβν γάρ Βιώρισται δι' άρετην η δε δια
τό χρησιμον η δε δια τό ήΒύ.
Ύουτων η μβν δια. τό χρησιμόν εστί νη Δια' τών 1•
πλείστων φιλία• δια γάρ τό χρήσιμοι ειι^αι φιλοϋσιν
35 αλλτίλου?, και μέχρι τούτου, ώσπερ ή παροιμία
Τλαΰκ* , επίκουρος άνηρ τόσσον φίλος^ ες κτε*
μάχηται,
καΐ
ούκετι γιγνώσκουσιν ^Αθηναίοι Μεγαρηας.
η δε δι' ηΒονην τών νέων, τούτου γάρ αίσ^τ^σιν»
εχουσιν διό εύμετάβολος φιλία η τών νέων, 1ί
μεταβαλλόντων γάρ τα ηθη κατά τάς ηλικίας
^ 6 add. Ric. * πάσιν Sus. : ήμΐν.
* τό τό Λ'α^όλοί' elfai Sus. : τό καθόλου fivai τό.
* τό add. Sp. ^ ούκ οΐιν ? Rac.
• τάϊ add. Βζ. ' έση ντ) Αία lac. : ίστικ η.
* τόσσον φίλοί Fr. : τόν σόφον φίΧον. * ίστε Sol.
" 11. 7-17. " Α friend in need is a friend indeed.
370
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 10-15
10 properly to that which is primarily so called. The
primary is that of which the definition is implicit
in the definition of all, for example a surgical instru-
ment is an instrument that a surgeon would use,
whereas the definition of the instrument is not
11 implicit in that of surgeon. Therefore in every case
people seek the primary, and because the universal
is primary they assume that also the primary is
universal ; but this is untrue. Hence in the case
of friendship, they cannot take account of all the
observed facts. For as one definition does not fit,
they think that the other kinds of friendship are
not friendships at all ; but really they are, although
12 not in the same way, but when they find that the
primary friendship does not fit, assuming that it
would be universal if it really were primary, they
13 say that the others are not friendships at all. But
in reality there are many kinds of friendships : '
this was among the things said already," as we have
distinguished three senses of the term friendship — / jij^ ^
one sort has been defined as based on goodness, '
another on utility, another on pleasure. '^:TS.'^-i' '
14 Of these the one based on utility is assuredly theNsed on
friendship of most people ; for they love one another^ieas^e,
because they are useful, and in so far as thev areiP"'^^
SO, as says the proverb —
Glaucus, an ally is a friend
As long as he our battle fights,'' *
and
Athens no longer knoweth Megara.
15 On the other hand friendship based on pleasure is ^
the friendship of the young, for they have a sense of /
what is pleasant ; hence young people's friendship
easily changes, for since their characters change as
371
ARISTOTLE
1236 b μζταβάλλζΐ καΐ το ηΒν. η δε κατ' άρβτην των
β€λτίστων .
Φανίρον δ' €Κ τούτων δτι ή πρώτη φιλία, η των 1
aya^cui^, βστίν άντιφιλία καΐ αντιττροαίρ^σις ττρός
αλλήλους, φίλον μέν γαρ το φίλονμ€νον τω φι-
λοΰντι, φίλος δε τω φιλονμ4νω καΐ αύτος 6 φιλών}
5 αϋτη μ€ν οΰν iv άνθρώπω^ μόνον ύττάρχ^ι rf φιλία, 1
μονός* γαρ αίσθάν€ται ττροαιρ€σ€ως• αϊ δ' άλλαι
και €v τοις θηρίοις. και γαρ^ το χρησιμον iiri
μικρόν τι φαίνεται €νυπάρχον και ττρος ανθρωττον
τοις ημ€ροις και προς άλληλα, οΐον τόν^ τροχίλον
10 φησιν 'Ηρόδοτο? τω κροκοΒβίλω, και ώς οι μάντεις
τάς σννεΒρίας και διεδρια? λέγουσιν. και οι φαύλοι ^
αν elev φίλοι άλληλοις και δια το χρησιμον και 8ιά
το η8ν• οι δ , δτι η πρώτη ονχ υπάρχει αύτοΐς, ου 1
φασι φίλους etvai* αδικήσει γαρ δ γε φαύλος τον
φαΰλον, οΐ δ' αδικούμενοι ου φιλοϋσι σφας αυτούς.
15 οι δε φιλοϋσι μεν, αλλ' ου την πρώτην φιλίαν, επει 2
τάς γε ετέρας ούθεν κωλύει• δι' τ^δοι^ΐ' γαρ
ύπομενουσιν'' αλλτ^λου? βλαπτόμενοι, εως^ αν ώσιν
ακρατείς, ου ^οκοΰσι δ' οι5δ' οι δι' ηΒονην φιλούν- 2
τες αλλτ^λου? φίλοι eti^at, όταν κατ' άκρίβειαν
ζητώσιν, δτι ούχ η πρώτη' εκείνη μεν γαρ βέβαιος,
^ αύτοί 6 φίλων Ross : άνηφίλών.
* άνθρώιτφ ? Sp. ; άνθρώττοΐί.
' 7] add. Ric. * Sp. : μόνον.
* yap add. Ric. • <n-pos> τόν ? Rac.
' Bz. : νπονοοΰσιν. * lac. : ώ? {fjs Ric).
" Herodotus, ii. 68, says that the trochilus picks leeches
out of the crocodile's throat, Aristotle, Hist. An. ix. 6. 6,
that it picks the crocodile's teeth. In reality it picks gnats
from the crocodile's open mouth.
372
/gj
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 15-21
they grow up, their taste in pleasure also changes.
But the friendship in conformity with goodness is
the friendship of the best men.
16 It is clear from this that the primary friendship. The last
that of the good, is mutual reciprgcity of affection vfrTuou^s*"
and purpose, i'or the object of affection is dear to\men; the
the giver of it, but also the giver of affection is him-
17 self dear to the object. This friendship, therefore.
two former
occur
among
, . ^11 • lanimals, and
only occurs in man, tor tie alone perceives purpose ;|badmen.
but the other forms occur also in the lower animals.
Indeed mutual utility manifestly exists to some small
extent between the domestic animals and man, and
between animals themselves, for instance Hero-
dotus's account of the friendship between the croco-
dile and the sandpiper,** and the perching together
and separating of birds of which soothsayers speak.
18 The bad may be each other's friends from motives
19 both of utility and of pleasure ; though some say
that they are not really friends, because the prim-
ary kind of friendship does not belong to them,
since obviously a bad man will injure a bad man,
and those who suffer injury from one another
20 do not feel affection for one another. But as a
matter of fact bad men do feel affection for one
another, though not according to the primary
form of friendship — because clearly nothing hinders!
their being friends under the other forms, since for;
the sake of pleasure they put up with one another!
although they are being harmed, so long as they are
21 lacking in self-restraint. The view is also held,
when people look into the matter closely, that those
who feel affection for each other on account of
pleasure are not friends, because it is not the primary
friendship, since that is reliable but this is unreliable.
373
ARISTOTLE
1236 b
"Ό αντη oe apepaios. η ο eart μ€ν, ωσπ€ρ ειρηται,
φιλία, ουκ €Κ€ίνη Se αλλ' άττ' €Κ€ίνης, το /Aei' ουν 22
€Κ€ίνως μόνον Xeyetv τον φίλον βιάζ^σθαι τά φαι-
νόμενα βστί, καΐ 7ταρά8οζα Xeyeiv αναγκαΐον καθ*
eva δε λόγον πάσας aSuvarov .^ λβιττεται τοίνυν 23
οϋτως, otl έ'στι μεν ώς μόνη η ττρώτη φιλία, eari
25 δ ώ$ ττασαι, οϋτ€ ώς ομώνυμοι /cat ώ? ετυχεν
εχουσαι ττρός αύτάς, ούτε καθ* ev ειδο?, άλλα
μάλλον ττρόζ ev.
ΈτΓβι δ' απλώς aya^oi' /cat απλώς ηΒύ το αυτό 24
/cat α/ζα αν μη τι^ εμποΒιζη, ο δ' άλτ^θιρ'ό? φίλος
και απλώς ό πρώτος εστίν, εστί 8ε τοιούτος ό
30 αυτό? δt' αύτόΐ' αιρετός {ανάγκη δ' etrat τοιούτον, ω*
γαρ βονλεταί τις δι' αύτον είναι τάγαθά, ανάγκη
και δι'* αυτόν αίρετόν^ efvat), ό* άλτ^^ιι^ό? φίλος 25
/cat τ^δυ? εστίν απλώς• διό δο/cet /cat ό όπωσοΰν
φίλος ή8ύς. ετι δε διοριστεον περί τούτου μάλλον 26
e^et ya/) επίστασιν, πότερον'' το γ* αύτώ aya^ot'
35 η το άττλώ? aya^oi' φίλον, και πότερον το κατ*
ενεργειαν φιλεΐν μεθ* ηΒονης, ώστε και το φιλητόν
ηΒυ,^ η ου. άμφω γαρ εις ταύτό συνακτεον τά τε
γαρ μη απλώς αγαθά άλλα κακά αν πως^ '^^Χϊί
φευκτά, και το μη αύτώ αγαθόν ούθεν προς αυτόν,
άλλα τοΰτ εστίν ο ζητείται, τά απλώς αγαθά
ί237 & οϋτως εΐναι aya^a. εστί γάρ αιρετον μεν^" το 21
απλώς aya^of, αύτω 8ε το αύτώ αγαθόν α 8εΐ
^ Βζ. : δυνατόν. * Γ : τ«.
' Sp. : ώϊ. * δι' add. Sp.
' Sp. : αίρΰσθαι. ' Sp. : ό δ'.
' Erasmus : ίχει ίττίστασιν. nbrepov yap.
* iaare το φιλητόν καΐ ηδύ ? Rac.
• άν πω$ lac. : άττλώί (άττλώ? ζ,κΆν ήδία 6vTay Ric).
10 μ(ν <άπλώϊ> ? Rac.
374
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. π. 21-27
But as a matter of fact it is friendship, as has been
said, though not that sort of friendship but one
22 derived from it. Therefore to confine the use of
the term friend to that form of friendship alone is
to do violence to observed facts, and compels one to
talk paradoxes ; though it is not possible to bring
23 all friendship under one definition. The only re- 1
maining alternative, therefore, is, that in a sense the
primary sort of friendship alone is friendship, but in
a sense all sorts are, not as having a common name
by accident and standing in a merely chance rela-
tionship to one another, nor yet as falling under one
species, but rather as related to one thing.
24 And since the same thing is absolutely good and 'Pleasant•
absolutely pleasant at the same time if nothing goodness.
interferes, and the true friend and friend absolutely
is the primary friend, and such is a friend chosen in \
and for himself (and he must necessarily be such, for
he for whom one wishes good for his own sake must
25 necessarily be desirable for his own sake), a true
friend is also absolutely pleasant ; owing to which it
26 is thought that a friend of any sort is pleasant. But
we must define this still further, for it is debatable
whether what is good merely for oneself is dear or
what is absolutely good, and whether the actual
exercise of affection is accompanied by pleasure,
so that an object of affection is also pleasant, or not.
Both questions must be brought to the same issue ;
for things not absolutely good but possibly evil are
to be avoided, and also a thing not good for oneself
is no concern of oneself, but what is sought for is that
things absolutely good shall be good for oneself.
27 For the absolutely good is absolutely desirable, but
what is good for oneself is desirable for oneself ;
375
ARISTOTLE
1237 a
σνμφωνησαι. /cat τοΰτο rj aperrj ttol€l• /cat rj
πολιτική επΙ τοντω, δπως οΐς μηττω earl yeVT^rat.
€ΰθ€τος^ δε /cat προ οΒοΰ ό^ άνθρωπος ων {φυσ€ΐ
5 γαρ αντω aya^a τα απλώς aya^a), ομοίως he /cat 28
ανηρ αντί γυναικός και βνφνης άφνονς^' δια τοΰ
ηο€ος oe η οοος• ανάγκη etvat τα καλά ηο€α. όταν
δε ταύτα* Βιαφωνη, ονπω σπον^αΐος^ τελε'ω?• εΐ'-
δε'χεταt yap εyyεvε'σ^αt άκρασίαν τω* yap δια-
φωνβΐν ταγαθόν τω τ^δεΓ ει^ τοΓ? πάθεσιν άκρασία
εστίν.
10 Ώστ €π€ΐ8η η πρώτη φιλία /cot' άρεττ^ΐ', 'έσον- 2ί1
Tat /cat αύτοι άττλώ? αγαθοί, τοΰτο δ' ούχ οτι
χρήσιμοι, αλλ' αλλοι^ τρόπον. 8ιχώς γαρ έχει το 3C
τωδί aya^ol•" /cat το' άττλώ? a.ya^oi'• /cat ομοίως,
ωσπ€ρ βπι τοΰ ωφελίμου, και εττι των' έ'^εωι/•
άλλο yap το άττλώ? ώφέλιμον και το τοισδι (οι^
15 τρόπον^ το yu/x^'αζεσ^αt ττρό? το φαρμακ€ν€σθ jli) •
ωστ€ και η ζζις, η ανθρώπου άρ€τή (έστω γαρ ό 31
άνθρωπος των φύσ€ΐ σπουδαίων) • η άρα τοΰ φυσ€ΐ
σπουδαίου άρ€τη απλώς aya^oi', η δε τοΰ μη
ζΚζίνω.
'Ομοίως Srj €χ€ΐ και το η8ύ. βνταΰθα γαρ 32
ετΓίστατεον και σκεπτ^ον πότερόν εστίν avev ηΒονης
20 φίλια, και τι δtα^εpεt, και iv ποτέρω ποτ^ εστί
^ Rac. : 6νθ4τωί (ante quod lacunam Sp., initium protaseos
cuius apodosis 1. 6 άνά-/κη).
* ό add. lac. ' Bus. : άφυί)ί eύφυovs.
* Bus, : TovTo. * sic versio Solomonis : στΓονδαϊοι>.
« Mb TO. 7 TO add. Rac.
* TO . . . τρόπον lac. (to add. Rac.) : τό καλόν τοιούτον.
376
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 27-32
and the two ought to come into agreement. This
is effected by goodness ; and the purpose of pohtical
science is to bring it about in cases where it does not
yet exist. And one who is a human being is well
adapted to this and on the way to it (for by nature
things that are absolutely good are good to him),
28 and similarly a man rather than a woman and a
gifted man rather than a dull one ; but the road
is through pleasure — it is necessary that fine things •'
shall be pleasant. When there is discord between
them, a man is not yet perfectly good ; for it is
possible for unrestraint to be engendered in him,
as unrestraint is caused by discord between the
good and the pleasant in the emotions.
29 Therefore since the primary sort of friendship is' Friendship
in accordance with goodness, friends of this sort will vfrt„e°the
be absolutely good in themselves also, and this not primary
because of being useful, but in another manner.:
30 For good for a given person and good absolutely arej
twofold ; and the same is the case with states of'
character as with profitableness — what is profitable
absolutely and what is profitable for given persons
are different things (just as taking exercise is a
different thing from taking drugs). So the state of
character called human goodness is of two kinds —
31 for let us assume that man is one of the things that
are excellent by nature : consequently the goodness
of a thing excellent by nature is good absolutely, but
that of a thing not excellent by nature is only good
for that thing.
32 The case of the pleasant also, therefore, is similar. Problems-
For here we must pause and consider whether there fagtor^^of
is any friendship without pleasure, and how such a pleasant-
friendship differs from other friendship, and on which ^^^^'
377
ARISTOTLE
1237 a ^ ^ ^ „ , , « , y c Ϊ /
TO φιλ€Ϊν, TTOTepov^ on αγαθός καν et μη ηους,
αλλ' ού^ δια τοΰτο; 8ιχώς δη λζγομίνου του
φιΧζΙν, 7τότ€ρον OTL άγαθον το κατ' evepyeiav ουκ
άν€υ TjSovrjs φαίνζται; hrjXov δ' οτι ωσπ€ρ εττι 3;
της ετηστημης at πρόσφατοι θ^ωρίαι καΐ μαθήσεις
25 αίσθηταΐ μάλιστα τω rjSei, οϋτω και at των
συνήθων αναγνωρίσεις, και 6 λόγος ο αύτος βπ
άμφοΐν. φυσ€ΐ γοΰν το απλώς aya^ov ηΒύ απλώς,
και οΐς aya^dr, τούτοις η8ύ. διό ευθύς τα όμοια 34
άλληλοις χαίρει, και άνθρώπω ήδιστον άνθρωπος'
ώστ Ιπεί και άτελη, ^ηλον οτι και τελειωθεντα•
30 ό Βέ σπουδαίος τέλειος, ει 6έ το κτατ' ενεργειαν
φιλεΐν μεθ^ ηδονής άντιπροαίρεσις της άλλτ^λων
γνωρίσεως, Βηλον οτι και όλως ή φιλία η πρώτη
άντιπροαίρεσις τών απλώς aya^cDi/ και ηΒεων οτι
aya^a και η8εα• eWt δ' αυττ7 η φιλία εζις αφ' 3ί
35 •^s^ η τοιαύτη προαίρεσις . το γαρ έργον αύτης
ενέργεια, αύτη δ' ουκ εζω αλλ' εν αύτώ τω
φιλοϋντι• δυνάμεως δε πάσης^ ^ζω, η γαρ εν
ετερω η fj* έτερον. Sio το φιλεΐν χαίρειν αλλ'
ου το φιλεΐσθαί εστίν το μεν γαρ φιλεΐσθαι ου 3(
τοΰ^ φιλητοΰ ενέργεια, το δε «rat φιλίας, και το
μεν εν εμφύχω, το δε /cat εν άφύχω• φιλεΐται γαρ
40 και τα άφυχα. επει δε το φιλεΐν το κατ' ενεργειαν 3'
^ καΐ πότερον Μ•». ^ άλλ' ον] fj οϋ, άλλα Sp.
' <,σωματικηί> πάσηί ? Ric. * rj add. Βζ.
' ού τοΰ add. Rac.
" Goodness and pleasantness.
'' Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' or not,
but because he is pleasant.'
' Potential and actual (Solomon).
'' Ross marks this clause as corrupted.
378,
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 32-37
exactly of the two things * the affection depends —
do we love a man because he is good even if he
is not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant ? ''
Then, affection having two meanings,'' does actual!
affection seem to involve pleasure because activity!
33 is good ? It is clear that as in science recent studies!
and acquirements are most fully apprehended, be-
cause of their pleasantness,** so with the recognition
of familiar things, and the principle is the same in
both cases. By nature at all events the absolutely
good is absolutely pleasant, and the relatively good
34 is pleasant to those for whom it is good.^ Hence
ipso facto like takes pleasure in like, and man is the
thing most pleasant to man ; so that as this is so even
with imperfect things, it is clearly so with things
when perfected, and a good man is a perfect man.
And if active affection is the reciprocal choice, ac-
companied by pleasure, of one another's acquaint-
ance, it is clear that friendship of the primary kind
is in general the reciprocal choice of things absolutely
good and pleasant because they are good and
35 pleasant ; and friendship itself is a state from which
such choice arises. For its function is an activity,
but this not external but within the lover himself ;
whereas the function of every faculty is external,
for it is either in another or in oneself qua other.
36 Hence to love is to feel pleasure but to be loved is
not ; for being loved is not an activity of the thing
loved, whereas loving is an activity — the activity of
friendship ; and loving occurs only in an animate
thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate
thing also, for even inanimate things are loved.
37 And since to love actively is to treat the loved
* 8c. (to TOLaSl ά7α^όΐ') oil ά-γαθόν, τούτοι% ηδύ.
379
ARISTOTLE
1237 b τω φίλονμενω^ earl χρησθαι fj φίλονμβνον , 6 8e
φίλθ9 φιλονμβνον τώ^ φίλω fj φίλος άλλα μη fj
μουσικός η ιατρός, ηΒονη τοίνυν η άττ' αντοΰ
fj αυτός, αϋτη φιλίκη• αυτόν γαρ φιλβΐ, ούχ οτι
5 άλλο.^ ωστ' αν μη χο-ψη fj αγαθός, ούχ η ττρώτη
φίλια. ούΒβ Set €μπο8ίζ€ίν ούθβν των συμβεβηκοτων 38
μάλλον η τό aya^ov €ύφραίν€ΐ,*' τι γάρ; σφό8ρα
ΒυσώΒης λειττεται^• άγαπητόν^ γαρ τό edvoeiv συζην''
δε μη.
Αϋτη μεν ουν η ττρώτη φιλία, ην^ πάντες ομο-
λογοΰσιν. αΐ δ' άλλαι δι' αύτην καΐ Βοκοϋσι καΐ 39
10 αμφισβητούνται , βέβαιον γάρ τι SoKei η φιλία,
μόνη δ' αϋτη βέβαιος' τό γάρ κεκριμενον βέβαιον,
τα δε μη ταχύ ')/ιν'ό/χ€ν'α μηΒε ρα8ίως ποιεί" την
κρίσιν όρθην. ουκ εστί δ' άνευ πίστεως φιλία 40
βέβαιος, η δε πίστις ουκ άνευ χρόνου• δει γάρ
πεΐραν λαβείν, ώσπερ λέγει και θεογνις'
15 ού γαρ άν ειδειτ^? ανΒρος νόον ούδε γυναικός ,
πριν πειραθείης ώσπερ υποζυγίου.
οι δ' άνευ χρόνου ού φίλοι^'* αλλά βοϋλονται είΐ'αι"
φίλοι, και /ιιάλιστα λαΐ'^άι^ει η τοιαύτη εζις ώς
φιλία• όταν γάρ προθύμως εχωσι φίλοι ett'ai, δια 41
20 τό πάνθ* ύπηρετεΐν τά φιλικά άλλι^λοι? οΐονται ού
βούλεσθαι ειναι^^ φίλοι αλλ' είναι φίλοι. τό δ'
ώσπερ επΙ των άλλων συμβαίνει και επΙ της
^ Fr. : τό φίΚούμΐνον 6, * Βζ. : και,
' lac. : ά\λψ, * Rac. : (ύφραίν^ιν.
* οίον d σφόδρα δνσωδηί yiverai Ric.
β Ross : άγαταταί. ' Sol. : (Tv^'jj.
* Fr. : η, • Βζ. : ού iroui.
^^ ο£ δ' . . . φίλοι Fr. : ούδ' Afev γρονου φίλοί.
^* elvai add. I"'r. ^* etVat add. Rac.
380
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. π. 37-41
object qua loved, and the friend is an object of love
to the friend qua dear to him but not qua musician
or medical man, the pleasure of friendship is the
pleasure derived from the person himself qua him-
self ; for the friend loves him as himself, not because
he is something else. Consequently if he does not
take pleasure in him qua good, it is not the primary
38 friendship. Nor ought any accidental quality to
cause more hindrance than the friend's goodness
causes delight ; for surely, if a person is very evil-
smelling, people cut him — he must be content with
our goodwill, he must not expect our society !
This then is the primary friendship, which all people Permanence
39 recognize. It is on account of it that the other sorts f/jendship.
are considered to be friendship, and also that their
claim is disputed — for friendship seems to be some-
thing stable, and only this friendship is stable ; for
a formed judgement is stable, and not doing things
40 quickly or easily makes the judgement right. And
there is no stable friendship without confidence,
and confidence only comes with time ; for it is
necessary to make trial, as Theognis says :
Thou canst not know the mind of man nor woman
E'er thou hast tried them as thou triest cattle.
Those who become friends without the test of time
are not real friends but only wish to be friends ;
and such a character very readily passes for friend-
^Y ship, because when eager to be friends they think
that by rendering each other all friendly services
they do not merely wish to be friends but actually
are friends. But as a matter of fact it happens in
friendship as in everything else ; people are not
381
ARISTOTLE
1237 b
φιλίας' ov γαρ el βούλονται uytaiVetv ύγιαίνουσιν,
ώστ* ούδ' et elvaC^ φίλοι βονλονται ηΒη και φίλοι
€ΐσίν. σημ€Ϊον Se• €ύΒιάβλητοι γαρ οι διακείμενοι 4*
25 avev πείρας τούτον τον τρόπον περί ών μεν γαρ
πεΐραν Βε^ώκασιν άλλτ^λοι?, ουκ εν^ιάβλητοι, περί
ών 8e μη, πεισθεΐεν αν όταν σύμβολα λεγωσιν οι
8ιαβάλλοντες . άμα 8e φανερον δτι οι)δ' εν τοις 4;
φαυλοις αϋτιη η φιλία• άπιστος γαρ 6 φαύλος και
κακοήθης προς πάντας• αύτώ γαρ μετρεΐ τους
30 άλλου?. διό εύεζαπατητότεροί είσιν οΐ αγαθοί,
αν μη δια πεΐραν άττιστώσιι^. οι δε φαΰλοι φ
αιροΰνται τα φύσει aya^a άντι του φίλου, και ούθ-
εις φιλεΐ μάλλον άνθρωπον η πράγματα, ώστ'
ου φίλοι' ου γαρ γίνεται οϋτω κοινά τα φίλων,
προσνεμεται γάρ 6 φίλος τοις πράγμασιν, ου τά
πράγματα τοΐς φίλοις.
35 Ου γίνεται αρ' η φιλία η πρώτη εν πολλοίς, ^,
ότι χαλεπον πο?ίλών πεΐραν λαβείν εκάστω γάρ
αν έδβι" συζτ^σαι. ούΒέ 8η αιρετεον ομοίως περί
1/χ.ατιου και φίλου' καίτοι εν πάσι Βοκεΐ του νουν .
έχοντος 8υοΐν το βελτιον αιρεΐσθαι, και ει μεν τω
χείρονι πάλαι εχρητο, τω βελτίονι δε μη^επω,
40 τοΰθ αιρετεον, αλλ' ουκ άντι του πάλαι φίλου
1288 •τόΐ' tiyvcDTa ei βελτίων. ου γάρ εστίν άνευ πείρας
^ elvai. add. Rac. » Bus. : hv δει (Set ? Rac).
382
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. π. 41-46
healthy merely if they wish to be healthy, so that
even if people wish to be friends they are not actually
42 friends already. A proof of this is that people who
have come into this position without first testing
one another are easily set at variance ; for though
men are not set at variance easily about things in
which they have allowed each other to test them, in
cases where they have not, whenever those who are
attempting to set them at variance produce evidence
43 they may be convinced. At the same time it is
manifest that this friendship does not occur between ,
base people either ; for the base and evil-natured ί
man is distrustful towards everybody, because hei
measures other people by himself. Hence good
men are more easily cheated, unless as a result of
44 trial they are distrustful. But the base prefer the
goods of nature to a friend, and none of them love
people more than things ; and so they are not
friends, for the proverbial * common property as
between friends ' is not realized in this way — the
friend is made an appendage of the things, not the
things of the friends.
45 Therefore the first kind of friendship does not its rarity.
occur between many men, because it is difficult to
test many — one would have to go and live with each
of them. Nor indeed should one exercise choice
in the case of a friend in the same way as about a
46 coat ; although in all matters it seems the mark
of a sensible man to choose the better of two things,
and if he had been wearing his worse coat for a
long time and had not yet worn his better one, the
better one ought to be chosen— but you ought not
in place of an old friend to choose one whom you
do not know to be a better man. For a friend is
383
ARISTOTLE
1238 a
oj)8e μιας ημ€ρας 6 φίλος, αλλά χρόνου Sel' διό
ets" τταροιμίαν eX-qXvdev ο μβ^ιμνος των άλών.
άμα δε δεΓ^ μη μόνον απλώς αγαθόν elvai άλλα 4'
και σοι, 61 ό* φίλος εσται σοι φίλος' aya^o? juev
5 yap άττλώ? εστί τω ά^α^ό? elvai, φίλος he τω
άλλω aya^os" άττλώς re δ'^ aya^os• /^αι φίλος όταν
συμφωνήστ) ταντα άμφω, ώστε ο eariv απλώς
aya^ov, το αυτό* αλλω• -^ και μη απλώς μβν
σπουδαίος ,^ άλλω δ' aya^o? οτι χρήσιμος. το 4ί
δε τΓολλοΐ? άμα elvat φίλον^ καΐ το φίλ^ΐν κώλυα•
10 ου γαρ οΐόν τε άμα προς πολλούς ivepyelv.
Έ/c 8η τούτων φαν€ρόν οτι ορθώς λεyεται ότι 4!
η φιλία τών βφαίων, ώσττερ η εύδαι/χοη'α τών
αυταρκών . καΐ ορθώς ειρηται
η γαρ φύσις βέβαιον, ου τα χρήματα —
πολύ δε Λτάλλιον βιπβΐν οτι rf άρβτη της φύσεως. 5(
15 και ο τ€ χρόνος λε'yεται δει/ίνυναι τόΐ' φίλον και
αί άτυχίαι //,άλλον τών ευτυχιών, τότε γαρ δηλον
ό'τι κτοιί'ά τα τών φίλων, ούτοι γαρ μόνοι άντι
τών φύσει o.ya^cDl•' και φύσει κακών, περί ά αί
εύτυχίαι και αί Βυστυχίαι, αίροΰνται μάλλον
άνθρωπον η τούτων τα μεν ειι^αι τα δε μη είναι•
20 η δ' ατυχία 8ηλοΐ τους μη όντως οντάς φίλους 5
άλλα διά το χρησιμον τυχόν.^ 6 δε χρόνος 8ηλοΐ
αμφότερους• ούδε yap ο χρήσιμος ταχύ 8ηλος,
^ Βζ. : el, ^ el 6 Bus. : eicat {el δη et ίσται <καΙ> Ric).
' re δ' add. Rac. (δ' add. Γ). * Ric. : τούτου,
^ Fr. : σπονδαίφ, * Syl. : φίλον,
' [17] Ric. * τνχύνταί V,
' Euripides, Electra 941.
' Or, emending the .ms. text, ' that friendship is goodness
of nature.'
384
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. n. 46-51
not to be had without trial and is not a matter of a
single day, but time is needed ; hence the ' peck
47 of salt ' has come to be proverbial. At the same
time if a friend is really to be your friend he must
be not only good absolutely but also good to you ;
for a man is good absolutely by being good, but
he is a friend by being good to another, and he is
both good absolutely and a friend when both these
attributes harmonize together, so that what is good '
absolutely is also good for another person ; or also
he may be not good absolutely yet good to another
48 because useful. But being a friend of many people
at once is prevented even by the factor of affection,
for it is not possible for affection to be active in
relation to many at once.
49 These things, therefore, show the correctness of its trust-
the saying that friendship is a thing to be relied on, ^o^^'^^'ness.
just as happiness is a thing that is self-sufficing. And
it has been rightly said ** :
Nature is permanent, but wealth is not —
although it would be much finer to say ' Friend-
50 ship ' than 'Nature.'^ And it is proverbial that
time shows a friend, and also misfortunes more
than good fortune. For then the truth of the saying
' friends' possessions are common property ' is clear,
for only friends, instead of the natural goods and
natural evils on which good and bad fortune turn,
choose a human being rather than the presence of
51 the former and the absence of the latter ; and
misfortune shows those who are not friends really
but only because of some casual utility. And both
are shown by time ; for even the useful friend is
not shown quickly, but rather the pleasant one —
2 c 385
ARISTOTLE
αλλ' 6 η^νς μα?<λον, ττλην ούδ' ο απλώς ηονς
ταχύς} όμοιοι γαρ οι άνθρωττοι τοις οΐνοις και
β^βσμασιν εκείνων τ€ γαρ το μέν γλνκύ^ ταχύ
2δ 8ηλοΐ, πλβίω 8e χρόνον γινόμενον άηδε? και ου
γλυκύ, και inl των ανθρώπων ομοίως, έ'στι γαρ
το απλώς ηΒύ τω τέλει όριστεον και τω χρόνω.
όμολογησαι^ν δ' αν καΐ οι πολλοί, ουκ εκ τών δ'.
άποβαινόντων μόνον, αλλ' ώσπβρ €πΙ του πόματος
καλοΰσι γλύκιον τοΰτο γαρ ου* δια το άποβαΐνον
30 ούχ η^ύ άλλα δια το μη συνεχές άλλα το πρώτον
εζαπατάν.
Ή μεν οδν πρώτη φιλία καΐ δι' ην αί αλλαι 5;
λε^οι^ται η κατ' άρετήν εστί καΐ δι ηΒονην την
άρετης, ώσπερ εΐρηται πρότερον. αί δ' αλλαι
εγγίνονται φιλίαι και εν τταισι και θηρίοις και τοις
φαυλοις• όθεν λέγεται " ηλιζ ηλικα τέρπει" και
35 " κακός κακώ συντετηκεν ηΒονη." ενδέχεται δε 5-
και η^εΐς άλληλοι? ε^ι^αι τους φαύλους, ούχ* fj
φαύλοι η μη^ετεροι, αλλ' οίον ει* ωδικοί άμφω,
η ό μεν φιλωΒός^ 6 δ' ωδικός εστίν, και τ^ πάντες
εχουσί tC αγαθόν καΐ ταυττ^ συναρμόττουσιν άλλτ^-
λοι?. έτι χρήσιμοι αν εΐεν άλλι^λοι? και ωφέλιμοι 6ι
1238 b (ουχ απλώς αλλά προς την προαίρεσιν) ούχ fj
φαύλοι^ η ουδέτεροι, ενδέχεται δε καί τω επι- 6ι
εικεί* φαΰλον είναι φίλον και γαρ χρήσιμος αν
είτ^ προς την προαίρεσιν ο μεν φαύλος προς την
^ ταχύ Guil. ^ Ric. : ήδύ.
8 ον add. Rac. * ούχ Γ : καΐ.
" ft (vel f)) add. Ric. « Vict. : φειδωλοί.
' ίχοιισΐ τι Fr. : ίχονσίν.
* ούχ § φανλοι add. Rac. (<φαΰ\οι> Ric).
• Γ : TOP έτΓΐΐίκη.
S86
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. π. 51-56
except that one who is absolutely pleasant is also
not quick to show himself. For men are like wines
and foods ; the sweetness of those is quickly evident,
but when lasting longer it is unpleasant and not
sweet, and similarly in the case of men. For ab-
solute pleasantness is a thing to be defined by the
52 End it effects and the time it lasts. And even the
multitude would agree, not in consequence of results
only, but in the same way as in the case of a drink
they call it sweeter — for a drink fails to be pleasant
not because of its result, but because its pleasantness
is not continuous, although at first it quite takes
one in.
53 The primary form of friendship therefore, and the
one that causes the narue to be given to the others,
is friendship based on goodness and due to the
pleasure of goodness, as has been said before. The The two
other friendships occur even among children and o'fTri/nd""'
animals and wicked people : whence the sayings — ship.
Two of an age each other gladden »•
and
Pleasure welds the bad man to the bad."
54 And also the bad may be pleasant to each other not
as being bad or neutral, ** but if for instance both are
musicians or one fond of music and the other a
musician, and in the way in which all men have some
55 good in them and so fit in with one another. Further j
they might be mutually useful and beneficial (not ( ^^^
absolutely but for their purpose) not as being bad ^^,
56 or neutral. It is also possible for a bad man to be ' ^
friends vnth a good man, for the bad man may be i^'^f
useful to the good man for his purpose at the time -j;2i-
" Euripides, Bellerophontes, fr. 298 (Nauck).
'' i.e. neither good nor bad.
387
ARISTOTLE
1288 b
ύττάρχουσαν τω σττουδαιο), 6 δε τω μ^ν άκρατοι
5 ττρος την ύττάρχουσαν τω 8e φανλω προς την
κατά φύσιν και βουλησεται τά aya^ct, άττλώς μ^ν
τά άττλα/ τά δ' €κβίνω βζ υποθέσεως, fj nevia
συμφβρ€ΐ η νόσος — ταύτα των άττλών^ αγαθών
evcKa, ώσττερ καΐ το φάρμακον τηεΖν ου γαρ αύτο^
βονλΐταο, άλλα τοΰδ' eveKa βονλβται. eVt καθ^ 5'
10 ους τρόπους καΐ άλληλοις οι μη σπουδαίοι elev αν
φιλοί' €'ί.η γαρ αν η8ύς ούχ η φαύλος, αλλ' ^ των
κοινών τινός μβτίχβι, οΐον et μουσικός. έ'τι τ^
evi Tt ττασιρ- €πιβικ€ς (διό evioi ομιλητικοί elaiv^
αν και σπου^αΐοι^) , η fj προσαρμόττουσιν ίκάστω•
€χουσι γάρ Tt πάντες του αγαθού.
15 III. Ύρία μ€ν οΰν €Ϊ8η ταΰτα φιλίας• iv ττασι δε 1
τούτοις κατ' ισότητα πως λίγεται η φιλία• και
γάρ οι κατ' άρβτην φίλοι iv ίσότητί πως άρ€της
€ΐσι φίλοι άλλτ^λοι?.
"Αλλτ^ δε διαφορά τούτων η καθ* ύπ^ρβολην , 2
ωσττερ θ€θΰ [άρετι^]* προς άνθρωπον, τοϋτο γάρ
20 €Τ€ρον ειδο? φιλίας, και όλως άρχοντος και αρχο-
μένου• καθάπ€ρ και το δίκαιον €Τ€ρον, κατ'
άναλογιαν γάρ ίσον, κατ' αριθμόν δ' ουκ ίσον. iv
τούτω τω γίν^ι πατήρ προς υιόν και ό €ύ€ργ€της
^ άττλώί Rieckher,
* αυτό hie Rac. : ante τό φάρμακον.
' elev Aid. * Ρ^ : σπουδαία; Μ^, <^αή> σττουδαΐοι Βζ.
* [άρβτή] Rac, (vel aperrj vel κατ' άρΐτηρ .subaudito φιλία),
" i.e. ready to associate with all and sundry, regardless of
moral inferiority. But perhaps the Greek should be altered
to give ' some (bad men) might be worthy to associate with,
even in the judgement of a good man,' or ' some might be
worthy to associate with even though not good.'
*" Between two unequal persons justice divides benefits in
proportion to their deserts, so that the two shares are not
388
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ii. 56— iii. 2
and the good man to the uncontrolled man for his
purpose at the time and to the bad man for the pur-
pose natural to him ; and he will wish his friend what
is good — wish absolutely things absolutely good, and
under a given condition things good for him, as
poverty or disease may be beneficial : things good
for him he will wish for the sake of the absolute
goods, in the way in which he wishes his friend to
drink medicine — he does not wish the action in
57 itself but wishes it for the given purpose. Moreover
a bad man may also be friends with a good one in
the ways in which men not good may be friends
with one another : he may be pleasant to him not as i^^'
being bad but as sharing some common characteristic,
for instance if he is musical. Again they may be
friends in the way in which there is some good in
everybody (owing to which some men are sociable "
even though good), or in the way in which they suit
each particular person, for all men have something
of good.
1 III. These then are three kinds of friendship ; Friendship
and in all of these the term friendship in a manner between
τ Λ• f 11 unequals.
mdicates equality, tor even with those who are
friends on the ground of goodness the friendship
is in a manner based on equality of goodness.
2 But another variety of these kinds is friendship
on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a
man, for that is a different kind of friendship, and
generally of a ruler and subject ; just as the principle
of justice between them is also different, being one
of equality proportionally but not of equality numeric-
ally.* The friendship of father for son is in this
equal to each other but each equal to its recipient's merit.
The word Ισον itself connotes ' fair,' just, reasonable.
389
ARISTOTLE
1238 b ^ ^ ^
ττρος τον €ύ€ργ€τηθ€ντα. αυτών 8e τούτων 3
οίαφοραι βίσιν άλλη^ πατρός προς νίον και άν8ρ6ς
25 προς γυναίκα, αϋτη μ€ν ώς άρχοντος καΐ αρχο-
μένου, η Se^ euepyeTou προς ζύεργετηθβντα. iv
ταύταις δε η ουκ eveaTtv η ούχ ομοίως το άντι-
φιλεΐσθαι. γελοΐον γαρ et τις εγκαλοίη τω θεώ 4
OTt ούχ ομοίως άντιφίλεΐ^ ώς φιλεΐται, η τω
άρχοντί 6 αρχόμενος*• φιλεΐσθαι γάρ, ου φίλεΐν,
30 του άρχοντος, η φιλείν άλλον τρόπον. καΐ rf 5
7]hovrj Βιαφβρει, ούδ' ev^ η re τοΰ αυτάρκους em
τω αύτοΰ κτηματι η παώΐ καΐ rf τοΰ €ν^€θΰς
€πί τω γι,νομενω . ώς δ' αϋτως και €πΙ τών δια 6
την χρησιν φίλων καΐ €πΙ τών δι' rjSovqv, οι μ€ν
κατ ισότητα είσίν, οι δε κα^' ύπεροχήν. διό και
οι €Κ€ίνως οίόμενοι €γκαλοΰσιν εάν μη ομοίως
35 ώσι' χρήσιμοι και ευ ποιώσιν και* επι της ηδο-
νής. 8ηλον δ' iv τοις βρωτικοίς• τοϋτο γάρ αίτιον 7
του /χά;!^εσ0αι άλλτ^λοι? πολλάκις, αγνοεί γάρ 6
€ρών ΟΤΙ ούχ 6 αυτός λόγος εστί της προθυμίας.^
διό είρηκεν Αΐνικος^^'
ερωμένος τοιαΰτ' άν, ούκ ερών λεγοι.
οι δε νομίζουσι τον αυτόν είναι λόγον.
1239 a IV. 'Ο,σπερ ούν εΐρηται τριών όντων ειδών 1
1 Mb; άλλην Pb, &\\αι <καΙ> Sp.
^ δέ <ws> Sp. * Γ : r<j? άντιφιΧβΐσθαι.
* ό άρχόμβνοί Βζ. : και άρχομένφ. ^ ή add. lac.
' οΰδ' iv lac. : ovbiv.
' ώσί add. Cas. * και <όμοίωί> vel <ώ(Γαΐ'τώ5> ? Rac
* Fr. : Xoyos riji έπ'ι την ιτροθνμίαν.
^* lac. : διό ίΰρηκέναι vukos ο.
" i.e. they complain if the pleasure or benefit they get
from their friend is not equal (absolutely, not merely in pro-
890
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. iii. 3— iv. i
3 class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary. And of
these sorts of friendship themselves there are varie-
ties : the friendship of father for son is different from
that of husband for wife — the former is friendship
as between ruler and subject, the latter that of
benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties
either there is no return of affection or it is not
4 returned in a similar way. For it would be ludicrous
if one were to accuse God because he does not return
love in the same way as he is loved, or for a subject
to make this accusation against a ruler ; for it is the
part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else to
5 love in another way. And the pleasure differs ; the
pleasure that a man of established position has in
his own property or son and that which one who
lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him
6 are not one and the same. And in the same way
also in the case of those who are friends for utility
or for pleasure — some are on a footing of equality,
others one of superiority. Owing to this those who
think they are on the former footing complain if
they are not useful and beneficial in a similar
7 manner ; and also in the case of pleasure." This
is clear in cases of passionate affection, for this is
often a cause of combat between the lover and his
beloved : the lover does not see that they have not
the same reason for their affection. Hence Aenicus ^
has said :
A loved one so would speak, but not a lover.
But they think that the reason is the same.
1 IV. There being then, as has been said," three
portion to a supposed difference of merit) to that which they
give to him. "* A dramatist of the Old Comedy.
' See 1236 a 7—1237 b 15.
391
ARISTOTLE
1289 a
φιλίας, κατ άρ^την καΐ^ κατά το χρησιμον καΐ
κατά το ηΒύ, αύται πάλιν Βι-ηρηνται et? δυο* at
μβν γάρ κατά το ΐσον at 8e καθ^ νπβροχήν etVi;^.
5 ^lAtat μβν ονν άμφότ€ραι, φίλοι δ' οι κατά την 2
ισότητα• άτοπον γάρ άν ^ΐη el άνηρ τταιδιω φίλος,
φιλίΐ δε ye και φιλίΐται. ενιαχον Be φιλ€Ϊσθαι
μ€ν δε? τον νπ€ρ€χοντα, iav δε ^tA^, οι^ειδιζεται
ώς άνάζιον φιλών τη γάρ άζία των φίλων^
μeτpeΐτaι καί τινι ΐσω. τά μίν ονν δι' ηλικίας 3
10 €λλ€ΐφιν dvctfta ομοίως φιλeΐσθaι, τά δε κατ' ape-
την η γ€νος η κατά άλλην τοιαντην ύπepoχήv• δει*
δε τον vπepeχovτa η ήττον η μη φιλeιv άζιοΰν,
και ev τω χρησιμω και ev τω rjSei και κατ' άρ€τήν.
ev μev ούν ταΐ? μικραΐς vπepoχaΐς elκότως γίνονται 4
aμφισβητησeις {το γάρ μικρόν βνιαχοΰ ovSev
15 ίσχυβι, ώσπ€ρ ev ξύλου σταθμω, αλλ' iv χρυσίω*•
αΛλα το μικρόν κακώς κρίνουσιν, ^αι^εται γάρ
το μev oiKelov αγαθόν δια το €γγνς μ4γα το δ'
αλλοτριον δια το πόρρω μικρόν) • οται» δε νπ€ρβολ'η 5
η, ουδ' αυτοί €πιζητοΰσιν ώς δει η άvτιφιλeΐσθaι
η ομοίως αντιφιλ€Ϊσθαι, οίον ει τι? ά^ιοΓ τον θβόν.
20 φανερόν Srj δτι φίλοι /χεν οται^ ev τω ΐσω, το 6
avτιφιλeΐv δ' εστίν avev τον φίλονς είναι. Βηλον 7
δε και δια τι ζητοΰσι μάλλον οι άνθρωποι την καθ'
νπζροχην φιλίαν της κατ' ισότητα• άμα γάρ
^ καϊ add. Rac.
* τφ φιλ(Ίν : τ6 φιλεΐν Βζ.
' Wilson : del. * χρνσίον Sp.
" i.e. proportional equality: see note on 1:338 b 21.
* Or ' one ought to expect the superior to feel . . .'
392
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. iv. 1-7
/kinds of friendship, based on goodness, utility and friendship
pleasantness, these are again divided in two, one unequars
set' being on a foQting of equahty and the other on possible in
2 one of superiority. Though both sets, therefore, are formsT*'
friendships, only^vKen they are on an equahty are
the parties friHmJs ; for it would" "be absurd'Tor' a
man to be a friend of a child, though he does feel
affection for him and receive it from him. In some
cases, while the superior partner ought to receive
affection, if he gives it he is reproached as loving an
unworthy object ; for affection is measured by the
worth of the friends and by one sort of equalityj*
3 So in some cases there is properly a dissimilarity
of affection because of inferiority of age, in others
on the ground of goodness or birth or some other
such superiority ; it is right for the superior to
claim to feel ** either less affection or none, alike in
a friendship of utility and in one of pleasure and
4 one based on goodness. So in cases of small degrees
of superiority disputes naturally occur (for a small
amount is not of importance in some matters, as in
weighing timber, though in gold plate it is ; but but these
people judge smallness of amount badly, since one's frTends. ^'^"^
own good because of its nearness appears big and
that of others because of its remoteness small) ;
5 but when there is an excessive amount of difference,
then even the parties themselves do not demand
that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved
alike — for example, if one were claiming a return ^
6 of love from God. It is manifest, therefore, that
men are friends when they are on an equality, but
that a return of affection is possible without their
7 being friends. And it is clear why men seek friend-
ship on a basis of superiority more than that on one
393
ARISTOTLE
1239 a
ύπαρχβι ούτως avrols τό re φίλ€Ϊσθαί και η
νπβροχη. διό 6 κόΧαζ τταρ Ivlois €νημότ€ρος χοΰ
25 φίλου • αμφω γαρ φαίνβσθαι 7Τοΐ€Ϊ ύπάρχαν τω
κολακ€υομ€νω. μάλιστα δ' οι φιλότιμοι τοιούτοι'
το γαρ ^αυ^αάζεσ^αι iv νπβροχγΙ. φύσ€ΐ be 8
γίνονται οι μβν φιλητικοι οι Se φιλότιμοι' φιλητικος
he 6 τω φιλΐΐν χαίρων μάλλον η τω φιλ€Ϊσθαι,
€κβΐνος he φιλoυμevoς^ /χαλλον. 6 μ€ν ονν χαίρων
30 τω θαυ/χάζεσ^αι και φιλζΐσθαι της vnepoxrjg φίλος,
6 he της ev τω φιλ€Ϊν ηhovης^ ο φιλητικός . eveaTi
γαρ άνάγκΎ} €ν€ργοΰντι^• το μ€ν γαρ φιλ€Ϊσθαι
συμβ€βηκός, εστί γαρ λavθάveιv φιλονμ€νον,
φιλονντα δ' ου. έ'στι he και κατά την φιλίαν τό 9
3ϋ φιλ€Ϊν μάλλον η τό φιλeΐσθaι* τό he φιλ€Ϊσθαι
κατά τό φιλητόν. σημeΐov he• eAotr' αι^ ό φίλος
μά?^ον, ei μη evhe^oiT' άμφω, γιvώσκeιv η
γιvώσκeσθaι, οίον ev ταΐς ύποβολαΐς^ αϊ γυναΐκ€ς
ττοιοΰσι, και η *Avhpoμάχη η ^Αντιφώντος, και
γάρ eoiKe τό μ€ν e^eAetl•- γινώσκ€σθαι αύτοΰ eveKa,
40 και του Trdaxeiv τι aya^ov άλλα μη iroielv, τό he
γιvώσκeιv του TToieXv και του φιλeΐv eveKa. διό 1
1239 b και τους €μμ€νοντας τω φιλ€Ϊν προς τους τ€θν€ώτας
€παινοΰμ€ν• γινώσκουσι γάρ, αλλ' ου γινώσκονται.
"Οτι μ€.ν ουν 7τλeίoveς τρόποι φιλίας, καΐ πόσοι
^ Rac. : φιλότιμοι.
^ rfj . . . ήδον^ Sp. (et Ric. om. ό).
' Ric. et Sol. : άνά-γκη ivepyovvra.
* [^ TO φιΚΐΙσθαι] ? Rac. ^ Vict. : ΰν(ρβο\αΐί.
" This poet lived at Syracuse at the court of Dionysius
the elder (who came into power 406 b.c). He is said to have
written tragedies in collaboration with the tyrant ; and he
was sentenced by him to death by flogging {Khet, 1384 a 9).
394
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. iv. 7-10
of equality ; for in the former case they score both
affection and a sense of superiority at the same time.
Hence with some men the flatterer is more esteemed
than the friend, for he makes the person flattered
appear to score both advantages. And this most
of all characterizes men ambitious of honours, since
8 to be admired implies superiority. Some jpersons
grow up by nature affectionate and others ambitious ";
"^orie who enjoys loving more than being loved_ is.
affectionate, whereas the other enjoys being loved
"more. So the man who enjoys being admired and
"loved is a lover of superiority, whereas the other,
the affectionate man, loves the pleasure of loving.
For this he necessarily possesses by the mere activity
of loving ; for being loved is an accident, as one can
be loved without knowing it, but one cannot love
9 without knowing it. Loving depends, more than
being loved, on the actual feeling, whereas being
Joved corresponds with the nature of the object.
A sign of this is that a friend, if both things were
not possible, would choose to know the other person
rather than to be known by him, as for example
women do when they allow others to adopt their
children, and Andromache in the tragedy of Anti-
phon." Indeed the wish to be known seems to be
selfish, and its motive a desire to receive and not
to confer some benefit, whereas to wish to know
a person is for the sake of conferring benefit and
10 bestowdng affection. For this reason we praise
those who remain constant in affection towards the
dead ; for they know, but are not known.
It has, then, been stated that there are several
modes of friendship, and how many modes there
395
ARISTOTLE
1239 b
τροποί, OTL τρ€Ϊς, καΐ δτί το φίλίΐσθαί καΐ άντι-
5 φΐΛ€Ϊσθαι καΐ οι φίλοι ^ιαφ^ρονσι,ν 61 τε κατ'
ισότητα και οι καθ υπεροχην, ειρηται.
V. ΕτΓβι δ€ το φίλον λέγεται και καθόλου ι
μάλλον, ωσπερ και κατ' αρχάς ελέχθη, ύττο των
εζωθεν συμπαραλαμβανόντων^ {οΐ μεν γαρ το
όμοιον φασιν etv-at φίλον, οι 8ε το εναντίον),
λεκτεον και ττερι τούτων ττώς είσι προς τάς
10 ειρημενας φιλίας. ai^ayeTai δε το μεν δμοιον και 2
εις το η8ύ και εΙς το aya^ov. το τε γαρ αγαθόν
αττλοΰν το 8έ κακόν πολνμορφον και ό αγαθός
μεν όμοιος άει και ου μεταβάλλεται το ήθος, ό
δε φαύλος και 6 άφρων ονθεν εοικεν εωθεν και
15 εσπέρας, διό εάν μη συμβάλλωσιν οι φαύλοι, ου 3
φίλοι εαυτοΐς αλλά διίστανται• η δ' ου βέβαιος
φίλια ου φιλία, ώστε οϋτω μεν το ομοιον φίλον,
ΟΤΙ το* αγαθόν δμοιον. εστί 8ε ώς και κατά το
η8ύ• τοις γάρ ομοίοις ταΰθ' ή8εα, και εκαστον 8ε
φύσει αυτό αύτω η8ύ. 8ιό και φωναι και εζεις^ 4
20 και συνημερευσεις τοις ομογενεσιν ηδισται άλλτ^λοι?,
και τοΓ? άλλοι? ζωοις• και ταύτη εν8εχεται και
τους φαύλους αλλήλους φιλεΐν
κακός κακω 8ε συντετηκεν η8ονη.
Το δ' εναντίον τω εναντίω φίλον κατά* το 5
χρησιμον. αυτό γάρ αύτω το δμοιον άχρηστον,
25 διό 8εσπότης 8ουλου 8εΐται και 8οΰλος 8εσπότου
και γυνή και άνηρ άλλτ^λωΐ'• και η8ύ και επι-
^ Sp. : συμΐΓ€ρί\αμβανόΐ'των. * τό add. Βζ.
* ν.1. αϊ ^ξ«ϊ: νράξείί ? Rac. {diaXi^ets vel διάλεξα Ric, sed
cf. 1. 20). * Rac. : ώί.
" 1235 a 4 fF. * C/. 1238 a 34 note.
396
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. iv. 10— v. 5
are, namely three, and that receiving aiFection and
having one's aiFection returned, and friends on an
equaUty and those on a footing of superiority, are
different.
1 V. But as the term ' friend ' is used in a more Friendship
universal sense as well, as was also said at the begin- "^^^of^'''^
ning," by those who take in wider considerations opposites
(some saying that what is like is dear, others what is §§^7,%!
opposite), we must also speak about these forms of
friendship and their relation to the kinds that have
2 been discussed. As for likeness, it connects with
pleasantness and also with goodness. For the good
is simple, whereas the bad is multiform ; and also
the good man is always alike and does not change
in character, whereas the wicked and the foolish are
quite different in the evening from what they were
3 in the morning. Hence if wicked men do not hit it
off together, they are not friends with one another
but they separate ; yet an insecure friendship is
not friendship at all. So the like is dear to us in
this way, because the good is like. But in a way
it is also dear on the score of pleasantness ; for to
those who are alike the same things are pleasant,
and also everything is by nature pleasant to itself.
4 Owing to this relations find one another's voices and
characters and society pleasantest, and so with the
lower animals ; and in this way it is possible even
for bad men to feel affection for each other :
But pleasure welds the bad man to the bad.*"
5 But opposite is dear to opposite on the score ofy
utility. For the like is useless to itself, and therefore I
master needs slave and slave master, man and wife
need one another ; and the opposite is pleasant
397
ARISTOTLE
θνμητόν το εναντίον ώς χρήσιμον, και ούχ ώς ev
τω^ re'Aei αλλ' ώς προς το τέλος- όταν γαρ τνχτ}
ου επίθνμ,βΐ, εν τω τέλει μεν εστίν ουκ ορέγεται
δε του εναντίου, οίον το θερμον του φυχροΰ και
το ζτ]ρ6ν του ύγροΰ.
30 "Εστί 8e ττως καΧ "η του εναντίου φίλια του 6
άγαθοΰ. ορέγεται γαρ άλλτ^λω^ δια το μέσον ως
σύμβολα γαρ ορέγεται άλλτ^λων, δια το ούτω^
ytVea^at εζ άμφοΐν εν μέσον, ώστε' κατά συ μ- η
βεβηκός εστί τοΰ εναντίου, καθ^ αυτό δε της μεσο-
τητος, ορέγονται γαρ ουκ αλλήλων τάναντία αλλά
35 τοΰ μέσου, ύττερφυχθεντες γαρ εάν θερμανθώσιν εις
το μέσον καθίστανται, και ύττερθερμανθεντες εάν
φυχθώσιν, ομοίως δε και επΙ των άλλων ει δε μη,
άει εν εττιθυμία, δτι* ουκ εν τοις μεσοις. άλλα 8
χαίρει ό εν τω μέσω άνευ επιθυμίας τοις φύσει
ήΒεσιν, οι δε ττασι τοις εζιστασι της φύσει εζεως.
40 τοΰτο μεν οΰν το εΐ8ος και επι των άφύχων εστίν 9
1240 a το φιλεΐν δε γίνεται όταν fj επι των εμφυχων.
διό ενίοτε^ άνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οΐον αυστηροί εύ-
τραπελοις και οζεΐς ραθύμοις• εις το μέσον γαρ
καθίστανται ι5π' αλλήλων, κατά συμβεβηκος ο^ν, κ
ώσπερ ελέχθη, τα εναντία φίλα και δια το aya^oi^.
5 Πόσα μεν οΰν εϊΒη φιλίας, και τίνες ^ιαφοραι
καθ^ άς λέγονται οι τε φίλοι και οι φιλοΰντες και
1 τφ add. Rac. (cf. 1333 a 10).
^ Sp. : διό ού τφ. ' Sus. : ίτι.
* δτι add. Sp. * ivioL rols Fr.
" The two halves of a bone or coin broken in half by two
contracting parties and one kept by each, to serve as a
token of identification μ hen found to fit together.
398
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. v. 5-10 ^ *^^
and desirable as useful, not as contained in the End j
but as a means to the End — for when a thing has |
got what it desires it has arrived at its End, and does ]
not strive to get its opposite, for example the hot the
cold and the wet the dry.^
6 But in a way love of the opposite is also love of the
good. For opposites strive to reach one another i
through the middle point, for they strive after each |
other as tallies," because in that way one middle |
7 thing results from the two. Hence accidentally love ',
•of the good is love of the opposite, but essentially
it is love of the middle, for opposites do not strive
to reach one another but the middle. If when
people have got too cold they are subjected to heat,
and when they have got too hot to cold, they reach
a mean temperature, and similarly in other matters ;
but without such treatment they are always in a
state of desire, because they are not at the middle
8 points. But a man in the middle enjoys without
passionate desire things by nature pleasant, whereas
the others enjoy everything that takes them outside
9 their natural state. This kind of relationship, then,
exists even between inanimate things ; but when it
occurs in the case of living things it becomes affec-
tion. Hence sometimes people take delight in
persons unlike themselves, the stiff for instance in
the witty and the active in the lazy, for they are
brought by one another into the middle state.
10 Hence accidentally, as was said,^ opposites are dear
to opposites also on account of the good.
It has, then, been said how many kinds of friend- Seif-iove
ship there are, and what are the different senses in
which people are termed friends, and also givers
" 1239 b 32.
399
ARISTOTLE
1240 a
ol φιλούμβνοι,, καί όντως toarc φίλοι elvai και
avev τούτου, €Ϊρηται.
VI. Ilept 8e του αντον αύτω φίΧον elvai -η μ,η 1
ττολλην €χ€ΐ βπίσκβφιν. So/cet γαρ eviois μάλιστα
10 'έκαστος αύτος αύτω φίλος eti^ai, και τούτω
χρώμβνοι κανόνι κρίνουσι την προς τους άλλους
φίλους φιλίαν. κατά δε τους λόγους και τα
Βοκοΰνθ^ ύττάρχ^ειν τοις φίλοις τα μ€ν ΰττ€ναντιοϋται,
τά δ' όμοια φαίνεται οντά. έ'στι γάρ πως κατ 2
άναλογίαν αϋτη^ φιλία απλώς δ' ου. εν hυσι γαρ
15 ΒΐΎ)ρημ€νοις το φιλεΐσθαι και φιλεΐν hi α μάλλον
οϋτως^ αύτος αύτω φίλος ώς^ επι του άκρατους
και εγκρατούς εϊρηται πώς εκών η άκων, τω τά
μέρη εχειν πως προς άλληλα τά της φυχης. και
ομοιον* τά τοιαύτα πάντα, ει φίλος αύτος αύτω
και εχθρός, και ει ά^ικεΐ τις αυτός αυτόν πάντα
20 γάρ εν δυσι ταύτα και Βιηρημενοις^• fj^ hrf δυο 3
πως και η φυχη, υπάρχει πως ταύτα, ff δ' ου
Βιηρημενα, ούχ υπάρχει.
ΑτΓΟ δε της προς αυτόν εζεώς είσιν* οΐ λοιποί
τρόποι του φιλον eivai ωρισμενοι καν ους εν
τοις λογοις επισκοπεΐν είώθαμεν. Βοκεΐ γάρ φίλος
etvai ό βουλόμενός τινι τάγα^ά, η οία ο'ίεται
25 αγαθά, μη δι' αυτόν αλλ' εκείνου ένεκα• άλλον δε 4
^ Ric. : αϋτη η. ^ oCros Μ*». 3 ώ? add. Γ.
* όμοια Sp. ^ Βζ. : δίτιρημένωί. * Fr. : et Ρ*", ή Μ".
' Sp. (enim Guil.): bi. * ή codd, ti Bk.
• Sp. : ws {καϊ Ric). ^^ lac. : φιλβΐσθαι διωρισμίνοι.
- Cf. 1223 a 36-b 17. Self-rostraint (or the lack of it)
indicates that a man's personality has in a sense two parts,
one of which may control the other; and similarly self-love
implies that one part of the personality can ha\'e a certain
feeling in regard to another part.
400
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. v. 10— vi. 3
and objects of afFection, both in a manner that makes
them actually friends and without being friends.
1 VI. The question whether one is one's own friend
or not involves much consideration. Some think
that every man is his own best friend, and they
use this friendship as a standard by which to judge
his friendship for his other friends. On theoretical
grounds, and in view of the accepted attributes of
friends, self-love and love of others are in some
respects opposed but in others manifestly similar.
2 For in a way self-love is friendship by analogy, but only met»•
not absolutely. For being loved and loving involve friendahip ;
two separate factors ; owing to which a man is his
own friend rather in the way in which, in the case
of the unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we
have said ** how one has those qualities voluntarily
or involuntarily — namely by the parts of one's spirit
being related to each other in a certain way ; and
all such matters are a similar thing, — whether a man
can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man
can treat himself unjustly. For all these relations
3 involve two separate factors ; in so far then as the
spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a
manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not
separate, they do not.
From the state of friendship for oneself are de- but the
termined the remaining modes of friendship under onrue° ^^
which we usually study it in our discourses.^ For friendship
a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for some-
body things that are good, or that he believes to be
good, not on his own account but for the other's sake ;
'' Cf. 1244 a 20. Perhaps a reference to Aristotle's
lectures (Stock).
2d 401
ARISTOTLE
1240 a
τροττον ώ το etvaL βουλ^ται δι' €Κ€Ϊνον /cat μη δι'
αυτόν, καν €l μη διανε/χωι^ τάγαθά, μητοι^ το
€Ϊναι, τούτω αν So^eie μάλιστα φίλος βΐναι^•
άλλον Se τρόπον ω σνζην αίρεΓται δι' αντην την 5
30 ομιλίαν κάΙ μη δι' eTepov τι, οΐον οί πατέρες το
μεν etvaL tols τέκνοις, συζώσι δ' €Τ€ροις. /χά;(6ται 6
8e^ ταύτα πάντα προς άλληλα• οΐ μεν γαρ αν μη
ι αυτοί?, οι ο€ αν μη το eii/ai, οι oe το σνζην,
ουκ οιονται ^lAeiq^ai. έτι το τω* aAyowTi συν- 7
αλγείν μη δι' eTepov τι ayaTrat' θησομεν — οΓοι^ οί
δοΰλοι προς τους δέσποτας οτι χαλεποί άλγοΰντες ,
35 αλλ ου δι αυτού?, ωσπερ αι μητέρες τοις τέκνοις
και οί συνωδίνοντες όρνιθες, βούλεται γαρ μάλιστα 8
τε ου μόνον συλλυπεΐσθαι 6 φίλος τω φίλω άλλα
και την αύτην λύπην {οίον 8ιφώντι συνΒιφην) ει
ενε8εχετο, είτε μη, οτι* εγγύτατα. 6 δ' αυτό? 9
λόγος και επι του χαίρειν το γαρ χαίρειν'' μη δι'
1240 b έτερον τι άλλα δι' εκείνον οτι χαίρει φιλικόν. ετι
τα τοιάΒε λέγεται περί φιλίας, ώς Ισότης φιλότης,
και μίαν φυχην^ eivai τοΓ? άλτ^^ώ? φίλοις.^ άπαντα 1(
ταύτα επαναφέρεται προς τον ενα• και γαρ βούλεται
5 ταγαθά αυτω^" τούτον τον τρόπον, ούθεις γαρ
αυτός αντον ευ ποιεί δια τι έτερον, ούΖε χάριν
TOOovSi eu" λέγει, οτι εποίησεν fj εις• δοκεΐν^^ γαρ
^ lac. : /ιη τφ.
^ lac. : μάλιστα φιλ^ΐν. » Sp. δ»;.
* lac. : μη τό eavroh. ^ τό τω Fr. : τφ.
* eire μή, 6τί Rac, : δτι μη (etre μiJ lac).
' τό yap xaLpetv add. Γ.
* Cas, : καΐ μη μίαν φιλίαν. • Rac. : τούί . . . φίλους.
^^ Bek. : αύτφ.
^^ χάριν τοσουδί e5 Rac. : χάριτοί ονδέ {χάριν τοσοΰδΐ lac).
^* lac. : δοκ€ΐ.
402
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. vi. 4-10
4 and in another way when a man wishes another's
existence — even though not bestowing goods on
him, let alone existence — for that other's sake and
not for his own, he would be thought to be in a high
5 degree the friend of that other ; and in another
way a man is a friend of one whose society he desires
, I merely for the sake of his company and not for some-
thing else, as fathers desire their children's exist-
ience, though they associate with other people. All
6 these cases conflict with one another ; some men
do not think they are loved unless the friend wishes
them this or that particular good, others unless their
existence is desired, others unless their society.
7 Again we shall reckon it affection to grieve with
one who grieves not for some ulterior motive — as
for instance slaves in relation to their masters share
their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and
not for their masters' own sake, as mothers grieve
with their children, and birds that share each other's
8 pain. For a friend wishes most of all that he might
not only feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel
actually the same pain — for example when he is
thirsty, share his thirst — if this were possible, and
9 if not, as nearly the same as may be. The same
principle applies also in the case of joy ; it is char-
acteristic of a friend to rejoice for no other reason
than because the other is rejoicing. Again there
are sayings about friendship such as ' Amity is
10 equality ' and ' True friends have one spirit.' All
these sayings refer back to the single individual ;
for that is the way in which the individual wishes
good to himself, as nobody benefits himself for some
ulterior motive, nor speaks well of himself for such
and such a consideration, because he acted as an
403
ARISTOTLE
φίλ^ΐν βουλ€ταί 6 SrjXov ποιών otl φιλίΐ, αλλ
ου φιλβΐν} και το etvai βούλ^σθαι^ και ro συζ'ην \
καΐ το σνγχαίραν και το συναλγ€Ϊν, καΐ μια δη
10 φνχη, κται το μ,η δυνασ^αι av€V αλλήλων μηΒε
ζην, άλλα συναττοθνησκΐΐν — οντω γαρ βχ€ΐ ο €ΐς,
και οντως^ 6μιλ€Ϊ αύτος αύτω — πάντα 8η* ταύτα
τω άγαθώ νπάρχ€ΐ προς αυτόν, ev δε τω πονηρω 1!
Βιαφωνβΐ, οίον ev τω άκρατ€Ϊ, καΐ δια τούτο δο/cet
και βχθρον Ιν^έχεσθαι αυτόν αύτω είναι* ^ δ ει?
15 και αδιαίρετο?, ορεκτος αντος αυτω. τοιούτο? ο ΐ;
aya^o? και ό κατ' άρ€την φίλος Ιπα, 6 ye μοχθηρός
ούχ €ΐς άλλα πολλοί, και τί^? αύτης ημέρας έτερος
και εμπληκτος. ώστε και η αυτού προς αύτον
φιλία ανάγεται προς την του αγαθού• οτι γαρ πη
20 όμοιος^ και εις και αύτος αύτω αγαθός, ταύτη
αύτος αύτω φίλος και όρεκτός. φύσει δε τοιούτος,
αλλ' ό πονηρός παρά φύσιν. 6 δ'® dya^o? οϋθ 1•
άμα λοώορεΐται εαυτω, ώσπερ 6 άκρατης, ούθ ο
ύστερος τω πρότερον, ώσπερ 6 μεταμελητικος ^
ούτε 6 έμπροσθεν τω ύστερον, ώσπερ 6 φεύστης
{όλως τε ει δει ώσπερ οι σοφισται διοριζουσιν, 1
25 ώσπερ το Κορισκο? και Κορισκο? σττουδαιο?,
8ηλον γαρ ώς το αύτο πόσον σπουΒαΐον αυτών*)•
επει όταν εγκαλεσωσιν αύτοΓ?,' άττοκτιννυασιν
αι5του?/** άλλα δοκει πας αυτός αύτω αγαθός.
^ φιλί! ? Rac. ■^ Kac. : μάλιστα.
' Rac. : ro-ws. * lac. : yap (δέ Γ).
* Bk. : όμοιοι. * Syl. : ούδί.
' Cas, : μΐταληπτικόί. * Fr. : αυτόν.
• Fr. : avTois. ^'' Fr. : aurous.
" Cf. 1. 3 : δτ) marks a quotation.
^ See Sophistici Elenchi, 175 b 15 fF. 'Coriscus' is used
for any imaginary person, cf. 1220 a 19 f.
404
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. vi. 10-15
individual ; for one who displays his affection wishes
11 not to be but to be thought affectionate. And
wishing for the other to exist, and associating
together, and sharing joy and grief, and ' being
one spirit ' " and being unable even to live without
one another but dying together — for this is the case
with the single individual, and he associates with
himself in this way, — all these characteristics then aii apply to
belong to the good man in relation to himself. man^s°iove
12 In a wicked man on the other hand, for instance in of self.
one who lacks self-control, there is discord, and be-
cause of this it is thought to be possible for a man
actually to be his own enemy ; but as being one and
13 indivisible he is desirable to himself. This is the case
with a good man and one whose friendship is based
on goodness, because assuredly an evil man is not a
single individual but many, and a different person
in the same day, and full of caprice. Hence a man's
affection for himself carries back to love of the good ;
for because in a way a man is like himself and a
single person and good to himself, in this way he is
dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like
that by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to
14 nature. But a good man does not rebuke himself
either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his
former self his later, hke the penitent, nor his later
15 self his former, like the liar — (and generally, if it is
necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is
related to himself as ' John Styles ' is related to
' good John Styles ' ^ ; for it is clear that the same
amount of ' John Styles ' is good as of ' good
John Styles ') — because when men blame themselves
they are murdering their own personalities, whereas
everybody seems to himself good. And he who is
405
ARISTOTLE
1240 b
ζητ€Ϊ Se 6 άττλώς ών αγαθός elvai καΐ αύτος αύτω
φίλος, ώσπ€ρ €ίρηται, οτί δυ' €χ€ΐ iv αύτώ α
30 φυσ^ι βονλ€ται etvai φίλα καΐ διασττάσαι αδύνατον.
διό €7γ' ανθρώπου μέν 8οκ€Ϊ έκαστος αύτος αντώ h
φίλος, €7Γΐ δε των άλλων ζωών ον,^ οίον ΐτητος
αύτος αύτω . . . ^ ούκ άρα φίλος, αλλ' ούδε τα
τταιδια, αλλ όταν ηΒη έ'χτ^ προαίρζσιν η^η γαρ
τοτβ Βιαφωνβΐ 6 νοΰς^ προς την Ιττιθυμίαν. eoiKe Γ
35 δ Tj φίλια Ύ] προς αύτον* τη κατά σνγγ€ν€ίαν'
ούθέτερον γαρ έφ' αύτοΐς λνσαι, άλλα καν δια-
φίρωνταί όμως ούτοι μβν συγγενβΐς en,* ό δε
€τι €ίς βως αν ί,η.
ΐίοσαχώς μβν ονν το φιλζΐν λβγβταί, καΐ οτι
77ασαι at φιλίαί ανάγονται προς την πρώτην, 8ηλον
€Κ των βίρημ4νων .
1241 a VII. Οίκεΐον δέ τη σκέφ€ΐ θεωρησαι καΐ π€ρΙ 1
ομονοίας καΐ εύνοιας• Sokcl γάρ τοις μεν etvai
ταυτό,* τοις δ' ούκ άνευ άλλι^λα;^. εστί δ' η εύ-
νοια της φιλίας ούτε πάμπαν έτερον ούτε ταύτόν.
Βιηρημενης γάρ της φιλίας κατά τρεις τρόπους, 2
5 ού'τ' εν τη χρήσιμη οϋτ* εν τη καθ' ηΒονην εστιι^.
εϊτε γάρ οτι χρήσιμος^ βούλεται αύτω τάγαθά, ού
δι εκείνον αλλά δι' αύτον βούλοιτ αν, Βοκεΐ δ'
ώσπερ . . .^ και η εύνοια ούκ αύτοϋ ένεκα* του
^ ού add. Sp. * lacunam Sus. ' P>. : τταΐϊ.
* Syl. : αυτόν. ^ είσί Sp.
• Rac. : ταύτα. ' Sp. : χρ•/ισιμον.
* lacunam edd. : <καΙ ή κατ' άρΐτην φιλία> Sus.
* lac. : βϋνοια.
" 11. 13-21.
'' Some words seem to have been lost here.
406
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. vi. 15— vii. 2
absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself,
as has been said,* because he has two factors within
him which by nature desire to be friendly and which
16 it is impossible to draw asunder. Therefore in the
case of man each individual seems dear to himself,
although in the case of other animals it is not so, for
example a horse to itself . . .'' so it is not dear to
itself. But neither are children, but only when they
have come to possess purposive choice ; for when
that point is reached the mind is at variance with
17 the appetite. And affection for oneself resembles
the affection of relationship : neither connexion is
in people's own power to dissolve, but even if the
parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still rela-
tives and the individual is still one as long as he lives.
From what has been said, then, it is clear how
many meanings there are of the term ' affection,' and
that all the forms of friendship carry back to the
first one.
1 VII. It is relative to our inquiry to consider also Goodwin
the subject of agreement of feeling and kindly Memuhlp*^
feeling ^ ; for some people think that they are the fo"nfiefi on
same thing, and others that they cannot exist apart.
Kindly feeling is neither entirely distinct from friend-
2 ship nor yet identical with it. If friendship isj
divided into three modes, kindly feeling is not
found in the friendship of utility nor in friendshit
for pleasure. If A wishes Β prosperity because he
is useful, the motive of his wish would be not B's
interest but his own, whereas it is thought that kindly
feeling like . . . <* is not for the sake of the person
" These are Solomon's versions of tlie terms usually
rendered ' concord and goodwill.'
<* Perhaps ' virtuous friendship ' should be supplied.
407
ARISTOTLE
1241 a
€ννοϊζο[Μ€νον eivat άλλα του ω evvoeZ' elr ^ ev rfj
του rjbeos φιλία, καν τοις άφνχοις ηννόουν ώστ€
10 hrjXov OTL π€ρΙ την ηθίκην φιλίαν η evvoid εστίν,
άλλα του μ€ν €ύνοοΰντος βουλ^σθαι μόνον εστί, του 3
δε φίλου καΐ ττράττβιν α βούλ^ται• eoTL γαρ η
εύνοια άρχη φιλίας, ό /χεν γαρ φίλος πας €ϋνους, ό
δ' ΐϋνους ου ττας φίλος, άργομένω γαρ eoiKev 6
15 ευνοών μόνον, διό άρχη φιλίας, αλλ' ου φιλία.
Δοκουσι γαρ οι τε φίλοι 6μονο€Ϊν και οι ομονοοϋν-
Τ€ς φίλοι είναι, εστί δ' ου περί πάντα η ομόνοια *
η φιλική, άλλα ττερι τα πρακτά τοις όμονοοϋσι και
δσα ει? το συζην συντείνει, ούδε** μόνον κατά διά-
νοιαν η κατά ορζξιν εστί γάρ τάναντία νοεΐν κται*
20 ζπιθυμβΐν, ωσττερ εν τω άκρατ€Ϊ δια0α>νεΓ τοΰτο*
ουδ' ει* κατά τι^ν ττροαίρεσιν ό/χονοει/ και κατά
την ετΓΐ^υ/χιαν. εττι δε των aya^cuv tJ ομόνοια' οι ^
γ€ φαύλοι ταύτα προαιρούμ€νοι και επιθυμοΰντβς
βλαπτουσιν αλλήλους, εοικε δε και ή ομόνοια ούχ 6
απλώς λέγβσθαι, ωσπ^ρ ούδ' ή φιλία, αλλ* ή μβν
25 πρώτη και φύσ^ι σπουΒαία, διο ουκ εστί τους
φαύλους ούτω?" όμονο€Ϊν, CTepa δε κα^' ην και οι
φαύλοι όμονοοΰσιν, όταν των αυτών την προαίρεσιν
και την ^πιθυμίαν εχωσιν. ούτω δε δει τών αυτών 7
ορ€γ€σθαι ώστ' ivhi^eadai άμφοτ4ροις ύπάργ^ιν
• Sp. : d δ' aut ei δη. « Sus. : οΰτί
' «ΌεΣΊ» και Sol. : τό κινούν, * ου δ(ί Μ^
* όμονοεϊν Ρ>>. β <οβτω5> add. Rac.
408
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. vii. 2-7
who feels it himself but for the sake of him for
whom he feels kindly ; and if kindly feeling were
found in friendship for the pleasant, men would
feel kindly even towards inanimate objects. So that
it is clear that kindly feeling has to do with the
3 friendship that is based on character. But it is
the mark of one who feels kindly only to wish good,
whereas it is the mark of the friend also to do the
good that he wishes ; for kindly feeling is the begin-
ning of friendship, as every friend feels kindly, but
not everyone who feels kindly is a friend, since the
kindly man is only as it were making a beginning.
Therefore kindly feeling is the beginning of friend-
ship, but it is not friendship.
For it is thought that friends agree in feeling, Concord
4 and that those who agree in feeling are friends. But c"nduc\ is
the agreement of friendship is not in regard to every- °°""°^^ ^°
thing, but to things practicable for the parties, and ^^°° '
to all that contributes to their association. Nor is
it only agreement in thought or in appetition, for it
is possible to think and to desire opposite things, as
in the man lacking self-control this discord occurs ;
if a man agrees with another in purposive choice he
does not necessarily agree with him in desire also.
5 Agreement occurs in the case of good men — at all
events when bad men purpose and desire the same
6 things they harm one another. And it appears that
agreement, like friendship, is not a term of single
meaning, but whereas the primary and natural form
of it is good, so that it is not possible for bad men to
agree in this way, there is another sort of agreement
shown even by bad men when their purpose and
7 desire are for the same objects. But it is only proper
for them to aim at the same objects in cases when
409
ARISTOTLE
1241 a ^ ^
ov ορίγονταΐ' αν yap τοιούτου ορίγωνται ο μη
30 €ν^€χ€ται άμ,φοΐν, μαχοΰνται. οΐ όμονοοΰντ^ς δ'
ου μάχονται}
"Εστί δτ^^ ομόνοια όταν περί του άρχ€ΐν και 8
άρχ€σθαι^ η αιϊτη προαίρ€σις ^, μη του ίκάτ^ρον,
άλλα του τον αυτόν, και έ'στιι^ η ομόνοια φιλία
πολιτική .
Uepi μεν οΰν ομονοίας και ζύνοίαξ ειρήσθω
τοσαΰτα.
35 VIII. Άττορεΐται δέ δια τί μάλλον φιλοϋσιν οι 1
ττοιησαντες ευ τους παθόντας η οι παθόντες ευ τους
ποιησαντας• δο/cet δε δίκαιον etvat τουναντίον.
τοΰτο δ' ύπολάβοι μεν αν τις δια το χρήσιμον 2
και το αύτω ώφελιμον συμβαίνειν τω* μεν
γαρ οφείλεται^ τον δ' άπο^οΰναι 8εΐ. ουκ εστί δε
40 τοΰτο μόνον, άλλα και φυσικόν η γαρ ενέργεια 3
1241 b αιρετώτερον, τον αυτόν δε* λόγον έχει το έργον και
η ενέργεια, 6 δ' ευ παθών ώσπερ έργον του ευ
ποιησαντος . διό και εν τοις ζωοις η περί τα τέκνα
σπουδή εστί και του γει^νί^σαι και τοίΡ τα* γεννώ-
μενα σώζειν. και φιλοϋσι 8η μάλλον οι πατέρες 4
5 τα τέκνα {και at μητέρες των πάτερων)^ η φι-
λοΰνται, και ούτοι πάλιν τά αύτώΐ' η τους γεννη-
σαντας, δια το την ενεργειαν εΐναι το άριστον, και
at μητέρες των πάτερων, οτι μάλλον οΐονται αυτών
ε?ι/αι έργον τά τέκνα' το γάρ έργον τω χαλεπώ 5
^ Κααμαχοΰΐ'ται. Sp. : δ' η.
8 \καΙ άρχΐσθαι] ? Rac.
* Fr. : τό (top edd.). ^ Fr. : ώφΐΧΰται.
• Sp. : δη. ' τον add. Rac.
* τα add. Sp. » [καΐ . . . πατέρων] Sp.
4.10
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. vii. 7— vni. 5
it is possible for both to have the things aimed at,
since if they aim at a thing of a kind that it is not
possible for both to have, they will quarrel ; but those
who agree in mind do not quarrel.
8 Therefore agreement exists when there is the
same purposive choice as to ruling and being ruled —
not each choosing himself to rule but both the same
one. Agreement is civic friendship.
So much for the subject of agreement in feeling
and kindly feeling.
1 VIII. The question is raised, why those who have \Love of
conferred a benefit feel more affection for those who /fQ®°^g^^g*f ''
have received it than those who have received it',ficiary.
feel for those who have conferred it ; whereas justice .
2 seems to require the opposite. One might conceive i
that it occurs for reasons of utility and personal bene-
fit ; for benefit is owing to one party and it is the
other party's duty to repay it. But really it is not
3 this alone ; it is also a law of nature — activity is a
more desirable thing, and there is the same relation
between effect and activity as between the parties
here : the person benefited is as it were the product
of the benefactor. This is why even animals have "
the philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to
produce offspring and also to protect the offspring
4 produced. And in fact fathers love their children
more than they are loved by them (mothers more
so than fathers) " and these in their turn love their
children more than their parents, because activity
is the greatest good. And mothers love their chil-
dren more than fathers, because they think that the
5 children are more their work ; for people estimate
" This clause is probably an interpolation in the Greek.
411
ARISTOTLE
Βίορίζουσιν, πλβίω δε λυττειται nepl την yeveatv
rf μητηρ.
10 Και π€ρΙ μεν φιλίας της προς αύτον καΐ της iv
πλΐίοσι ^ίωρίσθω τον τρόπον τούτον.
IX. Δο/cet δε τό τε δίκαιον elvat Ισον τι καΐ η 1
φιλία iv Ισότητι, el μη μάτην Aeyerat Ισότης η
φιλότης. αϊ δε ττολιτειαι ττασαι δίκαιου τι €Ϊ8ος•
15 κοννωνίαϊ^ Ύ^Ρ» '''^ δε κοιι^όι^ παν δια του δικαίου
συνβστηκβν, ώστε οσα ει'δτ^^ φιλίας, τοσαυτα* και
δίκαιου και κοινωνίας, και πάντα ταντα σύνορα
άλληλοις και εγγύς έχει τάς διαφοράς, ε'ττει δ'* 2
ό^Μοιω? έχει φνχη προς σώμα και τεχνίτης προς
όργανον και Ββσπότης προς Βοϋλον, τούτων μεν
20 ουκ εστί κοινωνία' ου γαρ δυ' εστίν, άλλα το μεν
εν, το δε του ενός ούδ' έν*• ουδέ διαιρετόν το
aya^oj/ εκατερω, άλλα το αμφοτέρων του ενός ου
ένεκα εστίν, το τε γαρ σώμα εστιΐ' όργανον σύμ-
φυτον, και του οεσποτου ό Βοΰλος ώσπερ μόριον
και όργανον'' άφαιρετόν, το δ' όργανον ώσπερ
Βοΰλος άφυχος.
25 Αι δ αλλαι κοινωνιαι εισιν»* μόριον τών της 3
πόλεως κοινωνιών, οίον η τών φρατερων η τών
όργεων^ η αϊ χρτ^/Αατιστικαι [έτι ττολιτειαι].'" αί
δε ττολιτειαι ττασαι iv ταΐς οικίαις^^ συνυπάρχουσι,
και αϊ ορθαι και αϊ παρεκβάσεις [εστί γαρ το
^ ή add. Rac. (et olim Fr.). ^ Bz. : κοινωνία.
* ώστ( δσα είδη Bz. : βστυ del δη (δια Μ*').
* τοσαΟτα add. llac. (cf. Μ. 31. 1211 a).
* δ' <οι'χ> ? Rac. « lac. : ουδέν.
' [καΐ 6pyavov] ? Rac. * Bz. : ΐΐσΐν ή.
' Sol. (et ν, L. & S.) : όρ-γίων {όρ-γςώνων Dietsche).
" Fr.
11 <Tats> οίκίαΐ! (cf. N.E. 1160 b 24) Fr. : okeiois.
412
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. viii. 5— ix. 3
work by its difficulty, and in the production of a child
the mother has more pain.
Such may be our decision on the subject of friend-
ship for oneself and of friendship among more than
one.
1 IX. It is thought that what is just is something Forms of
that is equal, and also that friendship is based on ^fpg.^'^"
equality, if there is truth in the saying ' Amity
is equality.' And all constitutions are some species
of justice ; for they are partnerships, and every
partnership is founded on justice, so that there are
as many species of justice and of partnership as there
are of friendship, and all these species border on each
2 other and have their diiferentia closely related. But
since the relations of soul and body, craftsman and
tool, and master and slave are similar," between
the two terms of each of these pairs there is no
partnership ; for they are not two, but the former is
one and the latter a part of that one, not one itself ;
nor is the good divisible between them, but that of
both belongs to the one for whose sake they exist.
For the body is the soul's tool born with it, a slave
is as it were a member or tool of his master, a tool is
a sort of inanimate slave.
3 The other partnerships are a constituent part of Analogy of
the partnerships of the state — for example that of fa"k)nsWp8
the members of a brotherhood or a priesthood, or ^'''th con-
business partnerships. All forms of constitution exist
together in the household, both the correct forms
and the deviations (for the same thing is found in
" i.e. to one another. Perhaps the Greek should be
emended to give ' not similar ' (to those just mentioned).
413
ARISTOTLE
1241b
avTo, ωσπ€ρ errl των αρμονιών, /cat iv^ ταΐς ττο-
30 Aire tats•), βασιλική p,kv ή του yevvriaavros , άριστο- 4
κρατική δ' ή avSpos και γυναικός, ττολιτβία δ' η των
α^βλφών, 7ταρ€κβασις δε τούτων τυραννίς, ολιγαρχία,
Βημος• και τά δίκαια Βη τοσαΰτα.
Έττβι δε το 'ίσον το μ€ν κατ* αριθμόν το δε κατ' 5
αναλογίαν, και του δικαίου €Ϊ8η έσται και της
35 φιλίας και της κοινωνίας, κατ* αριθμόν μεν γαρ
η {ΒημοκρατικηΥ κοινωνία, και η εταιρική φιλία
[τω γαρ αύτω δρω μετρείται) , κατ* αναλογίαν δε
η αριστοκρατική rf αρίστη και η* βασιλική {ου
γαρ ταύτον Βικαιον τω ύπερεχοντι και ύπερεχο-
μ€νω αλλά το άνάλογον) • και η φιλία δε ομοίως 6
40 πατρός και τταιΒός, και εν ταΐς κοινωνίαις 6 αύτος
τρόπος.
1242 a Χ. Αεγονται 8η^ φιλίαι συγγενική, εταιρική, κοι- 1
νωνικη, ή λεγομένη πολιτική, εστι μεν συγγενι-
κή πολλά έχουσα εΐ8η, ή μεν ως αδελφών, ή
δ ως πατρός και υίών^' και γάρ κατ* αναλογίαν,
5 οίον η πατρική, και κατ* αριθμόν, οίον ή των
αοελφών. εγγύς γάρ αύτη της εταιρικής• επι-
λαμβάνουσι γάρ και ενταύθα πρεσβειών, ή 8ε 2
πολιτική συνεστηκε μεν κατά το χρήσιμον καΐ
μάλιστα' δια γάρ το μη αύταρκες'' Βοκοΰσι συμ-
^ Sp. : των iv, * Sus.
' ή add. Ross. * ή add. Rac.
' Sp. : δέ. « [i7 μ^ν ώί . . . υΙων] ? Rac.
' Rac. : αυτάρκη,
" Cf. Politics viii., 1342 a 24 των αρμονίων παρ(κβάσ(ΐί (ΙσΙ
414
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. ix. 3— x. 2
constitutions as in the case of musical modes ") —
4 paternal authority being royal, the relationship of
man and wife aristocratic, that of brothers a republic,
while the deviation - forms of these are tyranny,
oligarchy and democracy ; and there are therefore
as many varieties of justice.
5 And since there are two sorts of equality, numerical
and proportional, there will also be various species
of justice and of partnership and friendship. The
partnership of democracy is based on numerical
equality, and so is the friendship of comrades, as it
is measured by the same standard ; whereas the
aristocratic partnership (which is the best) and the
royal are proportional, for it is just for superior and
inferior to have not the same share but proportional
6 shares ; and similarly also the friendship of father and
son, and the same way in partnerships.
1 X. Specified sorts of friendship are therefore the Friendships
friendship of relatives, that of comrades, that of ij^^e cialmr"
partners and what is termed civic friendship. Really of various
friendship of relatives has more than one species, d?ffer.*^ '^^
one as between brothers, another as of father and >Γ
son * : it may be proportional, for example paternal > /ji-
friendship, or based on number, for example the ■ ^ ^
friendship of brothers — for this is near the friendship ...^.v•^
of comrades, as in this also they claim privileges of
2 seniority. (jCivic friendship on the other hand is/ . • ι .
constituted in the fullest degree on the principle' ffi^^^
of utility, for it seems to be the individual's lack ofl
self-sufficiency that makes these unions permanent-^
καΐ των μΐλών τα σύντονα καΐ τταρακεχρωσμένα, ' those harmonies
and melodies that are highly strung and irregular in colora-
tion {i.e. divergent from the regular scale in having smaller
intervals) are deviations.'
^ These two clauses look like an interpolation.
415
ARISTOTLE
1242 a
μάνβιν^ iirel συνηλθόν y αν καΐ του σνζην χάριν.
10 μόνη δ' η πολιτική και η παρ* αύτην παρ4κβασις
ου μόνον φιλίαι, άλλα και ώς φίλοι κοινωνοΰσιν ,
at δ αλλαι καθ* ύπ€ροχ'ήν. μάλιστα Se δίκαιον το !
iv TTJ των χρησίμων φιλία, δια το tout' eii^at το
πολιτικον δίκαιον, άλλον γαρ τρόπον συνηλθον
πριων και τ€χνη, ούχ evcKa κοινού τινό? {οΐον'^ γαρ
15 όργανον και φυχή) άλλα του χρωμένου ev€K€v.
συμβαίν€ΐ δε και αυτό τό^ όργανον ^πιμ^λ^ίας ^
τυγχαν€ΐν ης δίκαιον προς το ^ργον εκείνου γαρ
€V€K€v €στι, και το τρυπάνω etvat διττόν, ών το
κυριώτ€ρον €ν€ργ€ΐα, ή τρύπησις. και iv τούτω τω
elhei σώμα και δούλος, ωσπ€ρ βΐρηται πρότ€ρον.
20 Το Srj ζητ€Ϊν πώς δβι τω φίλω όμιλ^ΐν, το ζητ€Ϊν Ι
8ικαιον τι βστίν. και γαρ όλως το δίκαιον ατταν
προς φίλον τό τ€ γαρ δίκαιον τισι και κοινωνοΐς,
και ο φίλος κοινωνός, ό μ€ν γάνους, ό he βίου. ό
γαρ άνθρωπος ου μόνον πολιτικον* άλλα και
οίκονομικόν ζωον, και ούχ ωσπ€ρ τάλλά ποτ€
25 συνδυάζεται και τώ τυχόντι και θηλ^ι καΐ appevi,
άλλ' ίδια ου μοναυλικόν^ άλλα κοινωνικόν άνθρωπος (
ζωον προς ους φύσ^ι συγγένεια εστίν και κοινωνία
τοίνυν και δίκαιον τι και ei μη πόλις €Ϊη. οικία '
δ εστί τι? φιλία• δεσττότου μ€ν ουν και δούλου
^ Sus. : (TVfeXeuv. * Γ : δλον. ' αυτό τό Βζ. : τοΰτο,
* Cas. : ά,νθρώττον μόνον ου πολιτίκόί {β,νθρωτΓΟί οΰ μόνον ττολι-
τ^κbs Γ).
' Sp. : άλλ' αί διάδυμον αύλικόν.
4.16
" Not its ^ζΐί, its shape, hardness, etc.
* 1241 b 17-24.
" i.e. ' friend ' in the sense of ' relation.'
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 2-7
since they would have been formed in any case merely
for the sake of society. Only civic friendship and
the deviation from it are not merely friendships
but also partnerships on a friendly footing ; the
3 others are on a basis of superiority, ^^he justice
that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest
degree just, because this is the civic principle of
justice. < The coming together of a saw vv^ith the
craft tmit uses it is on different lines — it is not for
the sake of some common object, for saw and craft
are like instrument and spirit, but for the sake of
4 the man who employs them. It does indeed come
about that even the tool itself receives attention
which it deserves with a view to its work, since
it exists for the sake of its work, and the essential
nature of a gimlet is twofold, the more important
half being its activity, boring." And the body and
the slave are in the class of tool, as has been said
before.''
5 Therefore to seek the proper way of associating Domestic
with a friend is to seek for a particular kind of justice, relations.
In fact the whole of justice in general is in relation
to a friend, for what is just is just for certain persons, , ■
and persons who are partners, and a friend is a
partner, either in one's family " or in one's life. For
man is not only a political but also a house-holding
animal, and does not, like the other animals, couple
occasionally and with any chance female or male,
6 but man is in a special way not a solitary but a
gregarious animal, associating with the persons with
whom he has a natural kinship ; accordingly there
would be partnership, and justice of a sort, even if
7 there were no state. And a household is a sort of
friendship — or rather the relationship of master and
2 Ε 417
ARISTOTLE
1242 a „ ^ ^
TjTrep και τβχνης /cat οργάνων καΐ φυχης καΐ
30 σώματος, αϊ δβ τοιαυται οϋτ€ φιλίαι οϋτ€ δίκαιο -
σνναι αλλ•' άνάλογον, ωσττερ και ro vyieivov^ ου
δίκαιον αλλ' άνάλογον. γυναικός δε και άν8ρ6ς 8
φιλία ώς χρησιμον καΐ κοινωνία• πατρός δε και
υιοϋ η αύτη ηπβρ θβοΰ προς άνθρωπον και του βυ
ποιησαντος προς τον παθόντα και δλως του φύσβι
35 άρχοντος προς τον φύσ€ΐ άρχόμ€νον. ή δέ των 9
αο^λφών προς αλλτ^λου? εταιρική μάλιστα, ι^^ κατ'
ισότητα —
ου γάρ τι νόθος τωδ' άπε^είχθην,^
άμφοΐν he πατήρ* αύτος^ €κληθη
Zeu? €μ6ς άρχων —
40 ταΰτα γαρ ως το ίσον ζητούντων λέγεται, διό iv
1242 b οικία πρώτον άρχαι και πηγαΐ φιλίας και πολιτείας
και δίκαιοι».
Εττει δε φιλίαι τρεις, κατ άρετην, κατά το Κ
χρησιμον, κατά το η8ύ, τούτων δε εκάστης δυο
8ιαφοραί {η μεν γάρ καθ* ύπεροχην ή δε κατ'
5 ισότητα εστίν εκάστη αυτών), το δε δίκαιον το ττερι
αυτά? εκ τών αμφισβητήσεων^ ^ηλον, εν μεν ττ^
καθ ύπεροχην άζιοΰται το άνάλογον ούχ ωσαύτως,
αΛΛ ο μεν υπερέχων ανεστραμμενως το αναλογον,
ως αυτός προς τον ελάττω, ούτω το παρά του ελάτ-
τονοςγινομενον προς το παρ* αύτοϋ, ^ διακείμενος* ώσ-
10 περ άρχων προς άρχόμενον ει δε μη τούτο, αλλά 11
το ίσον κατ αριθμόν άξιοι {και γάρ ^η και επι
^ vyieivof corruptum edd. : (irieiK^t ? Sus.
*^ lac. : ή. 3 Cas. : άττΐΜχθη.
* Γ: πατρ6ί. β Nauck: atVos.
® Fr. : άμ,φισβψ-ησάντων {άμψισβητιηθέντων Bz.).
' Fr. : τψ. 8 liac. : αύτοΰ.
* Bz. : διακΐίμ^νον.
418
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. x. 7-11
slave is that of craft and tools, and of spirit and
body, and such relationships are not friendships or
forms of justice but something analogous, just as
8 health <* is not justice but analogous to it. But
the friendship of man and wife is one of utility, a
partnership ; that of father and son is the same as
that between god and man and between benefactor
and beneficiary, and generally between natural
9 ruler and natural subject. That between brothers
is principally the friendship of comrades, as being
on a footing of equality —
For never did he make me out a bastard.
But the same Zeus, my lord, was called the sire
Of both— ,"
for these are the words of men seeking equality.
Hence in the household are first found the origins
and springs of friendship, of political organization
and of justice.
10 And since there are three sorts of friendship, unequal
based on goodness, on utility and on pleasure, and fr'enfisiiips
two varieties of each sort (for each of them is either forms.
on a basis of superiority or of equality), and what is
just in relation to them is clear from our discussions,
in the variety based on superiority the proportionate
claims are not on the same lines, but the superior
party claims by inverse proportion — the contribution
of the inferior to stand in the same ratio to his own
as he himself stands in to the inferior, his attitude
11 being that of ruler to subject ; or if not that, at all
•events he claims a numerically equal share (for in
" Perhaps the text is corrupt.
'' Sophocles fr. 735 Jebb and Pearson (684 Nauck).
The third Hne is completed in a quotation by Philo, θνητών
δ' ούδείί. (For τφδε dative of agent see Kuhner-Gerth, i. 422).
419
ARISTOTLE
1242 b
των άλ . χοίνωνιών ούτω συμβαίνει, 6τ€ μεν γαρ
αριθμώ το ΐσον^ μετεχουσιν, 6τ€ δε λόγω• el μεν
γαρ Ίσον αριθμώ είσήνεγκον άργνριον. Ισον και τω
15 ισω αριθμώ ^ιαλαμβάνουσιν , ει δε μτ] ϊσον, άνά-
λογον), ό δ' ύττερεχόμενος τουναντίον στρέφει το
αναλογον και κατά, ^ιάμετρον συζεύγννσιν ^όζειε 1
δ αν οΰτως ελαττοΰσθαι 6 υπερέχων, και λειτουρ-
γία η φίλια και rf κοινωνία, δει αρα τινί ετερω
ανισασαι και ττοιησαι άνάλογον τοϋτο δ' εστίν η 1;
20 τιμή, όπερ και τω άρχοντι φύσει και θεώ προς το
αρχομενον. δει δε Ισασθτιναι το κέρδος προς την
τιμήν.
Η δε κτατ' ΐσα φιλία εστίν ή πολιτική. ή δε 1-
πολιτική εστί μεν κατά το χρήσιμον, καΐ ωσπερ αί
πόλεις άλλί^λαΐδ" φίλαι, ούτω και οι πολΐται, και
ομοίως
25 ούκετι γιγνώσκουσιν ^Αθηναίοι Μεγαρήας
και οι πολΐται, όταν μή χρήσιμοι αΧλήλοις, αλλ' εκ
1 Rac. : του ίσου. ^ ή] οΰ Fr. (cf. Ν.Ε. 1163 a 29).
" The inferior party ρ claims to draw a larger share of
benefit Β and to leave the smaller share b to the superior
party P, the result of which would be ρ + Β and Ρ + b. The
superior party Ρ also invokes the principle of inverse pro-
portion (line 7), but applies it to their contributions to the
common cause, not to the benefits drawn from it : he claims
to make a smaller contribution c, while the inferior party
makes a larger one C, the result of which would be Ρ -c
and ρ - C. The proposed conjunctions are in fact both of
420
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 11-14
fact it happens in this way in other » iations
too — sometimes the shares are numerically equal,
sometimes proportionally : if the parties contributed
a numerically equal sum of money, they also take
a share equal by numerical equality, if an unequal
sum, a share proportionally equal). The inferior
party on the contrary inverts the proportion, and
12 makes a diagonal conjunction" ; but it would seem
that in this way the superior comes off worse, and
the friendship or partnership is a charitable service.''
Therefore equality must be restored and proportion
13 secured by some other means ; and this means is
honour, which belongs by nature to a ruler and god
in relation to a subject. But the profit " must be
made equal to the honour.
14 Friendship on a footing of equality is civic friend- Political
ship. Civic friendship is, it is true, based on utility, ™° ^ '^'
and fellow-citizens are one another's friends in the
same way as different cities are, and
Athens no longer knoweth Megara,**
nor similarly do citizens know one another, when^,-^
they are not useful to one another ; their friend-
them diagonal, connecting the larger person with the smaller
thing and vice versa :
Ρ Β PC
ρ b ρ c
'' Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' friendship
is a charity and not a partnership.'
" i.e. the advantage in the shape of protection, guidance,
etc., that the inferior party derives from the friendship.
^ Lit. ' the Athenians no longer recognize the Megarians.'
Author unknown (Bergk, Fr. Eleg., Adespota 6).
4.21
ARISTOTLE
1242 •> , , ^ ^ , ,,
χ€ίρ6ς els Χ^ίρα 'ή φίλια. έ'στι δε ενταύθα και 1
άρχον καΐ άρχόμ€νον, οντ€ το φυσικον ovre το
βασιΧικόν, άλλα το iv τω /xepet, ovSe τούτου
30 eveKa όπως ev ttoitj ως 6 θζός, άλλα ίνα ίσον rj^
του άγαθοΰ καΐ^ της λβιτουργίας. κατ' ισότητα δη
βούλ€ται etvat η ττολίΤίκη φιλία, βστι δέ της 1
χρησίμου φιλίας βϊΒη δυο, η μεν νομική η δ' ηθική.
βλ€π€ΐ δ' ή μεν πολιτική €ΐς το 'ίσον και βις το
πράγμα, ωσπερ οι πωλοΰντες και oi ώνούμενοι•
διό €Ϊρηται
μισθός avSpi φίλω.
35 όταν μ€ν ουν καθ^ όμολογίαν fj,^ πολιτική αυτή 1
φιλία και νομική' όταν δ' επιτρίπωσιν αύτοΐς*
ηθική βουλΐται etvat φιλία και εταιρική, διό
/ιιάλιστα τα εγκλήματα^ iv ταύτη τή φιλία• αίτιον
δ' ότι παρά, φυσιν eVepat yap φιλίαι ή κατά το
40 χρήσιμον και ή κατά τήν άρετήν, οι δ' αμφότερα^
βουλονται άμα εχειν, και όμιλοΰσι μεν του χρησίμου
1243 a ένεκα, ήθικήν δε ποιοϋσιν ώς επιεικείς, διό ώς
πιστεύοντες ου νομικήν ποιοϋσιν.
"Ολω? μεν γαρ εν τή χρήσιμη των τριών πλείστα^ 1
εγκλήματα (ή μεν γαρ αρετή άνεγκλητος^ οΐ δ
ή^εΐς έχοντες και Βόντες άπαλλάττονται, οΐ δε
5 χρήσιμοι ουκ ευθύς διαλύονται, αν μή νομικώς
και' εταιρικώς προσφερωνται)' όμως δε της 1
1 ίχτι ? Rac.
* καΐ Γ : ■)) {ίσον g τό ά-γαθόν rrj Xeirovpyiif. ? Rac).
' Fr. (et Γ) : ή. * Rac. : aurois.
* τά έ-γκλήματα Sp. : ?Ύκ\ημα.
• άμφοτέραί ? Rac. ' πλείστα τά Sp.
* Sp. : άνέ-'/κλητον. ' και : ά\\' ? Rac.
« C/. Ν. Ε. 1262 b 26.
* iV^.Z?. 1164 a 28. Hesiod, W.D. 371 /Λίσί^ό? δ' avipi φίλφ
422
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 15-19
15 ship is a ready -money transaction. * Nevertheless
there is present here a ruhng factor and a ruled — not
a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules in
his turn, and not for the purpose of conferring benefit,
as God rules, but in order that he may have an equal
share of the benefit and of the burden. Therefore
civic friendship aims at being on a footing of equality.
16 But useful friendship is of two kinds, the merely
legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to
equality and to the object, as buyers and sellers do
— hence the saying
Unto a friend his wage — .*
17 When, therefore, it is based on a definite agreement. Complaints
this is civic and legal friendship ; but when they frfemiThips
trust each other for repayment, it tends to be moral of utility
friendship, that of comrades. Hence this is the basis.
kind of friendship in which recriminations most
occur, the reason being that it is contrary to nature ;
for friendship based on utility and friendship based
on goodness are different, but these people wish to
have it both ways at once — they associate together . , -^ I '
for the sake of utility but make it out to be a morai. ''
friendship as between good men, and so represent
it as not merely legal, pretending that it is a matter
of trust.
18 For in general, of the three kinds of friendship, it
is in useful friendship that most recriminations occur
(for goodness is not given to recrimination, and pleas-
ant friends having got and given their share break
it off, but useful friends do not dissolve the association
at once, if their intercourse is on comradely and not
19 merely legal lines) ; nevertheless the legal sort of
eip-ημένο^ apKios 'έστω, ' let the wage stated for a friend stand
good.'
423
ARISTOTLE
1243 a ^ ^
χρησίμου η νομική άν€γκλητος. eWt δ' ή μβν
νομική διάλυσι? ττρος νόμισμα {μ€τρ€Ϊται γαρ
τοντω το Ίσον), η δ ηθική ακούσιος, διο Ινιαχοΰ
νομός eon τοις όντως ομιλονσι φιλικώς μη eti'at
10 Βικας των ακουσίων συναλλαγμάτων, ορθώς• τοις
γαρ άγαθοΐς ου ττέφυκζ ^ίκη^ elvai, οι δ' ως
αγαθοί και πιστοΐς^ συνα?^άττουσιν . έ'στι δ' iv 2
ταύτη τη φίλια τα ίγκληματα αμφιβάλλοντα αύτοΐς
άμφότ€ρα, πώς ίκάτερος ey/caAet/ όταν ηθικώς
άλλα μη νομικώς πιστ€νσωσιν.
15 Και €χ€ΐ Srj άπορίαν ποτ^ρως δει κρίνειν το* 2
hiKaiov, πότ€ρα προς το πράγμα βλέποντα το
υπηρβτηθζν ποσόν η ποιον, η^ τω πβπονθότι• ev-
δ€;^€ται yap* etvai όπερ Aeyei ©eoyt'i? —
σοι μζ,ν τοϋτο, θ^ά, σμικρόν, €μοι he μέγα,
εΐ'δεχβται δε' και τουναντίον γενέσθαι, ωσπζρ iv
20 τω λόγω, σοι μεν τταιδιάρ' tout' elvai, €μοι δε
θάνατον. €ντ€ΰθ€ν δ' ώσπερ^ είρηται^ εγκλήματα' 2
ό μεν γαρ άξιοι άντιπαθεΐν ως μέγα ύπηρετησας
OTL 6εομενω εποίησεν, η τι άλλο τοιούτο λέγων
προς την εκείνου ώφελειαν πόσον εΒύνατο αλλ' ου
Tt ην αυτω, ο οε τουναντίον όσον εκεινω αλλ
^ Sol. : δίκαιον {ayaOoh αύτοΐί ττέφυκΐ δικαίου Sp.).
* lac. : Toh.
' [ttws . . . εγκαλεί] ? gloss, (an lege ^7καλ^σ« ?) Rac.
* Sp. : τον. 6 7)v Fr. • Γ : 5i.
'' Fr. : yap. * ώστηρ add. Fr.
' Rac. : εϊρηται το. '••' Rac. : αύτφ.
" Or, adopting another conjectural emendation, ' since it
is natural for good men to be just of their own accord.'
*■ Solomon renders ' It is uncertain how either will re-
criminate on the other, seeing that they trust each other, not
424
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 19-22
useful friendship is not given to recrimination. The
legal method of discharging the obligation is a matter
of money, for that serves as a measure of equality ;
but the moral method is voluntary. Hence in some
places there is a law prohibiting friendly associates of
this sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts —
rightly, since it is not natural for good men to go to
law,* and these men make their contracts as good
20 men and as dealing with trustworthy people. And
in fact in this sort of friendship the recriminations are
doubtful on both sides — what line of accusation each
party will take, inasmuch as their confidence was of
a moral kind and not merely legal. ^
21 Indeed it is a question in which of two ways one Estimate of
ought to judge what is a just return, whether by " ^™^'
looking at the actual amount or quality of the ser-
vice rendered, or by its amount or quality for the
recipient ; for it may be as Theognis says —
Goddess, 'tis small to thee, but great to me,"
and also the result may be opposite, as in the saying
22 ' This is sport to you but death to me.' Hence
recriminations, as has been said ** ; for one party
claims recompense as having rendered a great service,
because he did it for his friend in need, or saying
something else of the sort as to how much it was
worth in relation to the benefit given to the recipient
and not what it was to himself, while the other party
on the contrary speaks of how much it was to the
in a limited legal way but on the basis of their characters.'
But the Greek text may be questioned.
" Theognis 14. This quotation illustrates that the amount
of a service is ' subjective,' the next quotation shows that
its quality is.
" 1242 b 37.
425
ARISTOTLE
1243 a
25 ούχ όσον αύτω} ore 8e και /xera^ctAAei^• ο μ^ν 23
γαρ όσον αύτω^ μικρόν άπββη, ο δ' δσον αντώ^
μβγα^ εΒννατο, οίον, el κιν8νν€νσας 8ραχμης αζιον
ωφίλησζν, 6 μ€ν το του κινδύνου μ^γ^θος ό 8e το
του αργυρίου, ωσπ€ρ iv tjj των νομισμάτων άττοδόσβι
30 — και γαρ ει^ταυ^α πepl τούτων η άμφισβητησις'
ο μ€ν γαρ άζιοΐ πώς τότ -ην, 6 8e ττώ? νυν, αν
μη διβι'ττωνται.
Η μβν ουν ττολίτικη βλέττ^ι els την ομολογίαν 24
και €Ls το πράγμα, η δ' ηθική els την πpoaίpeσιv'
ωστ€ καΐ Βίκαιον τοϋτο μαλλόν εστί, και δικαιο-
σύνη φιλική, αίτιον δε του jU,ci;^eCT^at διότι κιαλλιωι^ 25
35 juev η ηθική φιλία άναγκαιοτ€ρα Se ή χρησίμη• οι
δ άρχονται'^ μ€ν ως ήθικοΙ φίλοι και δι' άρετήν
ovTes, όταν δ' αντίκρουση^ τι των ιδίων, δήλοι γί-
νονται ότι eTepoi ήσαν. €κ π€ριουσίας γαρ διώ-
1248 b κονσιν οι πολλοί το καλόν, διό και την κάλλια»
φιλιαν. ωστ€ φαν€ρόν πώς Siaipereov πepι τούτων. 26
61 μεν γαρ ηθικοί φίλοι, els την προαίρεσιν.
βλεπτέον el 'ίση, και ούθεν άλλο άξιωτ€ον Θατ4ρω
πάρα Θατάρου• el δ' ως χρήσιμοι και πολιτικοί,
5 ως αν ελυσιτελει* ό/Μθλο•)/οίισΐΓ. αν δ' ο μεν
φη ωδε 6 δ' εκείνως, ου καλόΐ',' άντιποιήσαι
Seov, τους καλούς λέγειν λόγους, ομοίως Se και
^ (bis) Rac. : αντφ.
* μεταβά'\λ€ΐ (vel μεταλαμβάνει) Rac. : μεταλαμβάνων και
αμφιβάλλει. 3 μ^γ^ι] Soi_
* Bus. : άρχονται. ^ lac. : άντικρυί tj.
* 'έωί Άν λικτιτελ-η ? Rac, (tus άν λικτίτελί/ Sp.).
' Rac. : καλύν μίν.
" Or, altering the Greek, ' they agree for as long as it
profits them.'
426
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 23-26
23 donor and not how much it was to himself. And
at other times the position is reversed ; the one
says how little he got out of it, the other how much
the service was worth to him — for instance, if by
taking a risk he did the other a shilling's worth of
benefit, the one talks about the amount of the risk
and the other about the amount of the cash ; just
as in the repayment of a money loan, for there too
the dispute turns on this — one claims to be repaid
the value that the money had when lent, the other
claims to repay it at the present value, unless they
have put a proviso in the contract.
24 Civic friendship, then, looks at the agreement and
to the thing, but moral friendship at the intention. ;
hence the latter is more just — it is friendly justice.
25 The cause of conflict is that moral friendship is
nobler but friendship of utility more necessary ;
and men begin as being moral friends and friends
on grounds of goodness, but when some private
interest comes into collision it becomes clear that
really they were different. For most men pursue
what is fine only when they have a good margin in
hand, and so Avith the finer sort of friendship too.
26 Hence it is clear how these cases must be decided.
If they are moral friends, we must consider if their
intentions are equal, and nothing else must be
claimed by either from the other ; and if they are
friends on the ground of utility or civic friends, we
must consider what form of agreement would have
been profitable for them.*" But if one says they are
friends on one footing and the other on another,
it is not honourable, when an active return is due,
merely to make fine speeches, and similarly also in
427
ARISTOTLE
1243 b
€771 θατβρον αλλ' εττβιδη ον Βιβίποντο ώς ηθικώς, 2'
8et Kpivetv ηνά, μ'ηΒ^ ύποκρινόμ^νον μ•φξ.τ€ρον^
αυτών βζατταταν• ώστε δει στίργειν ίκάτερον την
10 τνχ-ην. ΟΤΙ δ' εστίν η ήθικη κατά προαίρεσιν 2ΐ
8ηλον, eVet καν el μεγάλα παθών μη άττοΒωη δι'
ά^υναμίαν αλλ' οσ'" εδυνατο, καλώ?• και yap' 6
θεός άν'εχεται κατά δυν'α/Αΐν' λαμβάνων τάς θυσίας,
αλλά τω ττωλοΰντί ούχ ίκανώς βζβι αν μη φηστ] 2'.
δυνασ^αι πλέον δούναι, ούδε τω Βανείσαντι.
15 Πολλά εγκλήματα ytVeTai εν ταΐς φιλίαις ταΓ?* 3ι
μη κατ εύθυωρίαν , και το δίκαιον ΐδειν ου pahiov
χαλεπον γάρ^ μετρησαι ενί τώδε τά* /χτ) κατ' εύθυ-
ωρίαν οίον συμβαίνει, επΙ τών ερωτικών, 6 μεν 3
γαρ 8ιώκει ώς τον' ή8ύν επι το συζην, 6 δ'
εκείνον ενίοτε ώς χρησιμον , όταν δε παύσηται του
20 εράν, άλλου γενομένου^ άλλος γίνεται, και τότε
λογίζονται τι άντι* tiVos, και ώς ΥΙύθων και
ria/MjMeVTys• ^ιεφεροντο, και όλως διδάσκαλο? και
μαθητής {επιστήμη γαρ και χρήματα ούχ ενΙ
μετρείται), και ως ηροοικος ο ιατρός προς τον
αποδίδοντα μικρόν τον μισθόν, και ώς ό κιθαρωδός
25 και ο βασιλεύς. 6 μεν γαρ ώς ήΒεΐ ό δ' ώς 31
^ Syl. : ύίΓοκρινόμενοί μηδέτ€ρο%. * Rac. : ώϊ.
' καΐ yap Fr. : καΐ. * Βζ. : roh.
' Γ : yip χαλεττόΐ'. * Γ : τφ.
' [τόν] Sp. * Rac. : yι^>oμέvoυ.
' τι άντΙ lac. : τταντί. ^" Sp. : Πρόδικοί.
" i.e. in a moral friendship it is not honourable to insist
on a return on a business footing.
* ' Dissimilar friendships, where action and reaction are
not in the same straight line ' (Solomon).
" The distinguished Theban general, friend of Epa-
minondas. Pytho may be a dramatist of Catana, or a
Byzantine rhetorician of the period.
428
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 27-32
27 the other case ** ; — but since they did not provide for
this in the contract, on the ground that it was a
moral friendship, somebody must judge, and neither
party must cheat by pretending ; so that each must
28 be content with his luck. But it is clear that moral
friendship is a matter of intention, since even if a
man after having received great benefits owing to
inability did not repay them, but only repaid as
much as he was able, he acts honourably ; for even
God is content with getting sacrifices in accordance
29 with our ability. But a seller will not be satisfied
if a man says he cannot pay more, nor will one who
has made a loan.
30 In friendships not based on direct reciprocity ^ Causes and
many causes of recrimination occur, and it is not οΓάίκριΓίΜ.
easy to see what is just ; for it is difficult to measure
by one given thing relations that are not directly
31 reciprocal. This is how it happens in love affairs,
since in them one party pursues the other as a
pleasant person to live with, but sometimes the other ■
the one as useful, and when the lover ceases to love,
he having changed the other changes, and then they,
calculate the quid pro quo, and quarrel as Pythoi
and Pammenes " used, and as teacher and pupil ,^,^
do in general (for knowledge and money have no —
common measure), and as Herodicus '^ the doctor
did with the patient who offered to pay his fee with
a discount, and as the harpist and the king fell out.
32 The king associated with the harpist as pleasant ■
and the harpist with the king as useful ; but the
"* Born in Thrace, practised in Athens fifth cent. b.c. ; tutor
of Hippocrates. The mss. give ' Prodicus ' (the sophist,
who figures frequently in Plato), and possibly the text has
suffered haplography, and both names should be read.
429
ARISTOTLE
1243 b
χρησιμω ώμίλζ,ι•- 6 δ', βπβώη'^ έ'δβι άττοδιδόναι,
αυτόν αύτον ώς η^ύν €7Τοίησ€ν, και €φη, ώσττβρ
€Κ€Ϊνον ασαντα βύφραναι, οϋτω καΐ αύτος υπο-
σχόμενος €K€LVii). όμως δε φανερόν καΐ ενταύθα 33
ττώς γνωριστεον evl γαρ μ€τρητ€ον καΐ €νταΰθ\
αλλ ουκ αριθμώ^ άλλα λόγω. τω' άνάλογον
30 γαρ μ€τρητ€ον, ωσπερ καΐ η ττολίτικη μετρείται
κοινωνία' ττώς γαρ κοινωνήσει γεωργω σκυτο-
τόμος, ει μη τω άνάλογον ίσασθησεται τα έργα;
ται? δ•)^* μη κατ' εύθυωρίαν το άνάλογον μετρον, 34
οίον ει ο μεν σοφιαν Sovvai εγκαλεί, ό δ' εκείνω
άργυριον, τί^ σοφία^ ττρός το πλούσιον εΙναί' ;
35 €ΐτα τι Βοθεν προς εκάτερον^ ; ει γαρ ό μεν του
ελάττονος ήμισυ ε8ωκεν, 6 Βε του μείζονος μη
πολλοστόν μέρος, 8ηλον ότι οΰτος ά8ικεΐ. εστί 35
Βε κάνταΰθα εν άρχη άμφισβητησις, αν φη ό μεν*
ώς χρησίμους συνελθεΖν αυτούς, ό Βε μη, αλλ' ώς
κατ άλλην Tti^o. φιλίαν.
1244a XI. ϋερι Βε του άγαθοΰ και κατ άρετην φίλου, \
σκεπτεον ποτερον Βεΐ εκείνω τα χρήσιμα ύπηρετεΐν
και βοηθεΐν η τω άντιποιεΐν τα ΐσα^" Βυναμενω . τού-
το Βε το αυτό πρόβλημα εστί, πότερον τον φίλον
5 η τον σπουΒαΐον ευ ποιητεον μάλλον. άν μεν 2
γαρ φιλος^^ και σπουΒαΐος, ΐσως ου λίαν χαλεπόν,
^ Rao. : eirel.
* lac. : ούχ δρψ. '• Fr. : τ6.
* Rac. : Toh δέ {δη ? Sus.). « Βζ. : τ^.
* Sol. : σoφίq.. ' dvai add. Rac.
* πρόί έκατίρου Fr. : Κ,έκατέρον^ wp6s ϊκάτΐρον ? Rac.
• Bk. : φήσωμεν. ίο lac. : άντιποιοΰντι και.
" <καΙ> <pi\os ? Rac. : <ό> φίλοί Rieckher.
" The story (also told N.E. ix., 1164 a 16) is related by
430
■ EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. χ. 32— χτ. 2
king, when the time came for him to pay, made out
that he was himself of the pleasant sort, and said
that just as the harpist had given him pleasure by
his singing, so he had given the harpist pleasure by
33 his promises to him." Nevertheless here too it is
clear how we must decide : here too we must measure
by one standard, but by a ratio, not a number.
For we must measure by proportion, as also the
civic partnership is measured. For how is a shoe-
maker to be partner with a farmer unless their ^
34 products are equalized by proportion ? Therefore
the measure for partnerships not directly reciprocal
is proportion — for example if one party complains
that he has given wisdom and the other says he has
given the former money, what is the ratio of wisdom
to being rich ? and then, what is the amount given
for each ? for if one party has given half of the
smaller amount but the other not even a small
fraction of the larger, it is clear that the latter is
35 cheating. But here too there is a dispute at the
outset, if one says that they came together on
grounds of utility and the other denies it and says
it was on the basis of some other kind of friendship.
1 XI. About the good friend and the friend on the casuistry of
basis of goodness, we must consider whether one friendship.
ought to render useful services and assistance to
him or to the friend who is able to make an equal
return. This is the same problem as whether it
is more one's duty to benefit a friend or a virtuous
2 man. If a man is a friend and virtuous, perhaps ^
Plutarch, T)e Alexandri fortuna ii. 1, of the tyrant
Dionysius of Syracuse.
* Or, altering the punctuation with Fritsche, ' is a friend
and virtuous equally.'
43!
ARISTOTLE
1244 a
άν μη τι,ς το μ€ν αύξηστ) το Se ταπβινώσΎ], φίλον
μ€ν σφόΒρα €v^ ποιών, €7η€ΐκη δε -ηρίμα. el 8e μη,
πολλά προβλήματα γίνεται, οΐον el 6 peev ην ουκ
ίσται he, 6 he εσται οϋπω he, η 6 μέν eyeveTo έ'στι
ου, ο ο eoTLV ουκ ην oe oυoe εσται. αΛΛ
CKetvo epywheoTepov . μη γάρ τι Aeyet Έιύριπί8ης 3
ποιησας
λόγων' hiKaiov μισθον αν λόγους φίροΐζ,*^
epyov δ' eKelvos^ epyov δς" παρ4σχ€το•
και ου πάντα δει τω πατρί, αλλ' έ'στιν αλλ' α heV
τη μητρί, καίτοι βeλτίωv 6 πατήρ ' oiihe γάρ τω
Ιό Διι πάντα λύεται, ουδ' έχει πάσας τάς τι/χά? άλλα
τιΐ'ά?. ίσως οΰν εστίν ά δει τω χρησίμω, άλλα 4
δε τω άγαθώ• οΐον ουκ el σΐτον hίhωσι και Tavay-
καία, και συζην τούτω δεΓ• ουδ' ω τοίνυν το συζην,^
τούτω ά μη ούτος hίhωσιv αλλ' ό* χρήσιμος'
αλλ' οι τοΰτο πoιoϋvτeς [τουτω]^" πάντα τω ερω-
μ€νω hιhόaσιv ου heov, oύh€vός^^ elaiv άζιοι.
20 Και οι ev τοις λόγοις οροί της φιλίας πάντ€ς
μ4ν πώς elσι φιλίας, αλλ' ου της αυτής, τω μ€ν 5
yap χρησιμω το βoύλeσθaι τάκβίνω aya^a, και
τω ευ ποιήσαντι, και τω οποίω δτ^^^ [ου γάρ
€πισημαίν€ΐ οΰτος 6 ορισμός της φιλίας), άίλλω δε
ϊ εΰ add. Rac. 2 ^ §' gy], , 5,^_
^ Bus. : λόγο»'.
* Bus. : λόγου ΐίσφέροα (λόγου φέροι% Bk.).
* Musgrave: εκείνοι^. ' ί'ργοί' δ»^ Meineke : ^ργο.
' Λλλ' a δίί Sus. : άλλα bL » βζ. : τό «5 f^;-.
» Sus. : άλλα. 10 Rac. " Fr. : ούδ'.
1^ lac. : OTTOiOs δβΐ.
" See the first sentence of the chapter.
" Fr. 882 Nauck.
432
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xi. 2-5
it is not over-difficult, provided one does not ex-
aggerate the one factor and underrate the other,
benefiting him greatly as friend but only slightly as
good. But in other cases many problems arise, for
instance, if A was a friend but is going not to be and
Β is going to be but is not now, or if A became one
but is not one now and Β is one now but was not
and is going not to be. But the former problem "
3 is more difficult. For possibly there is something
in the lines of Euripides * :
Prithee take words as thy just pay for words,
But he, that gave a deed, a deed shall have ;
and it is not one's duty to give everything to one's
father, but there are other things that one ought
to give to one's mother, although the father is the
superior ; for even to Zeus not all the sacrifices are
offered, nor does he have all the honours but some
4 particular ones. Perhaps, therefore, there are som.e
services that ought to be rendered to the useful
friend and others to the good friend : for instance,
if a friend gives you food and necessaries you are
not therefore bound to give him your society, and
accordingly also you are not bound to render to the
friend to whom you give your society the things that
you do not get from him but from the useful friend ;
hut those who by so doing vnrongly give everything
to one whom they love are good-for-nothing people.
' And the defining marks of friendship stated in the Different
discourses all belong to friendship in some sense, .j?.\"^^,°j[.
5 but not to the same kind of friendship. It is a marklhave difter-
of the useful friend that one wishes the things ^"'^ ^ *'"''^'
good for him, and so of the benefactor, and in fact
a friend of any sort (for this definition of friend-
ship is not distinctive) ; of another friend, that one
2f 433
ARISTOTLE
1244 a ^ ^
25 TO eivac και άλλω το συζην, τω 8e καθ^ η8ονην
το συναλγ€Ϊν καΐ συγχαίρβιν. πάντβς δ' ούτοι οΙ 6
opot κατά φίλίαν μβν Χίγονταί τιι^α, ου προς μίαν
δ ovSeig. διό πολλοί elai, και βκαστος /χια?
eiv-ai δοκεΐ φιλίας, ουκ ών, οίον η τοΰ eti^ai ττρο-
αιρεσι?• και ya/) ό καθ' νπ^ροχην και ποιήσας ev
βούλβται τω €ργω τω αύτοΰ ύπάρχβιν {και τω
30 δόντι το eti'ai δει και άι^ταποδιδόί^αι) , άλλα συΖ/ψ
ου τούτω αλλά τω ηΒεΐ.
Α8ικοΰσιν οι φίλοι evioi αλλήλους, τα γαρ 7
πράγματα μάλλον, αλλ' ου φιλοΰσι τον^ €χοντα•
διό φίλοι^ κακ^ίνω^ {οίον διότι ή^ύς τον οΐνον
βΐλβτο και ΟΤΙ χρήσιμος τον πλοΰτον eiAeTo), χρησι-
μωτβρος γαρ. διό δτ) άγανακτ€Ϊ,* ωσπβρ αν el
35 μάλλον €ΐλοντο^ άντι ήττονος• οι δ'^ €}/καλοί?σιν,
€Κ€Ϊνον γαρ νυν ζητοΰσι τον aya^ov, πρότ€ρον ζητή-
σαντ€ς τον ήΒύν ή τον χρήσιμον .
1244 b XII. Σικβπτ€ον δε και π^ρι αυτάρκεια? και 1
φίλιας, πώς βχουσι προς τάς άλλτ^λων 8υνάμ€ΐς.
απορησειβ γαρ αν τι? πότβρον, ei τις (ΐη κατά
πάντα αυτάρκης, έ'σται τούτω φίλος, ή^ κατ'
ένδειαι^ ζητείται φίλος και* έ'σται άγαθος^ αύτ-
5 αρκζστατος . ei 6 μετ αρετής βίος^^ ευδαίμων,
τι αν δεοι φίλου; ούτε γαρ των χρησίμων δει-
σσαι αυτάρκους , ούτε των εύφρανούντων^^ ούτε τοΰ
^ Βζ. : τα. " edd. : φιλεϊ. « Rac. : κάκείνοΐί. •
* rec, Pb : 8ei. » β^β. : el'Xe7-o. « Vict. : ό δ'.
"> Aid. : el. * Fr. : ή. » Ross : ayaObs.
^• βίοί add. Syl. ^^ Sp. : eC φρονούντων.
" i.«. the beneficiary.
* This also means the beneficiary, who is the cause of
the benefactor's being a benefactor ; so the benefactor ought
to repay him in kind by wishing his existence (as he does
also for the reason that he is his own product).
434
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xi. 5— xii. 1
wishes his existence, of another that one wishes his
society ; of the friend on the ground of pleasure, that
6 one shares his gi*ief and his joy. All these defining
marks are predicated in the case of some friendship,
but none of them with reference to friendship as a
single thing. Hence there are many of them, and
each is thought to belong to friendship as one, though
it does not : for instance, the desire for the friend's
existence — for the superior friend and benefactor
wishes existence to belong to his own work'* — and
to him who gave one existence ^ it is one's duty to
give existence in return ; but he wishes the society
not of this friend but of the pleasant one.
7 Friends in some cases wrong each other, because
they love things more, not the possessor of them,
and are friends of the possessor too on this account
(just as a man chose his wine because it was sweet
and chose his wealth because it was useful), for he is
more useful." Hence naturally he is annoyed, just
as if they had preferred his possessions to himself
as being inferior ; and they complain, for now they
look to find in him the good man, having previously
looked for the pleasant or the useful man.
1 XII. We must also consider self-sufficiency and Seif-sufflci-
friendship, and the interrelationship of their poten- ^"°^ f|]ji *'*^
tialities. For one may raise the question whether friends.
if a person be self-sufficing in every respect he will
have a friend, or whether on the contrary a friend
is sought for in need, and the good man will be
most self-sufficing. If the life that is combined with
goodness is happy, what need would there be of a
friend ? For it does not belong to the self-sufficing
man to need either useful friends or friends to amuse
" Sc, on account of his possessions.
435
ARISTOTLE
1244 b
συζ'ήν, αύτος^ γαρ αντω Ικανός avveivai. μάλιστα 2
θ6 Ύοϋτο φαν€ρόν εττι deov• SrjXov γαρ ώς ovbe-
νος ττροσ^ζομ^νος ουδέ φίλου δβησεταί, ουδ' έ'σται
10 αύτω e\ ye μηθβν Seoiro του.'' ωστ€ καΐ άνθρωπος
ο ζύ^αιμονέστατος ηκι,στα Se-qaeraL φίλου, αλλ' η
καθ όσον αδύνατον elvai αυτάρκη. ανάγκη άρα 3
ελαχίστους elvai φίλους τω άριστα ζώντι, και
aet' ελάττους γίνεσθαι, και μη σπου8άζ€ΐν δπως
ώσι φίλοι, αλλ' ολιγωρ€Ϊν μη μόνον των χρησίμων
15 αλλά και των* €ΐς το συζην αιρετών, άλλα μην
και τοτβ^ φανερον άν eti^at So^eiev ώς ου χρήσεως
ένεκα 6 φίλος ούδ' ωφελείας, άλλ' ο* δι' άρετην
φίλος μόνος. όταν γαρ μηθενος ενδεείς ώμεν, 4
τότε τους σνναττολαυσο μένους ζητοΰμεν^ ττάντες,
και τους εδ ττεισομενους μάλλον η τους ποιήσοντας^•
20 ayMetva» δ εχομεν κρίσιν αυτάρκεις οντες η μετ*
ενΒείας, μάλιστα re* τών συζην άζίων Βεόμεθα
φίλων.
ΤΙερι Βε της απορίας ταύτης σκεπτεον μη ποτέ 5
το μεν τι λέγεται καλώς το δε λαι^^άνβι δια την
παραβολην. 8ηλον δε λαβοΰσι τι το ζην το κατ*
ενεργειαν και ώς τέλος. φανερόν οΰν οτι το 6
25 αισ^αν-εσ^αι και το γνωρίζειν , ώστε και το συζην
το συΐ'αισ^αΐ'εσ^αί. και το συγγνωρίζειν εστίν,
εστί δε αυτό τ6^° αισθάνεσθαι και αυτό το'" γνω-
ρίζειν αιρετώτατον εκάστω {και διά τοΰτο του ζην
ττάσιν έμφυτος η ορεξις, το γαρ ζην 8ει τιθεναι^^
^ Sp. : of'Toj. 2 lac. : αύτφ οϋτί μηθίν δΐσιτότον.
' Sp. : δ€Ϊ. * των add. Sp.
* τψδ( Rieckher, τούτφ Sus. • ό add. Aid.
' Rac. : ί;-ητοΰσί. * Syl. : ττοιήσαντα^.
• Syl. : τ€ μάλιστα. ι» (bis) Sol. : τό αυτό (τό αύτοΰ Βζ.).
^^ Βζ. : δίατιθέναί.
436
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 1-6 >«^^
him and society, for he is sufficient society for him-
2 self. This is most manifest in the case of God ;
for it is clear that as he needs nothing more he will
not need a friend, and that supposing he has no \ y
need of one he will not have one. Consequently ''*y
the happiest human being also will very little need
a friend, except in so far as to be self-sufficing is ι
3 impossible. Of necessity, therefore, he who lives 1
the best life will have fewest friends, and they will \
constantly become fewer, and he will not be eager
to have friends but will think lightly not only of
useful friends but also of those desirable for society.
But assuredly even his case would seem to show that
a friend is not for the sake of utility or benefit but
that one loved on account of goodness is the only > ^^
4 real friend. For when we are not in need of some- '/"^-^
thing, then we all seek people to share our enjoy-
ments, and beneficiaries rather than benefactors ;
and we can judge them better when we are selft
sufficing than when in need, and we most need
friends who are worthy of our society.
5 But about this question we must consider whether
perhaps, although the view stated is partly sound,
in part the truth escapes us because of the compari-
son." The matter is clear if we ascertain what life
6 in the active sense and as an End is. It is manifest Psychology
that life is perception and knowledge, and that con- ufe"'"*^
sequently social life is perception and knowledge
in common. But perception and knowledge them-
selves are the thing most desirable for each indi-
vidually (and it is owing to this that the appetition
for life is implanted by nature in all, for living must
« i.e. of man with God, 1. 8 above ; cf. 1245 b 13.
437
ARISTOTLE
1244 b ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
γνώσιν τίνα), el ovv ης άττοτ€.μοι και ποιησ€ΐ€ ^
30 το γι,νώσκ^ιν αυτό καθ^ αυτό και τό^ μιη (άλλα
τοντο μ€ν λάνθανα ώσττ^ρ iv τω Χόγω γβγραπται,
τω μβντοι ττράγματι βστί μη λανθάνειν), ονθβν
αν Βιαφβροι η το γινώσκαν άλλον ανθ αύτοΰ• το
δ' ομοίον τω^ ζην άνθ^ αΰτου άλλον, ευλόγα»? δέ
το iavTov αίσθάνεσθαι καΐ^ γνώριζαν αίρ^τώτ^ρον .
35 δεΓ γαρ άμα avvdelvaL δυο iv τω λόγω, ότι τ€ το
ζην αίρ€τόν* καΐ οτι το αγαθόν, και βκ τούτων
1245 a ΟΤΙ το αύτοΐς^ νττάρχαν την τοιαύτην φύσιν. et 8
ουν ioTLV ael της τοιαύτης συστοιχίας η €Τ€ρα
iv τη τον αΙρ€τοΰ τάζει, καΐ το γνωστόν και το
αίσθητόν^ iστLV ώς όλως είτταν τω' κοινωνείν της
ώρισμίνης φύσεως,^ ώστε το αύτοΰ βουλεσθαι
5 αΙσθάν€σθαι το αύτον etvai tolovSl βονλεσθαι
iστίv, eTTet ουν ου κατ αυτούς iσμ€v εκαστον
τούτων άλλα κατά μβτάληφιν των δυνάμεων iv
τω αίσθάνεσθαι η γνώριζαν {αίσθανόμενος γάρ
αισθητός ytVeTat τούτω και* ταύτη και κατά
τοΰτο καθ^ ο^" πρότερον αισθάνεται και fj και ου,
γνωστός δε γινώσκων) — ώστε δια τοΰτο και ζην
10 άει βούλεται οτι βούλεται άει γνωρίζειν, τοΰτο δε
ΟΤΙ αυτό? είναι το γνωστόν, το 8η συζην αιρεΐσθαι 9
δάνειε μέν αν είναι σκοττουμένοις πως εϋηθες —
^ τό add. Wilson. ^ Sol. : τοΰ.
* καΐ <ίαντόν> Sp. * Fr. : καΐ aiperbv.
* Brandis : τό αύτ6 roh. * corr. Ρ*» : aifxrov.
' Fr. : τό. * hie laciinam Sus.
• τούτφ καΐ add. Rac. ^° Fr. : καθά.
" τοιαύτην = dyaO^v.
* e.g. the Pythagorean pair of series. One, Good, etc.
opposed to Many, Bad, etc. (Solomon). ' The Determined '
438
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 7-9
7 be deemed a mode of knowing). If therefore one
were to abstract and posit absolute knowledge and
its negation (though this, it is true, is obscure in the
argument as we have written it, but it may be
observed in experience), there would be no diiFerence
between absolute knowledge and another person's
knowing instead of oneself ; but that is like another
person's living instead of oneself, whereas perceiving
and knowing oneself is reasonably more desirable.
For two things must be taken into consideration
together, that life is desirable and that good is de-
sirable, and as a consequence that it is desirable for
8 ourselves to possess a nature of that quality .<* If,
therefore, of the pair of corresponding series '' of this
kind one is always in the class of the desirable, and
the known and the perceived are generally speaking
constituted by their participation in the ' determined '
nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish
oneself to be of a certain character, — since, then, we
are not each of these things in ourselves but only by
participating in these faculties in the process of per-
ceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one becomes
perceived by means of what one previously per-
ceives," in the manner and in the respect in which one
perceives it, and when knowing one becomes known)
— hence owing to this one wishes always to live
because one wishes always to know ; and this is
because one wishes to be oneself the object known.
9 To choose to live in the society of others might. Reasons for
therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish of^sodetyT"
(opposed to ' the Indeterminate ') belonged to the ' desirable '
series.
" i.e. perception of sonaething outside oneself causes con-
sciousness of self.
439
ARISTOTLE
1245 a
(eTTt των κοινών^ πρώτον καΐ τοις άλλοις ζωοις,
οίον του avveadUiv r) τοϋ^ συμπίν^ιν τι γαρ δια-
φ€ρ€ί το πλησίον ουσι ταΰτα συμ,βαίν€ίν η χωρίς
15 αν άφ€λΎ)ς τον λόγον ; άλλα μην^ καΐ τον λογον
κοινων€Ϊν του τυχόντος βτβρον τοιούτον, άμα τ
οϋτ€ διδάσκειν οϋτ€ μανθάνειν τοις αύταρκίσι
φίλοίς οΙόν τ€, μανθάνων μ^ν yap αύτος ουκ εχ€ΐ
ως Set, διδάσκοντα? δ' ό* φίλος, η δ όμοιοτης
φιλία) — άλλα μην φαίνεται ye οτι^ και πάντες Κ
20 rjbiov των aya^tui' μετά των φίλων κοινωνοΰμεν,
καθ^ όσον επιβάλλει εκάστω^ και ου δύναται
άριστου, άλλα τούτων τω μεν η8ονης σωματικής Ι.
τω δε θεωρίας μουσικής τω δε φιλοσοφίας' και
το άμα 8η^ e^vat τω φίλω (διο φησι ' μόχθος οΐ
τηλοΰ φίλοι '), ώστ^^ ου Βεΐ yei'ea^at άττ' άλλτ^λων'
25 τούτου γινομένου, όθεν και ό έρως δο/cet φίλια
ομοιον etvai• του yap συζην ορέγεται 6 ερών, άλλ'
ούχ ^ /ζάλιστα Βεΐ, άλλα κατ' αϊσθησιν.
Ό μεν τοίνυν λόγος εκεΐνά φησι ^ιαπορών, το 1!
δ έργον οΰτω φαίνεται γινόμενον , ώστε δηλοΓ οτι
παρακρούεται πως ημάς ό ^ιαπορών. σκεπτεον Γ,
οΰν" εντεύθεν^'' τάληθες• 6 γάρ φίλος βούλεται eiv-at,
30 ώσπερ η παροιμία φησίν, ' άΧλος 'Υϊρακλης,' άλλος
^ Βζ. : κοινωνών, ^ Βζ. : οίον τό . . . ^ τό.
' Bk. : μη. * Βζ. : οι).
* δτι add. (et καΐ om.) Fr. ' Ross: ϊκαστον.
' Rac. {καΐ το άμα δ€Ϊ Camerarius) : καΐ τολμφ δη (δίΐ Γ).
* Fr. : ws. • οϋν add. Fr.
ϊ" Sp. : ?νθ(ν.
" This proverb looks like a quotation, being half a line of
verse
* See 1244 b 2 ff., 1245 a 27. " lb. 22 if.
440
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 9-13
(first in the case of the things common to the other
animals also, for instance eating together or drinking
together, for what difference does it make whether
these things take place when we are near together
or apart, if you take away speech ? but even to
share in speech that is merely casual is a thing
indifferent, and also neither to impart nor to receive
information is possible for friends who are self-
sufficing, since receiving information implies a de-
ficiency in oneself and imparting it a deficiency in
10 one's friend, and likeness is friendship) — but never-
theless it surely seems that we all find it pleas-
anter to share good things with our friends, as far
as these fall to each, and the best that each can —
11 but among these, it falls to one to share bodily
pleasure, to another artistic study, to another
philosophy — ; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's
friend (whence the saying ' Distant friends a burden
are ' "), so that they must not be separated when
this is taking place. Hence also love seems to
resemble friendship, for the lover is eager to share
the life of the loved one, although not in the most
proper way but in a sensuous manner.
12 Therefore the argument in raising the question The Alter
asserts the former position,*" but the facts of experi- ^^*''
ence are obviously on the latter lines," so that it is
clear that the raiser of the question in a way mis-
13 leads us. We must therefore examine the truth o>^ **
from the following consideration : ' friend ' reallj' ^
denotes, in the language of the proverb ,** ' anothei
Hercules ' — another self ; but the characteristics are^
<* Quoted elsewfiere in the same connexion, but one may
conjecture that the phrase originally meant ' as strong as
Hercjiles.'
441
ARISTOTLE
1245 a
αύτος• διεσττασται 8e, /cat χαλίττον ττάντα^ €0'
€νος yeveadat, άλλα κατά μ€ν την φνσιν δ σνγ-
γβνβστατον, κατά 8e το σώμα όμοιος €Τ€ρος, άλλο?
e κατά την ψνχην, και τούτων κατά μοριον €Τ€ρος
€Τ€ρον. αλλ ovdev ye" 'ήττον βονλβταυ ωσττερ
35 αντος διαιρετό? eit'at ό φίλος, το ουν του φίλου 1^
αίσθάν^σθαί {και το του φίλου γνωρίζ^ιν^^ το
αυτοϋ ττως ανάγκη αίσθάνεσθαι elvaL και το αυτόν
ττως γνώριζαν. ώστ€ και τα φορτικά μέν συνηΒβσ-
θαι και συζην τω φίλω ηδύ βύλόγως {συμβαίνβι γάρ
€Κ€ίνου άμα α'ίσθησις aei), μάλλον δε τάς θβιοτερας
1245 b ηοονάς• αίτιον δ' οτι aei rjhiov ίαυτον θβωρ^ΐν iv
τω βζλτίονι άγαθω, τοΰτο δ' ioTiv ότβ μ€ν πάθος,
οτ€ δε πράζις, 6τ€ δε €Τ€ρόν τι. ει δ' αυτόν* ευ ^ryv»
και οϋτω και τόν φίλον, εν δε τώ* συζην συν€ργ€Ϊν,
ή κοινωνία των iv τε'λει μάλιστα γ€. διό δει*
5 συνθβωρεΐν και συν€υωχ€Ϊσθαι, ου τά δια τροφην
και τα avayKaia (αι τοιαυται yap κοιι^ωνιαι ού;\;'
όμιλίαι δοκοΰσιν είναι αλλ' άττολαυσει?), αλλ'
έκαστο? ου δύναται τυγχάν€ΐν τ€λους, iv τούτω 15
βούλίται συζην, ει δε ρ,τ^, και ττοιειν ευ και 7Γ(χσ;^ειν
υτΓΟ των φίλων αίροΰνται μάλιστα, οτι μβν τοίνυν
10 και δει συζην, και οτι μάλιστα βούλονται ττάντζς,
και οτι ο εύδαιρ,ονε'στατο? και άριστος μάλιστα
τοιούτος, φαν€ρόν. οτι δε κατά τόν λόγον ουκ
€φαιν€το, και τοΰτ' ευλόγως συνεβαινβ, λέγοντος
ϊ Rac: τά. 2 Syl. : re. » Rac.
* V.l. ΐΐ δυνατό» (el δ' αυτόν δυνατόν ed ξ'ην οϋτω και τόν φίλον
Sus.).
» ei δέ τό Fr. β Set add. Fr.
' yap κοινωνίαι ούχ add. Rac. (ομιλΙαι yap οΰχ Sus.).
" C/. 1244 b 2 fF., 1245 a 27.
44.2
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 13-15
scattered, and it is difficult for all to be realized in
the case of one person ; though by nature a friend
is what is most akin, yet one resembles his friend ^
in body and another in spirit, and one in one part
of the body or spirit, another in another. But still
none the less a friend really means as it were a
14 separate self. To perceive and to know a friend,
therefore, is necessarily in a manner to perceive
and in a manner to know oneself. Consequently
to share even vulgar pleasures and ordinary life
with a friend is naturally pleasant (for it always
involves our simultaneously perceiving the friend),
but more so to share the more divine pleasures ;
the reason of which is that it is always more pleas-
ant to behold oneself enjoying the superior good,
and this is sometimes a passive, sometimes an active
experience, sometimes something else. But if it is
pleasant to live well oneself and for one's friend
also to live well, and if living together involves
working together, surely their partnership will be pre-
eminently in things included in the End. Hence we
should study together, and feast together — not on
the pleasures of food and the necessary pleasures
(for such partnerships do not seem to be real social
15 intercourse but mere enjoyment), but each really
wishes to share with his friends the End that he
is capable of attaining, or failing this, men choose
most of all to benefit their friends and to be bene-
fited by them. It is therefore manifest that to live
together is actually a duty, and that all people wish
it very much, and that this is most the case with
the man that is the happiest and best. But that the
contrary appeared to be the conclusion of the argu-
ment " was also reasonable, the statement being
443
ARISTOTLE
1245 b
άληθη. κατά rrjv σύνθβσιν γαρ της παραβολής
αληθούς ούσης η λύσις Ιστίν οτι yap 6 ^eo? ου
15 Ύοίοϋτος οίος δεΓσ^αι φίλου, /cat τον ομοιον a^Lol}
καίτοι κατά τούτον τον λόγον ουδεν^ vorjaei, ο 1
σπουδαίος' ου γάρ ούτως 6 θζός ed €χ€ί, αλλά
βζλτιον η ωστ€ άλλο τι voelv τταρ' αυτό? αυτόν,
αίτιον δ' ΟΤΙ ημΐν μεν το eu καθ^ έτερον, εκείνω^
δε αυτό? αύτοΰ το ευ εστίν.
20 Και το ζητεΐν ημΐν καΐ εϋχεσθαι πολλούς φίλους, 1
άμα δε λέγειν ώς ούθεις φίλος ω πολλοί φίλοι,
άμφω λέγεται ορθώς, εν^εχόμενον* γάρ πολλοίς
συζην άμα και συρ-αισ^άνεσ^αι, ώς πλείστοις^
αίρετώτατον επει δε χαλεπώτατον, εν ελάττοσιν
ανάγκη την ενεργειαν της συναισθησεως ειν-αι, ώστ' 1
25 ού μόνον χαλεπον το πολλούς κτησασθαι {πείρας
γάρ δει*), άλλα και ουσι χρήσασθαι.
Και ότε μεν άπείναι ευ πράττοντα τον φιλούμενον
βουλόμεθα, 6τέ δε μετεχειν τών αυτών, και το
άμα βούλεσθαι είναι φιλικόν εν^εγόμενον*' μεν γάρ
α/Μα και εύ, τούτο πάντες αίροΰνται' μη εν^εχό-
S0 μενον* δε άμα,'' ώσπερ τον ' Ηρακλή^ ίσως αν ή
μητηρ εΐλετο θεόν είναι μάλλον η μετ αύτης οντά
τω Έιύρυσθεΐ θητεύειν. ομοίως γάρ αν εΐποιεν και 1
ο* 6 Αάκων εσκωφεν, επεί τις εκελευσεν αυτόν
χειμαζόμενον επικαλεσασθαι τους Αιοσκούρους.
' Βζ. : άξιον. * Rac. : ονδ(. ^ iKeiuos ? Rac.
* Rac. : (νδεχομένου. * Sp. : νλ^ίστονί.
* Syl. : aet. ' lae. : άλλα.
* Γ: τφ Ήρακλΐϊ. • lac. : tu,
" i.e. of man with God, 1241• b 7.
* He doubtless said that being in trouble himself he did
not wish to involve the Dioscuri in it (Solomon).
444
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xn. 15-19
true. For the solution is on the Hne of the com-
parison," the correspondence being true ; for the .
fact that God is not of such a nature as to need'i/
a friend postulates that man, who is like God, also
16 does not need one. Yet according to this argument
the virtuous man will not think of anything ; for
God's perfection does not permit of this, but he is
too perfect to think of anything else beside himself.
And the reason is that for us well-being has reference
to something other than ourselves, but in his case
he is himself his own well-being.
17 As to seeking for ourselves and praying for many Practical
friends, and at the same time saying that one who has '"^'^^^lons.
many friends has no friend, both statements are correct.
For if it is possible to live with and share the per-
ceptions of many at once, it is most desirable for them
to be the largest possible number ; but as that is
very difficult, active community of perception must
18 of necessity be in a smaller circle, so that it is not
only difficult to acquire many friends (for probation
is needed), but also to use them when one has got
them.
One for whom we feel affection we sometimes Presence
wish to prosper in absence from us, but sometimes of Γη^ιΐάΓί^η
to share the same experiences. And to wish to be prosperity
together is a mark of friendship, for if it is possible adversity.
to be together and to prosper all choose this ; but
if it is not possible to prosper together, then we
choose as the mother of Heracles perhaps would
have chosen for her son, to be a god rather than to
19 be with her but in service to Eurystheus. For men
Avould say things like the jest which the Spartan
made when somebody told him to invoke the Dioscuri
in a storm.''
44,5
ARISTOTLE
1245 b
Αοκ€Ϊ he τοΰ μ€ν φιλοΰντος το αττΕίργαν elvai τ'ής
35 σνμμ€θέζ€ως των χαλξπών, τον he φίλονμ€νον το
βovλeσθaι συμμeτ€χet.v. καΐ ταύτα άμφότ€ρα συμ-
βaLveι ευλογώ?" hei γαρ τω φίλω μηθ€ν elvat οντω
λνπηρόν ώς rjhv τον φίλον, hoKel he helv αίρβΐσθαί
μη το αύτοΰ. διό κωλνουσί συμμeτeχeLV• lkcwol 2
γαρ avTOL KaKonadouvTeg, ίνα μη φαίνωνται το
ί2Μ&αύτών OKOTTovvTes καί αιρεΓσ^αι το xaipetv λυττον-
μ4νου τοΰ φίλου, ctl he^ κovφότepoι eii^at μη μόνοι
φ€ροντ€ς τα κακά. eirel δ' alpeTov τό τ' ev καΐ το 2
άμα, hrjXov οτι και το άμα elvai μ€τ' ίΧάττονος
αγαθού αΙρ£τώτ€ρόν^ πως η χωρίς μ€τά μζίζονϋς.
ί> eTTei he^ άhηλov το πόσον δύναται τό άμα, ηhη
hιaφepovτaι, καΐ οι μ€ν* οΐονται^ τό μeτ€χeιv άμα
πάντων φιλικόν, /cat* ώσττβρ CΓυvh€ιπveΐv άμα φασιν
'qhiov^ ταύτα €χοντας• οι δ' άμα^ μ^ν του €u* βοΰ-
λονται, eπeιhη «Γ" τις ύπ€ρβολάς ποιησ€ΐ, ομολόγους
€ΐναι" άμα κακώς πράττοντας σφόhpa τ)*^ ev
10 σφόhpa χωρίς, παραπλήσιον he τοντω και περί τάς 2
ατυχία?• ότ€ μ€ν γαρ βovλόμeθa τονς φιλονς άπ-
etvat/^ ovhe λυπeΐv όταν μηθ€ν μάλΧωσι ποιησ€ΐν
πλέον, ότ6 he αυτούς^* jjhiaTov πapeΐvaι. τό he^^
της vπevavτLωσeως ταύτης και μάΧ' eΰλoγov. δια
γαρ τα πpoeιpημeva τοΰτο συ/χ^αινει, και οτι μ€ν
15 το λυπoύμevov η ev φαύλη οντά e^ei τόν φίλον
^ U (et lacunam ante in) Bk. : δί τό.
* Sp. : aiperbu. ' Sp. : έπΐώτη.
* oi μβν add. Sus. ^ Cas. : ohv καΐ.
* και om. Γ. ' ■ήδιον <7j Ιδία> Fr.
* Sp. : &v. * lac: μέντοι ov.
^^ lac. : iird δ^ y^. ^^ lac. : 6μο\(τ^ονσιν,
1* ή] καΐ ? Rac. 13 Cas. : elvai.
1* Syl. : τούϊ. " rb δ' <αΐτιον> Fr.
44()
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 19-22
It seems to be characteristic of one who feels
affection for another to debar him from sharing
his troubles, and of the person for whom affection
is felt to wish to share them. Both these things
happen reasonably ; for to a friend nothing ought
to give so much pain as his friend gives pleasure, yet
it is felt that he ought not to choose his own interest.
20 Hence people hinder their friends from sharing
their sorrows ; they are content to be in trouble by
themselves, in order that they may not appear from
selfish considerations actually to choose the joy of
their friend's grief and furthermore to find it a
21 relief not to bear their misfortunes alone. And as
both well-being and companionship are desirable, it
is clear that companionship combined with even a
lesser good is in a way more desirable than separation
with a greater good. But as it is not clear how much
value companionship has, at this point men differ,
and some think it is friendly to share everything in
company, and say, for instance, that it is pleasanter
to dine with company though having the same food ;
others wish to share only in well-being, because, they
say, if one supposes extreme cases, people experi-
encing great adversity in company or great pro-
22 sperity separately are on a par. And it is much the
same as this in regard to misfortunes also ; sometimes
we wish our friends to be absent, and do not want
to give them pain when their presence is not going
to do any good, but at other times for them to be
present is most pleasant. And the reason of this
contrariety is very easily explained ; it comes about
because of the things stated before," and because to
behold a friend in pain or in a bad state is a thing
" Cf. 1245 b 26—1246 a 2.
447
ARISTOTLE
1246 a
dewpelv φ^υγομ^ν απλώς, ωσττερ καΐ ημάς αντονς,
το δ οραν τον φίλον η^ν ωσπβρ άλλο τι των ηΒίστων,
δια την ζίρημβνην αΐτίαν, καΐ μην^ κάμνοντα el
αντος• ωστ6 οττότ^ρον αν τούτων η μάλλον rjSv, 2ί
20 ποΐ€Ϊ την ροπην του βούλ^σθαι παρ€Ϊναι η μη. καΐ
τοΰτο^ €7Γΐ των χ€ίρόνων συμβαίνα^ και δια την
αύτην αιτιαν γίν^σθαΐ' μάλιστα γαρ φιλοτιμούνται
τους φίλους μη ττράττειν eu μη8' άττ€Ϊναι* άν^
ανάγκη -η^ αύτοΐς κακώς, διό eViore τους Ιρω-
μ^νους συναποκτιννύασιν μάλλον γαρ του οικείου
25 aia^arcCT^ai κακοϋ, ώσπβρ αν, el και μβμνημενος
ΟΤΙ 7Τοτ€ €ύ €7τραττ€, μα?^ον η €ΐ ω€το άει κακώς
πράττ€ΐν.
^ Sol. : μη. 2 γ,. . ^^^^_
' Camot : συμβαίνειν. * Rac. : elvai.
^ ac add. Fr. « ^ add. Fr.
448
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 22-23
we absolutely shun, as we shun it in our own case,
but to see a friend is as pleasant as anything can
be, for the reason stated," and indeed to see him ill
23 if one is ill oneself ; so that whichever of these is
more pleasant, it sways the balance of wishing him
to be present or not. And it fits in that the
former occurs in the case of inferior people, and for the
same reason ; they are most eager for their friends
not to prosper and not to be absent if they them-
selves have to suffer adversity. Hence sometimes
suicides kill those whom they love with themselves,
as they think that they feel their own misfortune
more if their loved ones are to survive ^ ; just as,
if a man in trouble had the memory that he had once
been prosperous, he would be more conscious of his
trouble than if he thought that he had always done
badly.
" Cf. 1245 a 26-b 9.
^ In the Greek this clause is left to be understood.
2g 4.49
Θ
1240 *τ»» / ί>» '»' '' 1 ' 1
1. Απορησ€ί€ ο αν τις et cgtlv €καστω χρησα- 1
σθαι και e<j^' ο^ 7Τ€φνκ€ καΐ άλλως, καΐ τοΰτο fj
αυτό Tj αυ^ κατά συμβ^βηκός• οΐον rj* οφθαλμός,
30 IBelv rj καΐ αλλω? Trapihelv Βίαστρ4φαντα ware δυο
το ev φανηναί, αύται μ€ν Srj χρ€Ϊαί^ άμφω οτι μβν
οφθαλμός €στιν,* ην δ' όφθαλμώ αλλτ^' δε, κατά
σνμβββηκός, οϊον el rjv άπο^όσθαι η φαγ€Ϊν. ομοίως 2
δ€* καΐ €τηστ'ημΎ^• και yap άλτ^^ώ? και άμαρτείν,
οίον όταν €κών μη ορθώς γράφη, ώς αγνοία Srj νυν
35 χρησθαι, ώσπερ μεταστρίφασαι^" την χ€Ϊρα και
τον τΓοδα^^ τω ττοδι ττοτβ ώς χ^ιρι και ταντη ώς
ττοδι χρώνται αΐ^' όρχηστρί^ες. el δη πασαι αϊ 3
άρ€ται" ίττιστημαι, e'ίη άν^* και τη δικαιοσύνη ώς
αδικία χρησθαΐ' άδικτ^σει^^ αρα από δικαιοσυι^τ^?
τα άδικα πράττων, ώσπep και τα άγνοητικα από
\2Aeb eπιστημης• el Be τοντ αδύνατον, φαν€ρ6ν οτι ουκ
^ Ρΐ": έκάστψ φί\φ Μ^. ^ Sp. : <^ ant &.
' lac. : τοΰτο fj aiVo ηδύ. * lac. : rj.
^ Xpelai add. Sp. * έστιι^ lac. : δτι.
' lac. : Λλλτ;. * Sp. : δη.
* Sp. : επιστήμη. ^^ lac. : μΐταστρέψα^,
^^ rbv πόδα add. lac. ^^ αί add. Sp.
^' Sp. : 6.ρι.σταί. ^* ef?; Blv Sp. : eljrai'.
" Sp. : d δίκηί d.
' In M*' the remainder of the work forms part of the pre-
450
BOOK VIII «
1 I. But one may raise the question whether it is c. i. Good-
possible to use any given thing both for its natural Know-
purpose and otherwise, and in the latter case to use ^^^^™;^ ^^'®
it qua itself or on the contrary incidentally : for are not
instance, with an eye qua eye, to see, or also just ^nowiedge,^
to see wrong, by squinting so that one object appears which is
tΛVO — both these uses of the eye, then, use it because ^suae? °
it is an eye, but it would be possible to make use of
an eye but to use it in another way, incidentally,
for example, if it were possible to sell it or to eat it.
2 And similarly with the use of knowledge : one can
use it truly, and one can use it wrongly — for instance,
when one spells a word incorrectly on purpose, then
at the time one is using knowledge as ignorance, just
as dancing-girls sometimes interchange the hand and
3 the foot and use foot as hand and hand as foot.** If
then all the virtues are forms of knowledge, it
would be possible to use even justice as injustice —
in that case a man will be behaving unjustly by
doing unjust acts as a result of justice, as when one
makes ignorant mistakes from knowledge ; but if
this is impossible, it is clear that the virtues cannot
ceding Book, and some editors print it as cc. xiii.-xv. of
Book VII. The text has been fully treated by Jackson,
/. Phil. xxii. 170.
* i.e. stand on their hands and wave their feet in the air,
see Diet. Ant.^ " Saltatio."
451
ARISTOTLE
αν €L€V €7Τίστημαι αι aperat. ουο ei /χή εστίν
άγνο€Ϊν άπο €πίστήμης αλλ' αμαρτάν^ιν μόνον καΙ
τά αυτά /cat άττό ayvota? ttolcZv, οϋη άττό
Βικαιοσύνης ye ώ? από αδικία? 7τράζ€ί. αλλ' εττεΓ
5 φρόνησις €7τιστήμη και άληθ€ς τι, το αυτό ποιήσει
κάκ^ίνη• ivSexoLTO γαρ αν άφρόνως άπο φρον'ησ€ως
και άμαρτάνειν ταΰτά απερ ό άφρων el δε άπλ•^
•!^ν* 1^ έκαστου χρ^ία fj €καστον, καν φρονίμως
€πραττον ούτω πράττοντας. επι μ€ν οΰν ταΐς 4
αλλαι? Ιπιστ-ημαις άλλη κυρία ποι,ΐΐ την στροφην
10 αύτης δε τ-ί^? πασών κυρίας τις ; ου γαρ έτι επι-
στημη γε η νους. άλλα μην ούδ' άρεττ)• χρηται
γαρ αύτη,^ η γαρ του άρχοντος αρετή τη του
αρχομένου χρηται. τις οΰν εστίν; η ώσπερ λε'yεται 5
άκρασία η* κακία του αλόγου της φνχης, και πω?'
ακόλαστο? ό άκραττ^?, αχών νουν, άλλ' ■^δτ^ άν
15 ισχυρά η η επιθυμία, στρέφει και λoy ιεΓται τάναν-
τια; η ξ.στι'^ ^ηλον δτι, καν iv μέν τούτω αρετή εν
δε τω λόγω άνοια η, έτερα' μεταποιούνται; ώστε
εσται δικαιοσυνι^ τ' ου* δικαι'ω? χρησθαι και κακώς
και φρονήσει άφρόνως• ώστε και τάναντία. άτοπον
20 γαρ ει την ρ,έν ε'ν τώ λoytστtκώ άρετην* μοχθηρία
ποτέ έγγενομένη εν^" τώ άλόγω^^ στρέφει και
1 ^7re2 ή ? Rac. ^ 9ji> add. Rac. {'ή" pro ή Bus.)
* αύτη aiirfj ? Rac. * ή add. Rac.
* lac. : irws. * lac. : ^ σ^ί.
' lac. : irepai. * r' ού lac. : τό.
* Γ : TTJs , . . dper^. '■ Sp. : /u.ii'.
^^ Sus. : \6y<f).
452
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. i. 3-5
be branches of knowledge. And also if it is not pos-
sible from knowledge to be ignorant, but only to
make mistakes and do the same things as one does
from ignorance, a man will assuredly never act from
justice in the same way as he will act from injustice.
But since wisdom is knowledge and a form of truth,
wisdom also will produce the same effect as know-
ledge, that is, it would be possible from wisdom to
act unwisely and to make the same mistakes as
the unwise man does ; but if the use of anything
qua itself were single," when so acting men would
4 be acting wisely. In the case of the other forms of
knowledge, therefore, another higher form causes
their diversion ; but what knowledge causes the diver-
sion of the actually highest of all ? Obviously there
is no longer any knowledge or any mind to do it.
But moreover goodness does not cause it either ; for
wisdom makes use of goodness, since the goodness
5 of the ruling part uses that of the ruled. Who then
is there in whom this occurs ? or is it in the same
way as the vice of the irrational part of the spirit
is termed lack of control, and the uncontrolled man
is in a manner profligate — possessing reason, but
ultimately if his appetite is powerful it will turn him
round, and he will draw the opposite inference ?
Or is it manifest that also if there is goodness in the
irrational part but folly in the reason, goodness and
folly are transformed in another way ? so that it
will be possible to use justice unjustly and badly,
and wisdom unwisely ; and therefore the op-
posite uses also will be possible. For it is strange
if whereas when wickedness at any time arises in
the irrational part it will pervert the goodness in
" As in § 1 above it was shown not to be.
453
ARISTOTLE
1246 b ^
■ποί-ησβι αγνοεΐν, η δ άρετη rf ev τω αλόγω
ev τω λογιστικά)^ άνουας ζνονσης ον στρ€φ€ΐ ταυττ^ι^
καΐ ποίησβι φρονίμως κρίν€ΐν και τα δεον'τα/ καΙ
πάλιν η φρόνησις η Ιν τω Χογισηκω την ev τω
αλόγω άκολασίαν'^ σωφρόνως πράττ€ΐν, οττερ δο/cet
25 etvai^ η εγκράτεια, ωστ έ'σται και' άττό άνοια?'
φρονίμως. Ιστι δε* ταύτα άτοττα, άλλως τ€ και 6
άττο άνοιας^ χρησθαι φρονήσει φρονίμως• τοΰτο
γαρ €πΙ των άλλων ουδαμώς 6ρωμ€ν• ωσττΐ,ρ την
ιατρικτην η γραμματικην στρζφβι ακολασία, αλλ
ού^° την άγνοιαν, iav -η εναντία δια το μη eveivai
30 -την ύπ€ροχην, αλλά την άρετην δλως μάλλον etrat
ττρος την κακίαν οϋτως εχονσαν και γαρ α}^ ό
άδικος πάντα 6 δίκαιος δύναται, και δλως eveoTii'
iv τη 8υνάμ€ΐ η άΒυναμία. ωστ€ 8ηλον δτι άμα φρό- 7
νιμοι και αγαθοί, eKeivai^^ δ' άλλου (.ζεις, και όρθον^^
το Ίίωκρατικον^* δτι ovSev ίσχυρότερον φρονησεως .
35 αλλ ΟΤΙ βπιστημην εφη, ουκ όρθώς^^' άρ€τη γάρ
€στι, και ουκ επιστήμη άλλα γένος άλλο γνώσεως }^
II. Επει δ ου μόνον η φρόνησις ποιεί την ι
εύπραγίαν κατ άρετην,^'' άλλα φαμεν και τους εύ-
1247 a TU^et? εΰ πράττειν ώς και της ευτυχίας εμποιούσης^^
εύπραγίαν κατά^^ τα αυτά. τη επιστήμη, ^° σκεπτεον
^ η add. Rac. * ^u τψ λο-γιστικφ add. Sus.
^ δέονται <7Γράττείΐ'> vel ^ττοιεΊρ"^ ? Rac.
* Γ : κόλασιν Άν. ' είναι add. Rac.
* και Γ : και ή. ' (liis) lac. : ayvolas.
* (στι δέ Sp. : έττί re. * φρονήσει add. Sp.
^' ου Rac. : ονν ό {ονν ον lac).
^^ & add. lac. (post πάντα Γ).
^^ lac. : καΐ ayadai έκεΐναι αι.
^' Rac. : όρθωί. ^* Bek. : το σώμα κραττητικίιν.
^* Rac. : ορθόν. 1* Sp. : yvwa . . .
^' lac. : και άρετήν (καΙ αρετή Sp.).
454
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, viii. i. 5— ii. 1
the rational and cause it to be ignorant, yet good-
ness in the irrational part when there is folly in
the rational should not convert the folly and make
it form wise and proper judgements, and again
wisdom in the rational part should not make profli-
gacy in the irrational act temperately — which seems
to be what self-control essentially is. So that there
6 will actually be wise action arising from folly. But
these consequences are absurd, especially o'J?^^^.-/
using wisdom wisely as a result of folly ; -j-t^.^t
is a thing which we certainly do not &^^ .^
cases — for instance profligacy perverts one's medical
knowledge or scholarship, but it does not pervert
one's ignorance if it be opposed to it, because it
does not contain superiority, but rather it is good-
ness in general that stands in this relation to bad-
ness ; for example, the just man is capable of all
that the unjust man is, and in general inability yV
7 is contained in ability. So that it is clear that M-*
men are wise and good simultaneously, and that ^^r
the states of character above described belong to \Γ
a different person, and the Socratic dictum ' Nothing \3^\
is mightier than wisdom,' is right. But in that by J^f^
' wisdom ' he meant ' knowledge,' he was wrong ; \
for wisdom is a form of goodness, and is not scien-
tific knowledge but another kind of cognition.
1 II. But wisdom is not the only thing which c. ϋ. Good
acting in accordance with goodness causes welfare, luo™*'^'
but we also speak of the fortunate as faring well, ^^^^^°
which imphes that good fortune also engenders nature/not
welfare in the same way as knowledge does ; we ^y w'sdom
must therefore consider whether one man is fortu- dence.
^* έμΐΓθίθύσ'η3 Fr. : eC ττοιούσ-η^.
" Sp. : καΐ. ^° Sp. : τη? επιστήμης.
^55
ARISTOTLE
1247 a „,,,, ,, , ^ , , , v«w
ap' earl φνσ^ι ό μεν ευτυχής 6 δ άτυχης η ου,
καΐ πώς e^et περί τούτων, οτι μεν yap είσί Tires' 2
ευτυχείς όρώμεν άφρονες γαρ οντες κατορθοϋσι
5 ττοΧλοΙ^ εν οΐς η τύχη κυρία, οι Βέ καΐ εν οΐς τέχνη
εστί, πολλη^ μεντοι καΐ τύχη' ενυπάρχει, οίον εν
στρατηγία καΐ κυβερνητική, πότερον οΰν άπό τίνος 3
e^v^c ουτοί είσιν, η ου τω* αυτοί ποιοι τίνες eirai
γαατικοί είσι των ευτυχημάτων ; νυν μεν γαρ
10 ούτως οϊονται ως φύσει τινών όντων η 8e φύσις
ποιους τίνα? ποιεί, και ευθύς εκ γενετής Βιαφερου-
σιν, ώσπερ οι μεν γλαυκοί οι δε μελανόμματοι
τω τοδι* τοιονδι εχειν, ούτω και οι ευτυχείς και
ατυχείς. οτι μεν γαρ ου φρονήσει κατορθοϋσι 4
SrjXov, ου γαρ άλογος η φρόνησις αλλ' έχει λόγον
15 δια τι ούτω πράττει, οι δ' ουκ αν εχοιεν ειπείν δια
τι κατορθοϋσι, τέχνη γαρ αν ην ετι Βε φανερον οτι* 5
οντες άφρονες, ούχ οτι περί άλλα {τούτο μεν γαρ
ούθεν άτοπον, οίον Ιπποκράτης γεωμετρικός ων,
άλλα περί τά άλλα εΒόκει' βλάζ και άφρων efvai,
κ:αι τΓολύ χρυσίον πλέων* άπώλεσεν ύπο των εν
20 Βυζαντιω πεντη κοστολόγων δι' εύηθειαν, ως λε-
γουσιν) αλλ' οτι και εν οι?* εύτυχοΰσιν άφρονες,
περί γαρ ναυκληρίαν ούχ οι δεινότατοι ευτυχείς, 6
αλλ' {ωσπερ εν κύβων πτώσει ό μεν ούΒεν, άλλος
^ lac. : ΤΓολλά. * Rac. : ττολλοί (πολύ Cas.).
* Rac. : τύχη!. * Γ : oiku.
* Sp. : τό δ(ΐν. « δτί add. Sp.
' Β' : δοκΐΐ. * Sp. : πλέον. * Β' : iV/ois.
456
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. ii. 1-6
nate and another unfortunate by nature or not, and
2 how it stands with these matters. For that some
men are fortunate we see, since many though fool-
ish succeed in things in which luck is paramount,
and some even in things which involve skill although
also containing a large element of luck — for ex-
3 ample strategy and navigation. Are, then, these men
fortunate as a result of a certain state of character,
or are they enabled to achieve fortunate results not
by reason of a certain quality in themselves ? As it
is, people think the latter, holding that some men are
successful by natural causes ; but nature makes men
of a certain quality, and the fortunate and unfortu-
nate are different even from birth, in the same
way as some men are blue-eyed and others black-
eyed because a particular part of them is of a par-
4 ticular quality. For it is clear that they do not
succeed by means of wisdom, because wisdom is
not irrational but can give reason why it acts as it
does, whereas they could not say why they succeed
5 — for that would be science ; and moreover it is
manifest that they succeed in spite of being
unwise — not unwise about other matters (for
that would not be anything strange, for example
Hippocrates " was skilled in geometry but was
thought to be stupid and unwise in other matters,
and it is said that on a voyage owing to foolish-
ness he lost a great deal of money, taken from him
by the collectors of the two-per-cent duty at Byzan-
tium), but even though they are unwise about
6 the matters in which they are fortunate. For in
navigation it is not the cleverest who are fortunate,
but (just as in throwing dice one man throws a
" A Pythagorean philosopher of Chios, /. 460 b.c.
457
ARISTOTLE
1247 a , ^
δ e^^ βάλλ€ΐ) καθά rjv^ φύσα iarlv (ύτυχης. η τώ
φιλβΐσθαί, ώσπΐρ φασίν, νττο Oeov, καΐ εζωθίν τι
25 elvaL το κατορθοϋν , οίον ττλοΐον κακώς vevavm)-
γημ€νον αμβινον πολλάκις διαττλεί/ αλλ' ου δι'
αυτό αλλ' οτι e^et κνβ€ρνήτην aya^ov; αλλ' όντως
ο ευτυχών* τον δαι/χον e^et κυβερνητην.^ αλλ
άτοπον 9e6v η δαίμονα φίλείν τον τοιούτον, άλλα
μ,ή τον βέΧτι,στον καΐ τον φρονιμώτατον . el δη
30 ανάγκη η φύσει τ) νόίρ η επιτροπια tlvl κατορθοϋν,
τα δε δυο μη εστί, φύσει αν elev οι ευτυχείς, άλλα
μην η γε φύσις αίτια η τον άει ώσαυτω? η του ώς
επι το πολύ, η δε τυχτ^ τουναντίον, ει μεν ουν το*
παραλόγως επιτυ'^/χάνειΐ' τύχης Βοκεΐ είναι/ άλλ ,
ε'ίπερ δια τύχην ευτυχής, ουκ αν Βόζειε^ τοιούτον
35 είναι το αίτιον οΐον άει του αύτοΰ η ώς επι το πολύ-
έ'τι ει οτι' τοιοσδι ε7Γΐτυ•)/χάνει η αποτυγχάνει,^"
ωσπερ ότι^^ γλαυκός ουκ οζύ όρα, ου τύχη αίτια
άλλα φύσις' ουκ άρα εστίν ευτυχής άλλ' οΓον ευ-
φυης. ώστε τοΰτ' άν ε'ίη λεκτέον, οτι ους λεγομεν
1247 b ευτυχείς, ου δια τνχην εισίν ουκ άρα είσιν ευτυχείς,
εύτυχεΐς^^ γαρ οσοις^^ αιτία τύχη άγαθη ά•)/α^ών.
1 Ιί add. hie Rac. (post βάλ\€ΐ Β', lac).
* lac. (et post φύσ^ι, <τ ψ ττην φύσιν ixeif (ύτνχη^) : καθ' ijv.
' Syl. : δέ ΊτΧΐϊ. * Syl. : ouros ευτυχή? (ευτυχώ»» edd.).
* post κνβ(ρνητΊ}ν add. άγαέ'όΐ' codd. plur.
* οδί» <οί'τω> τό Bus.
' treat <ό δέ δια τύχην ει)τιιχτ;5> lac, <ό δί δίά τύχην ΐνι-
τνγχάνων εντνχηί^ ? Rac.
* δόξ€ΐ€ add. lac. * ότι add. Fr.
^*• ^ airoTiyxavei add. Siis. ^^ δτι ό codd. plur.
^^ B' : εΰτύχτ)!. ^' lac. : ΰσων.
458
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. π. 6-9
blank and another a six) a man is fortunate accord-
ing as things were arranged by nature." Or is it
because he is loved by God, as the phrase goes, and
because success is something from outside ? as for
instance a badly built ship often gets through a
voyage better, though not owing to itself, but be-
7 cause it has a good man at the helm. But on this ^
showing the fortunate man has the deity as steers- «^
man. But it is strange that a god or deity should Yet nature
1 ii_ J i'* uniform,
love a man of this sort, and not the best and most luck is not.
prudent. If, then, the success of the lucky must
necessarily be due to either nature or intellect or
some guardianship, and of these three causes two
are ruled out, those who are fortunate will be so by
8 nature. But again, nature of course is the cause
of a thing that happens either always or generally
in the same way, whereas fortune is the opposite.
If, then, unexpected achievement seems a matter of
fortune, but, if a man is fortunate owing to fortune,
it would seem that the cause is not of such a sort
as to produce the same result always or generally
9 — further, if a man's succeeding or not succeeding
is due to his being of a certain sort, as a man does
not see clearly because he has blue eyes, not fortune
but nature is the cause ; therefore he is not a man
who has good fortune but one who has as it were
a good nature. Hence we should have to say that
the people we call fortunate are so not by reason
of fortune ; therefore they are not fortunate, for the
fortunate are those for whom good fortune is a cause
of good things.
" Or, with Jackson's emendations, ' another a six according
as nature determines, so here a man is lucky because his
nature is such.'
459
ARISTOTLE
1247 b , , „
Et δ' οϋτω, TTorepov ούκ^ εσται τνχ•η όλως, η
εσται /tev, αλλ ουκ αΐτία^ ; αλλ' ανάγκη και etvat
καΐ αίτίαν elvai. ear at άρα καΐ αγαθών' τισίν Κ
5 αίτια r) κακών et δ' δλως i^aipereov, καΐ^
ovBev* από τνχης φατέον γίν€σθαι, αλλ' ly/xets•
άλλης οϋσης αιτίας δια το μη όράν τνχην etvai
φαμεν αιτιαν διό και οριζόμενοι την τύχην τιθβασιν
αιτιαν αλογοί'* άνθρωπίνω λογισμω, ώς ούσης τινό?
φύσεως, τοΰτο μεν ονν άλλο πρόβλημα αν εϊη'
10 επει δε* ορώμεν τινας άπαζ εύτνχησαντες , δια τι
ου και πάλιν αν δια το αυτό κατορθώσαιεν ,^ και
πάλιν, και πάλιν^ ; του γαρ αύτοϋ το αυτό' αίτιον.
ουκ άρα εσται τύχης τοΰτο^°• αλλ' oVar τό αυτό 1]
αποβαίνη άττ'" απείρων και αορίστων, εσται μεν
τω^^ αγαθόν η κακόν, επιστήμη δ' ουκ εσται αύτοϋ
η δι εμπειρίαν ^^ επεί εμάνθανον άν τινε? ευτυχείς,^*
15 η και ττασαι άν αί βττιστη/χαι, ώσπερ εφη Έωκράτης,
εύτυχιαι ήσαν. τί οΰν κωλύει συμβηναί τινι εφ- U
εζης τα τοιαύτα πολλάκις ούχ οτι τοιοσδί/' αλλ'
ΟΙΟΙ' αν εΐη^^ το κύβους άει μακαρίαν^^ βάίλλειν;
τι δε Βη; άρ' ουκ ένεισιι^ όρμαι εν τη φυχη αί μεν
απο λογισμού αί δ' άπο όρεζεως αλόγου; και
20 προτεραι αύται; ει γάρ εστί φύσει η δι' επιθυμίαν
^ ούκ Sp. : ή. * Sp. : άλλ' ούκέτι.
' [καΙ] Sp. * μ-ηζ^ν Sus.
* lac. : avoKoyou. • Β' : έιτβιδί}.
' lac. : δια τό άττοκατορθωσαι (propter idem dirigere unuvi
' καΐ ττάλιν και πάλιν Μ": και ιτάλιν Ρ*•.
* Β': τό yap αυτό τοντ'. ^^ Β': ού τό.
'^ Β': άττ' cm. codd. ** lac. : τό.
'^ Β': aireip'iav. ^* ίΐ/τυχί?»' Sp.
'* lac. : roij Set. ι* Syl. : ffei'.
^' Fr. : μακρό.!/.
460
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. ii. 9-12
But if so, shall we say that there is no such thing
as fortune at all, or that it does exist but is not a
10 cause ? No, it must both exist and be a cause. Con-
sequently it will furthermore be a cause of goods or
evils to certain persons ; whereas if fortune is to be
eliminated altogether, then nothing must be said
to come about from fortune, in spite of the fact that,
although there is another cause, because we do not
see it we say that fortune is a cause — owing to which
people give it as a definition of fortune that it is a
cause incalculable to human reasoning, implying that
it is a real natural principle. This, then, would be a
matter for another inquiry. But since we see that
some people have good fortune on one occasion, why
should they not succeed a second time too owing
to the same cause ? and a third time ? and a fourth ?
11 for the same cause produces the same effect. There-
fore this will not be a matter of fortune ; but when
the same result follows from indeterminate and in-
definite antecedents, it will be good or bad for some-
body, but there will not be the knowledge of it that
comes by experience, since, if there were, some fortu-
nate persons would learn it, or indeed all branches
of knowledge would, as Socrates said,*^ be forms of
12 good fortune. What, then, prevents such things from
happening to somebody a number of times running
not because he has a certain character, but in the
way in which for instance it would be possible to
make the highest throw at dice every time ? And
what then ? are there not some impulses in the
spirit that arise from reasoning and others from ir-
rational appetition ? and are not the latter prior ?
becaxise if the impulse caused by desire for what is
" Plato, Euthydemus 279 d.
461
ARISTOTLE
1247 b , ^ ^ , V
η8€ος, και ή ope^is φνσ€ΐ ye εττι το αγαθόν βαΒίζοί
αν TTavTore} el hr] τίνες elaiv εύφυέις {ωσπ€ρ οι 1
wSlkoL•^ ουκ ετηστάμενοί αδειι^ οϋτως ev ττβφνκασι)
και oivev λόγου όρμώσιν fj^ η φύσις ττίφυκε καΐ
€πιθυμοΰσι και τούτου καΐ τότ€* καΐ οϋτως ώς Set
25 /cat ού 8et και δτ€, ούτοι κατορθώσουσι^ καν
τυχωσιν άφρονες οντβς και άλογοι, ωσπερ και eu
ασονται^ ού' διδασκαλικοί οντες. οΐ δε' ye τοιούτοι
εύτυχβΐς, όσοι άνευ λόγου κατορθοΰσιν ώς επί το
πολύ. φύσει άρα οΐ ευτυχείς εΐεν άν.
Η πλεοναχώς λέγεται η ευτυχία; τα μεν γαρ 1
30 πράττεται από της ορμής και προελομενων πράξαι,
τα δ ου, άλλα τουναντίον και ei* εν εκείνοις
κακώς λογίσασθαι δοκουσι κατορθοΰντες, και* εύ-
τυχησαί φαμεν και πάλιν εν τούτοις, ει εβούλοντο
άλλο^" η ελαττον η^^ ελαβον τάγαθόν. εκείνους li
μεν τοίνυν εύτυχεΐν δια φύσιν ενδέχεται- ή γαρ
35 όρμη και η ορεξις ούσα ου ε'Βει^^ κατώρθωσεν, ό
8ε λογισμός ην ηλίθιος' και τους μεν ενταύθα,
όταν ό^' μεν λογισμός μη 8οκών όρθός^* eiv-at τύχη,^^
ορμη^^ δ αύτοίϊ αιτία ούσα, αύτη^^ όρθη ούσα
εσωσεν^^• αλλ' ενίοτε δι' επιθυμίαν ελογίσαντο^"
πάλιν ούτω και ητύχησαν .'''' εν δε 8η τοις ετεροις 1*
^ lac. {semper Β'): παν.
* Syl. : άδικοι {άδίδακτοι ωδικοί lac, indocti Β')•
* ri add. lac. {secundum quod W).
* Sp. {tunc W) : iroTk. * Fr. {dirigeiit W) : κατορθονσι.
« Syl. : ίσονται. ' Fr. {non BO : oi P", ^i M»».
* fl add. Rac. (post έκείνοΐί Sp.).
* [καΐ] (vel κατεντί'χησαι) Bus.
" lac: Af. " ^add. lac. ^* Fr. : M.
" ό add. Rac. " v.l. : όρθωί Ρ», Μ".
" Sp. : τύχη. 1' όρμη add. Rac. (ή add. Sp.).
^' Sp. : ai'Tj; δ'. " Sp. {saluauit B') : i^wffev.
462
EUDPLMIAN ETHICS, VHI. ii. 12-15
pleasant exists by nature, appetition also would merely
by nature proceed towards what is good in every
13 case. If, therefore, some men have good natures — -
just as musical people though they have not learnt
to sing " have a natural aptitude for it — and without
the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction
of the natural order of things and desire the right
thing in the right way at the right time, these men
will succeed even although they are in fact foolish
and irrational, just as the others will sing well
although unable to teach singing. And men of this
sort obviously are fortunate — men who without the
aid of reason are usually successful. Hence it will ^
follow that the fortunate are so by nature. ^
14 Or has the term ' good fortune ' more than one Luck an
meaning ? For some things are done from impulse term^"^it"*
and as a result of the agents' purposive choice, other includes
things not so but on the contrary ; and if in the former really*^
cases when the agents succeed they seem to have caused by
reasoned badly, we say that in fact they have had
good fortune ; and again in the latter cases, if they
wished for a different good or less good than they
15 have got. The former persons then may possibly
owe their good fortune to nature, for their impulse
and appetition, being for the right object, suc-
ceeded, but their reasoning was foolish ; and in their
case, when it happens that their reasoning seems
to be incorrect but that impulse is the cause of it,
this impulse being right has saved them ; although
sometimes on the contrary owing to appetite they
have reasoned in this way and come to misfortune.
" Or, with Jackson's additions, ' just as untaught musical
geniuses, without professional knowledge of singing.'
^* Sp. : eXoyLaaro. *" Sp. : ήτύχησεί'.
4-63
ARISTOTLE
1247b ^ „ , , , » w ■* ' 'έ
ττως earat η βντυχια κατ ευφυιαν ορζξβως και
i2i8 Λ εττίθυμίας ; αλλά μην η ivravda βντνχία κάκίίνη
■η αύτη. η vXeiovg at euTUVtat και τνχη διτττί^;
€7T€i Ο ορωμ€ν τταρα ττασας τας €τηστημας και τους ■
λογισμούς τους ορθούς βύτυχονντάς rcvas", hrjXov
b ότι €Tepov αν τι €Ϊη το αίτιον της ζύτυχίας. €Κ€ίνη
8e TTOTcpov ζστιν^ €ύτυχία η ούκ ecniv, fj^ επεθύμη-
aev ων e8et και δτ€ e8et ω* λογισμός ανθρώπινος
ουκ αν τούτου €Ϊη ; ου γαρ δη πάμπαν άλόγιστον
τούτο ου γε" φυσική ioTiv ή επιθυμία, άλλα 8ια-
φθειρβται υπό τίνος, εύτυχ^εΐν μεν οΰν Βοκεΐ ότι ή ]
10 'τνχΐ] T<J^v πάρα λόγον αιτία, τούτο* δε πάρα λόγον,
παρά, γαρ την επιστήμην και το καθόλου, αλλ' ώς ]
εοικεν, ούκ άπο τύχης, άλλα δο/cet δια τούτο,
ωσθ ούτος μεν ό λόγος ού Βείκνυσιν ότι φύσει εύ-
τυχεΐται,^ αλλ οτι ού πάντες οι 8οκούντες εύτυχεΐν
δια τύχην κατορθοΰσιν, αλλά' διά φύσιν ούδ' οτι
ού^εν εστί τύχη ^ούδ' οτι ούκ εστί τύχη^ αίτια
15 ούθενός ^είκνυσιν, αλλ' οτι^" ού των πάντων ων
Βοκεΐ.
Τούτο μεντ αν άπορήσειε τις, άρ' αυτοϋ τούτου ί
τύχη αιτία, του «πι^υ/χησαι ου δει και δτε δει; η
ούτω γε τταν'τα»!' εσται; και γαρ του νοησαι και
βουλεύσασθαΐ' ού γαρ δή εβουλεύσατο βουλευσά-
μενος και πριν^^ tout' εβουλεύσατο οι)δ' ενόησε
^ καΐ τύχη διττή hic Sp. : ante κάκΐίνη codd.
^ ^τιν Sp. : ή Mb, om. Ρ•». ' Fr. : ή. * lac: τό.
' o5 ye lac. : οϋτΐ. ' Vict, {hoc B') : τούτου.
' lac. {bene fortunate agatur W): εύτυχΐΐν.
* άλλ' <einoTe> ? Rac. : άλλα <7Γολλοί> ? Sus.
» lac. 1» Stl add. Cas.
" πριν add. Rac. {anteqiiam. consiliaretur B').
<• Cf. 1247 b 30 τά δ• οι» (Solomon).
464
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. ii. 16-20
16 But in the case of the others," then, how will good
fortune be due to natural goodness of appetition and
desire ? The fact is that the good fortune here and
that in the other case are the same. Or is good
fortune of more than one kind, and is fortune two-
17 fold ? But since we see some people being fortu-
nate contrary to all the teachings of science and
correct calculation, it is clear that the cause of good
fortune must be something different. But is it or is
it not good fortune whereby a man formed a desire
for the right thing and at the right time when in
his case human reasoning could not make this calcu-
lation .'' For a thing the desire for which is natural
is not altogether uncalculated, but the reasoning
18 is perverted by something. So no doubt he seems
fortunate, because fortune is the cause of things
contrary to reason, and this is contrary to reason,
for it is contrary to knowledge and to general prin-
19 ciple. But probably it does not really come from
fortune, but seems to do so from the above cause.
So that this argument does not prove that good
fortune comes by nature, but that not all those
who seem fortunate succeed because of fortune, but
because of nature ; nor does it prove that there is
no such thing as fortune, nor that fortune is not the
cause of anything, but that it is not the cause of all ', ι
the things of which it seems to be the cause. i
20 Yet someone may raise the question whether Right desire
fortune is the cause of precisely this — our forming chancrbut
a desire for the right thing at the right time. Or, a gift of
on that showing, will not fortune be the cause ^''^*"•
of everything — even of thought and deliberation ?
since it is not the case that one only deliberates
when one has deliberated even previously to that
2 Η 465
ARISTOTLE
1248 8
20 νοησας rrporepov η^ νοησαι, /cat τοΰτ' εΙς ατταρον,
αλλ' €στιν άρχη τι?.^ ουκ άρα του νοησαι 6 νοΰς^
αρχή, ούδε του βουΧ^νσασθαι βουλή, τι ow άλλο
ττλήν τύχη ; ώστ' άττό τύχης άπαντα έ'σται. ■^^ έ'στι
Tts Ο'ΡΧ''? 'ή^ ουκ eoTLV άλλη €ζω, αύτη he δια το
τοιαύτη ye eWt τοιούτο^ δύναται* ττοΐέΐν; το 2
25 δε ζητούμ€νον τοΰτ^ εστί, τι? ij τί^? κινησ€ως άρχη
ev τη φυχη. 8ηλον Βη' ωσπ€ρ ev τω ολω, deos και
ττάν cKel KiveV • Kivei γάρ πως πάντα^ το ev ημίν
deZov. λόγου δ' άρχη ου λόγος αλλά τι KpeiTTOV. 2
τι οΰν άν KpeiTTOV και €πιστημης εϊη^ και νοΰ^^
πλην θ€Ος; η γάρ άρ€τη του νου όργανον και δια
30 τοΰτο, ο" ττάλαι eλeγov, eύτυχeΐς καλούνται οι
οΓ^ άν όρμησωσι κατορθοΰσιν^^ άλογοι 6vτeς. και
βoυλeύeσθaι ου συμφ€peι αύτοΐς• €χουσι γάρ άρχην
τοιαύτην η κρ€ίττων^* του νου και βουλ€ύσ€ως
[οι δε τον λόγον, τούτο δ' ουκ €χουσι), και ev- 2
θουσιασμόν ^^ τοΰτο δ' ου δύνανται, άλογοι γάρ
35 6vτeς €πιτυγχάνουσι^^ και του των" φρονίμων και
σοφών ταχειαν είναι την μαντικήν και μόνον ου
την από του λόγου δει ά7Γολα)8εΓν, αλλ' οι μ€.ν δι'
€μπ€ΐρίαν, οι δε δια συντ^^ειαν του" τω σκoπeιv
1 ii add. Sp.
^ ά\\' . . . ris hie Rac. : ante ούδ' ένόησε codd.
* ό vovs Cas. : σννοΰσα..
* ^ Sus. {aut B') : ei (ei </iT/> Sp.).
* lac. : 5ia rl τοιαύτη τό elvai τό τοΰτο.
• Syl. {potest Β') : δύνασθαι.
' έκεΐ Kivel lac. : έκΐίνφ. ® ττάντα <τά ^ι» ήμΓί'> lac.
* Sp. : efTTot. ^^ κα'ί νοΰ add. Sp. {et intellectu W).
^^ lac. : oi. *^ of add. Ross.
^' Fr. (dirigunt B') : κατορθονν.
" Aid. ; KpeiTTOV. ^^ Sp. : ενθουσιασμοί.
" Syl. : ά7Γοτι;7χάνοΐ'σι•
" ToD τώΐ' Syl. : τούΓωί» (horum B'). " τοΟ Sol. ; re iv.
4,66
EuDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. ii. 20-23
deliberation, nor does one only think when one has
previously thought before thinking, and so on to
infinity, but there is some starting-point ; therefore
thought is not the starting-point of thinking, nor
deliberation of deliberating. Then what else is, save
fortune ? It will follow that everything originates
from fortune. Or shall we say that there is a cer-
tain starting-point outside which there is no other,
and that this, merely owing to its being of such
and such a nature, can produce a result of such
21 and such a nature ? But this is what we are in-
vestigating— what is the starting-point of motion
in the spirit ? The answer then is clear ; as in the
universe, so there, everything is moved by God ;
for in a manner the divine element in us is the cause
22 of all our motions. And the starting-point of reason
is not reason but something superior to reason.
What, then, could be superior even to knowledge
and to intellect, except God ? Not goodness, for
goodness is an instrument of the mind ; and owing
to this, as I was saying some time ago," those are
called fortunate who although irrational succeed in
whatever they start on. And it does not pay them
to deliberate, for they have within them a principle
of a kind that is better than mind and deliberation
23 (whereas the others have reason but have not this) :
they have inspiration, but they cannot deliberate. For
although irrational they attain even what belongs to
the prudent and wise — swiftness of divination : only
the divination that is based on reason we must not
specify, but some of them attain it by experience
and others by practice in the use of observation ;
« See 1247 b 26.
467
ARISTOTLE
1248 a
χρησθαΐ' τω θ^ίω^ δε ούτοι. ^ τούτο yap* ev
ορα και το μ€λλον και το 6ν, καΐ ών άττολυεται ό
40 Aoyo? οΰτοί.* διό οΐ μελαγχολικοί και evuvoveipoi•
1248 b eoi/ce yap τ^ ο,ρχη άττολνομενου του Aoyot»* io;)(ueiv
μάλλον, ωστίβρ^ οι τυφλοί μνημονβυουσι μάλλον,
απολυθέντες του προς τοις όρωμενοις'' e?vai το
μνημόνευαν .^
Φανερον hrf οτι δυο εί'δη ευτυχίας, η μεν θεία• 2'
διό και δο/ί€ΐ ό ευτυχής δια θεον κατορθοΰν, οΰτος
5 δ εστιι^ ό «τατά την όρμην κατορθωτικός,^" 6 δ'
έτερος 6 παρά την όρμην. άλογοι δ' αμφότεροι.
και η μεν συνεχής ευτυχία μά?0^ον, αΰτη δε ου συν-
III. Κατά μέρος μεν οΰν περί εκάστης αρετής 1
ειρηται πρότερον επει δε χωρίς 8ιείλομεν την
10 Βυναμιν αυτών, και περί της αρετής ^ιαρθρωτεον^^
της εκ τούτων ην καλοΰμεν^^ η^η καλοκάγαθίαν.
^ Sp. : θίψ. * Von Arnim: αΰται. ^ VonArnim: καΐ.
Sol. : oOros (11. 37 fF. συνήθΐίαν rb έν τφ σκοπεΐν χρησθαι τφ
θεψ δύνανται τοντο καΐ e5 όραν καΐ τό μέλλον καΐ τό 6ι>, και ών
άίΓολύβται ό λό-γο^ outws lac).
Sp. (cum B^) : άπολνομέρονί τούί λόγου?,
* Von Arnim : καΐ ώσπερ.
' Rac. : €ίρηυ.4νοΐί {του πρόί rotj <.όρατοΐ$ etvai τφ ττρό? TOis>
€ΐρημένοΐί <.στΓουδαιότερον> elvai τό μνημόνευαν lac, ad mirabilia
uirtuosius esse quod memoratur W).
* [to μνημόνευαν] ? Rac. • Fr. (itaque W) : bi.
" Von Arnim : διορθωτικός. " v.l. δωρθωτέαν.
^* Γ, lac. {uocamus B') : έκαλοΰμεν.
" The MS. reading gives ' and experience and habit use
God.'
* Or, with Jackson's text, ' But some of them by experi-
468
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. ii. 23— iii. 2
and these men use the divine." For this quality
discerns aright the future as well as the present,
and these are the men whose reason is disengaged. **
This is why the melancholic even have dreams that
are true ; for it seems that when the reason is dis-
engaged principle has more strength — ^just as the
blind remember better, being released from having
their faculty of memory engaged with objects of
sight.*'
It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of good
fortune — one divine, owing to which the fortunate
man's success is thought to be due to the aid of God,
and this is the man who is successful in accordance
with his impulse, while the other is he who succeeds
against his impulse. Both persons are irrational.
The former kind is more continuous good fortune,
the latter is not continuous.
III. We have, then, previously spoken about each c. ui.
virtue in particular ; and as we have distinguished x^e com^"
their meaning separately, we [must also describe in binatioa of
detail the virtue constituted from them, to which we *^^ virtues.
now give the name <* of nobility.® Now it is mani-
ence and others by habituation have this capacity of con-
sulting God in examining things, and of discerning aright
both the future and the present ; and those also have it
whose reason is disengaged in the manner described.'
" Jackson (with some hints from the Latin version)
emends to give ' just as blind men, who are released from
attention to visibles, remember better than others, because
the faculty of memory is thus more earnestly addressed to
what has been said.'
■* The MS. reading gives, ' we were already giving the
name,' but if that is correct, the passage referred to has been
lost.
' Καλοκά•γα.θία, like ' nobility ', connotes both social status
and moral excellence ; so κα.λοκά•γαθό$ may be rendered
' gentleman.'
469
ARISTOTLE
1248 b ^^ ^
OTt fxev ovv ανάγκη τον ταύτης αληθώς τ€νζόμ€νον 2
της προσηγορίας €χ€ίν τάς κατά μέρος άρ€τάς,
φαν€ρόν• ουδέ γαρ eirl των άλλων ονθζνος οΙόν τ
αΧλως e^etv, ούθ^Ις γαρ οΧον μβν το σώμα uyiatVet
15 μέρος δ' ονθάν, αλλ' άναγκαιον πάντα η τα πλα,στα
καΐ κυριώτατα τον αυτόν €.χ&ιν τρόπον τώ δλω.
έ'στι δι^ το aya^ov etvat καΐ το καλόν κάγαθον ου 3
μόνον κατά τα ονό^υ,ατα άλλα καΐ^ καθ^ αυτά
€χοντα ^ιαφοράν. τών γάρ αγαθών πάντων τέλη
εστίν α αυτά αυτών €ν€κά εστίν αιρετά, τούτων δε i
20 καλά δσα δι' αυτά οντά ττάντα^ επαινετά εστίν
ταΰτα γάρ εστίν άφ'^ ων α? τε πράζεις εισιν
ετταινεται και αυτά επαινετά, δικαιοσύνη* και
αΰτη και αϊ πράξεις, και αί* σώφρονες, επαινετή
γάρ και η σωφροσύνη• άλλ' ούχ ύγιεια ετταινετόν,
ουδέ γάρ το έργον, ουδέ το ισχυρώς, ουδέ yap η
25 ισχύς, άλλ' aya^a /χε'ν, ετταινετά δ' ου. ομοίως 5
δέ τοΰτο δτ^λον και έπι τών άλλων διά τη?
επαγωγής. αγαθός μεν ουν εστίν ω τά φύσει
aya^a έστιν aya^a. τά yap περιμάχητα και
μέγιστα είναι δοκουντα aya^a, τι/χή και ττλοΰτο?
και σώματος άρεται και εύτυχίαι και Βυνάμεις,
30 aya^a ρ,έν φύσει εστίν, ενδε'χεται δ' είναι βλαβερά
τισι διά τά? έξεις, ούτε γάρ άφρων ούτ άδικο? η
ακόλαστο? ών ουδέν αν ονησειε* χρώμενος αύτοΐς,
ώσπερ ούδ' ό κάμνων τη του ύγιαίνοντος τροφή
χρώμενος, ούδ' 6 ασθενής και ανάπηρος τοις του
υγιούς και τοις του ολοκλήρου κόσμοις. κάλος 6
85 δέ Kaya^o? τώ τών άyα^ώv τά καλά ύπάρχειν
αύτώ δι' αυτά, και τω πρακτικός είναι τών καλών
^ καΐ add. Bus. ^ aipera. pro ιτάντα ? Sp.
* Syl. : ΐφ'. * ζοΐον^ δικαιοσύνη Syl.
4,70
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. in. 2-6
fest that one who is to obtain this appellation truly
must possess the particular virtues ; for it is im-
possible for it to be otherwise in the case of any
other matter either — for instance, no one is healthy
in his whole body but not in any part of it, but all
the parts, or most of them and the most important,
must necessarily be in the same condition as the
3 whole. Now being good and being noble are really More than
different not only in their names but also in them- ^"(iness.
selves. For all goods have Ends that are desirable
4 in and for themselves. Of these, all those are fine
which are laudable as existing for their own sakes,
for these are the Ends which are both the motives
of laudable actions and laudable themselves — ^justice
itself and its actions, and temperate actions, for
temperance also is laudable ; but health is not
laudable, for its eiFect is not, nor is vigorous action
laudable, for strength is not — these things are good
5 but they are not laudable. And similarly induction
makes this clear in the other cases also. Therefore
a man is good for whom the things good by nature are
good. For the things men fight about and think the
greatest, honour and wealth and bodily excellences
and pieces of good fortune and powers, are good by
nature but may possibly be harmful to some men
owing to their characters. If a man is foolish or
unjust or profligate he would gain no profit by em-
ploying them, any more than an invalid would bene-
fit from using the diet of a man in good health, or
a weakling and cripple from the equipment of a
6 healthy man and of a sound one. A man is noble its
because he possesses those good things that are psychology.
fine for their own sake and because he is a doer of
* Sol. ; 4, ' Γ, Sp. : ονδ' 6ρήσ€ΐ€,
471
ARISTOTLE
1248 b ^
καΐ αυτών evcKa• καλά δ' εστίν at re άρεταΐ και
τά €.ργα τά από rrjs aperrjs.
"Εστί 8e τι? e^i? ττολιτικτ^, οΓαν οι Αάκων^ς 7
€χουσιν η άλλοι τοιούτοι €χοΐ€ν άν, αντη δ' €στΙν
40 e^t? τοιαύτη, elal γαρ οι οΐονται την άρΐτην Beiv
1249 a y^ev €χ€ΐν, άλλα τών φύσ€ΐ aya^oiv evcKev διό
aya^ot μβν dvSpes €ΐσίν (τά yap φύσ€ΐ μ,βν^ αγαθά
aya^a^ αυτοΓ? εστίν), καλοκάγαθίαν δε' ou/c
εχονσιν ου γαρ υπάρχει αύτοΐς τά καλά δι' αυτά
και προαιρούνται καλά κάγαθά*' και ού μόνον
5 ταύτα, αλλά και τά μη καλά μεν φύσει οντά,
αγαθά δε φύσει οντά, τούτοις καλά. καλά γάρ 8
εστίν όταν ου ένεκα πράττουσι και αιροϋνται
καλόν fj. διό τω καλώ κάγαθω καλά εστί τά
φύσει aya^a• καλόν γάρ τό δίκαιον, τοΰτο δε το
κατ' άζίαν, άζιος δ' ουτο? τούτων και τό πρέπον 9
10 καλόν, πρέπει δε ταΰτα τούτω,' ττλουτο? εΰyεvεια
δυνα/χι?. ώστε τω καλώ Kaya^o) τά αυτά και*
συμφέροντα και καλά εστίν τοις δε ττολλοι? δια-
φωνεί ταΰτα,^ ού γάρ τά άττλώ? aya^a κάκείνοις
aya^a εστί, τω δ' άγαθω dya^a• τω δε καλώ
Kaya^oi* και καλά, ττολλά? γάρ και καλά? πράζεις
15 δι' αυτά επραζεν. 6 δ' οίόμενος τάς άρετάς εχειν 10
δειν ένεκα τών εκτός άyα0ώv κατά τό συμβεβη-
κός καλά πράττει.
"Εστίν οΰν καλοκαγαθία άρετη τέλειος.
Και ττερι τ^δοντ^? δ' εϊρηται ποιόν τι και πώς 11
1 [μέν] ? liac.
2 ά7αβά alterum add. Sol. (cf. 1248 b 26).
^ Γ : γάρ. * Ross : καλοί κά•/αθοί.
* Γ : νλούτψ. * Brandis : «ai αυτά τά aut καϊ αι/τά.
' Rac. : τοΰτο. ' Sp. : τφ δ' ά-γαΟφ,
47 a
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. in. 6-11
fine deeds even for their own sake ; and the fine
things are the virtues and the actions that arise from
virtue.
7 But there is also a state of character that is the itisnon-
' civic ' character, such as the Spartans have or " " *'^'*"'
others hke them may have ; and this character
is of the following sort. There are those who think
that one ought, it is true, to possess goodness, but
for the sake of the things that are naturally good ;
hence though they are good men (for the things
naturally good are good for them), yet they have not
nobility, for it is not the case with them that they
possess fine things for their own sake and that they
purpose fine actions, and not only this, but also that
things not fine by nature but good by nature are
8 fine for them. For things are fine when that for
which men do them and choose them is fine. There-
fore to the noble man the things good by nature are
fine ; for what is just is fine, and what is according
to worth is just, and he is worthy of these things ;
9 and what is befitting is fine, and these things befit
him — wealth, birth, power. Hence for the noble
man the sarfte things are both advantageous and
fine ; but for the multitude these things do not
coincide, for things absolutely good are not also
good for them, whereas they are good for the good
man ; and to the noble man they are also fine, for
he performs many fine actions because of them.
10 But he who thinks that one ought to possess the
virtues for the sake of external goods does fine things
only by accident.
Nobility then is perfect goodness.
11 We have also spoken about the nature of pleasure itspieas-
-, - antness.
473
ARISTOTLE
1249 a
αγαθόν, καΐ otl τά τ€ απλώς ηδέα icat καλά. τά re
απλώς dya^o, καΐ^ τ^δεα. ου yLverai hk rjSov-η μη
20 iv πράζζΐ' δια τοΰτο 6 αληθώς βν^αίμων καΐ η^ιστα
ζησβι, καΐ τοΰτο ου μάτην οι άνθρωποι άζιοΰσιν.
Έττει δ eart τ駕 ορός καΐ τω Ιατρώ προς ον 15
άναφβρων κρίν€ί το ΰγιαΖνον^ σώμα και τ6^ μη,
και προς ον μ^χρι ποσοϋ ποιητβον βκαστον και
ύγΐ€ΐνόν,* €1 he έ'λαττον η πλ4ον ούκέτι, οϋτω και
25 τω σπουΒαίω π€ρΙ τάς πράζ€ΐς και αΙρ€σ€ΐς τών
1249 b φνσ€ΐ μ€ν aya^cDv ουκ iπaιveτώv δε δει τιρ'ά etvat
δρον και eζeως και της alpeσeως και φυγής, και
πepι χρημάτων πλήθος και όλιγότητα^ και τών βύ-
τυχημάτων. iv μέν ουν τοις πρότ€ρον ζλέγβη το 1'
ώς 6 λόγος' τοΰτο δ' eoTiv ώσπβρ αν ei τις
5 iv τοις πepι την τροφην €Ϊπ€ΐ€ν ώς η ιατρική και
6 λόγος ταύτης, τοΰτο δ' αληθές μ€ν ου σαφές
84. Sei δη ώσπep καΐ iv τοις άλλοις προς το h
άρχον ζην, και προς την e^iv /cat' την iv€pγeιav
την του άpχovτeς, οίον Βοΰλον προς δεσττότου και
eKaoTov προς την ΙκάσταΡ καθηκουσαν άρχην. €7Γ€ι Ιί
10 he και άνθρωπος φύσ€ΐ συν€στηκ€ν i^ άρχοντος
και αρχομένου, και €καστον αν* Beoi προς την
αύτου* άρχην ζην (αύ'ττ^ Se Βιττη, άλλως γαρ η
ιατρική άρχη και άλλως η uyteia, ταύτης he eveKa
βκείνη), οϋτω δη" eχeι και" κατά το θ€ωρητικόν.
ον γαρ €πιτακτικώς άρχων 6 θ€Ος, αλλ' οΰ eveKa
^ καΐ hie Rac. : ante τά re άπΧωί. * Vat. : vytfivov.
' τό add. Rac. * Ross : καΐ e5 uyiaivov.
* Zeller : καΙ περί φνγηί χρημάτων πλήθον$ και όλι-γότητοί.
* και Ross : κατά. ' Rac. : έκάστον.
* Άν Sp. : δη. • Sp. : βουτώ»' {εν αντφ ? Rac).
" Rieckher: Set. " »coi add. Sus.
« 1222 a 6-10, b 7, 1232 a 32 f.
474
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. in. 11-15
and the manner in which it is a good, and have said
that things pleasant absolutely are also fine and that
things good absolutely are also pleasant. Pleasurle"• .
does not occur except in action ; on this account the
truly happy man will also live most pleasantly, and
it is not without reason that people demand this.
12 But since a doctor has a certain standard by refer- Limit of
ring to which he judges the healthy body and the goods **
unhealthy, and in relation to which each thing up
to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome,
but if less is done, or more, it ceases to be whole-
some, so in regard to actions and choices of things
good by nature but not laudable a virtuous man
ought to have a certain standard both of character
and of choice and avoidance ; and also in regard
to large and small amount of property and of good
13 fortune. Now in what preceded " we stated the
standard ' as reason directs ' ; but this is as if in
matters of diet one were to say ' as medical science
and its principles direct,' and this though true is
14 not clear. It is proper, therefore, here as in other
matters to live with reference to the ruling factor, and
to the state and the activity of the ruling factor, as
for example slave must live with reference to the rule
of master, and each person with reference to the rule
15 appropriate to each. And since man consists by
nature of a ruling part and a subject part, and each
would properly live with reference to the ruling
principle within him (and this is twofold, for medical
science is a ruling principle in one way and health is
in another, and the former is a means to the latter),
this is therefore the case in regard to the faculty of
contemplation. For God is not a ruler in the sense
of issuing commands, but is the End as a means
475
ARISTOTLE
1249 b
15 η φρόνησις εττιτάττει φίττον Be το ου eVe/ca,
διώρισται δ' iv άλλοίς), CTret €Κ€Ϊνός γ€^ ονθβνός
δειται. ητίς οΰν αίρ€σις καΐ κτησις των φύσ€ΐ, h
άγαμων ποίήσα μάλιστα την τον deov θεωρίαν, η
σώματος η χρημάτων η φίλων η των άλλων αγα-
θών, αϋτη αρίστη καΐ ούτος 6 ορός κάλλιστος• et
20 τις δ η δι' ένδειαν η δι' νττβρβολην κωλυ€ΐ τον
θεον θ€ραπ€ν€ΐν και θεωρεΐν, αϋτη δβ φαύλη. €χ€ΐ Γ
δε τοΰτο οντω" τη φνχη, και οΰτος της φνχης ορός
άριστος, το' ηκιστα αίσθάνεσθαι του αλόγου* μέρους
της φυχης, fj τοιούτον.
Ύίς μεν ουν ορός της καλοκαγαθίας και τίς 6
25 σκοπός τών απλώς aya^cav έστω είρημενον.
^ Syl. : re. ^ οντω add. Rac.
3 Zeller: τά. * Fr. : όίλλοί'.
" End or ' final cause ' {οΰ ΐνεκα) denotes (1) the person or
thing for whose good something is done, (2) the purpose for
which it is done. God is the Final Cause in the latter sense :
476
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. in. 15-17
to which wisdom gives commands (and the term
' End ' has two meanings, but these have been
distinguished elsewhere *) ; since clearly God is in
16 need of nothing. Therefore whatever mode of as means
choosing and of acquiring things good by nature — tempiation
whether goods of body or wealth or friends or the of God.
other goods — will best promote the contemplation
of God, that is the best mode, and that standard is
the finest ; and any mode of choice and acquisition .
that either through deficiency or excess hinders us
from serving and from contemplating God — that is a
17 bad one. This is how it is for the spirit, and this is
the best spiritual standard — to be as far as possible
unconscious of the irrational part of the spirit, as
such.
Let this, then, be our statement of what is the
standard of nobility and what is the aim of things
absolutely good. i/~>Oc)
cf. Phys. 194 a 32-36, Be An. 415 b 2, Met. 1072 b 2
(Solomon).
477
INDEX I.— PROPER NAMES
References are to the pages, columns (a and b) and lines of the Berlin edition
of Aristotle, 1831, marked in the left-hand margin of the text. The two first
figures of the page-numbers are omitted, 14 α ίο 51 ft standing for 1214 a to
1251 6. The first line only of each passage referred to is given in most cases.
Short foot-notes on some of the nomes ivill be found below the translation.
Achilles, 30 a 19
Aenicus, 38 b 38
Agathon, 30 a 1, 32 b 8
Anaxagoras, 15 b 6, 16 a 11
Aiitiphon's Andromache, 39 a 38
Antiphon the orator, 32 b 7
Apis, 16 a 1
Athenians, 36 a 36, 42 b 25
Byzantium, 47 a 19
Celts, 29 b 28
Cheiron, 30 a 2
Cimon, 33 b 13
Clazomenae, 15 b 7
Coriscus, 20 a 19, 40 b 25
Crete, 29 a 24
Delos, 14 a 1
Dioscuri, 45 b 33
Egypt, 16 a 1, 35 b 2
Bryxis, 31 a 17
Euripides, 35 a 16, b 21, 38 a 12,
34, 39 b 22, 44 a 11
Eurysthenes, 45 b 31
Bvenus, 23 a 31
Glaucus, 36 a 35
Hector, 30 a 18
Heracleitue, 23 b 22, 35 a 25
Heracles, 45 a 30, b 30
Herodicus, 43 b 23
Herodotus, 36 b 9i
Hesiod, 35 a 18, 12 b 34
Hippocrates, 47 a 17
Homer, 30 a 18, 34 a 2
Indians, 26 a 29
Laconians, see Spartans
Leto, 14 a 2
Megara, 36 a 37, 42 b 25
Metapontium, 29 a 23
Olympia, 33 b 12
Pammenes, 43 b 21
Peliades 25 b 4
Philolaus, 25 a 33
Philoxenus, 31 a 17
Plato, 29 a 15
Plato's ethic refuted, 17 b 1
Polydamas, 30 a 20
Pytho, 43 b 20
Sardanapallus, 16 a 16
Sireng, 30 b 35
Smindyrldes, 16 a 16
Socrates, 16 b 2, 29 a 15, 30 a 7,
35 a 37, 46 b 34, 47 b 15
Solon, 19 b 6
Sophocles, 42 a 37
Spartans, 45 b 32, 48 b 38
Stratonicus, 31 a 11
Sybarite, 16 a 17
Themistocles, 33 b 11
Theognis, 30 a 12, 37 b 14, 43 a 17
I Zeus, 42 a 39, 44 a 14
479
INDEX II.— SUBJECTS
lleferences as in Index I.
Activity better than state, 19 a 31,
28 a 13, 41 a 40 ; constitutes
happiness, 19 a 28
Agreement of feeling, 41 a 2
Analytics, 17 a 17, 22 b 38
Appetition, 23 a 26, 25 b 25, 26 a 17,
47 a li)
Architecture, 16 b 9
Astronomy, 16 b 12
Boars, wild, 29 a 26
Boastfulness, 21 a 6, 24
Boors in comedy, 30 b 19, 34 a 5
Brotherhoods, 41 b 20
Buffoonery, 34 a 5
Categories, the ten, 17 b 27
Colourinji, protective, 35 a 12
Concord, 41 a 2 n.
Constitutions, normal and per-
verted, 41 b 27
Courage, 28 a 28, 30 a 30
Cowardice, 20 b 20, 28 a 32
Crocodile, 36 b 10
Culture, 14 b 8
Diagonal incommensurable, 26 a 3
Dog, 35 a 12
Downrightness, 29 a 20, 31 a 19
Drunkenness, 29 a 30, 31 a 19
Effeminacy, 29 b 1
Encomia, 19 b 9
Endurance, 21 a 9
Envy, 21 a 3, 33 b 19, 34 a 30
Equality, arithmetical and pro-
portional, 41 b 38
Eternal, 18 a 12
Experience, courage of, 29 a 15,
30 a 5
480
Extraneous discourses, 17 b 22,
18 b34
Extremes unequally opposed to
mean, 22 a 22 ; meet, 34 b 1
Felicitation, 19 b 14
Flattery, 21 a 7, 33 b 30, 30 a 24
' Forms ' a logical fiction, 17 b 20
Fortune, 15 a 12, 47 a 1
Freewill, 23 a 21
Friend another self, 45 a 29 ; must
be an equal, 39 a 5 ; number
limited, 45 b 20
Friendship, Bk. VII
Gentleness, 22 b 1, 31 b 5
Geometry, 16 b 8, 22 b 32, 47 a 17
Gimlet, 42 a IS
Gluttony, 31 a 19
God, 17 a 24, 43 b 12, 44 b 8,
45 b 17, 48 a 26, b3; the prime
mover. 22 b 23
Good, Plato's Absolute, refutwl,
17 b 1
Good feeling, 41 a 2
Good genius, 33 b 3
Goo<lness (virtue) defined, 18 b 37,
19 b 20, 20 a 2, b 20
Goodwill, 41 a 2 n.
Grammar, 2(5 a 36, 46 b 28
Greatness of spirit, 21 a 10, 32 a 19
Gullet, 31 a 15
Happiness defined, 19 a 28
Health, 17 a 37
Honour, 14 b 8, 82 b 10, 42 b 19,
44 a 15, 48 b 28
Ideal good, the, 17 b 1
Ideas, see ' Forms '
INDEX Π. TO THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS
Imagination, 19 b 24
Induction, TO a 1, 20 a 29, 48 b 26
Insensitiveness, 21 a 2, 22 a 3
Inspiration, 25 a 28
Intellectual virtue, 20 a 5, 21 b 29
Involuntary action, 25 b 1
Irascibility, 20 b 38, 31 b 6
Irrational, 19 b 31, 20 a 10, b 6, 21 b
31, 46 b 13, 47 a 13, b 19
Justice, 16 b 4, 18 a 10, 34 a 31,
42 a 33, 46 a 86, 48 b 21
Knowledge, use of, 25 b 11 ; misuse
of, 46 a 33
Lechery, 31 a 19
Liberality, 31 b 28
Life, love of, 44 b 28
Lives, three typical, 15 b 1
Luxuriousness, 21 a 9, 30
Magnanimity, see Greatness of
spirit
Magnificence, 21 a 11, 33 a 31
Mathematics, nature of, 22 b 23
Mean, the moral, 20 b 22, 22 a 10,
31 b 38, 32 a 12
Meanness, 21 a 11
Mind, 17 b 31, 40 b 34
Modesty, 21 a 1, 33 b 27
Natural goodness, 48 a 1
Natural science, 16 b 12
Nature not in our power, 23 a 11 ;
uniformity of, 47 a 31
Nemesis, see Righteous indignation
Nobility, 4S b 10
Nutritive part of spirit, 19 b 21
Odours, 31 a 6
Passion, 23 b 18
Philosophy, 14 a 13, 15 a 2, 16 a 29,
17 a 1, 45 a 22
Philtre, 21 b 5
Phratries, see Brotherhoods
Physics, 16 b 12 n.
Plants, 16 a 5, 22 b 18
Pleasure and Pain, 20 a 34, 22 b 10
Politicians, 16 a 23
Prodigality, 21 a 15, 31 b 38, 32 a 16
Prophecy, 25 a 28
Prot(ictive colouring, 35 a 12
2 I
Psychology, ethical, Bk. II. ch. i.
Purpose, 25 b 18
Revenge, 29 b 32
Righteous indignation, 21 a 3,
33 b24
Salt, 38 a 3
Sandpiper, 36 b 9
Schedule of virtues and vices, 20 b
30, 28 a 28
Sciences, theoretical and pro-
ductive, 16 b 11
Self-control, 23 b 1, 24 a 32
Self-depreciation, 21 a 6, 25, 33 b 39
Self-knowledge, 44 b 26
Shabbiness, 21 a 11, 35
Shamelessness, 21 a 1, 33 b 27
Sight, 18 a 32, 19 a 6, 27 a 24, 31 a 22
Skinflint, 32 a 12
Slave defined, 41 b 23
Sleep, 19 b 20
Smell, 31 a 22
Soft, 32 a 12
Spirit (soul), parts of, 18 b 35
Squeamish, 34 a 6
Stitt; 34 a 5
Stubborn, 21 a 8, 28, 33 b 34
Taste, 30 b 25, 33 a 39
Teaching, 18 b 17
Teetotallers, 23 b 3
Temperance, 30 a 36
Tile, 35 a 12
Tongue, 31 a 14
Tool defined, 41 b 24
Touch, 31 a 14
Truthfulness, 33 b 38
Unanimity, 41 a 16
Vanity, 21 a 10, 32, 33 a 11
Vegetative, see Nutritive
Vices of excess and defect, 21 a 13,
Virtue, see Goodness
Virtues and vices, schedule of, 20
b 36 ; voluntary, 23 a 9
Visions, 19 b 24
Voluntary, 23 a 21, 25 b 8
Wealth, 14 b 8, 17 a 37, 27 a 14,
30 a 11, 32 b 10, 48 b 28, 49 a 10
Wish, 23 a 27, b 26, 25 b 25, 27 a 3,
Wittiness, 34 a 4
481
ON VIRTUES AND VICES
INTRODUCTION
Contents
This essay is of interest as an example of the way in
which Aristotle's reduction to scientific form of the
ethical system adumbrated by Plato was later sys-
tematized and stereotyped by smaller minds. It
classifies the various kinds of good and bad conduct
under the virtues and vices of which they are mani-
festations. It starts from the ethical psychology of
Plato, dividing the Soul or personality of man into
three parts, the reason, the passions and the appetites.
Then turning to conduct, it ranges the various actions
and emotions under the virtues and vices which they
exemplify.
Affinities
The list of Virtues or forms of Goodness " is Aris-
totelian, as in addition to the four cardinal virtues of
Plato, Wisdom or prudence. Courage or manliness.
Temperance or sobriety of mind, and Justice or right-
eousness, it includes Gentleness, Self-control, Liber-
" The word ' virtue ' to the modern English ear denotes
only one department of αρετή, viz. ήθικη άρΐτή or ' moral
f goodness.' The Greek mind saw the imity of human excel-
ence behind its various forms.
484
ON VIRTUES AND VICES
ality or generosity, and Magnanimity or greatness
of spirit. But the analysis of these virtues adopted
is not Aristotle's. He exhibited them as forms of
moderation, lying midway between vicious extremes
of excess and deficiency ; but here each virtue is
merely contrasted with a single vice as its opposite.
And near the end of the essay (c. viii.) there is an
allusion to the comparison drawn by Plato in the
Republic between the well-ordered Soul and the well-
constituted State.
It is true that the rigorously systematic arrange-
ment of the matter and the concise fullness of detail
(in cc. vii., viii. three of the Vices are neatly sub-
divided into three species each) are more character-
istic of the Peripatic School than of the Academy ;
the formal exposition of a subject already fully
explored has replaced the tentative heuristic method
which Plato in his dialogues inherited from Socrates.
The descriptive treatment of the virtues and vices
(a method that had been first foreshadowed in the
Nicomachean Ethics, in for instance the portrait of
the Magnanimous Man) links the work with the
Characters of Theophrastus, and seems to have been
customary in the Peripatetic School from his time
onward. Zeller <* points out that the recognition of
an order of beings between gods and men, the
daimones, in the passages dealing with piety and god-
liness (cc. v., vii.), also indicates a late period. A
faint trace of Stoic influence may be seen in the
formal antithesis of praiseworthy and blameworthy
actions at the beginning and the end of the treatise.
" Eclectics, p. 145.
485
ARISTOTLE
Date
Susemihl "■ agrees with Zeller that the book prob-
ably belongs to the eclectic period ; he dates it not
earlier than the first century b.c. and perhaps in the
first century a.d., and sees in it an author of no great
ability, apparently a Peripatetic, attempting to
reconcile the moral philosophy of Aristotle with that
of Plato.
The earlier date suggested brings it within range
of Andronicus of Rhodes, who was head of the Peri-
patetic School at Athens in Cicero's student days.
Andronicus edited and commentated on the Master's
works, making some modifications of his own in logic
and psychology. Under his name, though scholars
usually assign it to a later date, there has come down
to us a treatise Hepl τταθων, and appended to this
treatise is an essay On Virtues and Vices which is a
copy of the one before us, though the order of the
contents has been rearranged. This book serves as
additional evidence for our text.
Some further evidence is supplied by the mss. of
the Florilegium of Joannes Stobaeus (John of Stobi
in Macedonia, fifth century a.d. or later), of which
miscellany the present essay forms c. xviii of
Book I.
Manuscripts and Texts
The text of this edition is based on that of Bekker
in the Berlin Aristotle, 1833, where liepl άρίτων
και κακ-ιώΐ' occupies pp. 1249-1251 in the second
volume ; Bekker gives no critical notes. The Berlin
" Teubner ed., p. xxxi.
486
ON VIRTUES AND VICES
page-numbers, columns (a and b) and lines are printed
in the margin here. The only considerable later work
on the text is that of Susemihl, who included this
essay in the volume containing the Eudemian Ethics
(Teubner, Leipzig, 1884) ; his text has full critical
notes, a few selections from which are given here.
Susemihl uses chiefly four mss. : L'', the twelfth-
century Paris MS. of the Nicomachean Ethics which,
lias Of Virtues and Vices appended, in a hand dating
probably at the beginning of the thirteenth century ;
F', the fourteenth-century Laurentian ms. ; and two
at Madrid, one grouping with F" and the other vvdth
L'', as do six others of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries (one in the Bodleian) which he has collated,
and the oldest extant edition, published at Basel in
1539 : an. older edition has now disappeared.
In the brief critical notes beneath tlie present text
the variants of U' and F'• are sometimes quoted, and
the readings of one or more other mss. are denoted
by v.l. The sources of conjectural emendations are
indicated by the following abbreviations :
And. = Andronicus
Rac. =Rackham
St. = Stobaeus
Sus. = Susemihl
A few conjectures of Bussemaker and of Sylburg are
quoted from Susemihl.
H. R.
December 1934.
487
ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΕΤί2Ν ΚΑΙ
ΚΑΚΙί2Ν
1249 a
26 Ι. Έι7ταιν€τα μ€ν ianv τα καλά, φ^κτα 8e τα 1
αισχρά• καΐ των μβν καλών ήγοΰνται αϊ aperai,
των δε αΙσχρών αϊ κακίαι• ωστ€ €ΤΓαιν€ταΙ μ€ν αί 2
άρεται/ ετταινετά δε εστί καΐ τά αΐτια των άρ€τών
καΐ τά παρ€πόμ€να ταΐς άρβταΐς καΐ τά γινόμενα άττ'
30 αυτών καΐ τά €ργα αυτών,' φεκτά δε τά εναντία.
Τρίμερους δε της φυχης λαμβανομένης κατά 3
1249 b Πλάτωνα, του μ€ν λογιστικού άρβτή εστίν η
27 φρόνησις, του δε θυμο^ώοΰς η τε πραότης και η
ανδρεία, του δε βττιθυμητικοΰ η τε σωφροσύνη και
η €γκράτ€ΐα, όλης δε της φυχης η τε 8ικαιοσύνη
και η €λ€υθ€ριότης και η μξγαλοφυχία- κακία δε 4
30 εστίν του μέν λογιστικού η αφροσύνη , του δε
θυμο^ώοΰς η τε όργιλότης και η δείλια, τοΰ δε
1250 a €πιθυμητικοΰ η τε ακολασία και η άκρασία, όλης
δε της φνχης η τε αδικία και η άνελευ^ερια και
η μικροφυχία.
II. "Εστίν δε φρόνησις μ€ν άρετη τοΰ λογιστικού 1
7ταρασκ€υαστικη τών προς ευδαι/χονιαν συντεινόν-
6 των. πραότης δε' εστίν άρ€τη τοΰ θυμο€ώοΰς καθ^ 2
ην προς οργάς γίνονται δυσκίνητοι. άνδ/3εια δε 3
488
ON VIRTUES AND VICES
1 I. Fine things are the objects of praise, base things Moral
of blame ; and at the head of the fine stand the ^*'*^^•
2 virtues, at the head of the base the vices ; con-
sequently the virtues are objects of praise, and also
the causes of the virtues are objects of praise, and the
things that accompany the virtues and that result
from them, and their M^orks, while the opposite are
the objects of blame.
3 If in accordance with Plato the spirit is taken as Psychology
having three parts, wisdom is goodness of the rational
part, gentleness and courage of the passionate, of the
appetitive sobriety of mind and self-control, and of
the spirit as a whole righteousness, liberality and
4 great-spiritedness ; while badness of the rational part
is folly, of the passionate ill-temper and cowardice, of
the appetitive profligacy and uncontrol, and of the
spirit as a whole unrighteousness, meanness and
smallmindedness.
1 II. Wisdom is goodness of the rational part that is applied to
productive of the things contributing to happiness.
2 Gentleness is goodness of the passionate part that
3 makes people difficult to move to anger. Courage is
^ ώστΐ . . . aperai And. : om. codd.
* και τα ipya αύτων om. F*^.
489
ARISTOTLE
1250 a
ianv aperrj τοΰ θνμοΐώοΰς καθ' rjv 8νσ€κπληκτοί
ασιν νπο φόβων των περί θάνατον, σωφροσύνη 4
8e εστίν αρεττ] τοΰ επιθυμητικοΰ καθ ην άνόρβκτοί
γίνονται των ττ€ρι τας άπολαύσβις φαύλων ηΒονών.
10 €γκράτ€ία δε εστίν άρ€τη τον €πιθυμητικοΰ καθ' 5
ην κατ4χουσι τω λογισμω την εττίθυμίαν όρμώσαν
CTTt φαύλας η8ονας. 8ίκαίοσύνη δε εστίν άρ€τη g
φυχης διανεμητική τοΰ κατ άζίαν. ελευθεριότης η
δε εστίν αρετή φυχης εύΒάπανος ει? τα καλά.
μεγαλοφυχία δε' εστίν άρετη φυχης καθ ην δυναν-
15 ται φερειν εύτυχίαν καΐ άτυ^^ιαν, τιμήν καΐ ατιμιαν.
III. 'Αφροσύνη δε' εστίν κακία τοΰ λογιστικοΰ 1
αίτια τοΰ ζην κακώς, οργιλότης δε εστί κακία 2
τοΰ θυμοειΒοΰς καθ ην ευκίνητοι γίνονται ττρος
όργην. δείλια δε' εστί κακία τοΰ θυμοειΒοΰς καθ' 3
•20 ην εκπλήττονται υπό φόβων, και μάλιστα των
ττερι θάνατον, ακολασία δε εστί κακία τοΰ επι- 4
θυμητικοΰ καθ' ην ορεκτικοί γίνονται των περί
τάς απολαύσεις φαύλων ήΒονών.^ άκρασία δε' εστί 5
κακία τοΰ επιθυμητικοΰ καθ ην αίροΰνται τας
φαύλας ήΒονάς κωλύοντος^ τοΰ λογισμοΰ .' αδικία 6
■2ό δε εστί κακία φνχης καθ' ην πλεονεκτικοί γίνονται
τοΰ* παρά την άζίαν. άνελευθερία δε εστίν κακία η
φυχης καθ' ην ορέγονται τοΰ πανταχόθεν κερ8ους.
μικροφνχία δε' εστί κακία φνχης καθ' ην αδύνατοι g
εισι φερειν εύτυχίαν και άτυχίαν και τι/Αΐ)ν και
άτιμιαν.
ao IV. Tt^s" δε φρονήσεώς εστί το βονλεύσασθαι, ι
το κρΐναι τά αγαθά και τά κακά και πάντα τα" εν
*• opeKTiKol . . . ήδονων : ν.Ι. αίροΰνταί. ras φαύλαί ijSovas.
* </*ή> KwXvovTos St.
490
ON VIRTUES AND VICES, ii. 3— iv. 1
goodness of the passionate part that makes them un-
4 dismayed by fear of death. Sobriety of mind is good-
ness of the appetitive part that makes them not
desirous of the base pleasures of sensual enjoyment.
5 Self-control is goodness of the appetitive part that
enables men by means of reason to restrain their
6 appetite when it is set on base pleasures. Righteous-
ness is goodness of the spirit shown in distributing
7 what is according to desert. Liberality is goodness of
spirit shown in spending rightly on fine obj ects. Great-
spiritedness is goodness of spirit that enables men to
bear good fortune and bad, honour and dishonour.
1 III. On the other hand folly is badness of the and to the
2 rational part that causes bad living. Ill-temper is '*'^^"
badness of the passionate part that makes men easy
3 to provoke to anger. Cowardice is badness of the
passionate part that causes men to be dismayed by
4 fear, and especially by fear of death. Profligacy is
badness of the appetitive part that makes men de-
sirous of the base pleasures of sensual enjoyment.
5 Uncontrol is badness of the appetitive part that
makes men choose base pleasures when reason tries
6 to hinder. Unrighteousness is badness of spirit that
makes men covetous of what is contrary to their
7 desert. Meanness is badness of spirit that makes
8 men try to get profit from all sources. Smallminded-
ness is badness of spirit that makes men unable to
bear good fortune and bad, honour and dishonour.
1 IV. It belongs to wisdom to take counsel, to judge virtuous
the goods and evils and all the things in life that are fg'e^ij""^*"'^
classified.
^ αίρουνταί . ■. . \ο-^ίσμ.οΰ : v.l, παρασύρουσι rrj oKoyiq. την
έτηθυμίαν ώθοΰσαν έπΙ ras των φαύλων ήδονων άττοΧαύσεΐί.
« τοΰ add. Rac. (cf. 1. 13).
^ τά add. Rac.
491
ARISTOTLE
1250 a
τω βίω αιρετά /cat φβυκτά, το χρησασθαι καλώς
ττασιν τοις ύπάρχουσιν άγαθοΐς, το όμίλησαι ορθώς,
το συνώβΐν τους καιρούς, το άγχίνως χρήσασθαι
3•'' καΐ λόγω και €ργω, το την €μττ€ΐρίαν €χ€ίν τών
χρησίμων 'πάντων. μνήμη δε καΐ €μπ€ίρία καΐ 2
αγχινοια ήτοι απο της φρονησ^ως εκάστη αύτώΐ'
εστίν η 7ταρ€7Τ€ται τη φρονήσει• η τα μεν αυτών
οίον συναίτια της φρονησεώς εστί, καθάπερ η εμ-
πειρία και η μνήμη, τά 8ε οίον μερη^ οίον ευβουλία
και άγχίνοια.
40 ΐΐραότητος 8ε εστί το 8ύνασθαι φερειν μετρίως 3
εγκλήματα και ολιγωρίας, καΐ το μη ταχέως
ορμαν εττι τας τιμωρίας, και το μη εύκίνητον eti^at
προς τας οργάς, άπικρον 8έ τω ηθει και άφιλό-
νεικον, έχοντα το ηρεμαΐον εν τη φνχη και
στασιμον .
^Αν8ρείας 8ε εστί το 8υσεκπληκτον είναι ύπο 4
4Γ, φόβων τών περί θάνατον και ευθαρσή^ εν τοις
1250 b 8εινοΐς και εϋτολμον προς τους κιν8ύνους, και το
μάλλον αίρεΐσθαι τεθνάναι καλώς η αίσχρώς
σω^τ^ι^αι, και το νίκης αίτιον etvat. ετι 8ε άν8ρείας
εστί και το πονεΐν και καρτερεΐν και άν8ραγαθι-
Γ. ζεσ^αι.^ παρεπεται 8ε τη άν8ρεία η τε εύτολμια
και η εύφυχία και το θάρσος,^ ετι 8ε η τε φιλο-
πονία και η καρτερία.
Έωφροσύνης 8ε εστί το μη θαυμάζειν τα? απο- 5
λαυσει? τών σωματικών η8ονών,^ και το eti'at
πάσης απολαυστικής [αίσχράςΥ η8ονης άνόρεκτον,
10 και το φοβέΐσθαι την άταξίαν,^ και το τετάχθαι
περί τον βίον ομοίως εν τε μικροΐς και μεγάλοις.
παρεπεται 8ε τη σωφροσύνη ευταξία, κοσμιότης,
αιδώ?, ευλάβεια.
492
ON VIRTUES AND VICES, iv. 1-5
desirable and to be avoided, to use all the available
goods finely, to behave rightly in society, to observe
due occasions, to employ both speech and action with
sagacity, to have expert knowledge of all things that
are useful. Memory and experience and acuteness
are each of them either a consequence or a con-
comitant of wisdom ; or some of them are as it were
subsidiary causes of wisdom, as for instance experience
and memory, others as it were parts of it, for example
good counsel and acuteness.
To gentleness belongs ability to bear reproaches
and slights with moderation, and not to embark on
revenge quickly, and not to be easily provoked to
anger, but free from bitterness and contentiousness,
having tranquillity and stability in the spirit.
To courage it belongs to be undismayed by fears
of death and confident in alarms and brave in face of
dangers, and to prefer a fine death to base security,
and to be a cause of victory. It also belongs to
courage to labour and endure and play a manly part.
Courage is accompanied by confidence and bravery
and daring, and also by perseverance and endurance.
To sobriety of mind it belongs not to value highly
bodily pleasures and enjoyments, not to be covetous
of every enjoyable pleasure, to fear disorder, and to
live an orderly life in small things and great alike.
Sobriety of mind is accompanied by orderliness,
regularity, modesty, caution.
^ μέρη Sus. : μέρη ttjs φρονήσΐίύί aut φρονήσεων aut αύτη%.
* ευθαρσή v.l. : τό ευθαρσή elvai.
^ άνδρα'γαθίξ'εσθαί St. : αΙρεΊσθαι καΐ δύνασθαι (viz. lipography
+ gloss). * TO θάρσοί καΐ τό θράσος codd. plur.
° ηδονών : έττιθυμιών St.
* [αίσχραί] Rac. : v.l. και αισχρά^.
' St. : την (/cat την F") δικαίαν άδοξίαν (aiit &δειαν).
493
ARISTOTLE
1250 b
V. Έιγκρατξίας δε εστί το 8waa^ai κατασχ€Ϊν 1
τω λογισμώ την επιθυμ,ίαν ορμώσαν €ττΙ φαυλας
άπολανσ€ΐς και ηΒονάς,^ καΐ' καρτ€ρ€Ϊν, και το
15 ύττομενετικον elvai της κατά φύσιν ivSeias re*
και λυττης.
δικαιοσύνης 84 εστί το 8ιαν€μητικ6ν eti^at τοΰ 2
κατ' άζίαν, και το σωζ^ιν τά πάτρια €θη και τα
νό/χι/χα και* τους γεγ ραμμένους νόμους, και το
αληθεύζΐν iv τω Βιαφέροντι, και το 8ιαφυλάττ€ΐν
20 τα? ομολογίας, έ'στι 8e πρώτα των δίκαιων* τά
προς τους θ€ούς, είτα τά ττρο? δαίμονας, €ΐτα τά
7Γ/3θ5• πατρίδα και yoveis•, βιτα τά ττρο? του? κατ-
οιχομ€νους• iv οΐς εστί και τ^ ^ύσίβ^ια, ήτοι
μέρος ούσα της δικαιοσύνης η παρακολουθούσα,
ακολουθεί δε τη δικαιοσύνη και η οσιότης και 3
η άλτ^^εια και η πίστις και η μισοπονηρία.
^^ Έιλευθεριότητος δβ «στι το προετικόν elvai 4
χρημάτων €ΐς τά επαινετά και Βαφιλη^ επι τω εις
τά δέοντα' άναλω^τ^ναι, και το βοηθητικον είναι
εν τω 8ιαφόρω, και το μη λαβείν όθεν μη δει.
εστί δε 6 ελευθέριος και περί εσθητα καθάριος
και περί οϊκησιν^ και κατασκευαστικός των περιτ-
30 των και καλών και δια'}/α>7ΐ7^ εχόντων η^εΐαν άνευ
τοΰ λυσιτελοΰντος , και θρεπτικός των ζωών των
ίδιον εχόντων τι η θαυμαστόν. ακολουθεί δε τη 5
ελευθεριότητι η τοΰ ήθους ύγρότης και εuαyα>'ytα
και φιλανθρωπία και το είναι ελεητικόν και φιλο-
φιλον και φιλόζενον και φιλόκαλον .
^ υ* : άτΓολοι^σευ ηδονών.
* L" : καΐ τό. 8 re add. St., And.
* «at Rac. : τό (aut καΐ τό) σφζίΐν.
' V.]. ίστι δέ πρώτη τών δικαιοσυνών.
494
ON VIRTUES AND VICES, v. 1-5
V. To self-control belongs ability to restrain desire
by reason when it is set on base enjoyments and
pleasures, and to be resolute, and readiness to endure
natural want and pain.
To righteousness it belongs to be ready to dis-
tribute according to desert, and to preserve ancestral
customs and institutions and the established laws,
and to tell the truth when interest is at stake, and
to keep agreements. First among the claims of
righteousness are our duties to the gods, then our
duties to the spirits," then those to country and parents,
then those to the departed ; and among these claims
is piety, which is either a part of righteousness or a
concomitant of it. Righteousness is also accompanied
by holiness and truth and loyalty and hatred of
wickedness.
To liberality it belongs to be profuse of money on
praiseworthy objects and lavish in spending on what
is necessary, and to be helpful in a matter of dis-
pute, and not to take from wrong sources. The liberal
man is cleanly in his dress and dwelling, and fond of
providing himself with things that are above the
ordinary and fine and that afford entertainment
without being profitable ; and he is fond of keeping
animals that have something special or remarkable
ί about them. Liberality is accompanied by elasticity
and ductihty of character, and kindness, and a com-
passionate and affectionate and hospitable and
honourable nature.
" Deities of a minor order, in some cases the souls of dead
men of the heroic age ; often the object of only local worship.
β δαι/Ίλή Sylburg : έπιδαψιλΐία F^, δαψιλΐΐ L•^, ^πίδα.\{/ίλ€ν€ΐν
Gaisford.
' τά δάορτα v.l. : δέορτι L»>, δάον F^, δ^ον τι edd.
* και irepi οικησιν om. V.l.
^95
ARISTOTLE
1250 b
36 Μβγαλοφυχίας 8e iart, το καλώς eveyKelv /cat β
€ύτνχίαν καΐ άτνχίαν, /cat τψην /cat άημίαν, /cat
το μη θανμάζίίν μήτ€ τρνφην μήτ€ θεραττ^ίαν μητ€
i^ovaiav μήτ€ τάς νίκας τας εναγώνιους, €χ€ΐν
δε TC βάθος της φνχης /cat μίγ^θος. eart δε^
μεγαλόψυχος οϋθ^ ό* το ζην ττερί πολλοΰ ττοιού-
40 μ€νος οϋθ^ ό" φιλόζωος. απλούς δε τω ηθει
και γενναίος ά8ικεΐσθαι δυνάμενος /cat ου τιμωρη-
τικος. ακολουθεί 8e τη μεγαλοφυχία άττλότης και 7
aAT^^eta.
VI. Αφροσύνης he εστί το κρΐναι κακώς τα 1
πράγματα, το βουλενσασθαι κακώς, το ομιλησαι
45 κακώς, το χρησασθαι κακώς τοις τταροΰσιν άγαθοΐς,
1251 a το φευΒώς Βοζάζειν περί τών εις τον βίον καλών
και aya^oiv. παρακολουθεί δε τη αφροσύνη 2
απειρία, a/xa^ta, άκρασία, επαριστερότης, άμνη-
μοσύνη .
^Οργιλότητος δε' εστίν εΐ8η τρία, άκροχολία 3
πικρία βαρυθυμία. εστί δε του όργίλου το μη
5 δυι^ασ^αι φερειν μητε^ τάς μικράς ολιγωρίας μήτε
τάς ελαττώσεις,* εt^'αt δε /coAaaTi/cot' και τιμωρη-
τικόν και εύκίνητον προς όργην και υπό έργου και
νπο λόγου του τυχόντος. ακολουθεί δε τη 6ρ- i
γιλότητι το παροζυντικον τοΰ ήθους και το*
εύμετάβολον και ή πικρολογία^ και το επι μικροΐς
10 λυπεΐσθαι και ταύτα πάσχειν ταχέως και παρά
βραχύν καιρόν.
Δεtλtαs• δε' εστt το υπό τών τυχόντων φόβων 5
εύκίνητον είναι, και μάλιστα τών περί θάνατον
και τάς σωματικάς πηρώσεις, και το ύπολαμβάνειν
κρεΐττον εtvαt όπωσοΰν aw^T^j^at η τελευτήσαι
καλώς, ακολουθεί δε τη δεtλtα μαλακία, avavSpia, 6
496
ON VIRTUES AND VICES, v. 6— vi. 6
6 To greatness of spirit it belongs to bear finely both
good fortune and bad, honour and disgrace, and not
to think highly of luxury or attention or power or
victories in contests, and to possess a certain depth
and magnitude of spirit. He who values life highly
and who is fond of life is not great-spirited. The
great-spirited man is simple and noble in character,
7 able to bear injustice and not revengeful. Greatness
of spirit is accompanied by simplicity and sincerity.
1 VI. To folly belongs bad judgement of affairs, bad Vicious
counsel, bad fellowship, bad use of one's resources, feeihig^s* '
false opinions about what is fine and good in life, classified.
2 Folly is accompanied by unskilfulness, ignorance, un-
control, aAvkwardness, forgetfulness.
3 Of ill-temper there are three kinds, irascibility,
bitterness, sullenness. It belongs to the ill-tempered
man to be unable to bear either small slights or
defeats but to be given to retaliation and revenge,
and easily moved to anger by any chance deed or
4 word. Ill-temper is accompanied by excitability
of character, instability, bitter speech, and liability to
take offence at trifles and to feel these feelings quickly
and on slight occasions.
5 To cowardice it belongs to be easily excited by
chance alarms, and especially by fear of death or of
bodily injuries, and to think it better to save oneself
6 by any means than to meet a fine end. CoAvardice is
accompanied by softness, unmanliness, faint-hearted-
1 oe ό Ι>.
* οΰθ' 6 (bis) Bekker : οι)δ' ό L", ouoe F=.
* μηδέ Bussemaker.
* [μήτε raj έ\αττώσει$] idem : ras <Μ€7άλα5> έλαττώσεΐί Sus.
* και τό And. : καΐ.
* St. : μικρό\ο•γία καΐ η μεταμέλεια codd.
2 κ 4.97
ARISTOTLE
1251 a ^ ^
10 αττονοια, φι,λοφυχία• υττεστι δβ ης καΙ €νλάβ€ΐα
καΐ το άφιλόνεικον του ήθους}
Ακολασίας δε εστί το αΙρ€Ϊσθαί τάς άττολαυσει? 7
των ηΒονών τών βλαβζρών καΐ αισχρών και'
ύπολαμβανΐΐ,ν €ύ8αιμον€Ϊν μάλιστα τους iv ταΐς
τοιαΰταις ηΒοναΐς ζώντας, και το φιλογίλοιον etv-at
-Ό και φιλοσκώτττην και φιλ^υτράττ^λον και το ραΒιουρ-
γον eti^at iv τοις λόγοις και iv τοις βργοις. άκο- 8
λουθ^ΐ he Tfj ακολασία άταζία, άΐ'αιδεια, άκοσμία,
τρυφη, ραθυμία, a/xe'Aeia, ολιγωρία, €κλυσις.
Ακρασίας δε ε'στι το κωλύοντας τοΰ λογισμού ^
τας αττολαύσζΐς τών ηΒονών αΙρ€Ϊσθαι, και το ύπο-
'■i'' λαμβάνοντα κρ€Ϊττον ειι^αι μη μ€τασχ€Ϊν αυτών
μ€Τ€χ€ΐν^ μη^ΐν ήττον, και το οΪ€σθαι μ€ν Seiv
πραττ€ΐν και τα καλά και τα συμφέροντα άφ-
ιστασ^αι δε αυτών δια τάς ηΒονάς. άκολουθζΐ δε Κ
TTJ ακρασία μαλακία και* ά^Με'λεια και τά ττλεΐστα
ταύτα ά και τη ακολασία.
30 VII. Αδικίας δε' iστιv €Ϊ8η τρία, άσε)8εια ττλεοι/- 1
ε^ια ΰβρις. άσε'/3εια μkv η π€ρι θ^ούς πλημ- 2
/ζε'λεια καΐ περί δαίμονας, η^ περί τους κατοιχο-
μ€νους και nepi γον€Ϊς και πατρίδα• ττλεονε^ια δε 3
η π€ρι τά συ/χ,^όλαια, παρά την άζίαν αίρουμ^νη
το διάφορον ύβρις δε καθ^ ην τάς ηδονάς αύτοΐς 4
35 7ταρασκ€υάζουσιν ίίς ονζώος άγοντες έτερους, όθεν
Έιύηνος ττερι αύτης λέγει
ήτις κερΒαίνουσ^ ούδεν όμως αδικεί.
εστί δε της αδικίας το τταραβαίνειν τά πάτρια 5
εθη^ και τά νό/χι/χα, το άπειθεΐν τοις νόμοις και
1251 b τοις άρχουσι, το φενδεσθαι, το επιορκεΐν, το παρα-
^ καΐ . . . ήίίουί οηι. ν.Ι. * /cai cet. : χαϊ τό Ι/^^χ
49S
ON VIRTUES AND VICES, vi. 6— vii. 5
ness, fondness of life ; and it also has an element of
cautiousness and submissiveness of character.
7 To profligacy belongs choosing harmful and base
pleasures and enjoyments, and thinking that the
happiest people are those who pass their lives in
pleasures of that kind, and being fond of laughter and
mockery and jokes and levity in words and deeds.
8 Profligacy is accompanied by disorder, shamelessness,
irregularity, luxury, slackness, carelessness, negli-
gence, remissness.
9 To uncontrol it belongs to choose the enjoyment of
pleasures when reason would restrain, and although
one believes that it would be better not to participate
in them, to participate in them all the same, and
while thinking one ought to do fine and expedient
things yet to abstain from them for the sake of one's
10 pleasures. The concomitants of uncontrol are soft-
ness and negligence and in general the same as those
of profligacy.
1 VII, Of unrighteousness there are three kinds,
2 impiety, greed, outrage. Transgression in regard to
gods and spirits, or even in regard to the departed
3 and to parents and country, is impiety. Transgres-
sion in regard to contracts, taking what is in dispute
4 contrary to one's desert, is greed. Outrage is the
unrighteousness that makes men procure pleasures
for themselves while leading others into disgrace ; in
consequence of which Evenus says about outrage :
She that wrongs others e'en when she gaineth nought.
5 And it belongs to unrighteousness to transgress
ancestral customs and regulations, to disobey the
laws and the rulers, to lie, to perjure, to transgress
* And. : μ,ΐτέχΐΐν δέ. * καΐ v.l. : om. L^^F*^.
* V.ll. κα.1 ή, καΐ. * ?θη om. L•^ F^.
2 Κ 2 499
ARISTOTLE
1251 b ^
^atVeiv τα? ομολογίας καΐ τάς πίστ€ΐς. άκολονθ€Ϊ 6
δβ ΤΎ] αδικία συκοφαντία, αλαζονεία, φιλανθρωπία
ττροσττοίητος, κακοήθεια, πανουργία.
Ανελενθερίας δε εστίν εΐ8η τρία, αΙσχροκερ8εια 7
5 φει8ωλία κιμβικία. αισχροκερ8εια μεν καθ^ ην 8
κερ8αίνειν ζητοΰσι πανταχόθεν και το κέρδος της
αίσγυνης περί πλείονος ποιούνται' φει8ωλία 8ε 9
καθ ην ά8άπανοι γίνονται των χρημάτων εις το
Βεον κιμβικία 8έ καθ* ην δατται^ώσι μεν, κατά 10
10 μικρόν δε και κακώς, και πλείω βλάπτονται τω
μη κατά καιρόν προεσθαι το 8ιάφορον. εστί δε 11
της άνελευθερίας το περί πλείστου ποιεΐσθαι χρή-
ματα και το μη8εν 6νει8ος τ^τ/εΓσ^αι των ποιούντων
κερ8ος, βίος θητικός και 8ουλοπρεπης και ρυπαρός,
φιλοτιμίας και ελευθερίας αλλότριος. ακολουθεί 12
15 δε τη ανελευθερία μικρολογία, βαρυθυμια [μικρό -
φυχία],^ ταπεινότης, άμετρία, αγένεια, juiaav-
θρωπία.
Μικροφυχίας δε' εστί το μήτε τιμήν μήτε άτιμίαν, 13
μήτε εύτυχίαν μήτε άτυ;(ΐαν' 8ύνασθαι φερειν, άλλα
τιμώμενον μεν χαυνοΰσθαι' μικρά δε εύτυχήσαντα
20 εζαίρεσθαι, άτιμίαν δε μη8ε την ελαχίστην ενεγκεΐν
8ύνασθαι άπότευγμα δε οτιοΰν άτυχιαν κρινειν
μεγάλην, ό8υρεσθάι δε επΙ πάσιν και 8υσφορεΐν.
ετι δε τοιούτο? εστίν 6 μικρόφυχος οίος πάντα τά
όλιγωρήματα καλεΐν ΰβριν και άτιμίαν, και τά δι'
άγνοιαν ή λήθην γινόμενα, ακολουθεί δε τη μικρό- 14
25 φυχία μικρολογία, μεμφιμοιρία, 8υσελπιστία, ταπει-
νότης.
VIII. Καρόλου δε της μεν αρετής εστί το ποιεΐν 1
σπουδαία^ την 8ιάθεσιν περί την φυχήν, ήρεμαίαις
και τεταγμεναις κινήσεσι χρωμενην και συμφωνοΰ-
500
ON VIRTUES AND VICES, vii. 6— viii. 1
6 covenants and pledges. Unrighteousness is accom-
panied by slander, imposture, pretence of kindness,
malignity, unscrupulousness.
7 Of meanness there are three kinds, love of base
8 gain, parsimony, niggardliness. Love of base gain
makes men seek profit from all sources and pay more
9 regard to the profit than to the disgrace ; parsimony
makes them unwilling to spend money on a necessary
10 object ; niggardliness causes them only to spend in
driblets and in a bad way, and to lose more than
they gain by not at the proper moment letting go
11 the difference. It belongs to meanness to set a
very high value on money and to think nothing
that brings profit a disgrace — a menial and servile
and squalid mode of life, alien to ambition and to
12 liberality. Meanness is accompanied by pettiness,
sulkiness, self-abasement, lack of proportion, ignoble-
ness, misanthropy.
13 It belongs to small-mindedness to be unable to
bear either honour or dishonour, either good fortune
or bad, but to be filled with conceit when honoured
and puffed up by trifling good fortune, and to be
unable to bear even the smallest dishonour and to
deem any chance failure a great misfortune, and to be
distressed and annoyed at everything. Moreover the
small-minded man is the sort of person to call all
slights an insult and dishonour, even those that are
14 due to ignorance or forgetfulness. Small-mindedness
is accompanied by pettiness, querulousness, pessim-
ism, self-abasement.
1 VIII. In general it belongs to goodness to make the Psychology
spirit's disposition virtuous, experiencing tranquil and «^ ^*^1"^^•
ordered emotions and in harmony throughout all its
■•■ Sylburg. ^ v.l. άναχαννοΰσθαι L^'F'^ cet.
501
ARISTOTLE
1251 b
σαν κατά πάντα τά μζρη' διό καΐ δο/cet τταρά-
30 ^€ΐγμα TToXiTeias άγαθτίς etvai φνχης σπουδαίας
Βιάθίσις. εστί 8e της αρετής καΐ το βύεργετείν 2
τους άζίους και, το φιλείν τους αγαθούς και το
μίσ€Ϊν τους φαύλους,^ καΐ το μήτί κολαστικόν
etvat μήτε τιμωρητίκόν , άλλα ϊλεων καΐ βύμενίκον
/cat συγγνωμονικόν . ακολουθεί δε ttj άρεττ] χρη- 3
στότης, επιείκεια, ευγνωμοσύνη, ελπις άγαθη^ ετι
35 δε και τά τοιαύτα οΐον φίλοικειον είναι και φιλό-
φιλον και φιλεταιρον και φιλόζενον και φιλάνθρω-
πον και φιλόκαλον ά Srj ττάντα των επαινουμενων
εστί.
Της δε κακίας εστί τά εναντία, και παρακολουθεί 4
τά ερ'αντια αύττ)• άτται^τα δε τά της κακίας και τά
παρακολουθοΰντα αυτί^ των φεγομενων εστίν».
^ και τό μίσεΐν τού% φαυΚον: om. ν.Ι.
* post ά-^αθη add. μνήμη ayaOTj ¥''-.
502
ON VIRTUES AND VICES, viii. 1-4
parts ; this is the cause of the opinion that the dis-
position of a good spirit is a pattern of a good constitu-
2 tion of the state. It also belongs to goodness to do
good to the deserving and love the good and hate the
wicked, and not to be eager to inflict punishment or
take vengeance, but gracious and kindly and for-
3 giving. Goodness is accompanied by honesty, reason-
ableness, kindness, hopefulness, and also by such
traits as love of home and of friends and comrades and
guests, and of one's fellow-men, and love of what is
noble- — all of which qualities are among those that
are praised.
4 To badness belong the opposite qualities, and it has
the opposite concomitants : all the qualities and con-
comitants of badness are among the things that are
blamed.
503
INDEX
Animals, v. 4
Caution, vi. 6
Courage, i. 2, ii. 3, iv. 4
Cowardice, i. 4, iii. 2, vi. 5
Custom, vii. 5
Daiinones, see Spirits
Death, fear of, ii. 3,'iii. 3, vi. 5
Dishonesty, vii. 3
Evenus, vii. 4
Folly, 1. 4, iii. 1, vi. 1
Friendliness, viii. 3
Gentleness, i. 3, ii. 2, iv. 3
Great-spiritedness, i. 3, ii. 8, v. 6
Harmony of character, viii. 1
Hospitality, v. 5
Ill-temper, i. 4, iii. 2, vi. 3
Injustice, see Unrighteousness
Justice, see Righteousness
Liberality, i. 3, ii. 7, v. 4
Lies, vii. 5
Luxury, vi. 8
Magnanimity, see Great-spirited-
ness
Meanness, i, 4, iii. 7, vii. 7 ff.
Misanthropy, vii. 12
Misfortune, vii. 13
Niggardliness, vii. 8
Outrage, vii. 1 ff.
Parsimony, vii. 7
Patriotism, v. 2, vii. 2
Perjury, vii. 5
Pettiness, vi. 4, vii. 14
Piety, V. 2
Plato, i. 3
Pleasure, vi. 7
Profligacy, iii. 4, vi. 7
Prudence, see Wisdom
Psychology, i. 3
Righteousness, i. 3, ii. 6, v. 1
Self-control, i. 3, v. 1
Small-mindedness, i. 4, iii. 8,
vii. 13
Sober-mindedness, i. 3, iv. 5
Spirits, V. 2, vii. 2
Sulkiness, vii. 12
Temperance, see Sober-mindedness
Truth, v. 21
Uncontrol, iii. 5, vi. 0
Unrighteousness, i. 4, iii. 6, v. 6,
vii. 1
Wisdom, i. 3, ii. 1, iv. 1 f.
505
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PAPYRI (SELECTIONS). A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar.
4 Vols. Vols. I. and II.
PARTHENIUS. Cf. DAPHNIS and CHLOE.
PAUSANIAS: DESCRIPTION OF GREECE. W. H. S.
Jones. 5 Vols, and Companion Vol. (Vol. I. 2nd
Imp.)
PHILO. F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H. Whitaker. 9 Vols.
Vols. I. -VI.
PHILOSTRATUS : THE LIFE OF APOLLONIUS OF
TYANA. F. C. Conybeare. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. Srd Imp.,
Vol. II. 2«d Imp.)
PHILOSTRATUS. IMAGINES ; CALLISTRATUS.
DESCRIPTIONS. A. Fairbanks.
PHILOSTRATUS and EUNAPIUS : LIVES OF THE
SOPHISTS. Wilmer Cave Wright.
PINDAR. Sir J. E. Sandys. {5th Imp. revised.)
PLATO : CHARMIDES, ALCIBIADES, HIPPARCHUS
THE LOVERS, THEAGES, MINOS and EPINOMIS;
W. R. M. Lamb.
PLATO: CRATYLUS, PARMENIDES, GREATER
HIPPIAS, LESSER HIPPIAS. H. N. Fowler. X
PLATO : EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAE-
DO, PHAEDRUS. H. N. Fowler. {Ith. Imp.) X
PLATO : LACHES, PROTAGORAS, MENO, EUTHY-
DEM US. W. R. M. Lamb.
PLATO : LAWS. Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols.
PLATO : LYSIS, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAS. W. R. M.
Lamb, {βηά Imp. revised.)
PLATO : REPUBLIC. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols. lA
PLATO: STATESMAN, PHILEBUS. H. N. Fowlei•
ION. W. R. M. Lamb.
PLATO : THEAETETUS and SOPHIST. H. N. Fowle*i
{2nd Imp.)
PLATO : TIMAEUS, CRITIAS, CLITOPHO, MENEXE-
NUS, EPISTULAE. Rev. R. G. Bury.
PLUTARCH: MORALIA. F. C. Babbitt. 14 Vols.
Vols. I.-III.
PLUTARCH: THE PARALLEL LIVES. B. Perrin.
11 Vols. (Vols. I., II., III. and VII. 2nd Imp.)
POLY BI US. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols.
PROCOPIUS: HISTORY OF THE WARS. H. B.
Dewing. 7 Vols. Vols. I.-VI. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)
β
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5UINTUS SMYRNAEUS. A. S. Way. Verse trans.
>T. BASIL : LETTERS. R. J. Deferrari. 4 Vols.
3T. JOHN DAMASCENE: BARLAAM AND lOA-
SAPH. Rev. G. R. Woodward and Harold Mattingly.
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Rev. R. G. Bury. In 3 Vols.
Vols. I. and II.
SOPHOCLES. F. Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 6th Imp., Vol.
II. ith Imp.) Verse trans.
STRABO : GEOGRAPHY. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols.
(Vols. I and VIII. 2nd Imp.)
THEOPHRASTUS : CHARACTERS. J. M. Edmonds ;
HERODES, etc. A. D. Knox.
THEOPHRASTUS: ENQUIRY INTO PLANTS. Sir
Arthur Hort, Bart. 2 Vols.
THUCYDIDES. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. Srd Imp.,
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Q V' ols i^Thd Iti'l'O I
vENOPHON : MEMORABILIA and OECONOMICUS.
E. C. Marchant.
:EN0PH0N : SCRIPTA MINORA, E. C. Marchant.
VOLUMES IN PREPARATION
GREEK AUTHORS
RISTOTLE: ON HISTORY, MOTION AND PRO-
GRESSION OF ANIMALS. E. S. Forster and
A Peck
•RISTOTLE: ORGANON. H. P. Cooke and
H. Tredennick.
ARISTOTLE: RHETONICA AD ALEXANDRUM.
H. Rackham.
DEMOSTHENES : MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTO-
CRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON. J. H.
Vince.
DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE ORATIONS. A. T.
Murray.
DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS : ROMAN ANTI-
QUITIES. Spelman's translation revised by E. Cary.
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ρί,ΝΥ^^'Νίϊυ^Αΐ HISTORY WHS Jones.
VMiRot Di UNGUA LATINA. R. G. Kent.
DESCnIPTIVB PEOSPEOTVS 0» APPLICATION
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